As Anthony Cordesman notes in the lead to his tripartite briefing on global energy security, "long-term assessments are inherently too speculative to be reliable." We are fortunate, however, that he continues to serve as a prolific contributor to the need for cutting edge analyses on a host of issues important to SUSRIS readers. Such is the case today with a series of briefings he prepared for a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.
We should also note his recent contribution to the Arab-US Policymakers Conference in Washington at which he
discussed US policies in the Gulf with co-panelists
Prince Turki al-Faisal and Assistant Secretary of State
Gordon
Gray, and moderator Anne
Joyce. The audio files from that and other panels are available on SUSRIS' companion web site
ArabiaLink.com [link below] and transcripts are forthcoming.
Saudi Energy Security: A Global Perspective
Anthony H. Cordesman
Washington, DC, November 10, 2006- The attached briefing analyzes Saudi energy security from a broad national, regional, and global energy security perspective. It is one of a series of three briefings on global energy security to be issued by the
Burke Chair at CSIS and was prepared for a conference held by the
Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on November 5th-6th, 2006. This and the two briefings to follow next week will deal with overall global energy security issues, and with the global security risks affecting oil exports by region and country.
This briefing draws on work by the Energy Information Agency of the US Department of Energy, the International Energy Agency, the CIA, various Saudi Government sources, and by Nawaf Obaid. In brief, it makes the following arguments:
-- The global energy debate focuses far too much on Saudi Arabia to the exclusion of other energy suppliers, and oil to the exclusion of other sources of energy. Such risk assessments often ignore the fact that Iran and Iraq, with more than 20% of the world's proven conventional oil supplies, have presented real supply problems since the fall of the Shah in 1979, and Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq War.
--There is little reason to believe Saudi Arabia will run out of oil, will not meet its production goals, or has serious investment and oilfield management problems.
-- Global dependence on increased Saudi exports is often grossly exaggerated because of the use of demand models based on low-price oil rather than more realistic high-priced cases.
--The Saudi political and social systems have significant problems, but real efforts are being made to address many aspects of these problems, and there is little evidence of any current internal threat.
--Energy terrorism is a serious global problem, but unlikely to present serious problems in Saudi Arabia. Small interruptions and panics are a possibility, but not a probability.
--Saudi Arabia faces serious mid- and long-term problems with economic diversification, demographics, and youth unemployment. At the same time, it is investing massively in trying to deal with these problems, and is using its new burst of oil wealth relatively wisely.
This assessment does not mean Saudi energy supply is risk free. It does mean many of the risks have been exaggerated, and that Saudi Arabia is likely to be a relatively stable energy supplier in the near- and mid-term. As is the case with many other potential risks in global energy supply, long-term assessments are inherently too speculative to be reliable.
To find the full briefing Click
Here
Rethinking Global Energy Security: Geostrategic & Economic Risks
Anthony H. Cordesman
Washington, DC, November 13, 2006- The attached briefing is the second in a series of three briefings taking a new approach to global energy security. The first focused on Saudi Arabia. The third will focus on oil export security by region and country.
This briefing suggests that the problems of energy security go far beyond oil exports. It notes that the expansion of coal will be as critical in meeting overall energy supply as oil, and that current projections of increased coal use may present as much cumulative risk as increases in oil supply and oil exports.
The fact that this will be driven by domestic energy investment and environmental decisions, and by not export capability, further illustrates the fact that the current focus on energy exports can be deeply misleading. Domestic decisions about new energy supply, efficiency, and conservation are at least equally critical and present major areas of risk. They are critical to the development of key nations like China and India, as well as to the real world future demand for oil and gas exports.
Gas is also identified as a key area of global risk. Particularly dependence on gas produced or shipped by Russia. Serious questions exist about Russia's ability to increase production at the forecast level, its pipeline projects, and its stability.
This does not mean that oil does not present a major area of risk, particularly since many gas exports must also move by sea. The various types of risk are evaluated, including security risks. At the same time, the briefing cautions that many estimates of oil demand are based on low to medium prices with little real analysis of the elasticity of demand. High oil prices sharply reduce demand, the need for increased exports, and the rate of depletion of reserves.
The analysis also concludes that efforts to create true global energy stability and security face problems too complex and too driven by other factors to solve. At the same time, it suggests that high prices have the general impact of making the world less dependent on energy growth and the secure flow of exports, and that smaller energy "crises" and interruptions serve a useful purpose in making the global economy more adaptable in dealing with inevitable problems in the smooth growth and flow of energy supply.
To find the full briefing Click
Here
Global Oil Security: Risks by Region and Supplier
Anthony H. Cordesman
Washington, DC, November 15, 2006- The attached briefing is the third in a series of three briefings taking a new approach to global energy security. The first focused on Saudi Arabia. The second focused on overall global risks for all forms of energy.
This briefing summarizes the risks to sustaining and increasing global oil exports by region and country. It examines the type of risk, their potential impact on global supply, and the problems in achieving a significant degree of stability.
One key message is that much depends on oil prices and that high oil prices sharply reduce global demand, the need for increases in supply, and risk of a major depletion of oil reserves. It suggests that over time, high oil prices may actually aid the global economy, not hurt it.
It also suggests that many estimates of the growth of Asian demand may be seriously exaggerated. The same is true of estimates of the need for increased oil exports from the Gulf.
At the same time, serious energy risks are identified in every exporting region. These include continuing problems in Iran and Iraq, with more than 20% of the world's conventional proven oil reserves, as well as West Africa and Latin America. These problems are compounded by new asymmetric military threats and the threat of terrorism.
To find the full briefing Click
Here
The Office of the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
The Burke Chair in Strategy is held by Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: +1 (202) 775-7325
Fax: +1 (202) 457-8746
Web: http://www.csis.org/burke
About CSIS
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in these publications should be understood to be solely those of the authors.