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EDITOR'S NOTE:
The
13th Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference (AUSPC)
was convened in Washington, DC on September 12-13, 2004
with the theme "Restoring Arab-U.S. Mutual Trust and
Confidence: What is Feasible? What is Necessary?"
A panel of
distinguished leaders from the United States and Saudi
Arabia shared their insights in a panel addressing the
"Strategic Overview" of U.S.-Arab relations.
The panel included: Chair, The Hon. Frances D. Cook,
President, The Ballard Group and former Ambassador to
Oman; Dr. Anthony
H. Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy, Center
for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Michael
C. Hudson, Director, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.
We are pleased
today to share Dr. Hudson's presentation on the impact of
America's global dominance in its relations with the Arab
world.
In the coming
days we will feature more presentations from the AUSPC.
For a complete list of the agenda items presented in
SUSRIS click
here.
The AUSPC
conferences are organized by the National
Council on US-Arab Relations (NCUSAR), a
Washington-based not for profit organization that seeks to
improve understanding of the Arab world among Americans.
Imperial Over-Reach? How to Lose Friends and Alienate People in the Arab East
Remarks by Dr. Michael Hudson
13th Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference
Washington, DC
September 13, 2004
Hon. Frances D. Cook: Next, I would like to introduce Dr. Michael Hudson, who is Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. I know Michael as the supreme expert on Lebanon in this country, but he has many other attributes and interests as you will see. He is going to address us this morning on a very provocative title, which is "Imperial Over-Reach? How to Lose Friends and Alienate People in the Arab East."
Dr. Michael C. Hudson: Thank you, Frances, and thank you to the conference organizers for inviting me to speak. The title of this conference,
"Restoring U.S.-Arab Mutual Trust and
Confidence," is a matter, which we over at Georgetown's Center for Arab Studies are also very deeply involved in. In fact as this academic year begins, we will be pursuing thematically, through various events, the situation in Palestine and Iraq and the broader war on terrorism, which if you're interested, you can access through the center's Web site -- ccas.georgetown.edu. Now that the plug is over, let me say that I cannot fault either of the previous two speakers -- one a very influential policy analyst
[Dr. Anthony
Cordesman] and the other a high official of the U.S. government [Amb. Philo Dibble]. It only deepens my enduring puzzlement that with all the good advice that seems to be available at high levels, why is it that we seem to get things so badly wrong? Indeed, they seem to be getting worse.�
Let me stand back for just a moment and take a somewhat historical or strategic overview that one needs to do when you're using words like empire and imperialism. We've all been hearing a lot about empire in the context of America's global domination in the post-Cold War period. The idea has been greeted positively, and in some cases celebrated, by neoconservatives, who are now in the ascendancy in American politics. It should be noted, however, that imperialism is a very dirty word in Arabic and in Islamic political discourse. That phenomenon stimulated the nationalist as well as the religious resistance movements of the 20th-century against European penetration. It looks like it will be more of the same in the 21st, only this time, America is the enemy.�
Now, my purpose is not to go over the evidence, which I think is quiet considerable for America's global dominance today, particularly our dominance of this region -- the Arab world and the larger Islamic world. Arguably, we have been functionally in an imperial mode in that part of the world since the end of World War II, notwithstanding, the considerable period during which the Soviet Union tried to penetrate and challenge our overall dominance of the region. It was our sphere of influence, and it still is. You can measure that I think quiet nicely simply by looking at the extraordinary military presence we have in almost every country of this region, not to mention our very substantial economic and commercial and even cultural influence. What we have, what we are doing, what we are involved in, whether we intended it or not, is not the classical imperialism of Europe with its protectorates, its mandates, its colonies and so forth, but, perhaps in its better form, the soft power of liberal globalization with a strong cultural component and a strong, of course, American center of gravity. Globalization is something that is kind of colored American.�
But, I would like to raise two questions about the imperial phenomenon. First, whether today's unrivaled superpower -- that's us -- needs to exercise domination to its fullest extent -- a la the Athenians of the Peloponnesian Wars. You recall Thucydides' famous aphorism -- "The strong do everything that they can. The weak suffer what they must" -- essence of real politick -- and rely on preemptive use of military force, wars of choice, not just necessity. Or, can empires -- our empire -- act in a more benign way a la soft power? My answer in theory is yes, but present-day American practice seems to say no.��
The second question is whether the American empire, with the way we use this term, is exercising its great power intelligently or not? My answer -- an empire that acts stupidly may be prone to imperial over-reach. Imperial over-reach, if unchecked, can prove to be very painful for the empire, not to mention those weaker parties subject to its ill-advised policies.�
Now, today, to be sure as we face this region, we are confronting an unusual challenge, not like the old Soviet Union. It's an unusual challenge of transnational networks mounting a new and very serious challenge, not only to our dominance of the region but even unto the integrity of our homeland national security. Our reaction to this has led I think to a kind of a perfect storm of bad policymaking. Over-reach is understandable but still perhaps not so intelligent.�
�
What is imperial over-reach?
��
When you assume that your adversaries can only be dealt with primarily through military force because force is all they understand, you think.
