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Gulf Security and US-Saudi Relations: The Cases of Iran and Iraq - A Conversation with
Khalid al-Rodhan

Editor's Note 

What is happening in Iraq and Iran? In the case of Iraq, how can the insurgency be broken, stability established and the country rehabilitated? In Iran, what will come of negotiations to resolve the confrontation over the nuclear enrichment program? What if negotiations fail? In what ways do the situations in each country overlap? 

These are the front page issues that occupy the agendas of top level decision makers in Washington these days. Likewise, in Saudi Arabia the thorny questions about Iran and Iraq are central to Gulf security, today and in the long term. Solutions are hard to come by. However, SUSRIS asked Khalid al-Rodhan at the Center for Strategic and International Studies to help us understand the current state of play and how US-Saudi relations are effected by these Gulf security issues.

Khalid al-Rodhan, visiting fellow at CSIS, has written extensively on these issues (links below) and is coauthor, with Anthony Cordesman, of the newly released, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat." He was interviewed by phone from his office at CSIS in Washington on June 16, 2006.

 

SUSRIS: Thank you for joining us today to talk about Gulf security issues from the perspective of Saudi-US relations. Let�s start with Iran. Saudi Arabian foreign minister Saud al-Faisal was recently in Tehran where the question of Iran�s nuclear program was discussed. What is Riyadh�s position on this issue?

Khalid al-Rodhan: The Saudi position has always been to push for a nuclear free Middle East that would include Iran, Israel and everybody else. The Saudi statements in the last couple of months have focused on urging Iran to cooperate with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. Prince Saud al-Faisal�s visit to Iran, I think, was another attempt to push Iran to accept the offer by the EU3 [UK, France, Germany], China, Russia and the United States. Whether Iran accepts it remains an unknown at this point. 

There has been a statement from President Ahmadinejad that was positive about the offer and that Iran is considering it, but again whether they accept it on not remains to be seen. 

The other issue with Iran is their involvement with Iraq. On this the Kingdom has expressed its position. When Prince Saud al-Faisal was in Washington he made several statements concerning it and we have also heard from both the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the British Minister of Defense regarding Iran�s involvement in Iraq�s internal affairs. 

Strategically speaking, the difficulty with both Iran�s nuclear program and Iran�s involvement in Iraq is that the strategic landscape in the Gulf is changing. The Kingdom and the other Gulf states have to deal with these issues. 

If there is a nuclear Iran with its long range strike capabilities, especially if they have missiles, then the Kingdom would have to reconsider both its strategic posture and defense posture toward Iran and Iraq, and toward being able to defend itself and the other Gulf states. So, to put things in perspective, everything is evolving at this point and the Kingdom is trying to adapt to this changing strategic environment. 

SUSRIS: What evidence is there of interference in Iraq�s affairs? What actions on the part of Iran in Iraq concerns Saudi Arabia?

Iraqi army soldiers from the 8th Iraqi Army Division Explosive Ordnance Disposal and U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians from Multinational Division - Central South prepare to dispose of piles of unexploded ordnance in Diwaniyah, Iraq, on April 8, 2006. The demolition of the ordnance denies their use by insurgents in improvised explosive devices. DoD photo by Senior Airman Jason T. Bailey, U.S. Air Force.Rodhan: Most of the indications we have come from statements by US, British and Saudi officials regarding Iran�s involvement. The statement that most people refer to was an accusation by British Prime Minister Tony Blair who charged Iran with supporting the insurgency by transferring bomb materials and by helping them with bomb making. 

The other accusations we have seen came from the United States, and they concern Iran�s involvement in Iraq�s internal affairs but without any specific details. However, most people take it that Iran was involved in supporting the Mahdi militia led by Sadr and also the Badr Brigade. Those two militias have been accused by United States and Iraqi officials of sectarian violence against the Sunnis.

It�s not only outside powers that are accusing Iran. Iraqi officials including [former Prime Minister] Ayad Allawi and [former President] Ghazi al-Yawer have accused Iran of meddling in Iraq�s internal affairs. They claim Iran is trying to push its own agenda in Iraq. We also have heard from [President] Jalal Talabani who accused Iran of meddling in Iraq�s internals affairs. So we have numerous accusations against Iran. 

The difficulty for the Kingdom and for the other Gulf states is how to deal with this. 

