Editor's Note:

Each fall the National Council on US-Arab Relations brings together a distinguished group of diplomats, government officials, business people, military officials, scholars and others to tackle the thorny issues surrounding US-Arab relations. SUSRIS has provided AUSPC speakers' remarks, which touch on the Saudi-US relationship, to you for over the last five years. In keeping with that practice we again provide for your consideration a collection of AUSPC presentations. 

Today we present the remarks of General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993 in addition to numerous other distinguished posts in and out of government, from a panel reviewing the challenges posed by Iran and Iraq to US policymakers. General Scowcroft was joined on the panel by Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, Mr. Wayne White and Dr. Kenneth Katzman. Their remarks will be provided separately. The panelists were introduced by Dr. John Duke Anthony, President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

Additional AUSPC sessions which address U.S. and Saudi issues will be provided by SUSRIS in the coming days.

17th ANNUAL ARAB-U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE
�Transitioning the White House: Challenges and Opportunities for Arab-U.S. Relations�
October 30-31, 2008 | Washington, DC

[DR. JOHN DUKE ANTHONY] Thank you. General Scowcroft. Lieutenant General, retired. He�s one of America�s foremost and most prominent analysts on foreign policy issues. He�s had a distinguished career in and out of government, on the inside dealing with the challenges and opportunities and also burdens of promoting America�s national security interests and key foreign policy objectives across the spectrum, be they strategic, economic, political, commercial, defense, and then the people to people private sector relations. 

He is the founder and President of the Forum for International Policy. This is a non-partisan, non governmental organization, which provides independent analysis and perspective on major foreign policy issues. He�s also President of the Scowcroft Group, an international business advisory firm, and he served as assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to President Gerald Ford and President Richard Nixon as military assistant, but National Security Affairs Advisor also to President George H. W. Bush. And it was particularly during that tenure in the White House that one of the longest wars of the 20th century, namely the Iran-Iraq War, starting in September of 1980 and ending with a cease fire August 18th, 1988. This was on General Scowcroft�s watch. 

And in many people�s minds, that was a successful U.S. mobilization and deployment of force. Twenty four other nations stood with the United States in an internationally concerted action to bring about the ceasefire. There was cooperation with all the members of the United Nations Security Council, with 15 out of 15 members, on July the 15th 1987, passing Resolution 598, the first unanimous resolution in the United Nations Security Council since the Korean War, directly dealing with an issue of war and peace. General Scowcroft was centrally, pivotally involved in helping one, to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq War; two, to prevent the Iranian Revolution from spreading to the western side of the Gulf to eastern Arabia and at the same time part and parcel of the ending of the Cold War with a defeat of the Soviet Union through another internationally concerted action pertaining to Afghanistan. General Scowcroft.

[LT. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT] Thank you very much Doctor Anthony, it�s a great pleasure for me to be here with such a distinguished group of speakers and a wonderful audience, and I want to congratulate you on the subject for this year. 

It�s a very critical time, and the title of the conference �Transitioning the White House� is very important. Now we�re supposed to talk about Iran and Iraq, but I want to make a couple of preliminary comments because I think there�s some danger in separating the various issues of the region because they tend to spill over on each other in a variety of ways. And what I want to say is just a few words about the Palestinian peace process. I think it is a major source of the problems in the region. It�s a major source of anti-Americanism in the region. It�s a major rallying point for extremists in the region. And the solution to that problem would make a great contribution to the other issues that beset us in the region. 

I am personally very disappointed that the efforts of this administrations have not produced success, but I think that the day that the new President sits in the White House, the first thing he ought to think about, there are a lot of first things, but one of the very first things is renewing the Palestinian peace process, because it�s one of those things that if we�re not moving forwards, we�re moving backwards, and I think that�s a real, a real danger. We cannot succeed in that without the direct personal involvement, I don�t think, of the President of the United States, in a heavy way. 

Success in this venture though, would first of all change the psychological climate of the region. It would restore the general attitude that the United States is a force for good in the region, a force for progress in the region, not simply in there for its own narrow national aims. It would change the psychological climate in no other way. It would move Iran from the offensive to the defensive, because Iran plays on the Palestinian peace process, through Hezbollah, through Hamas. Now they are organizations that are not wholly dependent on the Palestinian issue but they get their strength and they feed on the Palestinian issue. So to me, this is one thing that the President has to focus on. 

Now turning to Iraq. If this conference last year had focused on Iraq it would be gloom and doom. The attitude has changed much, and I think the attitude has changed much because the situation has changed significantly. Progress is being made. But it�s a very fragile process, and it�s, I think, easily subject to reversal. It has been something of an issue in the Presidential campaign although not so much recently. And to me, what we need to focus on is what we really need in Iraq. And it seems to me what we need in Iraq is a country that is an influence for stability in the region, not for conflict and chaos. And it�s getting to that point now that I think it is reversible, and so I think while the U.S. can probably begin to reduce some troops as the security situation improves, we have to be very careful about pulling out before we have a situation there that is clearly able to be sustained by the local system. And therefore, I would caution against a withdrawal of the United States according to a calendar, rather than according to the situation on the ground.