��
When we lack sufficient military force and the will to use it with all attendant costs over a fairly long period of time.�
�
When you arrogantly decide you can solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by ignoring issues of justice and balance and instead align essentially with a right-wing Israeli government, and essentially as has been mentioned, ignoring, dehumanizing, forgetting about the Palestinian side.�
When you attempt regime change in Iraq and then can't follow through.��
When you give the Muslim world the impression that you have declared war on Islam. People don't get the nuances of the 9/11 Commission's Report -- Islamist terrorism. But, you lack an understanding of what the enemy is and you lack the ability to rescue Islam from its hijackers as I have heard some neoconservatives' publicists say.�
�
When you announce your plan to transform the Arab and Muslim world through the implantation of freedom and democracy, in the American style, and yet, you lack the ability to engineer such reforms because of what I could call the "kiss of death" effect -- if we're promoting these ideas, then maybe there's really something seriously wrong with these ideas, which is very frustrating to indigenous reformers in the region.
�
When you decide that the answer is economic reform.
��
When you decide that economic reform and development of the Arab world will solve the terrorism problem. Well, that's a problematic hypothesis in itself -- about as we heard, it is widely held. And yet, you lack the capabilities to achieve such reforms in these countries within in any foreseeable future. It's a sort of crude economic determinism. Do we really believe that if, let us say, we could reduce the unemployment rate in Morocco, for example, from whatever it might be, let's say 20 percent, to 10 percent, would we then not have the 400 hundred known terrorists that the Moroccan government itself says are out and about in Morocco?��
When we frighten and intimidate our own Arab- and Muslim-American communities.�
�
When we refuse to countenance the idea in our public discourse that the deep and growing hatred of the United States is not related to specific American policies in the region.��
When we allow our foreign policy to be hijacked by a network of neoconservatives, right wing, pro-Israeli zealots, and some misguided Christian fundamentalists.�
When ill-conceived policies of preemptive warfare, clumsily executed, significantly increase the national security dangers we face because we've alienated the Islamic and especially the Arab world, thus creating a nutritious environment in which anti-U.S. terrorist cells can and undoubtedly do and will multiply.
��
When our government blunders clumsily, often with lethal force, into Middle East situations, which about our leaders are not only nearly totally ignorant but about which they entertain politically colored orientalist stereotypes.��
And, when right-wing ideologues have the chutzpah to denigrate the American Middle East studies academic community for failing to alert the nation to the terrorist threats when it is these ideologues themselves who have grievously damaged American national security.�
Finally, in conclusion, where do we stand now? This is, I regret to say, as I mentioned the sort of perfect storm of a confluence of negative and unfortunate tendencies coming together at this particular juncture to make things qualitatively worse than they were. I think Mr. Dibble actually made that point. I don't believe that we are winning any of the numerous wars we've recently engaged in since 9/11, whether it's the war on terrorism itself, whether it's Afghanistan, whether it's Iraq, whether it is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which make no mistake, we are engaged in indirectly.��
We are not doing so well to cope with the problem of spreading domestic insecurity in the region. We look at Saudi Arabia now. We look at the weakening of other traditionally friendly, and I must say, authoritarian regimes.�And, when we look, of course as has been mentioned, at the social and economic malaise that the several Arab Human Development reports have catalogued. Not only that, we are, I think, seriously losing the war for hearts and minds. If you look at the polling data, it's pretty clear -- contempt and disrespect instead of shock and awe. Clash of civilizations is beginning to turn into a self-confirming prophecy on both sides. Thus, I think the Greater Middle East and the MEPI projects face uphill sledding.��
Now, there are some influential officials -- I think of Martin Indyk, who quite a long time ago, I think this was 1991, argued, in my view incorrectly, that we were always hated anyway in this part of the world, so why bother to change it? And, what really counts is respect. Indyk told a House committee, I quote, "I think that anger in the Arab street is real. �It is produced by a number of different factors, but in the end, what matters is not whether they hate us or love us -- for the most part, they hate us; they did before -- but whether they are going to respect our power."�
Well, I believe it does matter. Hearts and minds do matter, and it matters especially when we are confronting the kind of unusual transnational, militant, ideological challenge that is not your conventional adversary. That's a big problem. There's no denying it, and if anything, the conceptualization of this problem underestimates its magnitude. The 9/11 Commission Report, which is an admirable document in my opinion in many ways, says the problem is Islamist terrorism. Well, yes, but that is not all. What you are seeing increasingly, and this goes back to the political trend of the last century, is a growing, reviving national resistance to yet another imperial, foreign occupation.��
Thank you.
The following is an excerpt from the question and answer session, which followed the panel discussion.
Hon. Frances D. Cook: I'm going to pose the final question to Dr. Hudson because I think it is a one-word answer. To Michael, given your concerns about the clumsiness and inability to sustain an effort, would you have advised that the U.S. should go into Afghanistan in post-9/11?�
Dr. Michael C. Hudson: Yes, definitely. I think this was a war of necessity. I think it had a logic to it. Al Qaeda had substantial bases there. It's just unfortunate that I think we pulled our punches and did not invest not just the military but also many other kinds of resources to bring about genuine and legitimate regime change. We've got continuing big problems in Afghanistan, but I have no doubt that in the aftermath of 9/11, knowing what we knew, that that was the right thing to do.��
About the Speaker
Dr. Michael C. Hudson is the Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab Studies and Professor of International
Relations, as well as the current Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University. He previously served as Director of the Center from 1999 to 2000 and from 1976 to 1989. Dr. Hudson is also a past president of the Middle East Studies Association. His research interests focus primarily on international relations, authoritarian states and civil society, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Dr. Hudson, who holds a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University, has edited and contributed to numerous books, including
Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (Columbia University Press/CCAS, 1999), The Palestinians: New Directions (CCAS, 1990), and
Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict (CCAS, 1984). His other works include
The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (Random House, 1968),
Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (Yale University Press, 1977), and numerous articles appearing in the Middle East Journal, Comparative Politics, and other scholarly journals.
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