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EDITOR'S NOTE:
Ambassador Robert Jordan served as America's top diplomat in Saudi Arabia during one of the most turbulent periods in the relationship between the two countries. Tapped by President Bush in July 2001 to the post, he began his tour in the Kingdom a month after the 9/11 attacks dramatically altered U.S.-Saudi relations. While he was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Jordan faced numerous challenges in the Kingdom and the region -- American led operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, improved cooperation and coordination between Americans and Saudis in the war on terrorism, strengthening business ties, supporting economic reforms and WTO accession efforts among numerous other issues. Ambassador Jordan also served during preparations for and prosecution of the war in Iraq.
In a telephone interview with SUSRIS on September 3, 2004, Ambassador Jordan recounted his experiences as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from October 2001 to October 2003, his insights on bilateral cooperation in the war on terrorism and his assessment of the impact of election year politics on U.S.-Saudi relations and vice versa.
Ambassador Robert Jordan Interview
SUSRIS: Ambassador Jordan, thank you for joining us today.
Ambassador Robert Jordan: It's my pleasure.
SUSRIS: Let's start with the introduction to your posting in Riyadh? Tell us about your experiences in assuming the office just weeks after 9/11.
Jordan: Well, when I arrived in mid-October, the bombing of Afghanistan had just begun. I found myself working far more with generals like Tommy Franks than with diplomats at that moment. We were heavily involved in securing Saudi cooperation, in logistics and assistance for the bombing efforts and the attempts to liberate the Afghan people. One of the early concerns was whether to continue bombing during Ramadan, which was fast approaching. The Saudis were very reluctant to allow us to use their bases and facilities for this purpose. I had an early meeting with Tommy Franks. General Franks made it clear to the Saudis that we could continue this conflict in one of two ways -- we could either continue to be patient and careful in the bombing with highly targeted precision bombing or we could engage in a much less precise method that some people might have called carpet bombing. With the precise bombing, civilian causalities would be minimized, and we could not guarantee the same kind of care if a wider, more indiscriminant bombing pattern were followed. The Saudis quickly understood this, and we never heard any further objections to the bombing during Ramadan when it became clear that it was simply going to take that long to do it the right way and as carefully as we possibly could.
The introduction to Riyadh was also, of course, a cultural introduction for me. I had never served in the Middle East. The closest I had been was in Turkey. So, I had a lot to learn, and I was fascinated in learning the Arab ways, visiting desert emirs out under tents and seeing their herds of camels and drinking coffee and tea with them. All of the exotic parts of the culture were quite fascinating to me. It also took some getting used to the trappings of being an ambassador with a large staff and a great mass of body guards. I traveled everywhere with about six or seven body guards and lost a lot of my privacy in the process.
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SUSRIS: What was the sense among the American community in Saudi Arabia about what had happened in New York and Washington on September 11?
Jordan: Well, it was profound. The American community there was completely caught up in what had happened as we were. I think the American community in Saudi Arabia was probably more understanding of the fact that most of the Saudis were really allies and friends of America rather than being some sort of suspicious group that needed to be marginalized and that no one can trust.��
It was hard for all of us to understand how 15 of 19 hijackers could have been Saudis. It took a great deal of work and diligence to develop a better understanding of why they were Saudis and also what the challenges we faced were with a growing terrorist activity within Saudi Arabia itself.
The Saudi government, in the early days after 9/11, was certainly concerned at the Saudi connection to the attacks but in some ways was also in denial that 15 of their sons could have done such a horrible thing. And so, we had to work through a little bit of that.
We had to work through a cultural tendency to not share intelligence information, to not share the results of investigations until the investigation was fully completed and wrapped up neatly in a bow. Rather than the interactive, full contact kind of intelligence sharing that American culture is more used to. As time went on, the Saudis got a lot better at sharing and being proactive in the intelligence area. But, certainly the first few months were less than fully satisfactory.
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SUSRIS:� By all indicators the bilateral cooperation certainly increased after the May bombing in Riyadh last year. How would you characterize the level of coordination and cooperation between Americans and Saudis, in view of continuing charges in the U.S. that the Saudis are not fully cooperating? Would you see that characterization as accurate, or should Americans be satisfied at the level of cooperation between officials on both sides?
