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EDITOR'S NOTE:
Today, we present Part II of an interview with Chas Freeman, President of the Middle East Policy Council, and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, on what is happening in the relationship and what should be done by both sides to address the shortcomings. Ambassador Freeman, who recently returned from one of his frequent visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, talked with SUSRIS on October 26, 2004 by telephone from Washington.
Ambassador Freeman discussed the interests that forged an alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia for over 60 years in Part I of this interview yesterday. Today, in Part II he reviews what can be done by governments and the private sector to address the erosion of the relationship. Ambassador Freeman also points out that the small circle of American organizations that work to improve U.S. relations with the Arab world are increasingly challenged in funding their important work.
U.S.-Saudi Relations: The Path Ahead
Ambassador Chas Freeman Interview
Part II
In the first part of his interview with SUSRIS, Ambassador Freeman discussed the changing landscape of U.S.-Saudi relations, addressing the bilateral interests that served as the basis of the close connections between the countries for over 60 years. He described the erosion of the relationship in a discussion of each of the fundamental elements.
Part II
SUSRIS: What must be done to reverse these trends?
Amb. Freeman: From the point of view of the interactions of the two countries, I would say a couple of things. There is a real danger, given the negative trends that I've outlined, that if there is not intelligent intervention by the new administration in the United States, whoever leads it after November 2, that is some sort of effort made to sit down with Crown Prince Abdullah and with his brothers to reassess and redefine the relationship along all of the axes that I have discussed, that the relationship will in fact drift permanently into a mutually disadvantageous mode.
Therefore, one of the most important things that both sides need to be doing is to think about how to overcome the legacy of the last three years and the negative campaign rhetoric that has been voiced by Mr. Kerry and how to restore a more balanced relationship.
Both sides need to recognize that their new relationship will not be the relationship that existed in previous years. It will not have many of the qualities of "specialness" that the previous relationship had. It will be, perhaps, the most important relationship for each country -- in terms of relations with the outside world for Saudi Arabia and in terms of the Middle East for the United States, but it will merely be one such relationship among several other relationships, which may be growing to become relatively greater in importance.
The two countries will find that we need to have a clearer understanding of how to manage regional security issues. We need to address the question of the relationships between the Islamic world and the Arabs with the United States in order to put these relationships on a sustainable basis. At the moment, they are on a deteriorating basis.
If we can't do these things, we will not be able to manage some of the regional security issues or continue the effective cooperation against terrorists that we have begun over the last three years. So, there is, I think, a great deal at stake for both sides, and I hope that the leaders on both sides after January 20 will rise to the challenge.
SUSRIS: What other challenges face those who recognize the importance of U.S.-Saudi relations?
Amb. Freeman: A great deal of what is driving the relationship on both sides is a negative image of the other. There exist often ignorant and uninformed stereotypical popular attitudes by one side toward the other. I think a great deal more has to be done by both sides to educate the public in the other, and there's room for cooperation between us to ensure that our own public is educated by us.
It would be a very positive move for the United States to consider some sort of effort to educate our citizenry about Islam and the Arabs in a more systematic way than we have done because the consequences of misunderstanding for our country are very grave. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, as a new generation arises -- that did not study in the United States and which knows us more from Hollywood movies rather than travel here on vacation or study here -- there is going to be a much greater requirement for the United States to explain itself. We need to work with Saudis who are friends of the United States to improve our image in Saudi Arabia and more generally in the region.
This requires something much deeper, though perhaps lower key, than mounting public relations campaigns. It is a kind of grassroots effort in which there is a continuing important role for organizations like the Middle East Policy Council. There is also a need in Saudi Arabia for counterpart organizations that don't yet exist. That is to say institutions that put arguments about relations with the United States and the West before the Saudi public as the Middle East Policy Council puts before the American public arguments regarding U.S. interests in the Arab and Islamic worlds and for strong ties to support those interests.
In our case, we argue from an American point of view; in the Saudi case, the case for improved relations would be argued from a Saudi point of view. But, the fact is that there needs to be more effort by those who do understand and support the relationship on both sides to make the case to skeptics and hostile critics. This is a very different task than the one of spin control or spin doctoring as events occur or putting out press releases when positive developments happen, important as it is to do those things too.
Frankly, I don't think a public relations effort can succeed in the long run unless it is addressing a better-educated and more sympathetic public than the one that we now have on both sides. So, I would argue that in sum that after the elections, after the inauguration, the two sides need to sit down at a high level and seriously review our interests and redefine our relationship to fit the new circumstances so that the relationship can be sustained and can grow in a healthy manner. Second, we need to consider how to address the problem of popular estrangement and ignorance in a sustained fashion on both sides.
SUSRIS: I'd like to pick up on one of those themes -- the one on image. In January, you were cited by Arab News as saying that Saudi Arabia needed a long-term strategy to refurbish its image in the U.S. In early October, a conference was held in Riyadh on Saudi Arabia's image. They set out to study and work out strategies to improve their image overseas, in the West and especially in the United States. Some of the things talked about included creation of think-tanks in Saudi Arabia, more introspection as to what the outward appearance of Islam and Saudi Arabia's role in Islam, and using economic clout to discipline countries that unfairly portrayed Saudi Arabia in the world. Is this a step in the direction of meeting the long-term need?
