|
Strategic Realism
in the Middle East and US and Arab Relations
Anthony H. Cordesman
This is a difficult
time to talk about strategic developments in the Middle East. Almost
regardless of where we turn, we see as enduring problems and there
are at least as many real-world difficulties as opportunities. There
is no area where we cannot round up long lists of faults, mistakes,
and missed opportunities on the part of both the US and Arab world.
In addition to the “usual
suspects” like the Arab-Israel conflict, Iraq, and Iran, have the
increasingly tired mix of mutual recriminations over the “war on
terrorism.” We also must try to breathe new life into the
long-standing strategic problems in energy, reform, and the US and
Arab military posture in the Middle East.
In fact, this very
familiarity is a key part of the problems we face. Fighting over
past mistakes should have beens, and different views of history and
international law has resolved nothing and perpetuated much. The
Middle East has become a region where there is no more certain way
to repeat the past than to remember it.
I make no claim to
dramatic new solutions to any of the major strategic problems in the
Middle East, but I have spent more than 40 years learning what
fails. In this region, the “blame game” is not the cure, it is
the disease.
What I would like to
do today is to focus on the future, and on the "art of the
possible" as it affects four of the key strategic issues that
do most to divide us. Let me also make it clear that I know all too
well that saying what I am about to say will be unpopular with most
of the Arab members of this audience, with the Bush Administration
as well as its more vehement opponents, and with anyone who may have
simply wandered in by mistake.
This, however, is not
a time for popularity contests or political correctness. We face a
strategic environment in which none of the practical options are
good options in the sense that they can please all sides. If we are
to make real progress in any critical area, it can only come from
unpleasant compromises and acknowledging unpopular realities and
problems.
The Arab-Israeli
Conflict
Let me begin with the
most divisive strategic issue in the region, and that one that does
most to polarize the strategic situation: The Arab-Israeli conflict.
If we are to move
forward, I believe that the time has come to face the fact that no
amount of negotiation, and past or future UN resolutions, will ever
give us a peace based on the 1967 boundaries -- much less what might
have been in 1948. We are not going to have what might have been
achieved at Camp David or Tabah.
Short of another war,
any peace settlement is going to mean continued Israeli control over
most of the Greater Jerusalem, a long period of physical separation
of Israeli and Arab by security barriers and walls, and a two-state
solution in which “Palestine” will evolve slowly towards full
sovereignty and will indefinitely be dependent on outside aid.
This means facing the
painful reality that any real world solution lies in accepting
something very close to the status quo. Lost wars are not going to
be won at the conference table.
At the same time, the
issue of territory is far less important than much of the debate
over peace settlements generally recognizes. Shaping the future is
not a matter of past boundaries, territory, water, or an
agricultural past. It is how to create an urbanized Palestinian
state that can function with viable infrastructure and lines of
communication. It is how to finance and execute economic development
and the creation of jobs. It is how to give an exceptionally young
and largely urbanized population real opportunity, security, and
citizenship in a real state.
The future lies in
creating a different kind of Road Map: One that focuses on how to
give Palestinians a real economic future, and not how to continue to
argue over the past. It lies in going from a vague, exhortative
"consensus" to a meaningful international effort that
presses both sides to accept has real lines on the map with real
details of what a “final settlement” should mean.
For either side to
win, both sides must lose. In the case of Israel, any meaningful
strategic solution means rejecting the Israeli desire for delay. In
the case of the Palestinians, it means acknowledging that
Palestinian sovereignty cannot wait on the perfect or even a
desirable Palestinian government and security structure.
We do not need
unfocused arguments over what will not happen. We do need the
courage to put pressure on Israel to accomplish what can happen. The
issue is not 1967, it is 2005. It is rolling back enough of the
occupation to make a functioning Palestinian state possible, it is
removing marginal settlements and excessive security zones, and it
is trading economic viability, infrastructure, and new routes of
communication for territory that will not be given up. It is
providing balanced US aid to the Palestinians, US help in creating
effective Palestinian security forces, and pressure on Israel to
accept something far less than perfect security.
To be more specific, a
meaningful approach to peace requires a US-led effort that pressures
Israel to roll back far more marginal settlements than any Israel
politician now wants; and to find some political and religious
compromise on Jerusalem that many Israelis will strongly resist.