Jordan: Well, cooperation had been improving before the May 12, 2003 bombing. But after those bombings, the Saudis really took it to a whole new level. They became much more proactive. They suggested things such as a joint terrorism center, which we established in Riyadh in a secret location that had Americans and Saudis sitting side-by-side reviewing the same raw intelligence on a daily basis. We have seen the Saudis dedicate a much greater number of personnel to these efforts. They have been far more proactive. They've been rooting out these terrorists.
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We've seen a lot of shootouts that have occurred in the last 18 months, where the Saudis really have gotten after these terrorists. They've also for the first time published the pictures of a number of these most wanted terrorists in the newspapers. We have seen the families turning in nephews and cousins. The Crown Prince and other leaders have gone to the Saudi public and have said "we not only condemn these terrorists but anyone who gives aid or comfort to these terrorists will be treated as harshly as the terrorists themselves."
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So, we are seeing a continuing improvement I think. Nothing is perfect. Most Western intelligence and police institutions have a hard time dealing with these kinds of terrorist threats. The Saudis are certainly no exception. They've taken it really to a whole new level.
I think it's kind of like Pearl Harbor was for the United States. After May 12, the Saudis realized that Al Qaeda wasn't some abstraction but was a real threat to them and their existence and survival just as we realized the Japanese attacks made World War II much more personal to us.�
SUSRIS: There are still many critics -- for example the sponsors of the Saudi Arabian Accountability Act and other legislative initiatives -- who seek to punish Saudi Arabia. To hear you describe the level of cooperation between our governments these efforts to undermine the relationship don't seem to square with reality. Can you help our readers -- who are very interested in the strength of the relationship -- understand the context of these efforts that undermine the relationship.
Jordan: Well, I think those who have pursued the Saudi Accountability Act are pretty much out of touch with reality and are also out of touch with America's national interests.�
It is in our national interest to have a solid relationship with Saudi Arabia. The congressional sponsors of these kinds of legislative proposals simply need to get their facts straight.�
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I think the most reliable source right now is probably the report of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission has made it clear that despite a lot of hysterical press coverage, the Saudi government did not institutionally support Al Qaeda. The Saudi ambassador's wife did not contribute to terrorists, either intentionally or unintentionally.
A lot of the negative press that has been recited by the sponsors of this legislation is simply not true. Now, the fact remains that we still have a concern about the ideological support for terrorism. I think this is a legitimate cause for further dialogue with the Saudis. What is taught in their schools and what is preached in their mosques does affect our national security. I think that's an area where continued improvement is needed. But, the Saudis are working on this in their own way. That hardly justifies the kind of punitive measures that this legislation suggests and is quite short sighted in my view.��
What we need is to find further ways to cooperate rather than ways to divide us. If we want to become an isolated state with an isolationist policy, we're going to have enormous problems. We simply have to be more engaged rather than less.
SUSRIS: During the decades of containing communism during the Cold War, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were solid allies and cooperated in many ways usually not discussed in public. In the case of the Iraq War, there seemed to be an effort to minimize in public the role of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. How would you characterize the performance of Saudi Arabia in support of the war to depose Saddam Hussein?
Jordan: They were one of our most steadfast allies in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Saudis cooperated with us to an unprecedented degree -- again in some ways that can't be fully disclosed in public at this time.
Because of the use of Saudi bases, Saudi airspace, Saudi logistics, we were able to save American lives. And, we were able to keep our pilots on station for shorter periods of time in the air war. We were able to take out forward observer positions. We were able to look for Scud sites and missiles that could have even attacked Israel. So, there were many ways in which we were able to work with the Saudis in a very productive way. I think as time goes on, we will see more specific descriptions of the extent of that cooperation.�
SUSRIS: After the major fighting ended in Iraq, U.S. forces in the Kingdom were reduced, specifically the Operation Southern Watch deployment at Prince Sultan airbase. Some have characterized it as a political concession to Riyadh when others saw it as the natural end of an operational requirement. How would you assess the change in the military footprint in the Kingdom and the political implications that it posed?
