The crisis in Lebanon has so many angles and subplots that it can easily confound observers trying to make sense of it. The relationships among the protagonists are complicated and contain often mutually exclusive interests. To help us examine the implications of the crisis on US-Saudi relations we've asked Professor Gregory Gause, Director of the Middle East Studies Program at the University of Vermont, for his perspectives.

SUSRIS readers will recall our earlier conversation with Professor Gause on the questions of reform in the Kingdom and the war on terror as well as his memorandum to Crown Prince Abdullah, an article he wrote for Foreign Policy magazine that was reprinted here. The article resulted in an insightful panel discussion on "How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists."

Professor Gause talked with SUSRIS by phone from his office on the campus of the University of Vermont on July 27, 2006.

SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time today to share your insight on US-Saudi relations and developments in the Kingdom related to the crisis in Lebanon. Let�s start with the position Saudi Arabia took in fixing responsibility for the crisis in the July 14 statement. What was your assessment of the public charges against Hizbollah and their backers?

Professor F. Gregory Gause: I think that the initial Saudi position was a reaction to the balance of power in the region � it was the same response in Jordan and Egypt, where they used almost the same language in Arabic about irresponsible adventures. They saw Hizbollah escalating a crisis and they thought that any kind of advantage that might accrue to Hizbollah, is an advantage to Iran. They all see the increase of Iranian power in the region as worrisome. 

Their initial response was to indirectly condemn Hizbollah for escalating the crisis, of taking that first step, of going across the border and killing some Israeli soldiers and capturing two of them. They viewed the situation through the lens of a fear of rising Iranian power. I don�t think it was a coincidence that the phrase used by King Abdullah of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt after their bilateral meeting was exactly the same words used in the statement the Saudis issued at about the same time. 

These three states appear to be coordinating their diplomacy, or at least they have a common view on where the region is going and the problems they face. That was interesting in that you have three Arab states -- two of them with peace treaties with Israel, but one of them not -- who, at a minimum, might be expected to at least either stay quiet or back the Arab side by saying that Arab civilians shouldn�t be attacked, and they did say that. But, for them to go beyond that politically and to criticize Hizbollah, even if indirectly was an interesting step. 

I think it had a lot more to do with balance of power politics than any kind of Sunni-Shia ideological motives. There might have been some of that in it too, but I think it was primarily about Iranian power. It seems to me that was where they started. Where they ended up after, we�ve been at this now for 15-16 days -- not just Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt and Jordan -- is that the early signal of a willingness to take a diplomatic stand, to try to defang Hizbollah, to try to pull it back, is over because of the public reaction in the Arab world to the fighting. 

SUSRIS: Who was the intended audience for the Saudi government statement in the first days of the crisis, the July 14 statement that condemned the �miscalculated adventures carried out by elements inside the state and those behind them?� Was it Hizbollah, the Lebanese government, the broader region, the West, or all of the above?

Gause: I think it was all of the above. But I think the most important signal there would have been to the United States. The message to international actors was that, �We�re willing to play a role in trying to defuse this even if it means putting us crosswise with Hizbollah -- because we see the danger.� There�s no payoff for the Saudis or the Egyptians or the Jordanian government making this kind of statement when their own public opinion clearly is much more sympathetic with the Arab parties in any Arab-Israeli confrontation. So I think it was mostly a signal to the international players, including the United States, that, �We�re available if you can come up with something.�

SUSRIS: In an op-ed in al-Hayat on July 26 titled, �Riyadh has lost its patience� Daoud Shirian, referring to the second Saudi statement [Jul 25], made the point that Saudi Arabia, as a result of their initial position, had to tolerate �the criticism of those who regarded the statement as a justification for the aggression.� Do you think the Saudis were surprised by the level of criticism and had to do a double take? Or was it that nothing came of the overture as evidenced by the outcome of Prince Saud al-Faisal�s visit to the White House and the lack of progress at the Rome meeting?

Gause: I think both. I certainly think that they got a clear sense from the meeting in the White House where Washington was on the issue. So they knew what was going to happen in Rome. I think the second Saudi statement, the July 25 statement, was largely a response to what they heard in Washington. My reading of the Saudis is if they heard something in Washington that they thought was worth pursuing they would bear the public opinion cost to do it. But since they didn�t hear anything in Washington that they thought was worth pursuing, why fight public opinion?

