Issues Of Engagement And The Course Of Future
U.S.-Saudi Relations, Post-September 11

by Mary E. Morris

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

This contribution to the dialogue on US-Saudi relations is reprinted with permission of GulfWire.

This GulfWire Perspectives advances the discussion of U.S.-Saudi relations to a new level. Mary E. Morris has written a masterful exposition on the interests that form the special relationship, the changing dynamics in the relationship and the road ahead for a relationship that is essential for both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

This Occasional Paper, published by the Center for Saudi Studies in Washington, presents Morris' well-researched and thoughtful study of the U.S.-Saudi relationship through the lens of post-September 11 events. However, she sets that stage with a thorough examination of the relationship's history -- its breadth and depth across the spectrum of interests that have bound the two countries for more than half a century.

GulfWire would like to thank Ms. Morris for contributing this excellent paper to the dialogue on U.S.-Saudi relations, and thank the Center for Saudi Studies for permission to present it to you.

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire.

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Issues Of Engagement And The Course Of Future
U.S.-Saudi Relations, Post-September 11

by Mary E. Morris

Executive Summary

This Occasional Paper addresses issues of engagement between the United States and Saudi Arabia and assesses the future course of a fifty-year relationship based on friendship and mutual interests. At the present time, the bond between the two countries has been challenged by differing views of issues such as security, perceptions of Israel, Iran, and Iraq, military cooperation, human rights, and terrorism. This Paper looks at agreements and differences between the two countries over these issues, as well as at the ties that bind the U. S. and Saudi Arabia, including oil and other commercial interests. It then suggests some possible actions for both Saudi Arabia and the United States in order to preserve and strengthen the relationship, taking into account the vital interests of both countries and the long-term congruence of those interests.

America's first "special relationship" in the Middle East was with Saudi Arabia. Together the United States and Saudi Arabia developed an oil empire; together they resisted Soviet influence in the Middle East; together they fought the Gulf War. The United States continues to use Saudi bases to counter Saddam Hussein. Saudi Arabia, in turn, depends on U. S. military equipment, advisors, and technical support to bolster its military strength and its regional security.

The United States and Saudi Arabia, however, must deal with problems both within their individual countries and in relation to each other. Saudi Arabia, for example, faces internal challenges of a political, social and economic nature that require attention and serious structural reforms for the long-term benefit of the Kingdom as well as for its international relations.

For its part, American blindness to issues of basic concern to the Middle East, and its insensitivity to the vital interests of others, creates a dangerous situation, a minefield that, if not reversed, will affect U.S. interests far beyond its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, an increasingly important key player in the region, has presented both the Middle East and the United States with a potential lifeline, a way out of the morass into which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has descended. His proposal outlines a vision of the future that acknowledges the existence of two nations, Israel and Palestine, and lays out the basis for peaceful co-existence between them. United States' support of Abdullah's proposal as an underpinning for a renewed peace process might bring about an end to the cycle of violence-and at the same time give America an opportunity to demonstrate a better understanding of regional dynamics.

For the United States and Saudi Arabia the stability of the Middle East is paramount. The reasons may be different for each country, but the goal is the same, as it has been for almost a century. In the end, the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia are likely to converge to an extent and in areas not explored before, and the "special relationship" will endure.

Content

Executive Summary
Content
Introduction
Oil And Security: Political, Mliltary, And Economic
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Impact Of The Iranian Revolution
Military Cooperation
Human Rights And Democracy
Terrorists, Dissidents And September 11th
Defining Mutual Interests
Conclusion
References

Introduction

This Occasional Paper will address issues of engagement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, as they have emerged from the historic relationship between the two countries. It identifies the principal issues that confront the relationship, the causes for either agreement or controversy: oil, security, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, military cooperation, human rights and democratic reforms, and terrorism. The Paper also looks at ways in which differences over issues could drive apart the U.S. and Saudi Arabia -- and what the consequences might be of a serious estrangement. It suggests some possible actions for both Saudi Arabia and the United States in order to strengthen the relationship, taking into account the vital interests that both countries bring to the table.

Rumors of dissension between the United States and Saudi Arabia -- indeed, between the United States and most of the Arab world -- have surfaced since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. There is much antagonism toward U. S. support for Israel, particularly as the crisis between Israelis and Palestinians has descended into extreme violence. But there are additional differences in perspective, over the nature and extent of the U. S. presence in Saudi Arabia, for example, which are exacerbated by the U. S. position with regard to Israel and Palestine. While the U.S. tends to see its troops as a temporary presence, many critics of the Saudi regime see the U.S. presence as a permanent foreign occupying force. These critics claim that the U.S. presence is colonial and demonstrates the illegitimacy of the Al-Saud government, particularly at a time when U. S. motives in the region are under question. Additionally, many religious conservative leaders in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world at large characterize the U.S. military presence as blasphemous because of its proximity to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah.

What appears to have been pushed to the sidelines is the strategic opportunity presented by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal for ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, exchanging Arab acceptance of Israel for the land it has occupied since 1967 -- in line with long-standing UN resolutions and international law. The horrific increases in violence since March of 2002, however, may have obscured the chance for regional peace embodied in the Crown Prince's offer -- which surely cannot be characterized as part of an extremist agenda. To date, while the Crown Prince's plan received endorsement from the Arab League, it has received little more than token recognition from either Israel or the United States, and an historic opportunity may have been missed.