Jordan:� I was directly involved in all of that of course. It's very clear, and I think that history will record, that we simply had completed the mission that was the purpose of having these air force personnel at Prince Sultan airbase in the first place. Operation Southern Watch was no longer needed. The military presence that we had at Prince Sultan airbase was completely oriented around Operation Southern Watch. So, this was not some sort of a strike force that was retained in the Kingdom for some other purpose. It was completely oriented as a support base for the work in Operation Southern Watch. When that mission ended, it was only logical that we would then no longer need our forces there and could redeploy them elsewhere. It was a very amicable conclusion to our presence there.
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We made it clear that we will retain an interest in returning if the Saudis asked us to come back for any reason. But, there's no need for us to have that kind of presence of those particular kind of personnel there at this time.�
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We have retained a small group of military advisors at the request of the Saudis to assist them in training and development of their military capability. But, they are not at Prince Sultan airbase, and it's a small group that we hope will continue to offer assistance to the Saudis as long as they want us there.�
SUSRIS: Turning from issues of war to issues of peace, in early 2002 Crown Prince Abdullah floated the notion of a comprehensive peace with Israel, recognition and ties with the Arab nations in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The Saudi proposal eventually won approval by the 22 members of the Arab League Summit that year. Recall for us if you would, how that evolved and why you think that proposal seems to have fallen from sight?
Jordan: Well, it evolved in kind of an interesting way. You know, the journalist Tom Friedman was actually visiting the Crown Prince. And, he himself made a suggestion that the Arab world really needed to try to normalize relations with the Israelis, perhaps if some final status issues could be successfully resolved like the '67 borders. The Crown Prince then turned to him and said, "Have you been reading my briefcase? I actually have a proposal I have prepared very much along those lines." Friedman said, "Do you mind disclosing it?" After a couple of days, he was allowed to disclose the Crown Prince's plan.�
It was a very important proposal in the sense that if these final status issues could be agreed upon, they would simply not cease hostilities, but the entire Arab world would normalize relations with Israel. That means having trade relations, it means exchanging ambassadors. It was a very far-reaching proposal, and it was striking that it received unanimous support at the Arab Summit in Beirut.
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The proposal did find its way into the roadmap that the President suggested quite some months later toward the end of 2002, and was specifically mentioned in the roadmap documentation. But, it did not continue to be I think as fully developed as it could have been, partly because events overtook some of these efforts.��
We had some suicide bombings in Israel. We had some Israeli retaliation that really spiked a long period of high-level violence in the Palestinian territories. I think the hopes that had been so great at the time both at the Arab Summit, the summit meeting with President Bush in Crawford shortly thereafter followed and then the roadmap, were affected by this level of violence. We then also of course lost confidence in Chairman Arafat's ability to be a partner for peace. All of the internal wrangling within the Palestinian Authority, the serial replacement of a couple of the prime ministers, the difficulty in finding leadership that was really committed to moving forward was a tremendous roadblock to the roadmap if you will. And so I think it was a consequence of all that that the proposal of the Crown Prince did not receive the continued attention that it deserved. My hope is that it will enjoy a revival as circumstances permit.
SUSRIS: While you were ambassador in Saudi Arabia there were a number of important developments in the economic relationship -- the work of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority to attract foreign investment, progress on WTO accession, and setbacks to business-to-business ties, problems with visas and so forth. Could you talk to us about the economic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and what happened in this area during your tenure?
Jordan: Saudi Arabia is America's largest trading partner in the Middle East. America is by far Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner. It occurred to me as I arrived in the Kingdom that the most certain way toward the kind of economic, political and cultural reform that we, the United States, would like to see in Saudi Arabia would be through accession to the WTO. I was shocked to learn there had not been a working party meeting with the Saudis on WTO accessions since October 2000. So, I took it on myself to elevate this issue to a political level. It was more than merely checking off some boxes on an accession application form. It was a matter of political importance to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.�
I went to the Vice-President, the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of State, and finally to the U.S. Trade Representative Bob Zoellick and received their support for elevating this issue to a much more prominent role. The Crown Prince then became very engaged in the process, and ultimately, we were able to have a meeting in Geneva in the fall of 2002 at which we just started the negotiations for accession. When the Crown Prince appointed a new commerce minister several months later, the process began to accelerate further.�
I am now pleased to see that many of the steps necessary for WTO accession have been taken. This means that we have new banking legislation; we're seeing new insurance laws, new foreign investment laws, a stock market regulatory scheme. So, we're seeing steps toward transparency, toward the building blocks of real economic reform. Foreign investment has been affected I think by both the security situation in Saudi Arabia as well as the general stresses and strains that have existed in the Middle East over the last couple of years. I believe there is going to be a tremendous resurgence of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis will be increasingly involved in world commerce through membership in the WTO, which I feel will come in the next several months.�
SUSRIS: All indicators are that it is a good time for those interested in doing business in the Kingdom.�
Jordan: This is an opportune time, and there are many infrastructure needs that must be addressed by the Saudis. This is a tremendous opportunity for foreign businesses, American businesses, to be involved. There are telecommunications, transportation, construction -- all sorts of major projects that need to be undertaken. The Saudis will need capable partners with expertise from all over the world to assist.
