Last week's attack on the
Saudi Aramco facility at Abqaiq sent an
immediate shock into the world oil market,
pumping up prices by about $2.00 a barrel in a
day. Fortunately the preparations by Saudi
security forces and the bravery of the guards at
Abqaiq's gates, two of who lost their lives,
thwarted the attack, later attributed to Al
Qaeda. Today we are pleased to share a
quick look report prepared by Khalid R.
al-Rodhan, visiting scholar at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in
Washington. In "The Impact of the
Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security" he
provides a comprehensive discussion of the
security of Saudi energy resources and
facilities and the specifics of the February 24
attack at Abqaiq. SUSRIS wishes to thank
him for permission to share it here.
The
Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy
Security
Khalid
R. al-Rodhan
Background
It
is too early to know the full details of what
actually took place at the Abqaiq oil facility
in eastern Saudi Arabia, but early reports
indicate that an attempted
attack was foiled by Saudi security forces
on February 24, 2006. The news caused oil prices
to jump more than $2 a barrel.
The reaction of the oil
market-that is all too aware of geopolitical,
security, and economic risks-is expected. The
attack comes amidst continuing instability in
Iraq, the uncertainty regarding the Iranian
nuclear issue, and the ongoing violence and
supply disruption in Nigeria.
Saudi Arabia is the world's
largest oil producer and exporter. It holds 25%
of the world's proven oil reserves (261 billion
barrels), produces 12.5% of the world's oil
production (9.0-9.5 million barrels a day), and
exports 16% of world's total exports (7.5
million barrels a day). Furthermore, the Kingdom
has the largest surplus oil production capacity
(approximately 1.1-1.8 million barrels a day. )
The stability of the global
oil market depends not only on the Kingdom's
capacity to meet shortages in oil supply, but
also in its ability to reassure the market. In
the past, Saudi Arabia has played the role of
"swing producer" to meet shortages in
supply. Now, the attention is focused on the
Kingdom's ability to meet global oil demand and
protect its key oil facilities.
In the case of Abqaiq, even
if some of the facilities were destroyed, Saudi
Aramco has claimed that it has backup and
redundant facilities to produce at near
capacity. The same fears about Saudi energy
security arose after the May 2004 attack in
Yanbu. During that incident, the Saudi security
forces were also able to suppress the attack.
The terrorists were quickly killed and the
facilities in Yanbu were not in danger. That,
however, did not stop speculation about Saudi
energy security.
The Importance of Abqaiq
The
importance of Abqaiq is twofold: contains one of
the largest oil fields in the world and its
facilities are the main oil processing centers
for Arabian Extra Light and Arabian Light crude
oils, with a capacity of more than 7.0 million
barrels a day. The facilities include pumping
stations, gas-oil separator plants, and
pipelines. This makes Abqaiq pivotal to Saudi
and global energy production and export
capacity.
In terms of the field, it
contains 17 billion barrels of proven reserves.
The proven reserves in the Abqaiq field alone
are larger than the reserves of some major oil
exporting countries: Mexico's total oil reserves
are 14.8 billion barrels and Canada's
conventional oil reserves are only 16.8 billion
barrels. (This obviously does not include
Canada's reserves of tar sands, which are
estimated at about 175 billion barrels.)
Abqaiq produces 4% of Saudi
Arabia's total oil production. Currently, Abqaiq
has a production capacity of approximately 0.43
million barrels a day, and it is estimated to
reach 0.44 million barrels a day in 2010. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts
Abqaiq's production capacity to decrease to
approximately 0.36 million barrels by 2030. This
is largely to due to natural depletion; Abqaiq
has the largest depletion rate of all the Saudi
oil fields. In 2004, Aramco estimated that 73%
of Abqaiq's total reserves have been depleted,
which would leave the field with approximately 5
billion barrels of proven oil reserves.
Abqaiq's
importance is compounded by the fact that it
mostly produces Arab Extra Light crude, which
requires little refining compared to other
heavier crudes (for example the crude produced
from Munifa). Abqaiq is also the most important
processing facility in Saudi and the world. At
Abqaiq, crude is stabilized by controlling the
levels of dissolved gas, natural gas liquids (NGLs)
and hydrogen sulfide. Once this is done, the
crude can be transported. Nearly two thirds of
Saudi Arabia's crude oil is exported via Abqaiq,
nearly 5.0 million barrels a day.