SUSRIS: You have made the point that the July 25 statement was a change of tune. It talked about a reassessment of the Abdullah peace plan and the possibility of a wider war. Can you pick up from that point?

Gause: Right. People have emphasized the issue of a wider war. The statement said if the peace option is not taken the only thing left is the war option. I don�t think Saudi Arabia is going to go to war with anybody, anytime soon. I think that was more or less a reflection of what they saw as the possibilities for wider regional conflict.

It was a signal to the United States saying, �Look, you know we made ourselves available to you and you can�t move on this, you haven�t moved on this so we are not going to take any heat for you on this.� We should recall, it wasn�t that many years ago, then Crown Prince Abdullah raised the issue of Israeli action in the occupied territories against Palestinians to a level of, I don�t want to say a crisis, but to a serious level in the relationship. It was before 9-11 but it shows that it�s not out of character for Abdullah to react in a strong way to scenes of Arab civilians being mistreated by Israelis. 

It seems there are countervailing forces here. One is not wanting to have the Iranians win any kind of diplomatic victory. One is not wanting to see a major regional crisis. One is trying to maintain good relations with the United States. On the other hand you have the pressures of public opinion. Saudi policy has always been a balancing act on any question involving the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict. I think the first statement was a signal that the Saudis -- along with the Egyptians and the Jordanians -- were willing to pay a price on the public opinion side if the Americans were willing to actively get involved. They wanted to end this crisis -- maybe in a way that would roll back Hizbollah power. But since the Americans weren�t willing to take that step I think the second Saudi statement was saying, �Okay, we�ve signed off. We are no longer available to give you an Arab cover for diplomatic efforts.�

SUSRIS: Aren�t all those objectives mutually exclusive -- roll back Hizbollah power and thwart Iranian influence in the region, against the desire to have the United States reign in Israel who is fighting to roll back Hizbollah power?

Gause: Well that�s the big question mark. Are they rolling back Hizbollah power? 

We�ll have to see how this ends. While Hezbollah is certainly taking the brunt on the military side, politically they might come out of this even stronger. We�ll have to see. 

Yes, there are contradictions. I think the Saudis were hoping that the crisis that Hizbollah caused could be used to rally international pressure that would get Syria to play a more constructive role vis a vis Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, there are problems, of course, in restraining Syrian influence in Lebanon.

If there is a strong international effort saying �Look this crisis has to end and Hizbollah has to pay a price for it,� then you might be able to isolate Hizbollah in Lebanese politics. But given the way things are developing I don�t think that�s going to happen.

SUSRIS: Let�s talk about the aid being provided by Saudi Arabia to Lebanon -- $1 billion to the Central Bank to bolster the economy, $500 million in reconstruction aid, and more to come. What is the political impact of jumping in with such a large aid package?

Gause: I don�t think it�s much. Clearly there is a some genuine humanitarianism in this, trying to help out the Lebanese. There is some contesting for influence with Iranian-backed Hizbollah in Lebanon. There is also the fact that oil is at $70 a barrel so it is really easy for the Saudis to make these donations right now.

However, it�s not insignificant in Lebanon if it�s used properly. We will only see that down the line. I think it is both humanitarian and political to some extent but not particularly costly to the Saudis.

SUSRIS: Let�s talk about some of the scenarios that could unfold in the coming weeks -- and no one who�s talking about the crisis suggests it�s going to be anything less than a couple of weeks. Syria has said that if Israel presses too far in Lebanon and gets close to the Syrian border that Damascus could act. No one knows if that is a hollow threat but if Syria gets involved militarily, what is Saudi Arabia�s position? Gause: Keeping their heads down. At that point I think the Saudis will be on the Arab side and they might even help the Syrians financially, but I don�t see the Saudis playing a confrontational role.

The only tool they have for a major confrontation would be, of course, the oil weapon. However, the Saudis have emphasized time and again that oil is off the table. So I would be extremely surprised if we saw the Saudis taking the kind of step they took in 1973. But they won�t be happy. That�s for sure. They would line up on the Arab side diplomatically, and maybe financially, if the war spreads.

You know I think the way this was handled was a lost opportunity. There was a window for the United States to use our relations with Saudi, Egypt and Jordan to come out of this crisis. We are talking hypothetically here, we don�t know if it could have happened, but there may have been a chance to come out of this crisis a little cleaner, and with Hizballah�s wings clipped a bit. 

