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September 24, 2008
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Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC
and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East
Saudi Arabia - An Excerpt from Chapter 5 (Part One)
Thomas Lippman
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Editor's Note:
Last week SUSRIS shared a conversation with author Mr. Thomas Lippman about his new book, "Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East." Today we are pleased to present an excerpt -- one of two from Chapter 5 that will be provided this week -- about Colonel Eddy's experiences in Saudi Arabia.
In his latest work, Mr. Lippman provides important details and perspectives on the dawning of the "official" U.S.-Saudi ties through the story of Colonel Bill Eddy, one of the most influential Americans in the foundation of the relationship. In the book's introduction Lippman talks about the visionaries who saw the potential benefits of an American-Saudi Arabian alliance. Among them were, "senior executives of Standard Oil Company of California, who defied the economic gloom of the Great Depression to invest millions in an unfamiliar land; King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, who recognized that his country would never progress without Western technology and investment and defied the opposition of his own people to acquire them; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who in the closing months of World War II and of his own life looked beyond the war and into a more promising future for Saudi Arabia and new opportunities there for America; and William Alfred Eddy, Marine Corps officer, war hero, spymaster and diplomat, the catalyst who translated Roosevelt's vision for Saudi Arabia into reality." "Arabian Knight" is Eddy's story.
Thomas Lippman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and a former Washington Post Middle East bureau chief. He is author of a number of books on U.S. foreign affairs including
"Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Relationship with Saudi
Arabia," published in 2004.
Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East
Saudi Arabia - An Excerpt from Chapter 5 (Part One)
Thomas Lippman
During the grim years from 1942 to 1945, few countries would seem to have had less claim than Saudi Arabia to the attention of President Roosevelt. The president and his military and foreign policy advisers had many more urgent concerns. Europe, North Africa, the Soviet Union, most of Asia, Canada and Australia were locked in the epic combat of World War II. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa were also involved, as colonies of the combatant states. Even Latin America required vigilance as a traditional region of U.S. interest where enemy agents were active, and Brazil sent troops to fight in Europe. Why, then, would anyone in Washington be thinking about Saudi Arabia? It was an impoverished backwater, known to the rest of the world only for the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, never colonized and thus unaffiliated with any European nation, and neutral in the war. The country was at the opposite pole of industrial development from the United States, without electricity, roads, schools or hospitals. It was true that Standard Oil Company of California, later known as Chevron, held a concession to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia and had begun producing for export in 1939, but those exports were quickly cut off by the outbreak of war, and Saudi Arabia�s output was negligible in the world oil market. Fewer than 150 Americans lived there.
The United States had granted diplomatic recognition to the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia soon after the creation of the unified country was proclaimed in 1932 by its founder, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, but there were no resident U. S. government officials; the senior American diplomat accredited to the Kingdom was based in Cairo and seldom went to Saudi Arabia. Nor did Saudi Arabia have an official representative in Washington. And yet Roosevelt was interested. He was curious about the country and about King Abdul Aziz, whom he had never met. Indeed the Saudi king at the (approximate) age of 63 had never met the leader of any country except neighboring Kuwait, and had never traveled much beyond the Arabian peninsula. Nevertheless, this semi-literate, half-blind desert monarch was remarkably well informed about the issues of the world that mattered to him -- he had court interpreters who translated radio broadcasts from New York, London, Rome, and Berlin -- and he had a serene confidence about his accomplishments, his abilities and his position as ruler over the holiest places of Islam. He was not awed by the power of an American president or of any other man.
Roosevelt began thinking about the King as early as 1938, when Abdul Aziz first wrote to him to complain about perceived U.S. support for Zionist aspirations in Palestine. We want to be your friends, the letter said in effect, so don�t give Palestine to the Jews -- a blunt message that put on the table an issue that would entangle Roosevelt and his successor, Harry S. Truman, for the next decade. The president had responded noncommittally, but signed his letter �Your good friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt.�
In January 1939, Roosevelt's interest was piqued by a letter about the King from a plumbing fixtures heir named Charles R. Crane. Crane, bored by sinks and bathtubs but fascinated by the Middle East, had busied himself in the region's affairs since the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. He was one of the first Americans to visit King Abdul Aziz, and in 1931 he financed an expedition to the Arabia to look for water and mineral resources led by an industrious engineer named Karl Twitchell. Twitchell's findings were instrumental in persuading the King to overcome his aversion to infidel foreigners and allow Chevron to come in to look for oil.