I think the number one question is: what are the goals of Iran in Iraq? And that is hard to answer at this point. The possibilities: Iran wants to see Iraq being made in its own image; or it wants instability in Iraq to continue; or it wants to distract attention away from its nuclear program; or wants the sectarian divisions to continue so the Shiites would get the upper hand. These are the scenarios. But the issue I think in dealing with Iran specifically is that most of its involvement is covert and Iran hasn�t responded to these accusations. They are saying that it�s not Iran�s fault -- it�s the failure of the United States in Iraq that has caused the sectarian division and that Iran has no interest in Iraq�s internal affairs except its stability. So there you have it. 

President George W. Bush speaks to U.S. troops and U.S. embassy personnel in Baghdad on June 13, 2006 (White House Photo - Eric Draper)SUSRIS: When President Bush was in Baghdad recently he called on Iraq�s neighbors to be more helpful. Is he talking about Saudi Arabia and if so what is it that the US could expect Saudi Arabia to do to be more helpful in Iraq?

Rodhan: I�m not sure he was referring to Saudi Arabia. Most of the talk on the U.S. side has referred to Iran and Syria. The U.S. has accused them of aiding the insurgency. 

In terms of Saudi Arabia I think there are several issues. One would be the political influence on the Sunnis to urge reconciliation. The Kingdom pushed for the Cairo conference [Arab League, Nov. 2005] that brought together the Iraqi factions. And the Kingdom has considerable influence within the Sunni community in Iraq. 

The second issue is control of the Saudi-Iraqi border. The Kingdom has spent about $1.2 billion on border control over the last year. The difficulty for the kingdom is that there is no control on the other side so they have to do the work for both sides. 

Lastly, the United States has pushed for -- and the Kingdom has expressed willingness to do it -- forgiving the Iraqi debt. So I guess on the political and the security side those are the areas where the Kingdom can be helpful in the case of Iraq.

SUSRIS: An often-discussed issue is the question of foreign fighters in Iraq. A number of articles talk about Saudi Arabians who are fighting with the insurgency in Iraq. What�s your take on the charges as to the number, the level of participation of Saudi Arabians in the insurgency?

Rodhan: Well I think we�ve heard both from US officials and Saudi officials that first of all the foreign fighters as a percentage of insurgency in Iraq is very small. It�s approximately four to five percent. So the focus on the foreign fighters is often exaggerated by the media. 

A second point is that the estimates for the composition of the foreign fighters change from one day to another. We have, for example, within a month, two different statements from the Minister of Interior in Iraq saying the foreign fighters dropped from 3000 to almost 800 or 900. So these are more like �guesstimates� than estimates. 

Some estimates put the Saudi volunteers at ninety percent, on the other hand some put them as low as 12%. That assumes the people making those estimates actually know the composition of the insurgency. But this is just one cross section. It�s very difficult to get a full picture, but I think it is very small. 

The Kingdom has implemented many policies to curb the flow of fighters into Iraq and to deal with them on the way back. We have statements from Prince Nayef that the Kingdom is doing everything it can to stop the insurgents from going to Iraq and the Kingdom is ready to deal with them on the way back. Many people accuse the Kingdom of letting them go through the border but that�s not true. You have statements from the U.S. military and statements by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior that they are coming through other neighboring states. It makes it a little bit difficult since the Kingdom has borders with many countries. They can go from one country to another and it�s very hard to track them.

SUSRIS: How would you categorize the closeness of the positions in Riyadh and Washington on the questions of the relationship with Iraq, and the issues with Iran? Are the United States and Saudi Arabia on the same sheet of music?

Rodhan: I think generally speaking yes. Both the Kingdom and the United States want a stable Iraq. They may disagree on the details of how to get there but both countries want a sovereign Iraq that�s stable, where the sectarian violence ends and where the future political solution is decided by Iraqis and not by outside powers. In the case of the Iran nuclear issue you have an agreement that both sides want to see a diplomatic and peaceful solution.

SUSRIS: What is your outlook for Gulf security in the short term? How do you see the situations in Iran and Iraq developing?

Rodhan: Both Iran and Iraq have historically been the wildcards in the Gulf. Predicting the future is hard in the case of Iran but its even more difficult in the case of Iraq. I don�t think we�ll see major changes. In terms of Iran�s nuclear issue I believe we will continue to see the back and forth talk about negotiations -- whether Iran accepts the six nations offer remains to be seen. I don�t believe there will be major changes there. 

