Editor�s Note:
The Arab League Summit is set for March 29-30, 2008 in Damascus Syria. Today we are pleased to share several essays published through bitterlemons-international.org, a forum for sharing perspectives on Middle East developments.
Bitterlemons "aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political
leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region."
Additional materials from SUSRIS and related resources will be posted to our new
SUSRIS Special Section addressing next week's summit.
The summit and Lebanon's political future
Oussama Safa
Waiting for Godot in Lebanon nowadays seems more fruitful than anticipating a political breakthrough in the near future. The hopes that a consensus president will be elected before the upcoming Arab summit in Damascus are quickly evaporating, to be replaced by renewed pessimism about the future of politics in the country. The triumph of Syrian diplomacy in securing an acceptable showing of Arab officials at the scheduled summit will be another missed opportunity for an all-out Arab effort to prevail on Damascus to facilitate the election of a Lebanese president. The Israeli attacks on Gaza have served the Syrians well by overshadowing the Lebanese crisis and making the Palestinian issue the priority agenda for the summiteers in Damascus. Arab leaders now find it increasingly difficult to boycott the gathering in Syria.
The pessimism about Lebanon's future is not entirely misplaced. While moderate Arab states had hoped for a quick resolution to the political crisis before the summit, a gradual escalation in rhetoric and organized violence by the opposition in Beirut accompanied the preparations for the summit and indicated there was no Syrian appetite for a thaw. Most ominous were the riots that pitted the Lebanese army against demonstrators and resulted in seven dead civilians on January 27 this year. The riots were intended as a bloody message to the Arab foreign ministers who were gathering in Cairo that day, but also carried an intentional embarrassment for presidential hopeful Michel
Suleiman, the army commander-in-chief. His chances of getting elected soon seem to have subsided after the riots and the humiliating ensuing investigation and subsequent suspension of seven military officers and soldiers.
Regionally, Syrian-Saudi relations took a turn for the worse. The Arab League initiative brokered by the Saudi and Egyptian foreign ministers in Cairo deadlocked in Beirut, mostly due to the opposition's ever changing demands. The recent victory by the conservatives in Iran will undoubtedly embolden President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's position in the region, particularly with Hizballah in Lebanon. The latter is involved in a covert war with Israel following the assassination of its senior military leader, Imad
Mughniyeh, in Damascus.
It remains to be seen whether the killing of Mughniyeh is the start of new forms of pressure against Damascus or just a settling of scores that happened to take place in Syria. While it is highly likely that covert confrontation between Israel and Hizballah will be the new face of war between them, the political scene in Beirut seems to be in a deep freeze.
Hopes are pinned on the revival of the Arab League initiative, though all indications are that the initiative is dead. As the Lebanese have grown accustomed to waiting for regional rapprochement of powers before they can expect a political deal, the upcoming Arab summit seems to be only the next disappointment in this regard. Depending on the summit's closing communique and the tone with which it deals with standing political crises in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, the aftermath of the summit is a period to watch carefully in Lebanon. Syria will soon host the summit leadership for the upcoming year, which means that joint Arab diplomacy will be based in Damascus for the next several months. This will inevitably break Damascus' isolation from the Arab fold and give it a much needed breather to expand its spectrum of regional and international diplomacy.
The summit's communique is also expected to deal with the six-year-old Arab peace initiative that until today remains intransigently rejected by Israel. Any move led by Damascus to alter the initiative will most likely provoke Saudi resistance and might entail even further worsening of relations between the two countries. At the same time, a low-key showing at the summit by the Saudis or any attempts by the latter to steal the thunder of the Damascus gathering will push Syria to retaliate in Lebanon. This might take several forms, including new levels of street violence between supporters of the opposition and loyalists, increased pressure on the loyalist government coalition or a new wave of car bombs and assassinations. The recent urgent warning to Saudi citizens to leave Beirut is an indication that the kingdom is bracing itself for a confrontation at the summit and in its aftermath.
Lebanon's late invitation to the summit has opened the door to various speculations as to whether it will be present at the Damascus meeting. While the government is undecided, the issue has become a subject of political controversy, with much of the opposition pushing for the country's representation at the summit. Whatever Lebanon ends up doing about the summit, its presence at the table is essential. The late Turkish President Turgut Ozal once opined about Turkey's role in redrawing the map of Iraq after the first Gulf war that "he'd rather be a guest at the table than an item on the menu." By not showing up at the summit, Lebanon risks becoming a forgotten hors d'oeuvre on the menu.
- Published 20/3/2008 � bitterlemons-international.org
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]
Edition 12 Volume 6 - March 20, 2008
Oussama Safa is general director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.
Related Items of Interest on SUSRIS:
