Imperial
Over-Reach?
How to Lose Friends and Alienate People
in the Arab East
Remarks by Dr. Michael Hudson
13th Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference
Washington, DC
September 13, 2004 |
|
 Hon. Frances D. Cook:
Next, I would like to introduce Dr. Michael Hudson,
who is Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab
Studies at Georgetown University.
I know Michael as the supreme expert on Lebanon in
this country, but he has many other attributes and
interests as you will see.
He is going to address us this morning on a very
provocative title, which is "Imperial Over-Reach?
How to Lose Friends and Alienate People in the Arab
East."
 Dr.
Michael C. Hudson:
Thank you, Frances, and thank you to the conference
organizers for inviting me to speak.
The title of this conference, "Restoring
U.S.-Arab Mutual Trust and Confidence," is a
matter, which we over at Georgetown's Center for Arab
Studies are also very deeply involved in.
In fact as this academic year begins, we will be
pursuing thematically, through various events, the
situation in Palestine and Iraq and the broader war on
terrorism, which if you're interested, you can access
through the center's Web site -- ccas.georgetown.edu.
Now that the plug is over, let me say that I cannot
fault either of the previous two speakers -- one a very
influential policy analyst [Dr.
Anthony Cordesman] and the other a high official of
the U.S. government [Amb. Philo Dibble].
It only deepens my enduring puzzlement that with
all the good advice that seems to be available at high
levels, why is it that we seem to get things so badly
wrong? Indeed,
they seem to be getting worse.
| Let
me stand back for just a moment and take a
somewhat historical or strategic overview that
one needs to do when you're using words like
empire and imperialism.
We've all been hearing a lot about empire
in the context of America's global domination in
the post-Cold War period.
The idea has been greeted positively, and
in some cases celebrated, by neoconservatives,
who are now in the ascendancy in American
politics. It
should be noted, however, that imperialism is a
very dirty word in Arabic and in Islamic
political discourse.
That phenomenon stimulated the
nationalist as well as the religious resistance
movements of the 20th-century against European
penetration.
It looks like it will be more of the same
in the 21st, only this time, America is the
enemy. |
..That
phenomenon
stimulated the
nationalist as well
as the religious
resistance movements
of the 20th-century
against European
penetration.
It looks
like it will be more of
the same in the 21st,
only this time, America
is the enemy..
|
Now, my purpose is not to
go over the evidence, which I think is quiet considerable
for America's global dominance today, particularly our
dominance of this region -- the Arab world and the larger
Islamic world. Arguably,
we have been functionally in an imperial mode in that part
of the world since the end of World War II,
notwithstanding, the considerable period during which the
Soviet Union tried to penetrate and challenge our overall
dominance of the region.
It was our sphere of influence, and it still is.
You can measure that I think quiet nicely simply by
looking at the extraordinary military presence we have in
almost every country of this region, not to mention our
very substantial economic and commercial and even cultural
influence. What
we have, what we are doing, what we are involved in,
whether we intended it or not, is not the classical
imperialism of Europe with its protectorates, its
mandates, its colonies and so forth, but, perhaps in its
better form, the soft power of liberal globalization with
a strong cultural component and a strong, of course,
American center of gravity.
Globalization is something that is kind of colored
American.
| But,
I would like to raise two questions about the
imperial phenomenon.
First, whether today's unrivaled
superpower -- that's us -- needs to exercise
domination to its fullest extent -- a la the
Athenians of the Peloponnesian Wars. You recall Thucydides'
famous aphorism -- "The strong do
everything that they can.
The weak suffer what they must" --
essence of real politick -- and rely on
preemptive use of military force, wars of
choice, not just necessity. Or, can
empires -- our empire -- act in a more benign
way a la soft power?
My answer in theory is yes, but
present-day American practice seems to say no. |
..an
empire that acts
stupidly may be prone
to imperial over-reach.
Imperial over-reach,
if unchecked, can prove
to be very painful for
the empire, not to
mention those weaker
parties subject to its
ill-advised policies..
|
The second question is
whether the American empire, with the way we use this
term, is exercising its great power intelligently or not?
My answer -- an empire that acts stupidly may be
prone to imperial over-reach.
Imperial over-reach, if unchecked, can prove to be
very painful for the empire, not to mention those weaker
parties subject to its ill-advised policies.
Now, today, to be sure as
we face this region, we are confronting an unusual
challenge, not like the old Soviet Union.
It's an unusual challenge of transnational networks
mounting a new and very serious challenge, not only to our
dominance of the region but even unto the integrity of our
homeland national security.
Our reaction to this has led I think to a kind of a
perfect storm of bad policymaking.
Over-reach is understandable but still perhaps not
so intelligent.
What is imperial
over-reach?
When you assume that your
adversaries can only be dealt with primarily through
military force because force is all they understand, you
think.
When we lack sufficient
military force and the will to use it with all attendant
costs over a fairly long period of time.
When you arrogantly decide
you can solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by ignoring
issues of justice and balance and instead align
essentially with a right-wing Israeli government, and
essentially as has been mentioned, ignoring, dehumanizing,
forgetting about the Palestinian side.
When you attempt regime
change in Iraq and then can't follow through.
When you give the Muslim
world the impression that you have declared war on Islam.
People don't get the nuances of the 9/11
Commission's Report -- Islamist terrorism.
But, you lack an understanding of what the enemy is
and you lack the ability to rescue Islam from its
hijackers as I have heard some neoconservatives'
publicists say.
When you announce your
plan to transform the Arab and Muslim world through the
implantation of freedom and democracy, in the American
style, and yet, you lack the ability to engineer such
reforms because of what I could call the "kiss of
death" effect -- if we're promoting these ideas, then
maybe there's really something seriously wrong with these
ideas, which is very frustrating to indigenous reformers
in the region.
When you decide that the
answer is economic reform.
When you decide that
economic reform and development of the Arab world will
solve the terrorism problem.
Well, that's a problematic hypothesis in itself --
about as we heard, it is widely held.
And yet, you lack the capabilities to achieve such
reforms in these countries within in any foreseeable
future. It's
a sort of crude economic determinism.
Do we really believe that if, let us say, we could
reduce the unemployment rate in Morocco, for example, from
whatever it might be, let's say 20 percent, to 10 percent,
would we then not have the 400 hundred known terrorists
that the Moroccan government itself says are out and about
in Morocco?
When we frighten and
intimidate our own Arab- and Muslim-American communities.
When we refuse to
countenance the idea in our public discourse that the deep
and growing hatred of the United States is not related to
specific American policies in the region.
When we allow our foreign
policy to be hijacked by a network of neoconservatives,
right wing, pro-Israeli zealots, and some misguided
Christian fundamentalists.
When ill-conceived
policies of preemptive warfare, clumsily executed,
significantly increase the national security dangers we
face because we've alienated the Islamic and especially
the Arab world, thus creating a nutritious environment in
which anti-U.S. terrorist cells can and undoubtedly do and
will multiply.
When our government
blunders clumsily, often with lethal force, into Middle
East situations, which about our leaders are not only
nearly totally ignorant but about which they entertain
politically colored orientalist stereotypes.
And, when right-wing
ideologues have the chutzpah to denigrate the American
Middle East studies academic community for failing to
alert the nation to the terrorist threats when it is these
ideologues themselves who have grievously damaged American
national security.
| Finally,
in conclusion, where do we stand now?
This is, I regret to say, as I mentioned
the sort of perfect storm of a confluence of
negative and unfortunate tendencies coming
together at this particular juncture to make
things qualitatively worse than they were.
I think Mr. Dibble actually made that
point. I
don't believe that we are winning any of the
numerous wars we've recently engaged in since
9/11, whether it's the war on terrorism itself,
whether it's Afghanistan, whether it's Iraq,
whether it is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
which make no mistake, we are engaged in
indirectly. |
..I
don't believe that we
are winning any of the
numerous wars we've
recently engaged in since
9/11, whether it's the
war on terrorism itself,
whether it's Afghanistan,
whether it's Iraq, whether
it is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict..
|
We are not doing so well
to cope with the problem of spreading domestic insecurity
in the region. We
look at Saudi Arabia now.
We look at the weakening of other traditionally
friendly, and I must say, authoritarian regimes. And,
when we look, of course as has been mentioned, at the
social and economic malaise that the several Arab Human
Development reports have catalogued.
Not only that, we are, I think, seriously losing
the war for hearts and minds.
If you look at the polling data, it's pretty clear
-- contempt and disrespect instead of shock and awe.
Clash of civilizations is beginning to turn
into a self-confirming prophecy on both sides.
Thus, I think the Greater Middle East and the MEPI
projects face uphill sledding.
| Now,
there are some influential officials -- I think
of Martin Indyk, who quite a long time ago, I
think this was 1991, argued, in my view
incorrectly, that we were always hated anyway in
this part of the world, so why bother to change
it? And,
what really counts is respect.
Indyk told a House committee, I quote,
"I think that anger in the Arab street is
real. It
is produced by a number of different factors,
but in the end, what matters is not whether they
hate us or love us -- for the most part, they
hate us; they did before -- but whether they are
going to respect our power." |
..What
you are seeing
increasingly, and this
goes back to the political
trend of the last century,
is a growing, reviving
national resistance to
yet another imperial,
foreign occupation.
|
Well, I believe it does
matter. Hearts
and minds do matter, and it matters especially when we are
confronting the kind of unusual transnational, militant,
ideological challenge that is not your conventional
adversary. That's
a big problem. There's
no denying it, and if anything, the conceptualization of
this problem underestimates its magnitude.
The 9/11 Commission Report, which is an admirable
document in my opinion in many ways, says the problem is
Islamist terrorism.
Well, yes, but that is not all.
What you are seeing increasingly, and this goes
back to the political trend of the last century, is a
growing, reviving national resistance to yet another
imperial, foreign occupation.
Thank you.
The
following is an excerpt from the question and answer
session, which followed the panel discussion.
Hon. Frances D. Cook:
I'm going to pose the final question to Dr. Hudson
because I think it is a one-word answer.
To Michael, given your concerns about the
clumsiness and inability to sustain an effort, would you
have advised that the U.S. should go into Afghanistan in
post-9/11?
Dr. Michael C. Hudson:
Yes, definitely.
I think this was a war of necessity.
I think it had a logic to it.
Al Qaeda had substantial bases there.
It's just unfortunate that I think we pulled our
punches and did not invest not just the military but also
many other kinds of resources to bring about genuine and
legitimate regime change.
We've got continuing big problems in Afghanistan,
but I have no doubt that in the aftermath of 9/11, knowing
what we knew, that that was the right thing to do.
Dr.
Michael C. Hudson is the Seif Ghobash Professor of
Arab Studies and Professor of International Relations, as
well as the current Director
of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at
Georgetown University. He previously served as
Director of the Center from 1999 to 2000 and from 1976 to
1989. Dr. Hudson is also a past president of the
Middle East Studies Association. His research
interests focus primarily on international relations,
authoritarian states and civil society, Lebanon, and
Palestine.
Dr.
Hudson, who holds a Ph.D. in political science from Yale
University, has edited and contributed to numerous books,
including Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and
Economics of Arab Integration (Columbia University
Press/CCAS, 1999), The Palestinians: New Directions
(CCAS, 1990), and Alternative Approaches to the
Arab-Israeli Conflict (CCAS, 1984). His other
works include The Precarious Republic: Political
Modernization in Lebanon (Random House, 1968), Arab
Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (Yale University
Press, 1977), and numerous articles appearing in the
Middle East Journal, Comparative Politics, and other
scholarly journals.
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