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EDITOR'S NOTE:
"Momentous changes" in the U.S.-Saudi relationship? The symptoms and effects of a transition in the traditional elements connecting America and the Kingdom are piling up. So, it is fortunate to have the insights of Chas Freeman, President of the Middle East Policy Council, and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, on what is happening in the relationship and what should be done by both sides to address the shortcomings. Ambassador Freeman, who recently returned from one of his frequent visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, talked with SUSRIS on October 26, 2004 by telephone from Washington.
Ambassador Freeman discusses the interests that have bound the United States and Saudi Arabia for over 60 years in Part I of this interview. Tomorrow Part II will feature a review of what can be done by governments and the private sector to address the erosion of the relationship.
Defining Interests and a Changing Relationship
Ambassador Chas Freeman Interview
Part I
SUSRIS: Thank you, Ambassador Freeman, for taking time to discuss U.S.-Saudi relations. You are a frequent visitor to Saudi Arabia and just completed a trip there. Can you share your impressions of the relationship, viewed from both sides?
Amb. Chas Freeman: �Well, I think there is an enormous sense of disappointment and frustration on the part of America's friends in Saudi Arabia that the relationship has not been restored to the level of trust and mutual comfort that they had hoped for. In fact, in many ways, the relationship is evolving away from familiar patterns.�
A good approach to understanding the current situation is to look at the relationship from the perspective of the four or five major interests that tie together the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. It is important to see how these interests and how the relationship that serves them are being redefined under the pressure of events and in the context of the broad and deepening estrangement at the popular level. We have a situation where the two governments, particularly with respect to counterterrorism, are cooperating very effectively. Yet, the attitudes by people on both sides continue to deteriorate.
SUSRIS: �In what ways are current events reshaping the basis of the relationship?
Amb. Freeman: ��If you look at the four or five different interests that tie the United States and Saudi Arabia together, it's clear that the healthiest area of the relationship is cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism. We have a common enemy and recognize that.�
There are domestic agencies on both sides, which had previously been inexperienced and even inept at working with each other, that have learned to cooperate and coordinate. There are now good working relationships between the Ministry of Interior and the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, between the Treasury Department and the Ministry of Finance in Saudi Arabia and so forth. Those parts of the government on both sides are focused on the struggle against terrorists.
But, while there is a very effective level of cooperation in counterterrorism, a new element in the relationship, the traditional interests of the two countries are finding some considerable erosion.
SUSRIS: �Which components of the relationship are being eroded?�
Amb. Freeman: ��To begin with, there's the classic basis of the Saudi-U.S. relationship. It had been a fairly straightforward trade-off of preferred American access to energy resources in return for American defense of the Kingdom against external enemies.�
Several things have happened on this score. First, the principal enemies of Saudi Arabia now are not external but internal, making the American connection less relevant to the Kingdom's defense. Second, those internal enemies in fact are stimulated to their enmity by their objections to the Saudi-American relationship, especially the defense relationship. Their objective is to bring down Saudi-American relations. To the extent that the U.S. in engaged against them by the Kingdom, this allows them to score propaganda points. It strengthens rather than weakens them. Of course, since the occupation of Iraq, the United States has removed combatant forces from the Kingdom, so they're no longer present.�
In many respects, the arms sales relationship, which was traditionally at the heart of our cooperation, is diminished as the Saudis look elsewhere for new or replacement systems. So, the military or security element of the relationship is in fact in the process of being lowered in level of importance for both countries.�
The United States no longer relies on facilities in Saudi Arabia for regional power projection. Saudi Arabia, similarly, is much more on its own in terms of defending itself against its principal enemies. So, I think the security element, which was at the core of this relationship, has become less important to both sides.