SUSRIS: Let's talk about the energy relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has announced last month that they were ready to add additional crude oil supplies to the world market. That stirred up critics who restated claims that Saudi Arabia was manipulating the price of oil. Just hours after the end of the Republican Convention Senator Kerry told an audience that allowing "the Saudi royal family to control our energy costs" made his opponents "unfit for duty." There seems to be a lot of political spin on Saudi Arabia's role in stabilizing world oil prices. How do you read those developments?
Jordan: Historically, the Saudis have tended to provide a stable price for oil. It's to their long-term interest to not have the price of oil anywhere near $50 per barrel because it affects demand and could affect worldwide economic trends and could lead to more aggressive production from other sources as well as alternative sources of fuel. So, it's in their national interest to keep the price of oil long-term within a more moderate band, and that's what they've done.
I think it's pure demagoguery to say that the Saudi royal family somehow has some impact on the price of oil in ways that have been harmful to America's national interest. The fact of the matter is that there is only a limited amount of additional production capacity that Saudi Arabia has, and they have more than anyone else in the world. We have shortages of refining capacity. We have a lot of speculation going on in the market right now, a lot of hedging. So, there is a lot more to explain the price of crude than simply Saudi manipulation of the market.
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To the contrary, the Saudis I think have realized that it's important now for them to open the spigot as much as possible to be sure the price of crude doesn't get out of hand. We are also saying there is a certain limit to how much any individual country or even OPEC collectively can affect the price of crude when this environment of speculation and refinery shortages continues.
SUSRIS: We recently talked with Thomas Lippman, you've probably seen his book Inside the Mirage. He related a conversation with a student who tried to find out who in the U.S. government was in charge of U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia. Mr. Lippman told me that his answer to her was "good luck." The President, and the Secretary of State and others in the administration have applauded various aspects of cooperation in the relationship and so forth but there doesn't seem to be an advocate for advancing what has been a beneficial relationship. How would you answer that student's question? Who on a day-to-day basis is shaping and advocating the strength of the relationship with Saudi Arabia and the U.S. government?
Jordan: I would say that at the operational working level, the person most directly in charge on a day-to-day basis would be Assistant Secretary of State [for Near Eastern Affairs], Bill Burns. There are many other players involved in a relationship of this complexity. So, you would also look to the National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, her deputy Steve Hadley. You would look also at other aspects of our government -- the CIA and other participants in the development and formulation of policy. I think it's a fair question, but you could almost ask the same question as to our policy with regard to any other ally. It isn't so much that there is one person in charge, as there is a system in place and an institutional commitment to developing the policy.
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In fairness I will say that I think we could stand to be more explicit in what our policy towards Saudi Arabia is. I have made some recommendations to our government that we need to be more systematic, more clear in precisely what that policy is and to engage the Saudis more directly on the relationship rather than simply asking their support for a policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian crisis or Iraq or Iran or whatever the topic of the moment is. In addition to that, we also need to be very clear to the Saudis on what our relationship with them should be and what we both would like it to be.
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SUSRIS: The presidential campaign process has drawn out a lot of criticisms, comments and analyses of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. You were President Bush's representative to the Kingdom during two years of his administration, how would you characterize his particular approach to relations with Saudi Arabia?