Amb. Freeman: I think the conference and the ideas that it brooded about were a very positive development. As I said, the Saudis need to develop institutions in Saudi Arabia that can connect them to the outside world more effectively. A good example is think-tanks. Saudis are not present at many international scholarly and policy gatherings because Saudi Arabia does not have institutions that connect to similar organizations -- think-tanks and university audiences -- that organize and go to those conferences. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is absent, and its voice is silent. Its influence is zero or even less than that. So, that's clearly an important point, and one that needs to be addressed.
I would argue that the returned students from the United States, the alumni of American universities could, if they can find the appropriate way of organizing themselves, play a greater role in outreach to their alma maters in the United States or for that matter, in the U.K. They could exercise a measure of influence that they have not done in terms of raising Saudi Arabia's profile. They could ensure that university endowments are present for studies of Saudi Arabia or the Gulf as well as for ancient history or other less immediately relevant topics. Clearly, there is a lot that needs to be done in Saudi Arabia along this line.
SUSRIS: There are organizations in the U.S. that seek to inform Americans about the Arab world, and occasionally public information campaigns such as those recently conducted by Saudi Arabia. Are they effective?
Amb. Freeman: Although Saudi Arabia has started a sort of public diplomacy effort through hired public relations companies in the United States and in the U.K., and this is a step in the right direction, there is a real danger that in the process, other things may be neglected or lost.
I will say honestly that I am concerned about the future of American institutions which make arguments on behalf of Americans for better relations with Saudi Arabia and the region, like the Middle East Policy Council or the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations or the Middle East Institute or AMIDEAST. All of them, to one degree or the other, share the characteristic of being American institutions arguing for stronger relations with Arabs. These organizations may in fact go under because of the combined impact of lack of funding, lack of attention, and an increasingly hostile atmosphere for their work domestically. I think that if they do go under, if the grassroots efforts and constituency consolidation role that they perform is neglected, then it will be impossible to reinvent them, and America and Saudi Arabia will have lost something very fundamental in terms of resilience and vitality of our relations.
So, I think what is required is a strategy that's balanced and includes several elements. First is building institutions to connect Saudi Arabia with similar institutions abroad. Second is sustaining or putting on a sustainable basis, endowing if you will, or otherwise putting on a firm long-term basis, organizations in places like the United States or the U.K. that support a better understanding of the Kingdom and the region. Third is a better-focused public relations effort. Some effort to build, within the Saudi diplomatic service, a public diplomacy function that is more proactive and less concerned with preventing information getting out than putting it out. In other words, I think the Ministry of Information, which has begun to move in this direction, needs to make significant further moves.
There is quite a range of things to do. It is not enough to do one thing and neglect others. Unfortunately, I would have to say that historically, the Kingdom has had a hard time putting together comprehensive, strategic approaches to issues on any issue. This one is a particularly difficult one to get a hold on intellectually or organizationally.
SUSRIS: You mentioned your concerns about the U.S. organizations that work to support Arab-American relations. What are their prospects for contributing to the work that needs to be done?
Amb. Freeman: I think it is very likely that one or more of us will be gone in a few years because, among other things, of the perpetual fascination in Saudi Arabia with doing new things. You do new things, and then forget about the old things.
To put it very bluntly, I think there is a direct trade-off between buying influence in public relations -- you buy staff time at a public relations company, and if it's a good one, you get a good deal for that money, but, the minute you stop paying, that's it -- versus sustaining friends who are doing things on their own. They look to find ways to do things for mutual interests and they try to do that regardless of whether you help them or not.
If you let the self-motivated American institutions that believe in strong U.S.-Saudi relations as something that is good for the United States go under, then you're not going to be able to substitute for that by hiring public relations executives. Quite aside from the fact that those of us -- I can't speak about other organizations particularly -- my presidency of the Middle East Policy Council is a part-time function. It's volunteer -- I don't get paid very much at all for doing this. Our staff is very lean. Our entire budget is less than the take home pay of senior officials of public relations companies in Washington -- the whole organization's budget. The bang for the buck is vastly larger. And the credibility of having Americans make arguments from an American perspective is invaluable.
SUSRIS: So, in addition to the challenges of educating Americans among other tasks, they are also faced with struggling to survive financially?
Amb. Freeman: The requirement for the work that organizations like the Middle East Policy Council, the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, the Middle East Institute -- do, has never been greater. But the level of financial support from the region has never been more erratic and less reliable. The size of the American business community there, which has been an important source of support, is declining rather than expanding, so our base is not what it was.
It is very difficult for us to operate in an environment where governments in the region, not just the Saudi government, but other governments in the region, don't really know what they're doing, they're constantly reassessing. There is no confirmed strategy, no reliable base of financial support for work that all acknowledge is in their own interest as well as that of both sides.