�
The other side of the bargain, of course, was energy supply to the United States. Here, the Saudis for many years made a major effort to maintain a preeminent market share in the United States in part to symbolize this bargain. It appears that they are not making that effort to the same extent.�
As China emerges as an alternative destination for Saudi oil exports -- a much faster growing market than the United States -- Saudi Arabia is increasingly interdependent with the Chinese on the energy front even as its relationship with the United States in this area declines.�
So, here too, you see a redirection of connections, probably not intended by anybody and maybe in large measure a function of circumstance or events that are beyond anyone's control. However, the net effect is to lower the importance of the relationship to both sides, and in the case of both countries, to make the relationship not so much first among equals as merely one among equals.�
In the new era, the United States is developing new energy-supply relationships with Russia and Western African countries and looking increasingly to its own hemisphere, to Venezuela or the gulf for energy and emphasizing conservation as much as new discoveries. The Saudis are emphasizing the rapidly growing markets in East Asia.
SUSRIS: �In an interview earlier this month, Professor Jean-Francois Seznec made many of the same points, but he attributed the shift to Saudi Arabian decision makers having given up on the U.S. relationship. He attributed the shift to U.S. policy in the region as well as the relentless condemnation of the Kingdom by American media, Congress and other critics.
Amb. Freeman: ��I don't see that they have "given up" on the relationship. �I think the Saudis are profoundly distressed by our campaign rhetoric. The royal family is insulted by some of candidate Kerry's comments for example. But, at the same time, I think they recognize that it is campaign rhetoric.�
Saudi decision makers are very realistic and pragmatic. I think they are pragmatically seeking to rebalance their relationships internationally in a way that relies less on the United States. In fact, I would argue that without having necessarily articulated such a policy at all, the Bush Administration has been doing the same -- rebalancing relationships to rely less on Saudi Arabia.�
So, you have a conjunction of market forces, events and trends, and perhaps hurt feelings on both sides that bring about this result. Now, the fact is, however, that there is a natural limit to how far this can go. It is illustrated by the fact that the United States remains the largest energy-consuming country in the world. Even if we are eventually overtaken by China, we will still be a major factor in global energy consumption. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is going to remain a major focus of American interest for many reasons -- one of them being its preeminence in global oil reserves.
SUSRIS: How is the change in the energy relationship likely to play out?
Amb. Freeman: I have a sense that there are very momentous changes in Saudi policy emerging. One is that the Saudis place less emphasis on -- maybe no emphasis on -- maintaining preeminence in market share in the United States. Therefore, they treat American purchasers like any other purchasers with no preference -- no more special relationship, if you will.�
Similarly, I don't think the Saudis are committed to continuing to pre-invest in excess production capacity or to play the sort of swing producer role or market-regulating role that they have traditionally played in OPEC. This, I think, many Saudis see as having been a very expensive favor on their part to the United States. We complain bitterly about the Saudis and OPEC until oil prices go very high, at which point Americans turn to Saudi Arabia and OPEC to beg that they intervene to bring prices back down. So, on one hand, denigration and complaint, and on the other hand in times of trouble, requests for assistance from Saudi Arabia were the norm. I don't think Saudis, by and large, are prepared to continue that pattern of interaction. That means that in the future, Saudi Arabia will be producing essentially to meet market demand and building capacity to meet market demand. It will probably limit its investment in new production capacity and decline to put pressure on its oil fields with excessively high levels of production. One can expect the considerably higher oil prices as a result.
SUSRIS: �Weren�t there more reasons for maintaining spare capacity, such as having the ability to throttle prices thereby keeping other energy sources from becoming cost-effective?
Amb. Freeman: �This was something that the Saudis traditionally didn't want to see happen. One of the reasons that they tried to keep prices at a moderate level was to discourage research and development of alternative energy sources. I think that they are much less concerned about that now. They are fairly confident that there is not much alternative to their oil reserves as the key component of future global oil supplies.�
Major new discoveries elsewhere are not very likely. Production elsewhere is largely declining or is troubled in one way or the other. Iraq is clearly not an alternative to Saudi Arabia. New producers are likely to be marginal in terms of overall global demand. So, I think the Saudis have concluded that on the whole, they would be better off with higher prices even if this meant that some substitutes for oil emerge. It's a very different world that we are looking to now as a result of that.
