Editor�s Note:
The Arab League Summit is set for March 29-30, 2008 in Damascus Syria. Today we are pleased to share several essays published through bitterlemons-international.org, a forum for sharing perspectives on Middle East developments.
Bitterlemons "aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region."
Additional materials from SUSRIS and related resources will be posted to our new
SUSRIS Special Section addressing next week's summit.
Getting through Damascus
Mohamed Abdel Salam
Ever since 2001, when Arab countries decided to hold a "leaders' summit" regularly, nearly no summit has taken place without problems. Even before then, Arab summits were not an easy affair: Arab countries disagreed regarding the necessity of some meetings and the content of resolutions adopted, there were personal problems among some of the leaders scheduled to participate, and there were sensitivities regarding the role of the host, convener or chairman vis-a-vis the other leaders. With few exceptions, Arab public opinion was not satisfied with the resolutions issued by the summits. Almost all summits witnessed problems at the level of representation, agenda, management of the sessions and final decisions. For decades, the "summit institution" was too crisis-ridden to be turned into a regular meeting.
These problems were merely exacerbated when the summit became an annual event. The problems began with a new factor: the venue of the summit. It was agreed that the summits be convened consecutively in the Arab capitals according to alphabetical order. Every capital destined to host the meeting began to dump its regional problems on the summit. This is currently happening with Damascus.
The venue issue has caused additional problems. There are capitals like Baghdad that will not host a summit in the foreseeable future. Differences among some of the capitals have led many leaders to stay away from participation. In addition, other complications have led most of the Gulf capitals to waive their role in hosting the summit for the benefit of the next on the list. A Saudi proposal appeared in 2007 to establish a permanent headquarters for holding the summit in the Egyptian town of Sharm el-Sheikh, precisely in order to avoid these problems.
But before anything could change, the process reached Damascus, the self-styled heart of Arabism. It has been understood since the close of the Riyadh summit last year that Damascus would not be one of the easier Arab stations. At that time, the possibility was broached to waive Damascus in favor of the next capital. The issue was not related to the fact that the president of the host country becomes chairman of the summit or that the host capital dominates the meeting and invitation arrangements and usually seeks to determine many of the items on the agenda. Rather, it touched on the more serious issues of Damascus' policies and the attitude of the key Arab countries toward them.
Syria has turned away from its traditional alliance with Egypt and Saudi Arabia to become party to a coalition with Iran, Hizballah and Hamas. The two alliances are waging a genuine cold war in the Middle East arena. This war has turned Lebanon into a time bomb, worsened the situation in the Gaza Strip, strained relations between Damascus and Riyadh and generated an unprecedented stalemate in relations between Damascus and Cairo. The Damascus summit has to address these open files in such a way that the summit does not end in a failure to resolve any issue at all, or at least makes it possible for the leaders to shake hands for the media, thereby avoiding an obvious farce.
Egypt, aware of the dangers of Syria's behavior, has traditionally sought to prevent Syria from moving in directions that Damascus might regret. It appears from published reports about contacts between them that Egypt has tried to exploit the Damascus summit as a real opportunity to maneuver Syria back into the so-called "Arab ranks". Even when this appeared to be impractical, Damascus was asked to submit something that might reflect an interest in the success of the summit, at least with respect to facilitating the task of electing a president in Lebanon. This would have constituted a first step toward alleviating radical Saudi-Syrian tensions.
Yet Damascus seems to be thinking in an entirely different direction. It is not ready at all to be flexible regarding the problems it faces even if this means the summit's failure. Indeed, Syria appears more willing to forego its Arab relations in favor of inviting Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad to be present and adopting an agenda, alarming to the other participants, that includes a critical approach to the Arab peace initiative. Damascus claims it has based these proposals on the legacy of previous summits and appears to be uninterested in amending them.
Syria's tactics were clear from the outset. It wants to convert the Damascus summit from a source of pressure to a bargaining chip. Thus, in order to avoid complete isolation and ensure the summit is held as scheduled, it has begun to signal a more cooperative attitude by keeping Iran away from the summit and sending an invitation--without solving the problem--to Lebanon. It also expressed its willingness to discuss policy differences--but during rather than before the summit, even though this contradicts the Arab summit tradition. There is still no specific understanding as to how the summit will be conducted once Arab delegations reach Damascus.
The Syrian capital has dumped all its problems on the summit. The summit has led to an opening of the files of Syria's policies in the region, yet without registering progress in resolving the problems generated by these policies. Now it appears that the opportunity to do so has been lost, and the direction of Syrian policies will be maintained during the post-summit period. For a country like Egypt, the challenge is to ensure that Syria is no better off after the summit than before it, and to enable the Arab summit institution to emerge intact from Damascus and move to another capital next year. Thus the hope is that the Damascus summit becomes just another summit and not an end to all summits.
- Published 20/3/2008 � bitterlemons-international.org
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]
Edition 12 Volume 6 - March 20, 2008
Mohamed Abdel Salam heads the Regional Security Program at Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.
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