SUSRIS: Who missed the opportunities and in what ways?

Gause: As I said this is all very hypothetical and I might be sketching castles in the sky that really didn�t exist. But the opportunity I�m referring to was in the first days of the crisis. If the United States could have gotten the Israelis to limit their military reaction -- not strike at the Lebanese infrastructure, strike in a much more limited way at clear Hezbollah military sites. It obviously would have been militarily much less effective for the Israelis, but I don�t think they have a military solution to Hizbollah in the long run anyway. But if Washington could have restrained Israel then at some point the United States could have tried to get consensus -- the EU along with Arab cover � for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. The US and the international community could have said, �Okay it is time to stop this with a cease fire and it is time for Hizbollah to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution that addresses disarming militias in Lebanon.�

You are not going to get Hezbollah completely disarmed but maybe you could get them partially disarmed. You could get movement back from the border. You could deal Hizbollah a political defeat by making them climb down. It would have entailed a greater openness to Syria. I think you would have had to try to bring the Syrians in on this somehow. There is a cost to that -- giving them more of a role in Lebanese politics after they were run out. It would mean ignoring the Hariri assassination investigation in which Syria is implicated, but it might have put off this escalation. Again, this is all hypothetical. Maybe it wouldn�t have resulted in a better outcome but it was an opportunity missed.

SUSRIS: Where do you see this situation in a month?

Gause: I believe the Israelis stop and leave. I think Hizbollah regroups with a political victory, because they will say they fought the Israelis to a draw and then regroups but lies low for a while in Lebanese politics. They are also going to have to answer some questions among the Lebanese. Why did you start this? Why did you bring this on us? 

If there is a new international force I don�t think it�s going to be effective -- that anybody is going to join up with a force if its job is to fight Hezbollah. They would know that�s a losing effort in the long run.

SUSRIS: What are the long-term implications of this crisis?

Gause: The strategic question out of this for the United States -- this has more to do with the Gulf than Lebanon -- is how does Washington read Iran? And what is Iran�s role in this? I don�t have any evidence but the more I�ve read and the more I�ve thought about this it seems to me that Iran probably wasn�t the instigator of this. It was probably a Hizbollah act on its own. 

But we know about the close relationship between Iran and Hizbollah. Hizbollah wouldn�t exist without Iran. It was basically founded by Iranians, and Iran supplies it with its money and its weapons. So if people in Washington see this as an Iranian directed operation, I think it just increases the likelihood that somewhere down the line there�s going to be some kind of military confrontation between Iran and the US.

SUSRIS: What�s the impact on US-Saudi relations of all this? 

Gause:  In the end it affects the atmospherics of the US-Saudi relationship, without a doubt. But the fundamentals of the relationship survived 9-11 and survived the differences over the Iraq war. They have survived differences over the Arab-Israeli conflict in the past. I don�t think there is any threat to the fundamentals of the relationship over this but the atmospherics are there and they make life a little more difficult in the bilateral relationship.

SUSRIS: Thank you again for sharing your perspective with SUSRIS readers.

Related Items - Middle East Crisis:

• Saudi-US Relations Perspectives: Crisis in the Middle East - Special Section - July 2006

• Riyadh Has Run Out of Patience - Daoud Shirian - SUSRIS IOI - July 27, 2006

• Saudi Arabia's View on the Crisis in Lebanon - Statement of the Royal Court - SUSRIS IOI - July 26, 2006

• Region in Crisis: Consultation - President Bush and Saudi Officials in White House Meeting - SUSRIS Special Report - July 27, 2006

• Region in Crisis: Responses - SUSRIS Special Report - Jul 19, 2006

• Region in Crisis: Who Is Responsible? - SUSRIS IOI - Jul 18, 2006

Related Items - Dr. Gregory Gause:

• Developments in the Relationship: A Conversation with Gregory Gause - SUSRIS Interview - March 31, 2005

• How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists By F. Gregory Gause III - SUSRIS IOI - Sep. 22, 2004

• How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists - Panel Discussion - Part 1 - SUSRIS IOI

• How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists - Panel Discussion - Part 2 - SUSRIS IOI

• Executive Summary -- The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States by F. Gregory Gause, III

F. Gregory Gause, III is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont, and director of the University's Middle East Studies Program. He was previously on the faculty of Columbia University (1987-1995) and was a Fellow for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (1993-1994).   <more>