Saudi Arabia - United States Relations - Ambassador Robert Jordan

Click logo for www.SUSRIS.org home page

Interview
August 16, 2006

The Impact of Lebanon on
US-Saudi Relations
A Conversation with Robert Jordan

Editor's Note

It would be hard to name an American, in or out of public office, who has had a better perspective on the most trying days of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia than Robert Jordan. As United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from October 2001 Jordan had responsibility as America's top diplomat in the Kingdom in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Ambassador Jordan arrived in Riyadh just as the bombing of Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan was beginning and coordination and cooperation between America and the Kingdom was essential in successful prosecution of the US military's Operation Enduring Freedom. He was thrust into an extremely sensitive post at a critical time in the history of both countries.

There would be more challenges as US Ambassador -- presenting America's case to Saudi leaders that Arab-Israeli peace could only advance with someone other than Arafat representing the Palestinian position and that the US case was sound for overthrowing the President of Iraq. Ambassador Jordan pressed for Saudi accession to the World Trade Organization within the US Government, which directly led to its completion after years of foot-dragging. He was the senior American official in the Kingdom when terrorists struck Western compounds in Riyadh in May 2003, resulting in 34 deaths, including 9 Americans. The stunning attack galvanized bilateral cooperation in the war on terror. In October 2003 he completed his posting and returned to Dallas to resume his work in the legal profession.

[For more on Ambassador Jordan's remarkable two years in Riyadh see Jim Landers' excellent article "Robert Jordan's Crucible." (Link below)]

As we try to assess the effects Lebanon is having on US-Saudi ties we could ask for no better authority on relations between Riyadh and Washington in times of crisis than Ambassador Jordan. SUSRIS wishes to thank him for taking time to walk through the various considerations stemming from the past month of conflict in Lebanon.

SUSRIS talked with Ambassador Jordan by phone from his office in Dallas on August 14, 2006.

SUSRIS: What is the impact of the crisis in Lebanon on US-Saudi relations?

Amb. Robert Jordan: It is going to have, to some degree, a negative impact in the short term, although probably not as negative as most people would assume. The Saudis, of course, came forward immediately after Hizbollah�s attack and kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers and condemned that action as reckless adventurism.

I think they felt there was every likelihood that the international community, especially the United States, would put pressure on Israel at that point to be proportional in its response. I am certain that it became harder and harder as the weeks went on for the Saudis and other Arab leaders to maintain a position of simply condemning Hizbollah when they saw the Lebanese people as victims and their citizens saw the Lebanese people as victims. They saw the Arab world and Muslims treated, in their view, harshly.

That has undoubtedly cooled relations. I have no doubt, though, that the Saudis have been involved in work on the cease-fire and peace agreement that is in place right now through the United Nations. I have no doubt they have been in touch with Syrian leaders, Lebanese leaders undoubtedly, and perhaps even Iranian leaders.

SUSRIS: The initial Saudi statement [July 14], the reckless adventurism of Hizbollah you referred to, came as a big surprise to a lot of observers, that Riyadh would criticize any Arabs who were actively confronting Israel. What do you think was the motivation for the Saudis to make that statement?

Jordan: There were several. The Saudis have a growing concern about the regional hegemony of Iran. A Shiite crescent overlaying much of the Arab world would be very upsetting to the Saudis; it would certainly challenge their regional dominance. They are a majority Sunni country, of course, and they would feel that it perhaps could incite further unrest in the Eastern province among the Shiite population in Saudi Arabia. Iranian hegemony could also threaten not only some of their oil exports that pass through the Strait of Hormuz, but also other economic and strategic Saudi interests.

They probably felt that the neighbors of Lebanon and Iraq have repeatedly been called upon to play a positive role in the region. This would have appeared to the Saudis to be an opportunity to play a positive role and to accomplish their other strategic objectives as well. Once the Israeli response became so prolonged and intense it was simply not viable for the Saudis to maintain that position. They may have hoped to be able to stake out some ground that might lead to a response from other countries who could be effective in stopping the violence.

SUSRIS: In the timeline of the crisis that was about the point where Prince Saud and Prince Bandar visited President Bush at the White House [July 23]. There was the inconclusive Rome conference. At that point there was a statement [July 25] saying Saudi Arabia foresaw dire consequences. Was that as a much a reaction to public opinion, what is called the "Arab street," as to frustrations within the leadership that more was not being done?

Prince Saud al Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and President George W. Bush at the White House, July 23, 2006. (Photo: White House)

Jordan: I think that�s right. I think the Saudi leadership has always paid careful attention to the "Arab street" and tried not to lose traction with their people by getting too far out ahead of them. This was a case where "Al Jazeera," newspapers and other media outlets provided a constant barrage of coverage of the violence in Lebanon that was simply unacceptable to the "Arab street." Saudi leadership realized that and reacted accordingly.

They probably also felt there might have been a chance to convince President Bush to intervene early, without giving Israel a green light to continue. You will recall Israel kept saying they would have this wrapped up in ten days, then another ten days, then another fourteen. So in the beginning I suspect there was some feeling that if the Israelis could end what was then an air campaign quickly, perhaps the US would then come in.

Well it didn�t turn out that way for a number of reasons, including the lack of success of the air campaign itself. I�m certain this led to some frustration on the part of Prince Saud, Prince Bandar and the Saudi leadership when they were not able to convince President Bush to intervene. The Rome conference was not successful except for the opportunity to bring parties together to start thinking about the problem. So the longer the campaign went on, the more violent it became and the more civilian casualties they saw, the more unacceptable it was to the Saudis.