Oil from Abqaiq goes to
export terminals in Ras Tanura (with a 6.0
million barrels a day export capacity), Ras al-Juaymah
(3.0 million barrels a day export capacity), and
many other terminals in the Gulf. In addition,
Abqaiq contains ten cylindrical towers within
which hydro-desulphurization occurs (the process
of making crude oil "sweeter"). Abqaiq
is also connected to the Shaybah oil field (with
estimated reserves of 15 billion barrels and
production of 0.5 million barrels a day) via a
395-mile pipeline, and to an export terminal in
Yanbu on the Red Sea via a natural gas liquid
pipeline with an estimated capacity of 0.3
million barrels a day.
Saudi Petroleum Security
Apparatus
The Kingdom has taken
precautions in securing pipelines, oil fields,
and other energy terminals. The Saudi security
budget for 2005 was $10 billion, including $1.5
billion on energy security (in 2004, the total
security budget was estimated to be $8 billion,
including $1.2 billion for energy security).
Surveillance from helicopters and F15 patrols
operate around the clock, as do heavily equipped
National Guard battalions on the perimeter. Oil
fields and processing plants, however, are large
area targets and redundant facilities ensure
that an attack on one would not cause a serious
disruption in the entire production system.
At any given time, there are
an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 troops protecting
the Kingdom's infrastructure. Each terminal and
platform has its own specialized security unit,
comprised of 5,000 Saudi Aramco security forces,
and an unknown number of specialized units of
the National Guard and Ministry of Interior. The
Coast Guard and components of the Navy protect
the installations from the sea.
Ministry of Interior security
units guarding Saudi energy infrastructure
include: representatives from the Special
Security Forces, Special Emergency Forces, the
General Security Service (domestic
intelligence), regular forces of the Public
Security Administration (police and fire
fighters), the Petroleum Installation Security
Force (PISF), and specialized brigades of the
Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Saudi Royal
Navy, and the Coast Guard.
Saudi
Aramco also has built advanced communication
centers to manage emergency and supply
disruptions in its pipelines and processing
hubs. For example, in November 2002, Aramco
inaugurated a new Abqaiq Area Emergency Control
Center (ECC). According to Aramco, the ECC
houses 14 workstations, which control radio and
telephone communication systems as well as link
this to the Shaybah field, export stations, and
pipeline control hubs.
[Photo: A
Saudi operator works at the
Shedgum Gas Plant, one of
the three giant gas processing
plants in the kingdom's
Master Gas System.
(Photo by S. M. Amin/Aramco/PADIA)]
Asymmetric Threat to
Energy Security
Terrorists present a new kind
of threat in terms of their willingness to
suddenly change strategies and tactics to attack
energy facilities. This threat not only presents
a threat to the physical security of key oil
facilities, but it also adds to the
"security premium" in the global oil
market.
Until recently, extremist
groups had generally avoided energy targets, or
had not made them critical priorities. This
changed dramatically when the insurgency became
serious in Iraq; since then, key al-Qaeda
leaders such as Bin Laden have threatened
attacks on oil facilities. In a tape that was
posted on an extremist website, Bin Laden
asserted that, "Targeting America in Iraq
in terms of economy and loss of life is a golden
and unique opportunity.. ..Be active and prevent
them from reaching the oil, and mount your
operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and
the Gulf." Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
also urged similar attacks. On December 7, 2005,
a statement attributed to Al-Zawahiri called on
the "mujahideen to concentrate their
attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, from which most
of the revenues go to the enemies of Islam while
most of what they leave is seized by the thieves
who rule our countries."
Abu Muzab Al-Zarqawi, the
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, made similar
statements urging attacks against energy
facilities in the Gulf and Iraq. Insurgents in
Iraq have made oil facilities one of their
targets. The Institute for the Analysis of
Global Security estimates that there have been
299 attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure and
personnel between June 2003 and February 12,
2006. These attacks continue to constitute a
threat and some of them have caused a complete
shutdown of oil exports from Iraq.
Rebel groups in Nigeria have
also attacked energy installations and disrupted
oil exports. Four days before the attack on
Abqaiq, the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for
attacking an oil facility and a naval vessel,
and for kidnapping oil workers. This caused
Shell to shut its operations and production of a
fifth of Nigerian oil output, approximately 0.45
million barrels a day. Interestingly, rebel
leaders used rhetoric similar to that of
al-Qaeda. MEND claimed that they were fighting a
"total war" to control the oil wealth
of the Niger Delta.