There will be more efforts made here, of course, in the United States to look at alternative sources of energy whether from renewable sources like wind power, hydro, solar energy or those sorts of things, which will actually become economical at this level of oil pricing. The same sort of surge in prices is very likely in the gas area, so that's not an answer to higher crude costs. Perhaps Americans will have to look to coal conversion or other technologies. There will still be demand for fossil fuels but there will be an effort to substitute something else for imported oil.�
SUSRIS: Is it more a confluence of political and economic pragmatism?
Amb. Freeman: Yes, you can sum all this up by saying that the Saudis seem to have concluded that the special relationship with the United States is no longer special to the United States and that they, therefore, should not make much of a special effort for the United States either.
�
What is emerging is a much more, if you will, nationalistic or self-centered or selfish set of Saudi policies, that is likely to be markedly more independent of American desires than has been the case in the past. We are also looking because of this at a world in which the role of OPEC is likely to diminish, and Saudi Arabia's leadership within OPEC is likely to be lessened. Even if Saudi Arabia achieves a measure of independence from the United States, its global leadership role perhaps will also be diminished.�
SUSRIS: What other areas of common interest do you see as changing?
Amb. Freeman: �We talked about the trade-off between security for energy, but you can see other elements being redefined as well. Saudi Arabia continues to be an essential territory for transit by American forces to bases that are located elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Qatar and Kuwait or in Iraq. You can't get to those bases without crossing Saudi territory and that requires the permission of the Saudi authorities. Therefore, Saudi Arabia remains very important to American forces from a strategic point of view.
�
Interestingly, as the United States has placed garrisons in countries like Qatar or in Kuwait, to some extent, we have become part of the traditional rivalry, if that's the right word, at any rate, contention between the smaller emirates in the Gulf and the Saudi Kingdom. The British used to defend those emirates against Saudi influence, but the United States was traditionally on the Saudi side. Now we're less clearly on the Saudi side, and maybe in some respects, beginning to develop relationships with the other emirates that Saudis find annoying if not objectionable.�
So, there is a beginning of the possibility of some level of disagreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia on regional security management issues and on intra-GCC matters. As much as the United States has traditionally promoted GCC cooperation on security matters, there is, in fact, not much of it. I think this is an area where the trends are perhaps not clear, but there are beginning to be question marks apparent about the way things might develop.
Then, we look to the next area of interest, which is Islam. The United States has always had a major interest in moderate management of the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia and in Saudi efforts to maintain a relatively open approach to Islam internationally, even if its own version of Islam is not a particularly open one. Now, however, we see a set of new issues arising with respect to religion. For much of the American body politic, the Saudis are seen as a negative force within the realm of Islam. That is they are seen as a force for fanaticism. I think this is in fact a false accusation in many ways, and it reflects a misunderstanding of the Saudi role. But, in politics, perception is reality. This perception is now firmly grounded in American thinking.
�
SUSRIS: �What about the perceptions on the Saudi side, regarding Americans' views of Islam?
Amb. Freeman: In Saudi Arabia, the United States is increasingly seen as engaged in a war with Islam or against Muslims whether with respect to American support of Ariel Sharon and extreme repression by Israeli authorities of the Palestinians and annexations of land by settlers or whether in Iraq, where increasingly, the opposition to the occupation has a religious tinge to it. Perhaps the symbol of our emerging differences is the recent designation of Saudi Arabia as a "country of particular concern" under the Religious Freedom Act. Traditionally, the White House, the President, recognizing the importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, took action to shield the Saudis from such criticism on the grounds that it was counterproductive and affected other American interests negatively. This President has chosen not to pay the domestic political price of intervening in that matter.
SUSRIS: Did that catch people off guard in the Kingdom?
Amb. Freeman: I think it probably did. I think the American ambassador and the American Embassy made a very professional effort to try to give early warning and explain the decision or put the decision into context. Nonetheless, this does represent a sharpening of differences. The United States at present is, perhaps without even realizing it, in the middle of a broad redefinition of our relationship with the Islamic and Arab worlds in the context of the so-called war on terror.