The world is not going
back to 1967, and the core realities of Greater Jerusalem will not
change. The issue is not 1967, UNSCR 242, or Green Lines. However,
the expansion of E1, Male Edomim (Adumim), and the more extended
parts of Givat Ze’ev and Pisqat Ze’ev around Jerusalem is a
different story. So is the effort to preserve Aerial, and the other
deep “outliers” that lead to impossibly large Israeli security
areas, “walls,” and levels of separation.
The Bush
Administration and the US Congress can only support an effective
peace initiative if they can develop the courage to make it clear to
Israel that the US cannot and will not support the open-ended
expansion of security zones around Jerusalem, and the preservation
of Israeli settlements, security roads, and long-term security
elements deep in the West Bank. Israel’s domestic politics, and
particular the politics of its more marginal “settlers,” do not
serve the cause of peace, American strategic interests, or even the
strategic interests of Israel. They are a pointless strategic
irritant and should be treated as such.
Israel, and its
supporters, need to develop a concept of strategy that looks beyond
today’s crises and the next election. Israel needs to accept the
fact that security is one thing, but that much of its current
presence on the West Bank does nothing more than provoke Palestinian
and Arab anger and make peace impossible. Separation may be
necessary, but it cannot work unless it is tied to a clear vision of
a Palestine that can actually function as a state, to Israeli
actions and incentives that support such a state, and to Israeli
efforts to reach out to all moderate Arab and Islamic regimes –
just as it has already done to Egypt and Jordan. There is no real
hope for a pragmatic and meaningful peace settlement as long as
Israel only looks towards security, and lacks grand strategic
vision.
Yet, a meaningful
approach to peace requires a matching Arab and European recognition
that the issue is not the boundaries of the past; it is the people
of the future. Most of today’s facts on the ground will be facts
for the future. Wasting generation after generation of Palestinians
has accomplished nothing and will accomplish nothing. It is
economics, demographics, and sovereignty.
The Arab world has
found it all too convenient to ignore the developing facts on the
ground and the cost of Arab rhetoric to both the Palestinians and to
Arab peoples. Far too many Arab regimes have used the Arab-Israeli
conflict as a lightning rod to excuse their own failures and a
pointless level of militarism. Talking about the 1967 Green Lines is
a valid negotiating position. Acting as if they could be real is
not. Moreover, most Arab nations need to understand that they longer
are the ones exploiting the issue. Islamist extremists are
capitalizing on the Arab lack of grand strategic vision, not Arab
regimes.
Palestinians need a
vision of their own, and one based on intelligent self-interest and
not empty historical rhetoric. It is far from clear that the
Palestinian Authority can survive its own mistakes, corruption, and
incompetence. It is possible that younger and more honest secular
Palestinians may supplement or replace the failed leaders of the
past. It is at least equally possible, that they may lose to
movements like Hamas and the PIJ. One thing is certain; they will
lose without realism and effective self-reform.
Finally, the
Palestinians themselves must come to grips with the issue of
creating a single, effective security force, rejecting violence, and
showing they can use aid effectively. The Palestinian Authority now
receives close to $1 billion in aid a year and another $1 billion in
revenue. Something like 75% of that money goes to salaries and
pensions – often for people who do not work or exist.
Regardless of how well
the Palestinian Authority uses its funds, however, demographics and
economics will enforce another strategic reality on the future of
Palestine. The Palestinian right of return will never take more than
token form in Israel. Equally important, every Palestinian who
returns to Gaza and the West Bank who is not a source of major
skills and capital will be a serious liability to a Palestine that
faces a decade long demographic nightmare.
According to the UN,
Gaza and the West Bank had a population of a little over one million
in 1950 (1,005,000). It was only about 1.2 million when the 1967 war
began. It is now some 3.7 million, and the UN estimates it will be
5.7 million by 2020 and 10.1 million by 2050.
The strategic future
of Palestinian refugees – if they are to have a real future –
lies either in full citizenship in the countries they now inhabit,
or in relocating them to areas that can absorb them far better than
Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, the time in which the Arab world,
or some Arab host states, could mistreat them or use them as
political pawns, to be manipulated with empty promises is long over.
The US, the Quartet,
Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians all need to recognize that
this kind of peace will not emerge simply with time and patience.