Attempts against Saudi oil
facilities continue to worry the global energy
market and the Saudi leadership. Following a
siege and a raid against extremists in Dammam,
Saudi security forces discovered more than 60
hand grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine
guns, RPGs, two barrels full of explosives, and
video equipment. The Saudi Minister of Interior,
Prince Nayef al-Saud, was quoted as saying that
the al-Qaeda cell had planned to attack Saudi
oil and gas infrastructure, but Prince Nayef
added, "There isn't a place that they could
reach that they didn't think about," and
insisted that al-Qaeda's ultimate goal has been
to cripple the global economy.
Shortly after the attacks
against Abqaiq, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.
In a statement posted on its website, al-Qaeda
in the Arab Peninsula said that the attack was
"part of a series of operations that
al-Qaeda is carrying out against the crusaders
and the Jews to stop their plundering of Muslim
wealth." Al-Qaeda dubbed the attack
"Operation Bin Laden Conquest," and
claimed that the attackers managed to storm the
compound. U.S. and Saudi officials,
however, confirmed that the attackers were
stopped from entering the compound and praised
the Saudi security forces for foiling the
attack. The U.S. ambassador in Riyadh James C.
Oberwetter said in a statement that, "The
Saudi government and Saudi Aramco deserve
considerable credit for what they have done in
recent years to enhance the security of oil
facilities throughout the kingdom.. ..I know
firsthand the robust security systems that are
in place there. When they were needed, those
systems worked, and the facility at Abqaiq was
fully protected."
Assessing the Saudi
Security Forces Performance at Abqaiq
While early reports are often
unreliable, the Saudi counterterrorism and
petroleum security forces seem to have largely
contained the attack against the facilities at
Abqaiq and minimized the damage. Tactically, the
operation and the Saudi response had a number of
characteristics and lessons:
-
Two suicide bombers tried
to drive two cars packed with explosives
into the Abqaiq compound on Friday February
24, 2006 at 3:10 pm Saudi time. The time is
significant given that most of al-Qaeda
attacks in the Kingdom have happened during
the night to keep an element of surprise,
prevent detection, and delay the response by
Saudi forces.
-
The tactic of using
vehicle-borne suicide bombers is also
significant. It has certainly been used by
al-Qaeda in the past to attack targets in
the Kingdom. For example, the attack against
three compounds on May 12, 2003 demonstrated
similar tactics. The attackers used four
cars that were packed with explosives and
had heavy assault rifles. After spraying
gunfire and killing the guards at the gates,
they drove an explosive rigged car inside
the compound where it was detonated.
-
In the case of Abqaiq,
the facility was far more protected than the
residential compounds in Riyadh were. Abqaiq
reportedly had at least three layers of
security. The goal of such frontal assaults
is to weaken the first layer of defenses,
penetrate it, and get closer to the center
of the area. The Saudi security forces
engaged the two approaching cars when they
approached the first gate. The first car,
reportedly, slammed into the gates,
exploding, and injuring the guards, who
eventually died in the hospital.
-
The second car used the
hole in the fence to enter the compound. It
was then engaged by Saudi forces at the
second tier of the security perimeter,
approximately 1.0 mile away from the closest
facility. This was probably done through
firing directly at the cars with large
caliber machine guns mounted on the armored
personal carriers of the Saudi Arabian
National Guard (SANG) unit at the gate or by
an elite counterterrorism squad from the
Special Emergency Forces. The explosives in
the cars detonated and caused damage to
facilities near the gate, but the damage was
largely outside and impacted only pumping
and processing stations at an adjacent the
pipeline. This may have been prevented by
strengthening the first layer of the
security perimeter to prevent the breach,
but Abqaiq covers approximately 1.0 square
mile. This would have meant that the second
layer of security was very close to the
first and that even the first perimeter was
breached, the damage to the facility would
be limited given the distance from the
center of Abqaiq.
-
Press reports have
claimed that the attackers wore Saudi Aramco
uniforms and used cars painted in the
company's colors. This does not, however,
imply that the cars were actually those of
Aramco. Al-Qaeda previously used cars in
attacks similar in appearance to those used
by Saudi internal security forces.
Subsequent investigations have shown that
the cars were painted by the terrorists in
order to breach security checkpoints.