In Iran, I think there are two general problems with Iran. The first one is Iran and the region, and the second is Iran and nuclear weapons. Thus far, what we can do or can�t do with Iran is for the United States pretty much of a mystery, because we have not been prepared to explore with them what the possibilities are. Now it�s difficult to explore with Iran because in a sense there are two different structures there. There is a governmental structure and there is a fundamental power structure, and it depends a lot who you talk to. But setting that aside, it seems to me that making discussions subject to preconditions before you will sit down and talk is not a recipe for understanding or for finding out what goes on. That is one of the purposes of talking, and talking in itself is not necessarily a concession. 

On Iran in the region, I think we need to know more about what Iran�s fundamental designs are, with respect to Iraq for example. There�s no question that they take great comfort from our problems in Iraq, and I think they undoubtedly contribute to those problems. But what do they really want to see? What kind of an Iraq? They were subject to a seven-year war with Iraq, which I�m sure they wouldn�t like repeated, and therefore they have a concern about a powerful Iraq. Would they rather have an Iraq which splintered into its major constituent parts, a Shia state in the south, a Sunni state in the center, and a Kurdish state in the north? From a power position, that might be very attractive to them. 

But a Kurdish state in the north is no less a problem for the Iranians than it is for the Turks, given the spread of the Turkish population in that region. But we don�t know, we don�t really know if there�s anything here in respect to Iraq that we might be able to work with the Iranians on. 

Then there�s Iran and nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that Iran considers itself in a difficult region. And I think that a turn to nuclear weapons is in many cases what appears to be a logical result for countries that live in difficult regions. But it�s not that simple, and for the United States, and for the rest of the world, it is not just Iran developing the nuclear weapons, it is what that means to the whole non-proliferation regime around the world. Because if Iran is allowed to develop the enrichment of uranium to the point that it can develop a nuclear weapons capability, then it seems to me we have made a very deep hole in the non-proliferation regime. 

It is difficult for me to see that that would not be followed by perhaps Egypt, perhaps Saudi Arabia, perhaps Turkey in the region, and by similar states with similar problems around the world. That is not a better world. What can we do? Again, I think discussion is important. This time discussion I think needs to be preceded by a very careful understanding among the negotiators on this issue, and that is the British, the French, the Germans, the United States, Russia, and China. None of those parties want Iran to develop nuclear weapons, but they all have different sorts of concerns. It seems to me that what we need to do is to agree first among those parties. We do not want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. What are the steps to be taken to avoid that as an outcome? That will take a level of cooperation, which so far we haven�t really achieved. Will it work? I don�t know. But it seems to me that is the approach to take rather than assuming that Iran cannot be dissuaded, and that it is either acquiescence or the use of force. I�ll stop there.

QUESTIONS POSED TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT IN THE Q AND A PERIOD:

[ANTHONY] ..One for General Scowcroft, could you be a bit more specific of what kind of great initiative the new American President might realistically, might feasibly launch, given the domestic pressures, the special interests, and how difficult this might be as a sell to elements of the American public?.. ..General Scowcroft, you want to take the first one about realistically feasibly given domestic and special interests constraints and pressures might you conceive of a successful or at least a beginning initiative. 

[SCOWCROFT] Yes, I�d be happy to. I think it is feasible and realistic. One of the things that we haven�t really thought so much about is the growing sentiment, especially among Palestinians, that they don�t want a two state solution. It seems to me that the perils of that for all concerned should put an impetus behind a renewed effort. I think that we�re actually closer to a solution than most people realize. If you look back at the Taba Accords in late 2000, early 2001, the two sides agreed on almost everything. 

Now there are some problems that one side or the other has to give way on, but this is not like starting all over again. Enormous progress has been made. One of the difficulties right now is in the recent negotiations is that both sides are relatively weak. They don�t represent strength back home. And therefore it�s difficult for them to reach out. What I sense is that if the United States had proposed a solution fundamentally along the lines of the Taba Accord and said, �This is what we think is fair to both sides. If you two can agree on modifications in it, fine.� But we didn�t do that. And I think that�s still what a, what the next President will have to do. 

It�s going to be probably somewhat more difficult because Israel is in a state of political turmoil right now. And how that gets resolved could have a considerable impact on the ability to negotiate. But it seems to me that the notion that the United State provides the meeting room and we say you two sit down and you come up with a solution, that that time has passed, and we need to be more assertive and I think it would work.

[OTHER QUESTIONS]

[ANTHONY] This last question will have 2 or 3 parts to it, and General Scowcroft may want to take 2 of the 3, or actually 4 parts to it.