"The papers out here [in California] say you have had a communication from Ibn Saud,"* Crane wrote to Roosevelt. "I should like to tell you a few things about him that are not very well known, at least not in the western world. He is the most important man who has appeared in Arabia since the time of Mohammed, is severely orthodox, and manages his affairs, his life and his government as nearly as possible as Mohammed would have done." In establishing his dominion over the Arabian peninsula by conquering rival tribes, Crane said, Abdul Aziz was always "guided by the old desert doctrine of
hilm, which Mohammed emphasized so much, of doing everything possible, in the most affectionate manner, to reconcile his enemies once he had conquered them." |
"The papers out here [in California] say you have had a communication from Ibn Saud,"* Crane wrote to Roosevelt. "I should like to tell you a few things about him that are not very well known, at least not in the western world. He is the most important man who has appeared in Arabia since the time of Mohammed, is severely orthodox, and manages his affairs, his life and his government as nearly as possible as Mohammed would have done." In establishing his dominion over the Arabian peninsula by conquering rival tribes, Crane said, Abdul Aziz was always "guided by the old desert doctrine of
hilm, which Mohammed emphasized so much, of doing everything possible, in the most affectionate manner, to reconcile his enemies once he had conquered them."
According to Crane, Abdul Aziz's treatment of vanquished foes was the opposite of the vengeful spirit that had prevailed at the Versailles treaty conference after World War I, which rearranged the geography and power structure of the entire Middle East.
Crane was fully familiar with the work of that conference because at the time President Wilson had appointed him, along with Oberlin College President Henry King, to advise him about the future status of Palestine. The Great War of 1914-1918 had ended centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine, but the land�s new status remained to be determined. Even then Zionist leaders were claiming Palestine as a future Jewish homeland, an objective King and Crane said in their prophetic 1919 report could be achieved only by force and only at the expense of Palestine's Arab population.
President Roosevelt was intrigued by Crane's portrayal of the king. "All I have heard of [Abdul Aziz] fully confirms your own impression of his fine character and personality," he wrote in response, adding that he hoped an opportunity would arise to learn more.
![Discovery Well #7 to the left. Dhahran - 1939 (Photo Courtesy Selwa Press) [Click for larger image]](https://www.saudi-us-relations.org/bookshelf/2007-books/discovery/0-0-NuDh-250.jpg)
Thus was planted a seed that would germinate throughout the war and culminate in a legendary meeting between the president and the king at which was forged the unique alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia that still endures. History has generally depicted that meeting as an afterthought to the great-power summit conference at Yalta that preceded it, and has described the encounter of the president and the king as if they were discovering each other for the first time. In fact, the meeting of the two leaders and the alliance they forged were years in preparation and the two men knew quite a bit about each other before they met. Throughout the years 1941 to 1944, Roosevelt gradually became convinced that Abdul Aziz and his kingdom could be economically and strategically useful to the United States, as well as interesting, and that it was worth the effort to reach out to the king to align him with American interests. The person eventually designated by the president to carry out that policy was Bill Eddy.
In those years of global crisis, Roosevelt displayed a gift for looking beyond the urgent issue of the moment to think about the future. Before the United States entered the war, the president was thinking about how the United States could win it, because he saw U.S. involvement as inevitable. Once the United States did enter the conflict, Roosevelt began thinking about postwar strategies and alliances. He came to envision Saudi Arabia not as an irrelevant curiosity or perpetual backwater but as a country with possibilities, a country that could develop to meet the needs of its own people in a mutually beneficial partnership with the United States.