There will never be a point where final settlement negotiations are
politically easy, and where good will solves key problems. The Bush
Administration, the EU, and Arab League should not try to enforce a
piece plan, but they should formulate concrete, details, plans and
put pressure on the Palestinians, Israel, and each other.
Negotiations must be pushed forward painfully -- and sometimes
divisively -- or even good intentions will wait forever.
Finally, the Golan has
become a Syrian problem that the rest of the world has little reason
to care about. Syria may have a first rate people, but it is now a
third rate military power with a fifth rate government. Hafez Asad,
even more than Arafat, showed brilliant skill in turning strategic
opportunity into strategic failure. He first wasted the opportunity
offered by President Sadat, and then the opportunity by Prime
Minister Barak and President Clinton. He and his son have done far
more to cripple the welfare of the Syrian people through their
failures in governance and economic reform than the Arab-Israel
conflicts.
If the Syrian
government can change, fine! But until it does, the return of the
Golan is not high on that list of regional strategic priorities.
Lebanon is no longer occupied by Israel or Syria, and should not be
proxy for either state. The future of the Palestinians is infinitely
more important than the future of a handful of putative Syrian
Golani. In fact, it is hard to think of a major strategic issue in
the Arab world that does not have more human importance and impact.
The Future of Iraq
Having now alienated
every Arab and Arab-American in the audience, let me proceed to do
the same with every supporter of the Bush Administration and every
American opposed to the Iraq War that is calling for a sudden
American exit from Iraq.
At this point in time,
it does not matter who broke Iraq or why they broke it. Historians
can and should argue how much of the responsibility should go to the
Bush Administration, Saddam Hussein, past Iraqi military juntas, the
British, and the Ottoman Empire. Policymakers and real-world
politicians cannot afford this luxury. Issues like past US
intelligence failures are now moot, as is the past lack of realism
in the neoconservative view of Iraq and of what an American invasion
would accomplish. What counts is that the past must not be the
prelude to the future.
We are where we are,
and we have a moral and ethical obligation to do what we can to
achieve the best possible outcome for Iraq and for all of the Iraqi
people. And when I say “we,” I do not simply mean the US. The
Arab world largely tolerated Saddam, even after fighting his
invasion of Kuwait. His legacy, and Arab attitudes, at least partly
shaped today’s Shi’ite and Kurdish anger and pressures for
federalism and separatism.
More importantly, the
Arab world simply cannot afford the strategic cost of sitting back
saying “I told you so,” and Europe cannot afford to seize the
high moral ground and sit there in safety.
There do have to be
practical limits to the US involvement in Iraq, and much depends on
the wisdom, inclusiveness, and leadership quality of Iraqi politics.
Iraqis are now responsible for the most critical element of Iraq's
success. The US cannot rescue Iraq’s political process if it
degenerates into civil war. It has no excuse to stay if an elected
Iraqi government asks the US to leave.
Failure is always an
option in the real world, and US strategy cannot be based on
constant global success without becoming a fantasy. This should be a
warning to Iraqi politicians, Iraqis, the Arab world, and the
region. An Iraq that muddles through the next 5-10 years has always
the real-world option for success. An Iraq that is torn apart, in
turmoil, divided, or placed under another strong man is all too real
a possibility. An Iraq that helps divide the region and Islamic into
Sunni and Shi’ite sections – with neo-Salafi extremists on one
side and Shi’ite conservative theocrats on the other, does not
merit American dollars or American lives.
Success or failure is
now an Iraqi, not an American responsibility. The Arab world has
come a master of avoiding responsibility, and waiting for others or
blaming them for Arab problems. Far too many Iraqis are not
exceptions to this pattern, and no one from the outside can save
them from themselves.
Only Iraqi politicians
can resolve ethnic and sectarian differences. Only Iraqis can create
an effective pattern of governance, and manage Iraq’s economic
development, budget, and use of aid. Only Iraqis can deploy the mix
of military, security, and police forces that can provide both
security and legitimacy. Only Iraq can create the image of a nation
that can unit its factions.
Nevertheless, for
Iraqi politics to have the chance to muddle through, the US must
continue to do what it can to create effective Iraqi military and
security forces; and to shift US aid to providing the funds Iraqis
need to manage a start towards economic development. The US
continues to make every effort to help Iraq develop politically –
even if the end result is a far cry from the original ideal of
either neoconservatives or neoliberals. To put it in cruder terms,
the US must be prepared to pay another 500 to 1,000 American lives,
another $60 billion in military expenditures, and another $20
billion in aid money.
