Editor's Note:

The Bitterlemons.org "Middle East Roundtable," an excellent source for essays, interviews and articles on developments in the Middle East, recently focused on "the vital challenges facing the region in the coming decade?"  Today we provide for your consideration an essay by Professor Soli Ozel of Istanbul's Bilgi University from that collection in which he addresses the need for cooperation among states in the region and the prospects for solutions to pressing problems increasingly coming from inside the Middle East. We thank Bitterlemons.org for permission to share these essays with you. 

Needed: a new vision of inter-state cooperation 
Soli Ozel 

The next decade will undoubtedly be a hectic one in the region. One does not have to be a genius to divine as much. The American-led war against Iraq both brought to an end a particular strategic balance that existed in the region since the modern Middle East was shaped and destroyed the social basis of political power in Iraq--with serious spillover effects elsewhere. 

In addition, the failure of that American enterprise, or at least the failure of its originally declared aims, combined with the unwise disinterest of the Bush administration in the moribund Middle East peace process, created a vacuum. As in all such cases, this vacuum is being filled by diverse regional actors. Note, for example, Turkey's initiatives on the Israel-Palestine and Israel-Syria fronts and the activism of Qatar during the recent debacle in Lebanon. One prediction about the coming decade as a result of this condition is that regional actors will play a more active and decisive role in resolving their own political and strategic problems.

Even in its failure, though, the war in Iraq changed, indeed transformed, the political and strategic landscape of the region. With the fall of the Baath regime in Iraq the majority Shi'ites came to rule this critical Arab country. Shi'ites elsewhere began to ask more aggressively for their citizenship rights; Hizballah in Lebanon, with the support of Syria and Iran, challenged both the domestic political structure of Lebanon and the military might of Israel. At the broadest level, this suggests that one of the greatest challenges to Middle Eastern regimes concerns how they deal with their religious, ethnic or sectarian minorities and whether they can actually create a national identity built on equal citizenship rights.

In recent years, non-state actors and transnational movements gained strength and challenged established regimes through either terrorism or mass action. In the next decade, no matter who comes to power anywhere, I expect the states of the region to gain the upper hand and reinstitute the supremacy of the state system over non-state actors. However, the regimes themselves--especially in Egypt and arguably in Syria- -might find themselves under increased pressure unless they manage to implement long delayed reforms. 

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is no longer the central political or strategic issue, yet it still has the potential to block all other openings. It has this power because of the moral weight it carries in the region's imagination and the de- legitimizing role that its irresolution plays. Even if the Syrians were to sign a peace treaty with Israel that leaves Hamas without its main sponsor, the matter would not go away and the "single state" option, however unacceptable it may be to Israelis, would gain traction. 

In general, it may become increasingly urgent for Israel to change its conception of security and decide to be a player of the region rather than being just from the region. As I will argue below, non-military threats to security and stability in the region will need to be dealt with through cooperative endeavors. Otherwise natural, demographic and political problems will all combine to undermine the regional system and the regimes therein. 

It is by now common wisdom that Iran became the unintended main beneficiary in strategic terms of the American war against Saddam Hussein's regime, gaining much advantage in the Gulf region and acquiring a presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Iran's strategic rise has also been compounded by the significant influence it wields in Iraq until that country settles down. To deal with this double jeopardy, the countries of the region will need to devise ways of containing and balancing Iran. Arguably, this cannot be done without the diplomatic and military weight of the United States. If Tehran overplays its hand, the likelihood of a confrontation will increase. 

In one fashion or another, the United States will withdraw the majority of its troops from Iraq. But it will continue to have a presence in the Gulf and probably in Iraq as well. Subtle efforts on the part of Washington to open paths of dialogue and cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government can also be seen as an attempt to fortify the circle around Iran. To the extent that this complements Turkey's desire to open up space for economic integration with its neighbors and, more importantly, so long as this rapprochement, combined with Turkey's domestic reforms, marginalizes or eliminates PKK terrorism, the zone of stability in the region will be expanded.

This is important because the American decision to withdraw is a risky one. It could indeed leave a void in an Iraq where political equilibrium has not yet been reached and thereby unleash full-scale civil war. The Iraqi state is not yet strong enough to provide security and order. Violent instability in Iraq will have repercussions throughout the region. In a worst-case scenario, should Iraq disintegrate all states in the region would face similar pressures. This is one of the reasons why the dynamics of the region itself will not favor or allow such an eventuality. But whether the region mounts a collective response to the challenge remains to be seen. 

In today's Middle East, it is almost impossible to attain strategic goals without taking into account the interests and relative power of diverse players. This obliges the United States to seek cooperation with regional actors and prioritize diplomacy and negotiation over military might to pursue its goals. There are strong grounds to assess that the next administration, because of either ideational commitment or lack of resources, will pursue such a policy. 

Finally, in order to stave off the challenges of the next decade the region will have to generate a new vision of cooperation. Water and land scarcity, the pressure of bulging populations, the discontent of citizenry that is denied participation in politics--will all put pressure on the old order. One must bear in mind that most populations nowadays live in urban areas. The temptation to opt for terrorism in order to overcome frustration will grow every year that essential problems of livelihood, decent environment and self-esteem are not addressed.- Published 23/10/2008 � bitterlemons-international.org 

Soli Ozel is professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi University and columnist for the daily Sabah. 

Published 23/10/2008 � bitterlemons-international.org  
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]

Edition 39 Volume 6 - October 23, 2008