In the long run, the only answer for the U.S. organizations is some sort of endowment. But, I see no effort being made by benefactors in the region to organize such an approach even though the amount of money that would be spent to provide an endowment for any one of these organizations would be probably less than is being spent on some specific public relations activities. It would be a once and for all, one time and forever investment.
We come back to the point that there needs to be a comprehensive strategy. Putting Saudi Arabia's existing friends and institutions that support the relationship on a sustainable long term basis has to be part of that strategy.
SUSRIS: Shifting gears a little at the end -- this is crunch week in the presidential campaigns. How do you see the role the U.S.-Saudi relationship is playing in presidential politics.
Amb. Freeman: Well, it's the first time in a long time, if ever, that U.S.-Saudi relations have actually been an issue in a campaign, where the challenger is accusing the incumbent president of having failed to act forcefully against the Saudis.
Even if critics don't take as extreme a line as Michael Moore in Fahrenheit 911, there are those who hold to the position that Bush is in bed with Bandar and Prince Bandar and the Saudi royal family call the shots in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. This is a ludicrous parody of reality and has no credibility at all with anyone who knows anything. Yet, this has been very warmly received by segments of the public and it is now an article of faith among many. It reflects the facts that I mentioned that there is a deep level of estrangement between the United States and Saudi Arabia at the popular level.
There's a great deal of suspicion by Americans of the Saudi royal family, a lack of understanding of Saudi society and a fundamental misunderstandings of Islam. These misunderstandings have come together to produce an atmosphere where this sort of political cheap shot is good electoral politics.
After the election, whoever wins is going to have to govern. And whoever governs is going to have to deal with the interests I mentioned. This means energy security in which Saudi Arabia is an important factor; a relationship with the Islamic world in which Saudi Arabia plays a key role; the management of security issues in the Persian Gulf and adjacent regions in which again Saudi Arabia is a key; and of course the question of cooperation against terrorists, many of whom focus their attention on Saudi Arabia as much as, or even more than they do on the United States.
There are these things plus the interests of the American business community in remaining competitive internationally. There are the interests of the American labor unions that there be jobs, that produce U.S. exports. These things are among the realities that anyone who governs is going to have to deal with.
It means that the gratuitous insults and rhetorical slights of the campaign will have to be put aside. It's a vital part of retuning the struggle against terrorists internationally to put the U.S.-Saudi relationship back on a firm, solid, long-term, sustainable basis, and that requires a measure of thought and a measure of politeness, in mutual dialogue that has been lacking in the campaign.
SUSRIS:� Thank you, Ambassador Freeman for your consideration today in sharing your insights and experiences.
Amb. Freeman:� Not at all.
Click here to read Part I of this interview.
About Amb. Chas Freeman
Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. succeeded Senator George McGovern as President of the Middle East Policy Council on December 1, 1997.
Ambassador Freeman was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1993-94, earning the highest public service awards of the Department of Defense for his roles in designing a NATO-centered post-Cold War European security system and in reestablishing defense and military relations with China. He served as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). He was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the historic U.S. mediation of Namibian independence from South Africa and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
Chas. Freeman served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge'Affaires in the American embassies at both Bangkok (1984-1986) and Beijing (1981-1984). He was Director for Chinese Affairs at the U.S. Department of State from 1979-1981. He was the principal American interpreter during the late President Nixon's path-breaking visit to China in 1972. In addition to his Middle Eastern, African, East Asian and European diplomatic experience, he served in India.
Ambassador Freeman earned a certificate in Latin American studies from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, certificates in both the national and Taiwan dialects of Chinese from the former Foreign Service Institute field school in Taiwan, a BA from Yale University and a JD from the Harvard Law School. He is the recipient of numerous high honors and awards. He was elected to the Academy of American Diplomacy in 1995. He is the author of The Diplomat's Dictionary (Revised Edition) and Arts of Power, both published by the United States Institute of Peace in 1997. Ambassador Freeman is Chairman of the Board of Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based business development firm that specializes in arranging international joint ventures, acquisitions, and other business operations for its American and foreign clients. He also serves as Co-Chair of the United States-China Policy Foundation and Vice Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is a member of the boards of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the regional security centers of the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Washington World Affairs Council.
Previous Positions
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1995 - Present Chairman of the Board,
Projects International, Inc.
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1994-95 Distinguished Fellow, United States
Institute of Peace
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1993-94 Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs
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1992-93 Distinguished Fellow, Institute for
National Strategic Studies
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1989-92 U S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
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1986-89 Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, African Affairs
Recent Honors
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1995 Elected to American Academy of
Diplomacy
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1994 Distinguished Public Service Award
(Policy innovation in Europe)
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1994 Distinguished Public Service Award
(Contributions in Defense Policy)
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1994 Order of 'Abd Al-'Azziz, 1st Class
(Diplomatic Service)
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1991 Defense Meritorious Service (Desert
Shield/Storm)
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1991 CIA Medallion (Desert Shield/Storm)
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1991 Distinguished Honor Award (Desert
Shield/Storm)
Recent Major Publications and Writings
Source: MEPC.org
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