In April 1941, six months before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt asked J.A. Moffett, a New York-based executive of Chevron's Saudi Arabian operation, known as CASOC, (and a prodigious campaign fundraiser for the president) for "a memorandum covering the situation in Saudi Arabia and what the King might be able to do in furnishing finished petroleum products" to the U.S. Navy. Roosevelt had to ask CASOC for information because the oil company had people inside Saudi Arabia, while the U.S. government did not.
Moffett replied on April 16. "Our representatives have had numerous conferences with the King," he wrote. "His financial situation is desperate." It may seem strange now to think of Saudi Arabia as destitute, but such was the case in the early 1940s. The huge country had few resources other than oil, and the outbreak of war had cut off revenue from that source just as it started to flow. The Kingdom's other principal source of income, a tax on pilgrims to Mecca, had also been reduced because the war limited travel. A drought was devastating the country's limited agriculture. The King, who was accustomed to handing out cash to maintain the loyalty of tribal leaders in the unruly land he had unified only a decade before, was indeed in dire fiscal straits. Moffett informed the president that Britain had given the King some money but not nearly enough to meet his anticipated needs.
"If the United States government will advance to the King of Saudi Arabia $6,000,000 annually for the next five years, we feel confident that we can work out with the King an arrangement whereby he will deliver through us the following quantities of petroleum products, at the prices mentioned," Moffett proposed. He listed 1.8 million barrels of gasoline, 2.66 million barrels of diesel fuel, and 3.4 million barrels of heavy fuel oil, "totalling approximately $6,000,000 worth of petroleum products annually." It was urgent to accept this offer or find some other way to provide aid, Moffett said, because "unless this is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos."
What was really driving Moffett and his oil industry friends was the fear that Britain, which had supported Abdul Aziz and his desert warriors as they rode to conquest thirty years earlier, still harbored designs on Saudi Arabia and its oil. If the United States government failed to support the king in his hour of need, they feared that the British would entice Saudi Arabia into the sterling currency zone, the king would revoke the American oil concession and transfer it to the British, or both. This tension between American and British interests in the Kingdom was an underlying theme of all that would happen in U.S.- Saudi Arabian relations -- and in Bill Eddy's work -- for the next several years.
The issue as explained by Moffett raised the obvious question of why, if Saudi Arabia was so important, Standard Oil of California did not advance the money itself, to protect its investment. Moffett anticipated questions from the White House and Congress on this point, telling the president that the company had indeed already given the king advances against anticipated postwar royalities of $6.8 million, through CASOC, an acronym for California Arabian Standard Oil Company. "It has now come to a point where it is impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under present abnormal conditions. However, the King is desperate," he wrote.
The president asked the State Department for comment. In a political background memo, the department said it was aware in general terms of the King's fiscal difficulties but had no details because it had no representative in Saudi Arabia. "King Ibn Saud is unquestionably the outstanding figure in the Arab world today," this memo said. "All of our recent reports from our own officers and the British indicate the the King favors the Allied cause," aside from his objections to Britain's longstanding commitment to the creation of "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.
In principle, the State Department said there was no objection to the arrangement proposed by Moffett. The alternative, it said, was to supply aid directly to Saudi Arabia under the Lend-Lease program. This program, created by Congress in March 1941, authorized the president to provide vast amounts of equipment and supplies to allies in the war against the Axis powers. Some $50 billion worth was distributed over the next four years, mostly to Britain and the Soviet Union. The problem with using Lend-Lease to assist Saudi Arabia was that Saudi Arabia was at best neutral in the war, not an ally. By some accounts, the King was actually pro-German, as were many Arabs who saw the prospect of a German victory as putting an end to British and French colonial rule. Abdul Aziz opened diplomatic relations with Hitler�s government in 1939 and according to the British author Robert Lacey "sent a messenger to Berchtesgarten with a personal letter assuring Hitler 'that it is our foremost aim to see the friendly and intimate relations with the German
Reich developed to the utmost limits.'" It could be argued that the king said that sort of thing to any foreign leader who expressed a desire for friendship, but it was certainly a stretch in Washington to think of the king as some sort of principled beacon of liberty.