Jordan: He has a strategic vision for the role of Saudi Arabia in the world and its relationship to the United States. He also developed a correct and useful personal relationship with Crown Prince Abdullah at a time when we needed Saudi assistance in the war on terrorism as well as the Afghanistan and Iraqi military conflicts. So, he saw it from both angles.��
He developed a policy, he put people in place to implement the policy; but at the same time, he developed a personal relationship that I think has made it easier to call upon the Crown Prince and Saudi Arabia for assistance from time to time. Likewise, I think he has been attentive to the concerns that the Crown Prince has suggested to him, regarding particularly the Palestinian question as well as some of the aspects of the broader Middle East developments toward democracy and greater public participation.
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For one thing, we've seen the Crown Prince announce that elections will be held in Saudi Arabia starting with the municipal level and ultimately broadening to the Shoura Council. These are trends that the President applauds and supports. I think his personal relationship with Crown Prince Abdullah has assisted in this.
SUSRIS: What do you think of the various books and movies questioning the President's motives on Saudi Arabia?
Jordan: Well, I don't pay much attention to them. The President's motives were very clear to me and that was to protect the national interest, to make certain that we are vigilant in the war on terrorism, that we eliminate as much terrorist financing as possible and that we maintain a stable base that ultimately provides for great public participation in the societies in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, and make certain that they will be a stable and reliable ally for many years to come.
These books are entertaining and fun from time to time, the movies, but they don't really do much to add to the responsible debate. They are harmful in many ways to the relationship because they have so grossly misstated the facts that I think commissions like the 9/11 Commission are in the process of pointing out.
SUSRIS:� On the other side of the ballot, Senator Kerry as you know, has been very critical of the Saudis and has indicated his intention to change the nature of the relationship. Some observers believe that if he did take office he would have to moderate some of those views and deal with the practical realities of our historic ties with Saudi Arabia. Do you see it that way, or do you see in a Kerry administration that there would be a significant change in the way of doing business?
Jordan: I think some of Senator Kerry's comments have been pretty silly and just very short-sighted. I spent a couple of days with him when he came out to Saudi Arabia and he was nothing but complimentary of the Saudis at that time. He even offered to host a breakfast or a lunch for Saudi businessmen at his home in Georgetown and than he turns around and continues to demagogue the issue by now making Saudi Arabians seem like the greatest demons in the world.
The fact of the matter is Saudi Arabia is an important ally. It is an important player in the world economic scene and strategically as well.��
I think even John Kerry will have to come to realize that and deal with the reality. There is no way to reduce America's dependence on hydrocarbons at this moment. The vast preponderance of hydrocarbons exists in Saudi Arabia. Strategically they are located in an important part of the world. In dealing with the Islamic extremist threat we need their support -- with 1.3 billion Muslims in that regard.�
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I think Senator Kerry's demagoguery will probably give way to common sense if he is elected.
SUSRIS: Can you sum up your assessment of the current state of the relationship and outlook for the future?
Jordan: The relationship is clearly under stress at the moment. We're still suffering the aftermath of 9/11.
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We're suffering a great deal of misunderstanding on both sides I think, in terms of how important the relationship is to each other. There's also a certain amount of hurt that I think the Saudis are experiencing. They felt they were in many ways adjunct American citizens before 9/11, and now they're finding it hard to get visas to allow their children to come here for education, or to come here for vacations or visits. This is a personal unhappiness that I think they're dealing with.�
They also don't like the way our media have characterized them, and they are resentful I think of what could be deemed an intrusive attitude toward how they teach their children in the schools and what they preach in the mosques. So there's clearly a stress to the relationship. But long-term, the common interests that unite us will be stronger than what divides us. We clearly both have a commitment to winning the war on terrorism, to minimizing terrorist financing and to stabilizing world economic markets, particularly in the oil and petrochemical areas.
SUSRIS:� Ambassador Robert Jordan thank you very much for helping us understand the U.S.-Saudi relationship better. We hope we'll be able to talk with you again about your experiences in Saudi Arabia.
Jordan:� Thank you very much. I've enjoyed talking with you.
Robert Jordan was selected by President George W. Bush to serve as the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the most critical point in the history of the relationship between our two countries. After Senate confirmation, he served as ambassador from October 2001 through October 2003.
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