-
The terrorists were
killed before they could get out of the cars
and cause further damage. It is unclear if
the Saudi security forces directly killed
the assailants or the explosions of the cars
actually killed them. Regardless, the
important fact is that the attackers were
stopped from using automatic weapons,
grenades, or suicide belts to kill workers
or attack facilities inside the compounds.
While such assaults may have little lasting
damage to the facilities it could have
caused far more to the "security
premium" in the global oil market than
a $2 per barrel jump in the oil price, if
the attackers were successful at breaching
the security at Abqaiq.
-
The attempted attack most
likely happened after surveillance by the
attackers. One of the hallmarks of al-Qaeda
is its surveillance capabilities. In
addition, early reporting from the Kingdom
indicated that the Saudi security forces
were expecting an attack in the Eastern
province, which may have come from Saudi
counterintelligence monitoring of al-Qaeda.
Preparation, enhanced by warning, also
explains the success of Saudi forces in
foiling the attack.
-
As noted earlier, most
large attacks by al-Qaeda took place during
the night. The fact that the attack against
Abqaiq happened on a Friday afternoon (the
Muslim day of prayer) may signal that
al-Qaeda was changing tactics, but it also
shows that the Saudi security forces were on
alert, adapted to this shift, and responded
accordingly.
-
Saudi Arabia issued two
most-wanted lists. In December 2003, it
published a list of 26 wanted terrorists, of
which the Kingdom killed or captured all but
one. The second list was issued in June 2005
of 15 wanted terrorists. The al-Qaeda
statement following the attempted attack
against Abqaiq identified the attackers as
Mohammed Saleh al-Ghaith and Abdullah
Abdulaziz al-Tweijri. This was subsequently
confirmed by DNA tests by the Saudi
authorities. This shows that the Saudi
authorities have been successful at both
identifying the most dangerous elements of
al-Qaeda, and at tracking them, but it also
shows that these two could have been far
more dangerous if they were successful at
storming the compound. In addition, while
the success rate of capturing of killing
those who are on the most wanted lists is
impressive, the death of the two attackers
at Abqaiq leaves six terrorists from both
most-wanted-lists at large.
-
According to the Saudi
Ministry of Interior (MoI), the cars carried
two tons of ammonium nitrate (one ton in
each car) as well as unspecified quantities
of high explosives including RDX, PITN, and
Nitro Glycerin. These are large quantities
of explosives were most likely smuggled into
the Kingdom either through the Saudi-Yemeni
(906 miles) or the Saudi-Iraqi (506 miles)
border. This highlights the importance of
border security. Saudi Arabia has spent
billion of dollars on securing its border
with Iraq and Yemen with thermal imaging,
border guards, 20-foot tall berms, and
barbed wires. These precautions, however,
cannot stop every infiltrator. Cooperation
between Saudi Arabia with the Iraqi and
Yemeni authorities, however, can limit
penetration of terrorists, explosives, and
weapons.
-
If the attackers were not
stopped and managed to storm the gate, they
could have reached major facilities and the
damage may have been more severe. The extent
of the damage is not yet fully known. The
MoI claimed that the damage was
"limited to a small fire which was
brought under control." Other reports
have claimed that the explosion set fire to
a segment of the pipeline, but that it was
easily restored and returned to operation
shortly thereafter.
-
Another equally important
lesson is that while oil fields are large
areas, they are hard targets and the damage
from a car or a suicide bomb is limited to
the vicinity of the attack, particularly
given that there is much redundant
infrastructure. While fires can be set in
many areas of a working field, including at
oil wells, fires do not produce critical or
lasting damage. Unless wells are attacked
with explosives deep enough in the wellhead
to result in permanent damage to the well,
most facilities can be repaired rapidly.
It is important, however, to
distinguish between attacking the Abqaiq oil
field and the Abqaiq facilities. The attackers
did not reach the Abqaiq oil field, and were not
successful at attacking key processing
facilities. They were, however, successful at
adding more uncertainty and risk to an already
volatile global oil market.
The Significance of the
Attack
It is equally important to
note that the attack against Abqaiq should not
be seen as a turning point in either Saudi
stability or the global energy market. Rather,
it is evidence that al-Qaeda and other
extremists groups will stop at nothing to
disturb the global economy and international
peace. It also signals that al-Qaeda is changing
tactics to attack an area that will garner most
attention and inflict most damage on the Saudi
leadership, the U.S., and the international
community.