Roosevelt sent Moffett's memo and the State Department's comments to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, asking him to try to set up some
arrangement along the lines proposed by Moffett. In May, Knox replied that it could not be done: "I have had an investigation made of the oil produced in Saudi Arabia and find that its quality is not suitable for Navy use" because of its high sulfur content.
A few week�s later, Roosevelt�s adviser Harry L. Hopkins sent all this material to Jesse Jones, administrator of the Federal Loan Agency, with a note saying that "The president is anxious to find a way to do something about this matter." Perhaps food aid could be sent under Lend-Lease, Hopkins said, "although just how we would call that outfit a 'democracy' I don�t know." Jones, who was not an admirer of the king and steadfastly rebuffed overtures on his behalf from Chevron, replied that "There appears to be no legal way we can help the king" and suggested that the British provide what the king needed. Roosevelt accepted the argument that the king, a desert autocrat who was sitting out the war, was not a candidate for U.S. government financial assistance. In a famous note he told Jones, "Jesse: Will you tell the British I hope they can take care of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield for us."
But the president did not let the matter rest there, despite all the more urgent things on his mind. On February 13, 1942, he wrote to the King to inform him that he was sending, at U.S. government expense,
Karl Twitchell and two experts in desert agriculture to examine prospects for increasing agricultural output in the Kingdom through irrigation. (This was the same Twitchell who had been dispatched to Arabia by Charles Crane a decade earlier. He was present on the shore when the first Chevron geologists arrived in the Kingdom by boat in 1933, and was later introduced to Roosevelt by Wild Bill Donovan.)
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In his letter notifying the King that he was sending the agricultural team and that the U.S. government would pay for it, Roosevelt was elaborately flattering of Abdul Aziz and his people, to the point of finding in them a "love of liberty" not readily discernible to others. The president extended best wishes to "the Government and people of Saudi Arabia, who have a long and noble history, and whose love of liberty finds a particularly warm response in our hearts at this time.. ..As Your Majesty is doubtless aware, my countrymen, in association with the other peoples comprising the United Nations, have pledged their lives and their fortunes to the eradication of the evil forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which seek to destroy the world's liberties in accordance with an utterly selfish plan, pursued in a cruel and dishonorable manner. However bitter the struggle may be, the final outcome is not in doubt, and, in view of the bonds of civilization and the common aims which unite our Peoples, I am confident that Your Majesty will assist in the attainment of freedom, security and progress in such manner as your wisdom and judgment may determine." In a handwritten
postscript to his official letter, the president said, "I have just seen some very interesting films of various places in your kingdom which have pleased me. I wish that I could visit your country."
In response, the King expressed his gratitude, and added: "Your excellency's expression of the fact that you would like, if you had the chance, to visit my country, which has been made nearer to other countries by the modern means of communications, has caused me great pleasure. I will look forward to the realization of this desire, which is also mine, with satisfaction, delight, and pleasure."
Among Roosevelt's papers is a memorandum from the State Department asking him to approve the Twitchell mission to court the King's favor because the Army Air Corps was considering "the desirability of requesting the permission of the Saudi Arabian government for the installation of airfields." This was raising the stakes in Saudi Arabia. The United States was by now engaged in war in Asia and Europe, and Saudi Arabia was between the two fronts; the War Department was looking for bases in the Persian Gulf region that would shorten the distance between the Mediterranean and South Asia, would be out of German reach, and would not be under British control. Roosevelt told Secretary of State Cordell Hull that it was time to open a permanent U.S. diplomatic mission in Jeddah to begin talking directly to the King and his advisers. On April 13, 1942, a career diplomat named James S. Moose Jr. arrived in Jeddah as charge d'affaires of the first resident U.S. diplomatic legation in Saudi Arabia.