Iraqi success,
however, requires more than Iraqi leadership and American
persistence. It requires aid and engagement by Europe, Arab states,
Turkey, and possibly Iran – not on American terms or to help the
US -- but on Iraqi terms and to meet the interests of both Iraq and
the other nations engaged. One thing is certain. Success is not
going to be achieved by vague references to the UN, the “international
community,” or the “Arab world.” Help will come one nation at
a time.
The Future of Iran
I am going be to be
equally unpopular in talking about the strategic posture of Iran. I
have never believed that Iran was on the road to being either part
of the axis of evil or was on the road to moderate reform. I also do
not believe that the US now has a good rationale for military
options, or that it could much to encourage regime change. At the
same time, I have always questioned whether reaching some form of
US-Iranian rapprochement through options like engagement, dialogue,
and "grand strategic bargains" has been more than wishful
thinking on the part of well-intentioned Americans, Iranians, and
others.
As the recent Iranian
election has made all too clear, we are almost certainly talking
about containment while Iranian politics play out their course --
driven by Iran’s internal dynamics on largely internal terms.
Good, bad, or indifferent, exile groups and outside players will be
largely marginal players dreaming ambitious dreams.
Iran will have to play
out these politics by wandering through its own theocratic
fantasies, and do so in terms of its own social structure, internal
economics, and regional ambitions. Until its own internal political
dynamics change for internal political reasons whose timing and
nature we cannot now predict, Iran will continue to play games in
Lebanon and Israel, creep towards nuclear weapons, develop
long-range missiles, and enhance its capabilities for asymmetric
war.
Under these
conditions, “dual containment” must take on a new meaning. The
US cannot engage Iran at present. The Gulf states, however, have
already shown that they can deal with Iran in positive ways and have
a positive influence. The same has been true of Europe when it has
established clear lines, and has only provided inducements when Iran’s
conduct has justified them. Iran cannot be dealt with by broad
embargoes and isolation, or by military containment and threats. It
must be clear that strong incentives exist for the right kind of
Iranian behavior, and that Iran is not threatened unless it becomes
a threat.
The US will need to
play the “bad cop” in this game. Iran needs to understand that
it faces overwhelming military power if it attempts military
pressure, threats, or adventures. This means forward deployed US air
and sea power, and possibly missile defenses. It means de facto
guarantees to Iran’s neighbors. It means the US should continue to
try to block or delay Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles, and Iranian adventures outside Iran.
It is also important
that all the players understand certain realities here:
-
The Gulf
Cooperation Council will remain weak and ineffective, and talk
of new Gulf security concepts is well-meaning nonsense. So is
talk about NATO or Europe providing more than cover for American
power projection. The region will not act and Iran will not be a
credible partner.
-
Lebanon needs to
come to grips with Amal, the Hezbollah, and Iran – not just
Syria. No one can stop Iran from opposing Israel, but Lebanese
security and peace negotiations do mean that Lebanon should not
be a sanctuary for Iranian asymmetric adventures.
-
The US can win by
deterring, but will lose if it provokes or go to war. The US is
even less able to control the future aftermath of any major
conflict with Iran than it was able to control the aftermath of
such a conflict with Iraq. This does not mean Iran will not lose
far more than the US, but it does mean the US cannot win in the
sense of shaping the peace.
-
Iran, Iraq, and
the Arab world all need to look beyond narrow security issues to
the strategic threat posed by divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite.
If nothing else, the post-Reformation military barbarism of the
Christian world should be a warning. Neo-Salafi hatred of Shi’ism,
and the risk of clash within a faith and a civilization, is a
far more real and dangerous risk than a clash between Islam and
the West.
More broadly, the Arab
Gulf states and the rest of the Arab world need to focus on internal
security and internal stability, and not on conventional military
forces and arms imports. The MENA region (including Iran and Israel)
is still spending some $55 billion a year on conventional military
forces, some 6% of its gross domestic product. It still has some 2.8
million active military, 2.5 million reservists, and some 940,000
reservists. It signs some $10-15 billion of new arms agreements a
year, and much of this total is not included in the formal total of
$55 billion for defense budgets.
