A Firsthand Look At Saudi Arabis Since 9-11:
On The Road In Saudi Arabia

With Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman

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Editor's Note:

Are you among the many people wanting to know the true picture of developments in Saudi Arabia since the events of September 11, 2001? If so, this GulfWire interview with Dr. Anthony C. Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies [see bio below], will provide observations and insight not easily available to consumers of recent media reporting.

It is the product of first hand meetings and discussions among members of a US delegation of defense representatives, strategists and analysts, and Saudi Arabian hosts and officials. The visit was led by the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations from September 20-28, 2002. Meetings were held with some of the most prominent defense and diplomatic personnel in the Kingdom, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education, oil company heads, representatives of the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), American and Saudi Arabian corporate CEOs, 18 Saudi Arabian women leaders, and newly elected officials of the country's 19 chambers of commerce and industry, among others.

GulfWire was pleased to be represented on the delegation and to have the opportunity to talk with Dr. Cordesman about developments in Saudi Arabia since "9-11." This interview was conducted in Jeddah on September 27 as the visit neared its end.

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

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A Firsthand Look At Saudi Arabis Since 9-11:
On The Road In Saudi Arabia

With Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman

[GULFWIRE] What impressions are you taking away after a week of meetings, discussions and observations in Saudi Arabia?

[DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN] What we saw on one hand was a great deal of Saudi sympathy for what happened on 9-11 and a great concern for the deterioration of the US Saudi relationship.

It is difficult to summarize what are often very different, personal views, but I think there was recognition among Saudi officials that after 9-11 Saudi Arabia reacted initially with a combination of sympathy and denial. They never communicated the fact that they recognized Saudi Arabia had real problems, many of them had been domestic and that Saudi Arabia had faced its own threat from Bin Laden. They really did not communicate: the level of cooperation that was given the United States in terms of counterterrorism, the fact that Saudi Arabia recognized weaknesses in the educational system, and the fact that the Islamic extremist movement was acting against them. As a result it created a climate where many Americans felt Saudi Arabia extended sympathy but took no action.

At the same time I think there was a feeling in Saudi Arabia that Americans did not understand the real source of Saudi concern. It was not Islamic extremists or the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia or any of the usual factors discussed about the Gulf, but the Second Intifada.

There is a deep popular concern -- that has taken the form, in some cases, of a popular effort to simply refuse or boycott American products -- that the US had drifted away from seeking peace [in the Arab-Israeli conflict]. United States' support of Israel was creating a far more serious set of tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia, than were being caused by a small minority of religious extremists.

These concerns were raised virtually everywhere we went and at virtually every level. Of course the other compounding problem that was always present was Iraq. Here I think it is fair to say that the reaction, almost universal, was that Saddam was an evil and incompetent leader. However, no one has yet made it clear that there is an urgent need to go beyond containment, or what the US plans are if we do overthrow him. Why will it be better for the Iraqi people? Why will it be worth the cost of war?

[GW] What has been the impact of the drumbeat of criticism -- back and forth -- most notably that playing out in our media.

[AC] I think inevitably whenever relations become tense and newspapers start writing exaggerated articles, it is a mutually reinforcing process and it is usually based on the worst common denominator. Every country looks at the worst thing the outside media says about their country and immediately feels compelled to find a counterbalance and its rarely a quiet, smooth, reasoned argument. It's almost invariably, "Well, you may have criticized our faults, but look at all of yours."

There have been conspiracy theories on both sides. People have hidden agendas that go far beyond US-Saudi relations. Some feel they want to separate Saudi Arabia from a power that is an ally of Israel. Some certainly see this as a way of undermining the Saudi regime. Some see this whole issue not just in the context of US-Saudi relations, but that the entire Mideast should become of copy of the US, or who look more at Israel's security interests than the interest of the US. This problem is compounded on both sides because if the US is an ally of Israel and see the Israeli side of things to the exclusion of the Palestinian side, then Saudi Arabia sees the Palestinian side to the exclusion of the Israeli side.

[GW] How would you characterize the level of cooperation between the two governments based on your conversations with Saudi Arabian and US officials.

[AC] I think it is very clear when you talk not only to the Saudis but US officials here that there has been a lot of cooperation.

Tensions over the US presence in Saudi Arabia are real. They have been exacerbated by the fact that the Saudis really do not belief that military intervention in Iraq is wise, or that the United States has a clear course of action beyond intervention to overthrow Saddam. In spite of that, I think it is important to note, a lot of the cooperation, rather than being reduced, is actually being restored. There will be a new series of joint exercises. There is more flexibility on the use of Saudi airspace. There is less concern over the issues of stockpiling munitions or the use of stockpiles in Saudi Arabia. There is an effort to bring back some of the common training in addition to exercises.