Moose was not part of the State Department's Ivy League elite -- he grew up in a
small town in Arkansas and attended Kentucky Military Institute -- but as a young Foreign Service officer he studied Arabic and became a full member of the State Department group known collectively as "The Arabists." He had a long and successful career, capped by a term as ambassador to Syria, but unlike his colleagues became disillusioned with the Arabs and is probably best remembered for one quotation: "Arabic is a language that opens the door to an empty room."
From the day of Moose's arrival in Jeddah, the United States and Saudi Arabia moved steadily closer to each other -- despite British delaying tactics -- and closer to the point where their leaders would meet in the historic encounter that led to their permanent alliance. On February 18, 1943, just ten months after Moose took up his station, Roosevelt declared Saudi Arabia to be strategically vital to the defense of the United States and thus eligible for Lend-Lease assistance. The following month, Secretary of State Hull recommended that the position held by Moose in Saudi Arabia be elevated to "minister resident," raising the occupant's status with the King. Moose was promptly promoted. (Not until 1949 was the mission elevated to full embassy status.)
By June 1943, the war was raging almost around the world, from the plains of Russia to the Italian islands to the Aleutians off Alaska to the mountains of China. The Allies could sense that the tide had turned in their favor, but victory was not yet sight. In the midst of this cataclysm, Roosevelt sent his personal foreign affairs adviser, Brig. Gen. Patrick Hurley, to Saudi Arabia to talk to the King.
Hurley's specialty was China, not the Middle East, and he was a Republican -- he had been secretary of war in the administration of President Herbert Hoover. But Roosevelt trusted his judgment, as he had that of another prominent Republican, Bill Donovan of the OSS. On June 9, Hurley sent the president a long report about his conversations with the king.
"Ibn Saud is the wisest and strongest of all the leaders I have met in the Arab states," Hurley wrote. "He is a man of vision and executive ability ready to lead his people in keeping pace with the progress of the world. He is, however, sensitive to the primitive outlook of his countrymen and their reluctance to accept foreign influence too readily. Ibn Saud acknowledges frankly that his country for its own safety and welfare needs the friendship and the assistance of a strong foreign power, but he distrusts and fears foreign imperialism. He is determined that his country will not become a ward or a mere instrument for profit of some foreign government. The king has, however, great faith and confidence in the United States.. ..He expressed complete confidence in your leadership and sincerely pleaded for your friendship."
Hurley said the King told him he wanted the oil resources of his country to be developed exclusively by American enterprises. "Saudi Arabia is potentially one of the greatest oil areas of the world.. ..The development of the situation in Saudi Arabia gives you, Mr. President, the possibility for a complete answer to the critics who tell us we are exhausting our oil resources at home without any hope of replacement. The development of the great oil resources of Saudi Arabia will give you a supply of this essential commodity in a strategic location," he added. The King, he said, was looking forward to postwar American assistance in irrigation, road construction, transportation, communications, education and public health. Hurley also observed that Saudi Arabia�s economic distress was compounded by the fact that its silver riyal coin, the basic unit of currency, had silver content higher than its monetary value and therefore disappeared over the borders as soon as it circulated. He recommended that Saudi Arabia switch to paper money, which it resisted doing until Americans introduced the concept a decade later.
This remarkable document, from a mid-level envoy in the middle of a world war, conveys concisely many of the essential elements of the unique relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the ensuing six decades: the Saudi preference for American involvement over European because the United States was not a colonizer, the tension between Saudi Arabia's need for outside assistance to develop its resources and protect itself and the aversion of the Saudi people to infidels and outsiders (reflected most dramatically in popular resentment of the U.S. deployment for Operation Desert Storm in 1991), and the sensitivity of the proud desert Arabs about their material backwardness.