In the case of Iraq I think it largely depends on what the Iraqi government will do in the next three months. It�s important that the Iraqi government resolves the sectarian violence, that it deals with death squads, that it cleans up its Ministry of Interior, that the new prime minister � Prime Minister Maliki � delivers on his promise to deal with the economic and the social problems that Iraq is dealing with. Most people focus on the security issues but the problem really goes beyond just security in Iraq. Iraqis have to feel that they are part of the nation and that the government is serving them. 

In terms of direct effect on the Gulf security I think it�s hard to see what impact Iraq will have. There are two main issues. What will the nature of the insurgency be in the next couple of months? Will the death of Zarqawi impact the structure of the insurgency or not? It remains to be seen. 

The other question is what is the future of Iraq? Whether the three main sectarian factions will come together, the Kurds the Shiites and the Sunnis. How will these two dynamics impact the neighboring states and hence Gulf security. I think these are the key areas that we need to watch in the next couple of months.

SUSRIS: You have written, with Dr. Cordesman at CSIS, about a U.S. military option against Iran if diplomacy fails. What will be the impact on U.S.- Saudi relations if that happens?

Rodhan: I think the Kingdom does not want to see a military option exercised or economic sanctions implemented. The Kingdom sees that the best option for everyone is a peaceful solution. I think the Kingdom would advise against a military option because the consequences -- as we discussed in our book and reports -- outlined the retaliatory options by Iran and the strategic implications for the region. I don�t think anybody, the Saudis or the United States wants to see those consequences. The Gulf has seen a lot of challenges in the last several years and an attack on Iran by the United States would just add to the uncertainty, to the risks in the Gulf.

SUSRIS: Any closing thoughts on these questions?

Rodhan: I think there are many unknowns out there. There are many who are speculating about what the Kingdom would do, what Iran would do, what Iraq would do, and what the United States would do. But most of it is based on speculation, not facts, so at this point we�ll have to wait and see what the future brings in the next couple of months. 

SUSRIS: Are you optimistic or not?

Rodhan: Always optimistic. 

SUSRIS: Thank you so much for sharing your insights on Gulf security and US-Saudi relations with us today.

 

CSIS Profile - Khalid R. al-Rodhan

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(CSIS Press Release)

Iran�s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat 
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan


Washington, DC, June 1, 2006- There is no simple or reliable way to characterize Iran�s ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the means to deliver them. Iran is clearly attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, but it has never indicated that such weapons would have chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear warheads. Iran has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown. And, although the Iranian leadership has consistently argued that its nuclear research efforts are designed for peaceful purposes, Iran�s actions have raised serious concerns about its nuclear ambitions. 

This latest work by Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al- Rodhan covers all facets of Iran�s weapons of mass destruction. The authors analyze Iran�s motivation for acquiring WMD capabilities; the history of its WMD program; its chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities; and its delivery options, including its missile program, air force, and Revolutionary Guards. They also examine the spectrum of diplomatic and economic sanctions available to make Iran comply with the United Nations Security Council, as well as military options and the different ways Iran might respond. In addition, the authors explore the geostrategic implications of these options on regional stability, energy security, and the struggle against terrorism. Up to date through May 2006, this is the most current and comprehensive reference available on Iran�s weapons of mass destruction.

Contents
List of Figures, Tables, and Maps
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. Iran�s Motivation for Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction
3. Iran�s Chemical Weapons
4. Iran�s Biological Weapons
5. �Guesstimating� Iran�s Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
6. The History of Iran�s Nuclear Programs
7. The Uncertain Character of Iran�s Nuclear Facilities
8. Possible Dates for Iran�s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
9. Delivery Systems
10. Iran�s Options and Potential Responses

About the Authors

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News, a frequent commentator on National Public Radio and the BBC, and the author of more than 40 books on U.S. security policy, energy policy, and the Middle East, including Iran�s Developing Military Capabilities (CSIS, 2005). 

Khalid R. Al-Rodhan is research fellow with the Burke Chair and coauthor with Cordesman of several books on energy security and military strategy, including Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War (Praeger/CSIS, forthcoming).

 

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