These levels of
conventional military effort are not needed in a region where Iraq
no longer poses a conventional threat and Iran is so weak; where no
real Arab-Israel arms race or prospect for conventional war exists,
and where North African states face no real military threat other
than their own populations. There may well be a need for more
spending on internal security and anti-terrorism.
There may be a need
for different kinds of spending to deal with the threat of
asymmetric warfare and counterproliferation. In virtually every
case, however, the need is for internal national defense reform and
not for regional security or dealing with external threats.
The Struggle for
Reform and the War on Terrorism
Finally, we need to
reshape our efforts to address the problem of terrorism and Islamic
extremist, and the divisions between the US and Arab world, and the
West and Islam. It is true that we are dealing with a small minority
of violent extremists. It is true that they do not speak for the
Arab world and Islam. It is also true that the US has often
overreacted to the events of 9/11, and done so clumsily and
sometimes out of ignorance. The same is true of much of the West.
We sometimes confuse
legitimate differences with hatred and terrorism. The Arab-Israeli
conflict, Iraq, and issues like Iran compound the divisions between
the US and the region. They do not breed "hatred" but they
do breed anger. They interact with a host of lesser issues,
conspiracy theories, and mutual misunderstanding. Instant satellite
communications and news, the Internet, and extraordinary levels of
social mobility interact to drive the resulting fears and passions.
At the same time, the
Arab and Islamic worlds have been slow to react, and have often
tried to avoid confronting the problems that have led to extremism.
There is real clash taking place within the Arab world and Islamic
civilization. There is a real struggle over what Islam should be and
over the role it should play in society and politics.
Neo-Salafi groups and
practices have an influence that goes far beyond Bin Laden and will
almost certainly long survive him. Other religious extremists,
including many of the theocratic leaders of Iran, argue for less
violent and hate-driven interpretations, but they also argue for
practices that block essential social and economic reform, and
beliefs that are too intolerant to preserve a modern social order.
Like many other forces
of religious extremism and violence in human history, this religious
and ideological struggle interacts with many other forces. There is
no simple or direct correlation between terrorism and economic
failings, population pressure, hyperurbanization and radical social
change. Each nation in the Arab and Islamic world also faces a
different mix of such problems.
The fact remains,
however, that far too much of the Arab and Islamic world do lag
behind in economic development. Population pressure is acute and
growing and has created a youth explosion that is creating massive
employment problems and a wave of emigration. Rural and agricultural
development has largely collapsed, traditional tribal and social
structures have been forced to radically mutate or collapse, and
urbanization has strained infrastructure, social services, and
education -- often to a near breaking point.
Most Arab and Middle
Eastern populations have real per capita incomes at the lowest
levels of development. The handful of oil rich states that do not
are absorbing a transfer of over $1 trillion dollars in largely
unearned income, but do not distribute that income equitably, and
often do not use it to create effective programs for economic and
social development. Far too much is still spent on arms when the
real problem is internal security and stability, on failed forms of
state industry and socialism, and on corruption and narrow
oligarchies. Authoritarian, overcentralized, and repressive regimes
often compound the problem.
In brief, most MENA
states face some or all of the following problems:
-
Much of the region
cannot afford to provide more water for agriculture at market
prices, and in the face of human demand; much has become a “permanent”
food importer.
-
Employment and
education are critical challenges to national stability.
-
Hyperurbanization
and a half-century decline in agricultural and traditional
trades impose high levels of stress on traditional social safety
nets and extended families.
-
Broad problems in
integrating women effectively and productively into the work
force.
-
The region has had
limited or no real growth in per capita income, and growing
inequity in the distribution of that income, for more than two
decades.
-
Overall economic
growth is too low.
-
The Middle East is
not competitive with the leading developing regions.
-
The region is not
competitive in trade.
-
Radical economic
changes are affecting traditional regional societies.
-
“Oil wealth”
has always been relative, and can no longer sustain any country
in the region.
-
In spite of
decades of reform plans and foreign aid, there are no globally
competitive economies in any of the MENA states.
-
Far too many
countries have a sustained debt and budget crisis.
The US and Bush
Administration have made many mistakes, but they have almost
certainly been correct in stating that the Arab world and Middle
East can only achieve stability through reform. It is true that
terrorism and extremism can only be defeated at the ideological,
political, economic, and social level. Without such action, military
and internal security efforts will fail -- sometimes quickly as in
the case of Iraq and sometimes slowly as in the case of today's more
successful "one man" regimes.
Where the US and Bush
Administration have gone wrong is in assuming that reform can come
from the outside, that the same largely American or Western solution
can work in all Arab and Islamic states, and that
"democracy" is somehow a magic word that transforms entire
societies.
The fact is that
meaningful religious reform can only come from within. The US and
the West cannot fight Islam's battle for the soul of Islam. This is
a struggle that can only be fought and won within the region. If it
is left to outside or deal with through denial, it is a struggle
that will go on indefinitely and sometimes be lost. It is a struggle
that every Middle Eastern intellectual, and every government, needs
to face.
The most outsiders can
do is point out the obvious: This struggle is the most important
single strategic priority for virtually every Middle Eastern and
Islamic state. It is necessary and unavoidable, and interacts with
the broader struggle for a tolerant global society based on mutual
respect and human rights.
More broadly, the US
and the Bush Administration are also wrong in focusing on
"democracy" as if a simple political fix could be
encouraged or imposed on every nation from the outside and at the
nearly the same time.
At a minimum, workable
"democracy" actually means taking the time to create
government with strong checks and balances. It means priority for
human rights and the rule of law over the simple act of voting. It
means creating functional political parties capable of both serving
the nation and looking beyond one man, one vote, one time. Pure
democracy has never worked in any state. Sufficiently crude
democracy is little better.
Both development, and
regional strategic stability, will occur one nation at a time, and
at different rates and in different ways. They will be driven either
by local reformers and by political evolution, or will often
collapse into forms of revolution that may be worse than the status
quo.
The real world
priority for reform also has to give equal balance to economic
reform, employment, education, social services, and reducing
population growth rates. It means finding solutions to ethnic and
religious divisions, and social change. It means giving at least as
much priority to the economic role of women as the political role;
creating a broad and globally competitive labor force.
This kind of
evolutionary reform can only occur at a different pace and in a
different way in each state in the region. Like religious reform, it
can only come from within and must be driven by local reformers. It
cannot be driven by US public diplomacy, or by seeking to makeover
every state in something approaching the form of the US or Europe.
We are not talking about a few years; we are talking a decade and
sometimes decades.
The Middle East and
Arab world cannot deal with these needs for reform through denial,
through complaining about outside states and forces, complaining
about US and other external calls for reform, or waiting for the
solutions to the region's other strategic problems. The US cannot
deal with them through its traditional initial solution to every
problem: "simple, quick, and wrong."
The Middle East and
Arab world will succeed, if and when, it starts to solve its
problems one nation at a time, honestly, and without waiting for
outside aid or solutions to all the region's ills. It is also
important to note that it now has a unique window of opportunity.
The current projections of the EIA indicates that MENA oil export
revenues will rise from a recent low of around $100 billion in 1998
in constant 2004 dollars to over $500 billion in 2005 – reaching
or exceeding the former peak of some $500 billion reached in 1980.
According to Merrill Lynch, the capital controlled by wealthy
individuals in the Middle East already rose by 29% during 2003-2004,
to a level of approximately $1 trillion dollars. This estimate
projects a further 9% annual rise from 2004 to 2009.
The question is
whether MENA governments will act upon this window of opportunity,
whether the wealthier states will look beyond their own needs, and
whether the poorer states will actually move towards effective
development and reform. No nation has developed since World War II
that did not develop itself, and solve virtually all of its own
problems. If Asian states like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, or other
Asian states had waited for peace or regional solutions, Asia would
be another Middle East.
The US and Europe,
however, need patience, a balanced approach to reform, strong
country missions capable of encouraging local governments and
reformers, and the understanding that different societies and
cultures will often take a different path. In practice, this means a
very different strategy based on persuasion, partnership, and
cooption rather than pressure and conversion:
-
Implement a
broadly-based reform strategy: Social, economic, and political
reforms should be supported, but in an evolutionary sense. The
US and Western states, however, cannot be seen as pushing these
reforms in ways that discredit local officials and reformers.
Outside pressure for change will be resisted even if the reforms
are necessary, and too much overt pressure is counterproductive.