Separately, Roosevelt dispatched Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, an Arabic-speaking intelligence agent who was Bill Eddy's cousin and Princeton classmate, to sound out the King on the subject of Palestine; pressure was building, as the reality of the Nazi Holocaust was revealed, to permit thousands of traumatized Jewish refugees from Europe to migrate to the Holy Land. The Arabs uniformly opposed additional Jewish migration to Palestine, and the King rebuffed Roosevelt's overture, telling the president that it was a nice of him to send a "tactful representative" to talk about it but there was no give in the position he had already stated in two previous letters: Palestine is Arab land. In his report to Roosevelt, Hoskins concluded with this warning: "Not only you as president but the American people as a whole should realize that if the American government decided to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine [as Zionists were demanding], they are committing the American people to the use of force in that area, since only by force can a Jewish state in Palestine be established or maintained." This echoed what the King-Crane Commission had told President Wilson, but somehow even this blunt assessment from a trusted analyst, and many similar memos Roosevelt was receiving from a strongly anti-Zionist State Department, left the president with the belief, or the hope, that he could charm the king into flexibility on this subject.
While he was in Saudi Arabia, Hoskins conveyed to the king an invitation to visit the United States or to send a member of his family if he could not come himself. In September 1943, two of Abdul Aziz's sons, princes Faisal and Khalid -- both future kings -- were invited to Washington and were well-treated (although by some accounts they were upset when told that wartime restrictions made it necessary to deny their request to acquire 14 automobiles.) Vice President Henry A. Wallace attended a splashy dinner for them at the White House. They stayed at Blair House, the official government guest house, and were provided with a special train to carry them on a sightseeing trip to the West Coast. Upon their return home, they reported favorably to their father, and also informed him that they had been told President Roosevelt enjoyed collecting stamps. Hoskins also had told the king that the president was a stamp collector. These messages gave the king an opening to approach the president directly. He assembled a set of 160 current and old-time stamps from the Arabian Peninsula, then quite rare in the West, and sent them to the president as a gift.
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During that same summer of 1943, on August 10, Roosevelt received a memo from Harold Ickes, the wartime oil administrator, alerting him to the urgency of securing new supplies of oil because the United States was already at peak production. Ickes was a flamboyant political brawler of progressive leanings who served Roosevelt throughout his presidency as secretary of the interior and, during the war, as a trusted counselor on all matters dealing with oil. He was renowned for blunt talk, and his memo to the president reflected it: "Despite everything," Ickes wrote, "our supplies are falling below demand. Therefore, it behooves us to find supplies of crude oil elsewhere.. ..We have assumed obligations in the world upon which we must make good. This means that we should have available oil in different parts of the world. I believe that the time to get going is now." The logical conclusion to be drawn from this was that Saudi Arabia would become increasingly important to U.S. strategic and economic interests; the oil reserves of the other countries around the Persian Gulf were under British control.
On February 10, 1944, Roosevelt sent the king a letter thanking him for the stamps. He expressed regret that he had been unable to meet the king during a recent trip to Cairo and Tehran -- a trip on which he flew over part of Saudi Arabia and conceived the idea of bringing irrigation and agriculture to the region's vast deserts -- and expressed the hope of meeting Abdul Aziz on some future journey. "There are many things I want to talk to you about," the president said.
The king took this as a commitment from the president to visit, and began asking Moose when he could expect Roosevelt's arrival. The president's forthcoming journey to Yalta, in the Soviet Crimea, for the crucial meeting at which he would discuss postwar arrangements with Churchill and Stalin, was to provide the opportunity for the president and the King, so different in background but in many ways kindred spirits, to come together at last. |
*King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, or son of Saud, was for many years referred to in the West as Ibn Saud. Now it is customary to refer to him by his given name, Abdul Aziz. The Arabs use the given name in reference to all princes of the House of Saud.
ABOUT
THOMAS LIPPMAN:
Thomas W. Lippman is an
adjunct scholar at the
Middle East Institute in Washington. In four years as
the Washington Post's Middle East bureau chief, three
years as the Post's oil and energy reporter and a
decade as the newspaper's national security and diplomatic
correspondent, he traveled extensively to Saudi Arabia. He
is the author of
Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of
American Power in the Middle East,
Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi
Arabia, Madeleine Albright and the New American
Diplomacy, Understanding Islam, and Egypt
After Nasser. A writer and journalist specializing in
U.S. foreign policy and Middle Eastern affairs, he lives in
Washington, DC.