Some have claimed that the
attack on Abqaiq was an act of
"desperation" by al-Qaeda, while
others questioned the Saudi ability to protect
its energy infrastructure. It is, however, all
too clear that the Saudi counterterrorism
strategy, intelligence, and internal security
forces are getting progressively more effective.
The Saudi response to the attempted attack
against Abqaiq was a victory for the Saudi
counterterrorism forces. They were successful in
both limiting the damage and containing the
impact of the attack.
This,
however, is one battle in the war against
al-Qaeda. Since May 12, 2003, attacks in Saudi
Arabia by the terrorist organization have caused
the death of 144 Saudi nationals and foreign
residents and 120 militants. The attempted
attack on Abqaiq, however, is the first major
terrorist assault in the Kingdom since December
29, 2004-more than a year ago, which is seen by
many as evidence to the fact that Saudi
counterterrorism efforts have been steadily
improving. Others see the delay as al-Qaeda
waiting for more "spectacular"
targets. Like all security efforts, the Saudi
counterterrorism forces have made improvements
in many areas. But the enemy is adapting their
tactics and so must the Saudis adapt the
strategy against them.
While "al-Qaeda in the
Arab Peninsula" may well be on the
defensive, the asymmetric and terrorist threat
to the Kingdom and its energy facilities is
certainly not over. The al-Qaeda statement that
claimed responsibility for the attack against
Abqaiq also threatened more attacks against
other Saudi oil facilities. The Saudis are
taking these threats seriously, and, reportedly,
the Saudi forces have been put on a higher state
of alert in the Eastern Province. On Monday
February 27, 2006, Saudi security forces shot
five militants and arrested one in a shootout
with members of al-Qaeda who were suspected of
being involved in the Abqaiq attack.
Many analysts, however, are
concerned about what may come next. Some have
argued that given the failure of al-Qaeda to
destabilize Saudi Arabia, they may turn their
attention to "softer targets," not
necessarily in the Kingdom, but against oil
installations of neighboring Gulf States. While
a lot is known about the Saudi petroleum
infrastructure security apparatus, there is
little known how countries such as Kuwait,
Qatar, and the UAE actually protect their energy
facilities. It is equally unclear if the Gulf
countries' internal security and intelligence
capabilities can withstand the type of assaults
and intensity level that the Kingdom has
experienced since May 2003.
Conclusion
There are no "bullet
proof" security systems for energy
facilities. Perhaps the weakest link in the
Kingdom's energy infrastructure is its estimated
11,092 miles of pipeline. It is impossible to
protect all of this area, but as noted earlier,
short of a large attack that damages these
pipelines at multiple points, the resulting
damage can be repaired relatively quickly. In
addition, the building of redundant facilities
may not be economically viable in the short-run,
but given this asymmetric threat, it adds one
layer of indirect security to vital energy
structures.
Incidents like the attack on
Abqaiq will happen, and the global energy market
will react accordingly. The challenge for the
Kingdom and all energy producing nations is to
limit the physical damage to the facilities and
the psychological impact on the global energy
market. With the tightness of the current energy
market and world energy consumption estimated to
increase by more than 50% by 2025, the security
of Saudi energy exports will play an
increasingly more central role in the world's
economy.
The geostrategic and security
risks facing the global energy market are all
too clear. Stability in petroleum exporting
regions is tenuous at best. Algeria, Iran, and
Iraq all present immediate security problems,
but recent experience has shown that exporting
countries in Africa, the Caspian Sea, and South
America are no more stable than their
counterparts in Middle East. There has been
pipeline sabotage in Nigeria, political
posturing in Venezuela, alleged corruption in
Russia, and civil unrest in Uzbekistan and other
former Soviet Union countries.
Finally, energy security must
also be understood in a broader context. In the
near future, energy supply and transportation
routes may be challenged by transnational
terrorism and proliferation. It is equally
possible that recent surges in the demand for
oil, supply disruptions by hurricanes, the US
refining capacity bottleneck, and the limited
spare production capacity will continue to test
the energy market in the mid to long-term.
About the Author
Khalid R. Al-Rodhan is
a visiting fellow at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) in Washington DC. He and Dr. Anthony H.
Cordesman have written The Global Oil Market:
Risks and Uncertainties (CSIS, 2006); The
Changing Dynamics of Energy Security in the
Middle East (forthcoming Praeger, Summer 2006);
and The Gulf Military Forces in the Era of
Asymmetric Warfare (forthcoming Praeger, Fall
2006).
[Photos
and graphics added by SUSRIS.org]
