The Bitterlemons.org Web site, an excellent source for essays, interviews and articles on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, recently featured regional views on the aftermath of the Israel-Hizbollah-Lebanon crisis. The newsletter addressed developments during and after the ceasefire from the perspective of Syria, Iran, Turkey and Egypt. Among those items was a Bitterlemons interview with Nawaf Obaid, Managing Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, on the view from Saudi Arabia. We are pleased to share that interview with you today.

Iranian Policy Divisive
A "Bitterlemons" Interview with Nawaf Obaid

BI: Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Jordan, came in for a lot of popular criticism because of its initial position on Hizballah's action in the lead-up to the war. How has this played itself out now after the ceasefire?

Obaid: The initial policy hasn't really changed. The only difference is that the concentration now is more on rebuilding the necessary infrastructure for the Lebanese people. We've seen huge Saudi aid allocated to the Lebanese government. 

BI: Did any of that initial popular Arab criticism register in Saudi Arabia?

Obaid: Even in Saudi Arabia there was a lot criticism of the government's policy. But after the ceasefire, things have slowly been changing because the actual extent of the damage is now being realized, as is the fact that Hizballah will not be able to rebuild what they have promised. And the apology by Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah for the war was a big change in the perception that Hizballah had actually been victorious.

So what we've seen is Saudi Arabia go ahead with a huge aid package and last week Riyadh announced a program to pay for all Lebanese students from kindergarten all the way through to university, for the school year, because most of the educational facilities in the south of the country have been destroyed.

BI: Is there some element of competition here between Saudi Arabia and Hizballah or Iran?

Obaid: The initial Saudi aid package was announced ten days into the war. Since then there has been money from the Saudi Red Crescent and this huge recent addition for the education sector.

I wouldn't say there is direct competition, but indirectly, of course, there is. It is certainly being perceived as such, especially from the Hizballah side, which, just after the war, promised to pay for reconstruction. 

BI: To what extent can the war and ceasefire be seen in terms of strategic regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Obaid: Iran has not made secret its desire to extend its influence in countries with a majority Shi'ite population. There are only two, Bahrain and Iraq, but in Lebanon the Shi'ite community constitutes the single largest group. 

Initially, Hizballah was branded as victorious, especially after the ceasefire, after holding out to what is considered the might of the Israeli army. But in the mid- to long-term, I think there will be a realization that it is hard to spin this war as victorious, especially with the degree of damage Lebanon has suffered because of Hizballah's action. So in the mid- to long-term, I think the realization will be that the loser was the Lebanese people, and Hizballah will be blamed.

BI: What are the long-term ramifications of such a realization?

Obaid: The long term consequences will be that Hizballah--and we are beginning to see it--will be neutralized. Hizballah will not be able to repeat the actions that inflamed this issue, and there is going to be more and more suspicion vis-a-vis Iran and Iranian policies in the Middle East, specifically in dealing with Shi'ite communities. We already see in Lebanon the debate about Nasrallah's apology. There are now tensions emerging on the surface in Iraq between major Iraqi Shi'ite figures and Iran. And I believe there will be a slow reconsideration of Iran's relationship with the Arab countries that have a majority Shi'ite community.

BI: In this context, what role can Saudi Arabia play? Is there room for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in terms of policies toward the rest of the region?

Obaid: As much as Iran is doing what we're seeing it's doing, so far there is actually a close working relationship between the two countries. The only problem is there is an understanding that whatever the Saudi government is told on an official level by Iran is not necessarily what is actually happening, specifically in Iraq, but also in Lebanon. And Saudi Arabia is very careful not to pursue a similar policy regarding Sunni communities to what the Iranians are doing with respect to Shi'ite communities, because that could lead to chaos and potentially to war.

So in Lebanon, the aid is given to the Lebanese government for all the Lebanese people. The aid for education is specifically given to everyone, from Christian to Shi'ite. This is a conscious policy, and in this respect one consequence of the war is a realization that Iranian policy is being disruptive and Saudi Arabia is trying to do the opposite.

BI: Is there a feeling in Saudi Arabia that Iran understands that?

Obaid: From what we've seen so far, Iran is still encouraging a disruptive policy. The initial small aid that was widely publicized in the press was about Hizballah giving money to all the Shi'ites that suffered from the Israeli attacks. And Iranian policy is to help specifically Hizballah, and, in Iraq, funding and helping the major Shi'ite organizations. This shows that Iran is still pursuing this policy.

Saudi Arabia is very concerned about this. We see a disconnect at the official level of what is being told to Riyadh and what is actually happening on the ground, and the latest reminder was in Bahrain where the government had to stop the sale of land to front companies acting on behalf of Iranian charities and intended specifically for the Shi'ite community. 

This [Iranian] policy is divisive and will lead to violence and civil war if it is not curtailed. And this is what Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid. 

BI: Was Saudi Arabia happy with the ceasefire resolution?

Obaid: Saudi Arabia was the main supporter of the resolution, especially after the US-French resolution was rejected. Now there is a resolution in which all Israeli forces will leave Lebanon and the UN will come in. But we have to bear in mind that there is another country that needs to be engaged, and where the consequences of the war are likely to be more detrimental, and that is Syria.

Published 14/9/2006 � bitterlemons-international.org 
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]

Edition 35 Volume 4 - September 14, 2006

Nawaf Obaid is managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a consultancy based in Riyadh.

For more information about Nawaf Obaid

For more information about the Saudi National Security Assessment Project