Saudi Government Counterterrorism-
Counter Extremism Actions
By Anthony H. Cordesman


Crown Prince Abdullah quickly addressed Saudi Arabians following the May bombings in Riyadh, condemning those responsible and vowing to bring them to justice.

I do not wish to be an apologist for Saudi Arabia. It has made many mistakes, and it faces major challenges to its stability. I do, however, find that the present flood of charges being made by people with little or no real experience in the country and often are based on unsourced or suspect data. What should be serious articles and media coverage is often filled with financial guesstimates that cannot be validated, and loose chains of guilt by association that confuse Saudi government carelessness with the deliberate support of terrorism. Far too many charges are being made by people who have never read a Saudi budget or five-year plan, never really talked to Saudi clerics, or examined the progress the Kingdom has actually made.

Far too many ignore both the history of the Kingdom�s past counterterrorism efforts, and what it has done since 9/11. Certainly, much of the current debate over the classified 28 pages in the Congressional report on the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in failing to detect the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. has fallen into this pattern. The focus has been on what Saudi Arabia did or did not do before the September 11, 2001 attacks. It has also been filled with the usual speculation, uncertain numbers, and conspiracy theories.

I have spent some three decades dealing with the Saudis and my own criticisms (and praise) of Saudi Arabia can be found in two books that have just been published on the country: Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, Vol. 1: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, and Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, Vol. 2: The Military and International Security Dimensions, Praeger/CSIS, April 2003. I am clearly on record as having found many problems in Saudi Arabia�s political structure, budgets and economic plans, efforts to deal with social reform, and military forces. The first volume, in particular, provides a detailed critique of many aspects of the Saudi effort to deal with terrorism.

The Right Kind of Pressure and Media Coverage Can Be of Great Value

I firmly believe that the Bush Administration needs to keep up quiet pressure on the Saudis to improve their counterterrorist activity, and implement reforms. I also believe that informed, investigative media and academic criticism helps not only to put indirect pressure on the Saudi government, but also to support Saudi reformers and moderates.

Such pressure and reporting is particularly useful when it addresses:

--Exerting tighter controls over specific Saudi charities.

--Supporting full Saudi and U.S. cooperation in official counterterrorism activities.

--The need to modernize Saudi intelligence, internal security operations and the operations of the Ministry of the Interior.

--Saudi government treatment of domestic support for religious schools and institutions outside Saudi Arabia, and the extent to which funds and support go to hard-line Salafi and other extremist movements.

--The state of Saudi educational reform, its progress, success in removing anti-Christian and anti-Jewish content, and its success in educating young Saudis for jobs.

--Excessive Saudi military spending and wasteful arms imports.

The Wrong Kind of Criticism is Both Counterproductive and Risks Losing the War on Terrorism

But, I am increasingly concerned that the majority of Western reporting on the Kingdom fails to go into any detail on the many things the Saudi government has done to deal with terrorism since 9/11. It focuses on the statements of Saudi extremists rather than the many attacks Senior Saudi officials have made on extremism, makes broad charges about �corruption� with no credible details, and ignores Saudi progress in economic and social reform � much of it of considerable importance.

I am concerned with the careless use of �Wahhabi� (a term many Saudis find offensive because it personalizes Islam in terms of one teacher) to describe religious movements and groups. Far too often, the groups and movements involved are Salafi and not �Wahhabi,� or have closer ties to the Moslem Brotherhood or Egyptian and North African groups than Saudi ones. Statements are selected from the worst of Saudi preachers (and Christianity and Judaism have their own bigots and hatemongers) that are not representative of main line Saudi religious teaching and practices. There is a careless tendency to confuse extremist Saudi preachers with the kind of preaching and attitudes one encounters from most religious Saudis.

I am concerned with the equally careless condemnation of the entire Saudi royal family � which has had many highly competent leaders that have pushed for reform � and the ignorance or indifference to the role of Saudi businessmen, technocrats, and educators � many educated in the West and the US. Certainly, it is hard to see how any near-term Saudi government could be better or do more to move towards reform than the present alliance of Crown Prince Abdullah, the more moderate and progressive princes, and Saudi technocrats, educators, businessmen, and moderate clerics.