�
Increasingly, there is animosity between that part of the world that is Islamic and the United States, and there is less and less interaction at the people-to-people level. Travel is way down because of new barriers. In the case of the United States, there are visa requirements and other practices that have been altered out of a concern to stop terrorists from entering the United States. It's down because people in the region, including Saudis, don't feel welcome or secure in the United States anymore. It's down because American businesses are concerned with their security as terrorists target them and are concerned about an atmosphere that is increasingly anti-American.�
There is less communication and dialogue and heightened animosity on religious questions. This is a very negative combination that is driving things in a bad direction, which is in turn affecting the final element, or pillar, of the relationship, which has been its business dimension.
�
There is an enormous expansion of the Saudi economy going on under the impact of money coming in from high oil prices. There is a great deal of construction, imports, private sector innovation, and prosperity, in fact, from the perspective of ordinary Saudis, which I think I want to come to at the last. Although the relationship with the United States is deteriorating, things in Saudi Arabia look pretty good. But, Americans are excluded to an increasing extent from participating in this happy set of developments in the Kingdom. We are notable by our absence.
While U.S. exports to the Kingdom have risen in absolute terms, our market share, which I think is the far more important indicator of our role in Saudi Arabia and the region, is declining sharply. So, relatively speaking, we are not participating in the economic boom to the extent that we would have if we didn't have all the other problems that I've been talking about.
Tomorrow in Part II -- What should be done by governments and the private sector to address erosion of the relationship?
About Amb. Chas Freeman
Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. succeeded Senator George McGovern as President of the
Middle East Policy Council on December 1, 1997.
Ambassador Freeman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1993-94, earning the highest public service awards of the Department of Defense for his roles in designing a NATO-centered post-Cold War European security system and in reestablishing defense and military relations with China. He served as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). He was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the historic U.S. mediation of Namibian independence from South Africa and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
Chas. Freeman served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge'Affaires in the American embassies at both Bangkok (1984-1986) and Beijing (1981-1984). He was Director for Chinese Affairs at the U.S. Department of State from 1979-1981. He was the principal American interpreter during the late President Nixon's path-breaking visit to China in 1972. In addition to his Middle Eastern, African, East Asian and European diplomatic experience, he served in India.
Ambassador Freeman earned a certificate in Latin American studies from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, certificates in both the national and Taiwan dialects of Chinese from the former Foreign Service Institute field school in Taiwan, a BA from Yale University and a JD from the Harvard Law School. He is the recipient of numerous high honors and awards. He was elected to the Academy of American Diplomacy in 1995. He is the author of The Diplomat's Dictionary (Revised Edition) and Arts of Power, both published by the United States Institute of Peace in 1997. Ambassador Freeman is Chairman of the Board of Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based business development firm that specializes in arranging international joint ventures, acquisitions, and other business operations for its American and foreign clients. He also serves as Co-Chair of the United States-China Policy Foundation and Vice Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is a member of the boards of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the regional security centers of the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Washington World Affairs Council.
Previous Positions
- 1995 - Present Chairman of the Board,
Projects International, Inc.
- 1994-95 Distinguished Fellow, United States
Institute of Peace
- 1993-94 Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs
- 1992-93 Distinguished Fellow, Institute for
National Strategic Studies
- 1989-92 U S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
- 1986-89 Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, African Affairs
Recent Honors
- 1995 Elected to American Academy of
Diplomacy
- 1994 Distinguished Public Service Award
(Policy innovation in Europe)
- 1994 Distinguished Public Service Award
(Contributions in Defense Policy)
- 1994 Order of 'Abd Al-'Azziz, 1st Class
(Diplomatic Service)
- 1991 Defense Meritorious Service (Desert
Shield/Storm)
- 1991 CIA Medallion (Desert Shield/Storm)
- 1991 Distinguished Honor Award (Desert
Shield/Storm)
Recent Major Publications and Writings
Source: MEPC.org
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