SUSRIS: In the next phase of the crisis the Arab League became a major player in public diplomacy: addressing the issues, meeting in Beirut and working with the Security Council. How would you describe the relationship among Saudi Arabia, the Arab League, and the United Nations in crisis diplomacy?

Jordan: Well, the Arab League is generally regarded as not very effective. While they were making statements, I don�t think the League itself or its professional leadership was all that effective in this case. The Egyptians, the Saudis and to some degree the Jordanians have always been the ones who quietly have taken the lead behind the scenes to try to broker peace agreements or at least be intermediaries in these discussions. That is especially the case here since the United States does not have on going public diplomatic discussions with the Syrians and the Iranians. Countries like Saudi Arabia, therefore, play a much more important role and undoubtedly they played that role here. And I think they played it faithfully.

SUSRIS: It was interesting in the context of the Lebanon crisis to hear a number of people, including Senator Hagel from the Senate floor, talking about a comprehensive peace for the region in the context of the Abdullah Peace Plan which became the Beirut Declaration in 2002. What are your thoughts on the Abdullah Peace Plan and the applicability that it may have in the current environment?

Jordan: I think it still has a very viable role down the line. First we�ve got to get a security environment created where those kinds of discussions can be held. But once again I think we�ve seen how inconclusive military action on both sides can really be. I don�t know that anyone could properly declare victory here. We have to create a situation where the constant threats to the peace and security of all the citizens in the region are futile. That might be an incentive to pay more attention to the Abdullah Peace Plan.

The hang-up of course is the insistence on withdrawing to the 1967 borders by Israel, which they view as a non-starter. However, so many people have viewed the peace plan as a "take it or leave it" situation, when in fact, as in all diplomacy, there is a lot of room for negotiation. I would certainly look at the peace plan as an opportunity to negotiate.

SUSRIS: You were Ambassador to Saudi Arabia when the plan was presented, after the famous "leak" by then Crown Prince Abdullah to columnist Tom Friedman. What do you recall about bilateral considerations of the plan?

Jordan: Yes, it was unveiled to the world by Tom Friedman. Right after that we found a great deal of interest in the United States Government and in my official capacity to pursue it. In fact when after much delay the "Road Map" was unveiled later in the year it paid specific attention to the Abdullah Peace Plan and referred to it as an important and integral part of the background of the "Road Map."

The "Road Map" is, of course, not especially viable at the moment, but the concept behind it, the Beirut Declaration, very much is, and I think King Abdullah deserves enormous credit for raising it in the first place, and continuing to remind us it is out there.

SUSRIS: The conflict in Lebanon is but one among a host of regional crises where the United States and Saudi Arabia must work closely together but the issues involved often cause friction. What do you see as the long-term implications of this crisis on US-Saudi relations?

Jordan: Well I think for a while the United States is going to be viewed to some degree as a pawn of Israel rather than vice versa. The close alignment of the United States with Israel has been underscored by this episode. My guess is we will see efforts by the United States government to reach out to the Arab and Muslim world to attempt to counteract some of that.

Frankly, I think the United States, the United Nations, and the encouraging role of France have had a tempering impact on Israel�s response and so there ought to be some credit that the United States and Europe get for these efforts. However, from a public relations standpoint there will be a cool period somewhat like what we saw in the spring of 2002 with the second Intifada. My hope is that we can get beyond that as we did with the Intifada, to some degree, later that year.

SUSRIS: Any last thoughts on the crisis in Lebanon and the relationship.

Jordan: I think we are going to see some rough sledding here if the Olmert government goes down. Bebe Netanyahu has been very forceful in the Knesset in criticizing the performance of the government. If the Kadema-led government falls and the Likud party comes back in, we may well see a more militant position taken by the Israelis, which would be harder to deal with as well. That will inflame passions in the region and once again place the United States in a position of being identified with Israel at a time when tensions are very high. So that is something to watch very closely.

I also think that Iran, to the extent they want to inflame things in the region, could well motivate Hizbollah to bolt at some point. However, I believe Hizbollah has accomplished all they can right now. They need to re-supply. This will be something to carefully watch. Can the munitions be re-supplied to Hizbollah or will this new United Nations peace-keeping force really be effective in stopping that? There are a lot of uncertainties here as to the performance of that peace-keeping force. There�s also the question about whether the Lebanese Army is really up to the job.

SUSRIS: An important consideration is Saudi Arabia�s ability to influence Syrian behavior. Is Riyadh likely to restrain Damascus from making more trouble in Lebanon?

Jordan: I suspect that�s right. Bashar Assad has always had a kind of son to father relationship with King Abdullah, at least in a loose sense. He has a lot of respect for what King Abdullah has told him. Let�s all remember that King Abdullah was very effective after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, in almost ordering Bashar Assad to remove Syrian troops and intelligence forces from Lebanon. That was not the answer Bashar Assad wanted when he went to Riyadh but that was certainly what he got.

SUSRIS: Thank you very much, Ambassador Jordan, for helping us understand this complex situation.

About Ambassador Jordan

Robert Jordan was selected by President George W. Bush to serve as the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the most critical point in the history of the relationship between our two countries. After Senate confirmation, he served as ambassador from October 2001 through October 2003.
<< for more >>

Related Items - Amb. Jordan:

Middle East Crisis Reporting:

Saudi-US Relations Information Service
eMail: [email protected]
Web: http://www.Saudi-US-Relations.org
� 2006
Users of the The Saudi-US Relations Information Service are assumed to have read and agreed to our terms and conditions and legal disclaimer contained on the SUSRIS.org Web site.