So when you look at a lot of these issues you discover that, below the surface of the extreme commentary, a lot of the US-Saudi relationship still exists. It is not that Saudi Arabia plans to support the US in Iraq, but it has not totally rejected it -- certainly not if the UN passes a strong resolution under Article 7. I think we sometimes look for a much more polarized relationship than exists.

The same is true whenever you talk about the issue of counterterrorism. Nobody thinks this cooperation is perfect but generally both US and Saudi officials make the point that there is a lot more cooperation than people wish to make public in detail. And I think from talking with counterterrorism specialists in the US they probably agree. There is a lot that still needs to be done but there is a lot that has been accomplished. Certainly the countries are working together better than they were on September 11.

[GW] What is your sense of the level of credibility the United States has with partners in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, on the question of Iraq?

[AC] First, I think you need to understand that most people in the world have no understanding of weapons of mass destruction. The most they can do is interpret white papers and speeches, in terms of how other people interpret them.

In the Mideast, so far, the case that the Bush administration and Prime Minister Blair have made has not been convincing. Some of that, frankly, is denial -- the refusal to really remember what UNSCOM found, the UNSCOM reports to the Secretary General. There is a feeling that if we pay too close attention to this we're going to have to admit that Saddam is more of a problem than we'd really like to admit.

Part of the problem is that the case has been made very late in the game. The first substantive paper is Prime Minister Blair's. The US has issued speeches and one brief statement but no details. There's no case that people find convincing and that's true of Saudi officials at the classified level just as it is in many places such as with our NATO allies. The situation is complicated by the fact that some Saudis have been in a state of denial too, about Saddam's failings and shortcomings, and of the problems that need to be addressed.

It is also complicated by the fact that the US has issued papers on subjects such as preemption and US officials have talked about democratizing the Arab world. The lack of focus in the US message has had a powerful impact -- the lack of detail and consistency over time. The tendency for US officials to speak to American and Western audiences rather than the world has had an impact.

As I mentioned earlier the most serious and persistent problem is that no one knows what US intentions are. Are we going to hold onto the Iraqi oilfields, exploit them? Are we going to go into Iraq, overthrow Saddam and leave a mess, potentially a divided Iraq and a civil war? Are we going to go in, basically do things which will inevitably hurt the Iraqi people and not have a clear recovery plan? Nobody [in Saudi Arabia] can answer those questions. The question of what we will do if we act and when we win is, I think, the constant dominating uncertainty, as much as the issue of whether Saddam is evil and whether the weapons of mass destruction are an imminent threat.

[GW] You raised the question of economic and demographic issues facing Saudi Arabia with officials you met. How would you characterize the implications of demographics -- specifically the high population growth rate -- in Saudi Arabia with the economic situation and whether Saudi Arabian officials are addressing the issues adequately?

[AC] There are two dangers here. One is to forget that if we set the standard for Saudi per capita income in 1980, that was a freak year. The fact that it's dropped from an excess of $20,000 to well under $9,000 in constant dollars is not always relevant.

Nevertheless I think the Saudis recognize they are in economic trouble in the long run. The population, at least among the educated Saudis, is going to present massive problems in terms of new jobs, diversification, and dealing with the demands of a very young population with more and more people entering the labor force. Are the Saudis realistic in dealing with the issues? The answer quite frankly has to be no, they're not. If you look at the numbers they quote it is striking that no one can even say there is a meaningful estimate of unemployment. Some of that seems to be deliberate -- if you issue the figures you would have to admit the problem. People are celebrating the creation of a Water Ministry and the appointment of a Water Minister. But it is unclear anybody believes there is an effective plan to deal with water and electric power issues, that there is a clear plan that is economical for gas development. For Saudi Arabia, these are incredibly expensive activities which require a lot of foresight and technological integration.

The Saudization plan often, depending on who you talk to, is either recognized as having, at best, moderate value or sometimes seen as the solution. But often the number of jobs that can be Saudized is exaggerated.

It is not that the Kingdom is under some kind of immediate pressure, but when dealing with many of these areas it has good plans in broad terms for reform. However, they are being executed far too slowly to have the impact that is needed and it is not honestly addressing the scale of the problems it faces or the difficulty of solving them.

[GW] What struck you in particular during your visit to the Kingdom on this trip?

[AC] I think the most striking thing is, not any one issue, but the fact that we are talking about real pragmatic issues where there are legitimate differences of opinion.

We are not talking about extremism, we are not talking about Islam as being a threat. We are not talking about Saudis who want to sever the relationship or end all military cooperation. We are talking about Saudis searching for a way to restore the kind of friendship and relationship that existed before 9-11.

If we are going to address this, it is not a matter of looking at some kind of conspiracies, looking at this in any sense as a religious or national issue. It is dealing with differences that really have to be worked out. These are going to be issues like Iraq, terrorism, the second intifada -- issues which are not going to go quickly away. It is where we have to know how to agree on disagreeing, as well as find ways to agree on making compromises.

[GW] Thank you Doctor Cordesman.