I am concerned with the use of Saudi Arabia as a virtual scapegoat for a far broader set of problems with Islamic extremism and violence that affects every Middle Eastern and most Central Asian states, as well as the Islamic states of South and Southeast Asia. The fight against terrorism certainly will never be won, nor even have the right target, if people continue to believe that Saudi money is the only money supporting extremism (or that the government can fully ever control what is done with the vast private holdings of capital Saudi citizen have outside Saudi Arabia). It certainly will not be won if the causes of extremism and terrorism that both the governments in the region and the West must deal with are not considered on a country-by-country basis.

Handing Bin Laden Victory

I am struck by the fact that many of Saudi Arabia�s most severe critics are unconsciously handing Bin Laden a major victory by helping to create exactly the kind of gulf between the US and Saudi Arabia that Bin Laden wants. We have seen the dangers in the crisis of religious extremism in the Middle East since 9/11, and because of that, we see it as a clash between civilizations. In reality, Middle Eastern governments have been dealing with the problem for well over a decade, and it is far more a �clash within a civilization� than one between Western and Arab or Islamic society.

Ultimately, we can only win if we help governments and societies in the region modernize, diversify, and �globalize� their economies, if we recognize the social strains that drive minorities to violent Islamic extremism, and if we understand that demographic pressures and poverty cannot be dealt with simply by calling for undefined �democratization.� The Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, the Islamic areas of Africa, and parts of Islamic Southeast Asia, all face internal challenges that will take a decade, if not decades, to address. Pragmatic evolution is the only way that this can be done without massive internal and external violence.

At present, the flood of attacks on the Saudi government ignore this need for evolutionary change and the single most important strategic reality affecting the Kingdom�s future: Crown Prince Abdullah, the more progressive princes, Saudi technocrats, Saudi businessmen, Western-educated Saudi educators, and an often moderate Saudi press are the only force that can lead this deeply conservative nation forward. In fact, modernization in Saudi Arabia has always come from above, not from below, as the result of pressures from non-existent popular movements.

Should evolution in Saudi Arabia move faster? Probably, but it is far from clear that Saudi society is willing to do so at a broad level. Is virtually any credible alternative to the present progressive elements of the Saudi regime likely to be Islamist extremists, and do the Saudi people and world far more harm? Almost certainly!

Even from the narrowest perspective, does trashing the Saudi government actually help Israel? No, it simply creates a deep adversarial relationship. Do the neocons who do the same have any practical path to their vague calls for instant Saudi democracy? No, again. They are Bin Laden�s unconscious allies.

Saudi Actions in Dealing with Terrorism

As a result, I would urge you to read through the list of actions listed below that the Saudi government has stated that it has taken to fight terrorism since 9/11. Do these claims oversimplify the problems and overstate what Saudi Arabia has done? Yes, of course. Does each Saudi claim merit detailed media examination and criticism, and further quiet pressure from the Bush Administration? Yes, again.

The fact remains, however, that the nearly constant U.S. and other Western focus on the worst-case interpretation of Saudi actions before 9/11 ignores real progress. When this is coupled to a lack of detailed investigative reporting into what the Saudi government has done since that time, the result is both unfair and dangerous.


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Saudi Arabia's Progress in the War on Terrorism


- Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard
May 13, 2003

Actions to Counter Terrorism
From September 2001 to May 2003:

More than 300 terrorist suspects were arrested.

About 100 suspects were referred to the courts to stand trial.

Over 1,000 suspects were questioned.

Since May 2003:

Over 130 individuals with suspected ties to terrorism have been arrested.

Over the course of the arrests security officers also seized large quantities of high explosives, automatic rifles, bomb-making materials and devices, false identity cards and documents, and large amounts of cash.

Specific Cases:

Yousif Salih Fahad Al-Ayeeri, a.k.a. Swift Sword, a major Al-Qaeda operational planner and fundraiser, was killed on May 31 while fleeing from a security patrol.

Ali Abdulrahman Said Alfagsi Al-Ghamdi a.k.a. Abu Bakr Al-Azdi, surrendered to Saudi authorities. Al-Ghamdi, considered one of the top Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia, is suspected of being one of the masterminds of the May 12 bombings in Riyadh.

