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Editor's
Note:
The Bitterlemons.org Web site, an excellent source for essays, interviews and articles on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, recently focused on "War in Gaza: the regional dimension" including insights from Riad
Kahwahi, CEO of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis
(INEGMA) in Dubai. We thank Bitterlemons for permission to share this perspective with you today and we recommend you visit the
bitterlemons-international.org
Web site for more insight on developments in this critical area.
Moderate Arabs fear consequences of failed Gaza war
Riad Kahwaji
The division in the Middle East region between the so-called moderate pro-western camp on the one side and the Iranian axis that includes Syria, Hizballah and Hamas on the other was clear in the early reactions to the Israeli military operation against Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip. Egypt and Saudi Arabia took the lead in the moderate camp in criticizing Hamas for giving Israel the alibi to wage this devastating onslaught by cancelling the lull from its side. Hizballah, Syria and Iran accused some moderate Arab countries, directly and indirectly, of conspiring with the United States and Israel against Hamas.
Hence, not only Israel was on the defensive diplomatically, trying to justify its actions to Arabs and the international community. Hamas also found itself on the defensive, trying to explain why it did not do more to promote national reconciliation and extend the lull with Israel. This was clear in news talk shows on pan-Arab channels and media outlets affiliated with Saudi Arabia or based in Dubai and Beirut.
But things quickly started to change. Images of dozens of scarred and dead children in Gaza have unified Arabs in their anger over Israel's excessive use of force against civilians. In the first week of the war, Arab public opinion was split regarding who is more to blame--Hamas or Israel--for starting it, and how it should be resolved. But the longer the conflict has gone on, the more support Hamas has been gaining. Since the Israeli military is unable to seriously weaken or decapitate Hamas in a timely manner, the majority of Arab analysts and officials fear Israel will once again fail as it did against Hizballah in the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006.
Therefore, many members of the moderate Arab camp are becoming more critical of Israel and more sympathetic toward Hamas. One example is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the leadership has gradually grown more critical of the Israeli operation and the media has become more graphic and detailed in its coverage of the suffering of civilians in the densely populated Gaza Strip. The UAE leaders, moving in the footsteps of their Saudi counterparts, have ordered a general fundraising campaign for war victims in Gaza. UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, like his Saudi counterpart, joined the Arab League delegation to the United Nations Security Council to demand an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
As Hamas gains more public support, its allies, like Syria, grow stronger. The Syrian leaders were quick to capitalize on this conflict by presenting themselves as brokers. Being the host to the Hamas leadership-in-exile, Damascus has received several senior officials from the region and the West seeking to use Syrian influence with Hamas to gain more concessions from the movement and bring about a ceasefire. Syria will make sure to gain credit for whatever deal is negotiated with Hamas to end the current Gaza war. This situation has once again reinforced Damascus' position in the region as a major player that cannot be ignored by the international community. For the Syrians, being a member of the Iranian axis could once again pay.
As for Lebanon, what applies to Syria would to a certain extent apply to Hizballah, which is widely credited for training and arming Hamas. Most Lebanese have been concerned about the spillover of the Gaza war into Lebanon. The worry expressed by the Lebanese president and prime minister as well as many others and their wish to maintain stability along the border with Israel was reflected in the quick decision to send military reinforcements to South Lebanon to assist United Nations peacekeepers in policing the area and preventing any groups from firing missiles into northern Israel.
Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah has been vague in recent speeches as to whether his party would open another front from South Lebanon to help Hamas. Most Lebanese analysts believe Hizballah would not risk sparking a war with Israel just a few months before Lebanese general elections because this could undermine its Christian allies' status at the polls by proving that the party's weapons were not for defending Lebanon but were serving foreign interests. Moreover, Iran seems to have been careful not to do anything provocative in the last few weeks of the outgoing US administration of George W. Bush in order to avoid being drawn into a large-scale military conflict.
Thus, the moderate Arab camp finds itself in a paradoxical situation: it cannot afford to see the Iranian axis grow stronger, and at the same time cannot but oppose Israel when the latter resorts to indecisive and bloody military campaigns. By failing to get Israel to accept the Arab peace initiative or to generate progress in the peace process, the moderate camp is weakened every time Israel unsuccessfully engages any of Iran's allies.
Many Arab officials and analysts believe that, for a number of reasons, Israel is unable to wage a decisive military campaign against Hamas or Hizballah. Therefore, as long as Israel does not seriously pursue the peaceful route, the moderate camp will become weaker and Iran stronger every time Israel resorts to the military option. This time around, the majority is starting to believe Israel will fail in Gaza and is worried about the consequences for Iran's status in the region.- Published 8/1/2009 � bitterlemons-international.org
Riad Kahwahi is CEO of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) in Dubai.
Published Jan 8, 2009 � bitterlemons-international.org
[Reprinted with permission of "bitterlemons"]
Edition 1 Volume 7 - January 08, 2009
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