One is, there have been three wars in this area in the last 30 years; the first Iran-Iraq War, then Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and now Operation Iraqi Freedom. And perhaps one could�ve added the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In terms of the lessons learned from what we have done, certainly for the first two of these that I mention, the Iran-Iraq War and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where the United States was roundly lauded and applauded from one end of the Gulf to the other. But the exact opposite since Operation Iraqi Freedom, where all the countries in the Gulf, with one exception, that would be Kuwait, that saw its situation in an existential circumstance, advised us that we didn�t know what we were getting into, we would be in over our head, we would rue the day, it would make things further complex in the region, and America�s friends would feel the rug was being pulled out from under them because they would be seen and tarred with the brush of moderates, etc. Being America�s Arabs, lackies, running dogs, that old jargon. 

Why such a contrast between the lauding and applauding of America�s response and policies and positions and actions and attitude towards those first two big ones, but the exact opposite largely for the, the one that we�re still dealing with there?

And then secondly, was it not true that under the Kissinger Secretary of Stateship that was either an agreement or on acceptance or on acquiescence or on accommodation to the Shah�s wanting to become a nuclear power? And of course, the relationship with Iran during that time between the United States was intimate, strategic, economic, political, and commercial, writ large. This was before the Shah really hit the fan there, and it�s been something quite different now. Could you square that, that we are on record as having been not uncomfortable, let alone opposing the idea of Iran being a nuclear power? 

So those are the two pieces that pertain to you, and I�ll ask the others of the others.

[SCOWCROFT] Well, on the first one, I think the difference in the attitude of the region towards the United States and some of the people in the region know better what their attitudes were than we. We were seen in the first two conflicts to be trying to help the region. We were out trying on behalf of the region. 

And indeed, when Saddam went into Kuwait, one of the first things he did was say now let�s have a conference on the peace process. And we said no, we deal with your aggression. But then quietly we said to the region let�s do this and then we will address the peace conference, and we did at the Conference on Madrid. 

Whereas, as you pointed out in the last Gulf War, we were advised by everyone else except Kuwait, which is a special thing, but not to do it. So we were seen not to be helping the region with its problems, but dealing with a problem we have within the region. And I think that accounts for, that�s why I said I think if we start with the Palestinian peace process, we can reverse that, and get back to where we were before. 

In the first Gulf War, we had Egyptian troops, we had Moroccan troops, we had Syrian troops. It was a very different kind of an attitude, and it seems to me that�s part of what we need to get back to. That we�re there not for our narrow goals, but we�re there to help the region with its problems, which also helps us in a more general way. 

The Shah. No it�s not true. My guess is the Shah in the back of his mind eventually had the notion of being a nuclear power. I think had he continued in power he probably would�ve gone down that road. And yet this was, we supported him; we didn�t think it was maybe the smartest thing for him to do. We supported him in his goal to develop nuclear energy. We said you know, you�re one of the richest oil companies in the world, why do you need that? Well he said, the oil�s going to run out eventually. Now whether it�s that or whether it was a nuclear program in disguise, I don�t know. But that simply is not true.

<end>

Source: Arab-US Policymakers Conference Web Site (AUSPC 2008)
http://www.auspc.org 

Transcription Services by Ryan & Associates

About Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret)

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), is one of the nation�s preeminent authorities on international policy. He is the founder and President of The Forum for International Policy, a non-partisan, non-profit organization providing independent analyses and perspectives on major foreign policy issues. He is also President of The Scowcroft Group, Inc., an international business advisory firm. 

General Scowcroft served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. He also served as Military Assistant to President Nixon and as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Presidents Ford and Nixon. Prior to joining the Bush Administration, General Scowcroft was Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc. 

In the course of his military career, General Scowcroft held positions in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Other assignments included faculty positions at the U. S. Air Force Academy and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and Assistant Air Attach� in the American Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 

General Scowcroft currently serves as a Director of the Qualcomm Corporation. He also serves on the University of California President�s Council on the National Laboratories. He serves as Chairman of the American-Turkish Council (ATC). He is President of the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is also a Member of the Board of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the George C. Marshall Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the International Republican Institute, the National Defense University, and the American Council on Germany. He also serves as an Advisory Board Member of Columbia University�s School of International and Public Affairs. 

General Scowcroft has chaired or served on a number of policy advisory councils, including the President�s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; the United Nations Secretary-General�s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; the Eisenhower Institute; the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control; the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management; the Defense Policy Board; and the President's Special Review Board (Tower Board) investigating the Iran-Contra affair. 

General Scowcroft has an aeronautical rating as a pilot and has numerous military decorations and awards. In addition, President George H. W. Bush presented him with the Medal of Freedom Award in 1991, the nation�s highest civilian award. In 1993, he was presented with the insignia of an Honorary Knight of the British Empire (K.B.E.) by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace. 

General Scowcroft was born in Ogden, Utah. He received his undergraduate degree and commission into the Army Air Forces from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he was recently recognized as a Distinguished Graduate. He received M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University. He also is the recipient of the following honorary degrees: Doctor of National Security Affairs from National Defense University; Doctor of Humane Letters from the Medical University of South Carolina; Public Service Doctorate from Brigham Young University; Doctor of Humanities from the University of Utah; LHD from the College of William and Mary; LLD from Columbia University; Degree from DePaul University; and LLD from George Washington University.