THOMAS
LIPPMAN ON SUSRIS:
-
Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of
American Power in the Middle East - Introduction Excerpt -
Thomas Lippman - SUSRIS IOI - September 19, 2008
-
SUSRIS EXCLUSIVE -
Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the
Rise of American Power in the Middle East - A Conversation with Thomas Lippman
- SUSRIS Interview - September 15, 2008
-
Saudi Arabia Update - Thomas Lippman on "Middle East
Interviews" - SUSRIS IOI - August 29, 2008
-
"Good Morning, Mr. President" - Thomas Lippman's Briefing
for POTUS - SUSRIS IOI - January 11, 2008
-
American Influence on Modern Saudi Arabia - Thomas Lippman at the Cookeville, Tennessee Rotary Club - SUSRIS IOI - Oct 1, 2007
-
Political and Economic Developments in Saudi-US Relations -
A Conversation With Thomas Lippman - SUSRIS Interview - Sep
29, 2007
-
Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil - Wallace Stegner -
Foreword by Thomas Lippman - SUSRIS IOI - Sep 18, 2007
-
Determined to Remain Friends - A Conversation with Thomas
Lippman - Exclusive - SUSRIS Interview - Aug 7, 2007
-
A New Regional Leadership - Thomas W. Lippman - SUSRIS IOI -
May 10, 2007
-
Anniversary of Historic Meeting between Ibn Saud and FDR -
SUSRIS IOI - Feb 14, 2007
-
Region in Crisis: Fine Lines and Consequences - A
Conversation with Thomas W. Lippman - SUSRIS Interview - Aug
2, 2006
-
Crawford Summit Perspective: A Conversation with Thomas
Lippman - SUSRIS Interview - May 9, 2005
-
Insight on the Kingdom from the Author of Inside the Mirage
-- A Conversation with Thomas Lippman - Part One - SUSRIS
Interview - March 30, 2005
-
Insight on the Kingdom from the Author of Inside the Mirage
-- A Conversation with Thomas Lippman - Part Two - SUSRIS
Interview - Apr 18, 2005
-
U.S.-Saudi Relations: A Glass Half Empty, Or Half Full? - An
Interview With Thomas Lippman - Exclusive - SUSRIS Interview
- Aug 28, 2004
-
Thomas Lippman - "Inside The Mirage" - US-Saudi Relations --
SAIS Panel - SUSRIS IOI - Dec 16, 2003
MORE on the history of Saudi Arabia and relations with the U.S.:
-
The Day I Met My Dad - Steve Furman - Saudi American Forum - Aug 28, 2004
-
Achievements
of Our Fathers - Tim Barger on 75 Years of Aramco
Success - SUSRIS IOI - May 27, 2008
-
Lunch with a Prince - Steve Furman - Saudi American Forum - Aug 13, 2004
-
Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Foreword/Chapter One - Saudi American Forum - Mar 6, 2004
-
Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Two - Saudi American Forum - Mar 13, 2004
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Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Three - Saudi American Forum - Mar 20, 2004
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Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Four - Saudi American Forum - Mar 27, 2004
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Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Five - Saudi American Forum - Apr 3, 2004
-
Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Six - Saudi American Forum - Apr 10, 2004
-
Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Seven - Saudi American Forum - Apr 17, 2004
-
Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Eight - Saudi American Forum - Apr 24, 2004
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Honey & Onions: A Memoir Of Saudi Arabia In The Sixties - Frances Meade - Chapter Nine - Saudi American Forum - May 1, 2004
-
Saudi Arabs, Americans and Oil - Robert L. Norberg - Saudi American Forum - Mar 20, 2003
-
On
the Turquoise Coast: Memories of a Ras Tanura Boyhood -
William Tracy - Saudi American Forum - Apr 7, 2004
-
Lunch
with a Prince - Steve Furman - Saudi American Forum -
Aug 13, 2004
-
The
Story of the Saudi Government Railroad - Frederick Haack
- Saudi American Forum - Mar 5, 2004
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