-
One size does not
fit all. The Arab and Islamic worlds are not monolithic. Each
country requires different sets of reforms and needs. Some need
help in reforming their political process, others need economic
aid, and others need special attention to their demographic
dynamics and population control. The West, therefore, must avoid
any generalized strategy of dealing with the Arab-Islamic world
as one entity.
-
Work on a
country-by-country approach and rely on strong country teams,
not regional approaches: Regional polices, meetings and slogans
will not deal with real world needs or provide the kind of
dialogue with local officials and reformers, tailored pressure
and aid, and country plans and policies that are needed. Strong
country teams both in Washington and in US Embassies are the
keys to success.
-
Recognize that the
pace of reform will be relatively slow if it is to be stable and
evolutionary, and dependent on partnership and cooption.
Artificial deadlines and false crises can only lead to failed
tactics and strategies. Outside support for reform must move at
the base countries can actually absorb, and shift priorities to
reflect the options that are actually available. History takes
time and does not conform to the tenure of any given set of
policymakers.
-
Carefully support
moderate voices: “Moderates” in the region do need the
support of the West, but obvious outside backing can hurt
internal reform efforts. Moreover, “moderate” must be
defined in broad terms. It does not mean “secularist” and it
does not necessarily mean “pro-American.” It also, however,
does not mean supporting voices that claim to support freedom
and democracy, but are actually the voice of extremism.
-
Democratization is
only part of reform and depends on creating a rule of law,
checks and balances and a separation of powers, protection for
minorities and human rights, and effective political parties.
Trying to force or "rush" democracy on Middle Eastern
countries is impractical and counterproductive. The goal should
be to help MENA countries develop more pluralistic and
representative governments that respect the rights of
minorities.
-
Recognize that the
key to effective action is local political action, dialogue,
education, efforts to use the media, and public diplomacy: The
West and the US cannot hope to win a struggle for Islam and
reform from the outside. It is the efforts of local governments,
reformers, educators, and media that will be critical.
Encouraging and aiding such efforts is far more important than
advancing the image of the US or Western states or trying to
shape local and regional attitudes through Western public
diplomacy.
-
Avoid generalizing
about Muslims: generalizing Islam as a source of violence and
discriminating against Muslims in the west can alienate “uncommitted”
Muslims.
-
Demonizing any
part of Islam will aid extremists: The problem of terrorism is
not the problem of “puritan” or “Wahabi” Islam, but the
attitude of violence and intolerance of politically motivated
groups that exploit religious teaching to gain legitimacy in the
eyes of their recruits and followers. To defeat these groups,
their motivations need to be understood and fought at their
roots. E.g. Al-Qaida’s goal of ruling the “Arabian
Peninsula.”
-
Avoid supporting
“secularism” against “traditionalism:” The region has
seen its share of failed governance systems. Most efforts to
secularize have failed and the US should not be seen as a
driving force behind what may be assured failure. Moreover, the
word “secularism” translate into “elmaniyah” is often
intermingled with “atheism.”
-
Don’t try to
divide and conquer: The West should stay clear of issues like
Sunni-Shiite frictions, and taking sides with ethic and
sectarian groups. It does not serve anyone when they are played
against each other. The Iran-Iraq War was a perfect example of
how interfering can backfire. The US should avoid playing any
role that could encourage such divisions, particularly given the
current environment in Iraq.
-
Liberalism vs.
counter-terrorism: The liberty democratic societies afford
people is sometimes the same tool extremists use to spread their
hateful ideology. The west must be careful in advocating
immediate liberalization and freedom of speech of the Middle
East.
-
Apply a single set
of standards to Western and regional counterterrorism: Do what
you preach and preach what you do. The West and specifically the
US should void being seen as supporting violation of human
rights and abusive security measures in counter-terrorism, which
advocating human freedom. Violence by states against civilians
be it Russia, Egypt, or Israel should be equally condemned.
In short, any
effective strategy to deal with terrorism and extremism means
addressing two key strategic issues that go far beyond the so-called
war on terrorism. One is whether the Arab world can recognize the
need for reform and achieve it. The second is whether the West, and
particularly the US, can learn to work quietly with nations for
effective reform, rather than seek to impose it noisily, and
sometimes violently, on an entire region.
|
Anthony H.
Cordesman holds the Arleigh A Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS.
He and Nawaf Obaid have written Saudi Security: Military and
Internal Security Developments, which will be published by the CSIS
and Praeger this fall.