Turki Nasser Mishaal Aldandany, another top Al-Qaeda operative and mastermind of the May 12 bombings, was killed along with three other suspects in a gun battle with security forces that had them surrounded.

Three clerics, Ali Fahd Al-Khudair, Ahmed Hamoud Mufreh Al-Khaledi and Nasir Ahmed Al-Fuhaid, were arrested after calling for support of the terrorists who carried out the Riyadh attacks.

International Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and the United States maintain a Counter-Terrorism Committee comprised of intelligence and law enforcement personnel who meet regularly to share information and resources and develop action plans to root out terrorist networks.

In May 2003 a new U.S.-Saudi team was organized from across law enforcement and intelligence agencies to work side by side to share �real time� intelligence and conduct joint operations.

Also in May 2003, Saudi authorities worked closely with U.S. and British law enforcement agents who came to the Kingdom to assist in the investigation of the Riyadh attacks.

Saudi Arabia has provided extensive intelligence and military cooperation in the assault on Al-Qaeda. Public disclosures to date have revealed major Saudi contributions to the breakup of a number of Al-Qaeda cells, the arrests of key Al-Qaeda commanders, and the capture of numerous Al-Qaeda members.

In 2002, Saudi Arabia asked Interpol to arrest 750 people, many of whom are suspected of money laundering, drug trafficking, and terror-related activities. This figure includes 214 Saudis whose names appear in Interpol�s database in addition to expatriates who fled Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is engaging other countries to locate and extradite Al-Qaeda operatives who may be hiding in those countries.

Actions Taken in the Financial Area

Saudi government departments and banks are required to participate in international seminars, conferences and symposia on combating terrorist-financing activities. Saudi Arabia has hosted many such events; and is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) established by the G-7 in 1988.

Saudi Arabia completed and submitted two FATF self-assessment questionnaires: one regarding the 40 FATF recommendations on the prevention of money laundering and the other regarding its eight special recommendations on terrorist financing.

Saudi Arabia has established a High Commission for oversight of all charities, contributions and donations.

A special Financial Intelligence Unit was established to ensure that funds are not misdirected into the hands of those who would use them to harm others.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States took steps to freeze the assets of a close bin Laden aide, Wa�el Hamza Julaidan, who is believed to have funneled money to Al-Qaeda.

In March 2002, the U.S. Treasury Department and Saudi Arabia blocked the accounts of the Somalia and Bosnia branches of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation. While the Saudi headquarters for this private charity is dedicated to helping those in need, it was determined that the Somalia and Bosnia branches supported terrorist activities and terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and AIAI (al-Itihaad al-Islamiya). In May 2003, Saudi Arabia asked the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and all Saudi charities to suspend activities outside Saudi Arabia until a security clearance mechanism to screen all personnel is implemented. The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation has closed its offices in Croatia, Albania and Ethiopia while moves are under way to close others in Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia and Pakistan.

In February 2003, SAMA began to implement a major technical program to train judges and investigators on legal matters involving terror financing and money-laundering methods, international requirements for financial secrecy, and methods followed by criminals to exchange information.

Also in May 2003, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) distributed a circular entitled Rules Governing Combating Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing to all banks and financial institutions in the Kingdom requiring the full and immediate implementation of nine new policies and procedures that relate to accounts of charitable and welfare institutions.

In June 2003, the Consultative Council approved new legislation that puts in place harsh penalties for the crime of money laundering and terror financing. The law consists of 29 articles and stipulates jail sentences of up to 15 years and a fine of more than $1.5 million for anyone laundering money through charities. Other money-laundering offenses are punishable by up to 10 years in jail and a fine of $1.3 million.

Saudi Arabia has investigated many bank accounts suspected of having links to terrorism and has frozen 41 accounts belonging to 7 individuals that totaled $5,697,400.85.



Source: "Saudi Arabia's War on Terrorism"

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For additional information on this issue:

Congressional 9/11 Report Missing Pages: Saudis Ask for Full Disclosure, July 31, 2003
Press Briefing on the War on Terrorism, Statement of Adel Al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah, June 12, 2003
Saudi Report: Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Financial Area to Combat Terrorism, May 2003

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