On the whole, however, reports of rifts between the United States and Saudi Arabia have been exaggerated. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly condemned terrorism and terrorist acts, and the Bush Administration has consistently emphasized that the U. S. government is satisfied with Saudi cooperation and emphasized its reliance on Saudi Arabia as a regional partner. Saudi Arabia severed its relationship with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan on September 25, 2001, and Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that the Saudi government has "responded to every request we have made of them." [1] Nonetheless, differences do exist in the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia, as well as in the perspective that both countries bring to those interests.

Oil And Security: Political, Military, And Economic

Saudi Arabia's oil business began with the United States, and with the May 1933 agreement granting exploration and production rights over some 360,000 square miles for sixty years to Standard Oil Company of California (Socal -- now Chevron). The first major discovery was made five years later, in the area of present-day Dhahran, at Well Number 7 in the Dammam Dome exploration area.

The discovery opened a new era in both petroleum drilling and in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Dhahran became the administrative, industrial, and residential hub in Saudi Arabia for employees of ARAMCO -- the Arabian American Oil Company-formed in 1944 as a joint venture between Socal, Texaco, Esso, and Mobil oil companies.[2] Scores of American workers and their families populated what came to be a U. S. outpost in the Saudi desert, an American enclave within the remote society of Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO was fully purchased by Saudi Arabia in 1976, but U.S. executives and key engineers continued to recruit replacements for more than ten years, until King Fahd officially established the Saudi Arabian Oil Company -- Saudi ARAMCO -- by royal decree in 1988. [3]

The effect of oil wealth on Saudi Arabia was phenomenal. Saudi Arabia was one of the poorest countries on the globe at its creation in 1932, when King Abdul-Aziz united the Arabian Peninsula into the nation of Saudi Arabia.

The importance of oil in the U.S.-Saudi relationship cannot be denied --especially when one looks at projections of increasing dependence on Saudi/Gulf oil over the next two decades and when one realizes that Saudi Arabia's proven oil reserves are estimated at 263.5 billion barrels.[4] However, oil is not the sole bond between the Kingdom and the United States. Both countries have gained from the oil relationship, but significant security benefits have accrued on both sides as well.

The Saudi relationship was particularly valuable to the U.S. during the Cold War, amid mutual suspicions of Moscow's intentions in the Gulf. The principal focus of the United States, with little exception, was the Soviet Union and the threat posed to the U.S. and to the entire free world by Communism. For Saudi Arabia as well, Communism and the spread of influence by the Soviet Union presented substantive threats. These common security concerns, as well as overt challenges to Saudi security posed by Iran and Iraq, have led to a close military cooperation between the two countries, one that has endured in spite of cultural and political differences and disagreements, particularly over U.S.-Israeli policy. At its inception, Saudi Arabia had a population of approximately two million in an area half the size of India. Recent estimates put Saudi Arabia's population at anywhere between 14 and 20 million, depending on the proportion of non-Saudi citizens who are counted in the total.

Oil explorations and discovery changed all of this: in a short period of time, the Kingdom was beset by assaults on its religion, history, and cultural traditions.

The "special relationship" between the United States and Saudi Arabia dates back to World War II, by which time the extent of Saudi oil resources had become known-along with their importance to the war effort and beyond. In 1943 the first U.S. military mission to the Kingdom was dispatched, and the Roosevelt Administration declared that the defense of Saudi Arabia was a vital interest to the United States. That relationship was further cemented in 1945, at a meeting between King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia and President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake. The Kingdom's relationship with Washington became a cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy and a critical element of U. S. interests in the Middle East.

With the outbreak of the war, Dhahran became an important way station for air routes to the China-Burma-India theatre from North Africa. Under the Lend-Lease agreement, the Persian Gulf and Iran became the southern supply route to the USSR and, geographically, increasingly important to U.S. strategy in defeating Germany. Newly-developed Saudi oil fields -- as well as friendship with the Kingdom -- became significant to the U.S. war effort, leading American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to declare in 1943 that "I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."[5] The first U.S. military mission was dispatched shortly thereafter, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers providing training for the Saudi Army.

In recent years perceptions of the importance of the Persian Gulf to Western security concerns have changed. The collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the entry of Russian and Central Asian oil into the open market have reduced the strategic value of Saudi Arabia to some extent -- but it is unlikely that these alternate sources will replace Arabian oil. At the present time, the United States uses twenty-five percent of the world's oil production, with 4 percent of the world's population and 3 percent of its reserves. Two-thirds of world reserves -- more than 600 billion barrels -- belong to the nations of the Persian Gulf, while the region continues to account for approximately 30 percent of all oil traded globally.[6]

In fact, despite the development of alternative sources of oil, projections are that the United States, and the world, will become increasingly dependent on Gulf oil over the next few decades. Over the next twenty years, fourteen percent of North American oil consumption will come from the Persian Gulf-up from 8 percent in 1995. For Western Europe, approximately thirty-five percent of oil consumption will be provided from the Gulf, compared to 25 percent in 1995.[7]

In the Gulf, ARAMCO manages the largest proven petroleum reserves on earth. With enormous operations and assets, it is the world's largest oil producer and exporter, and has unequaled spare petroleum production capacity.[8] These assets came into play in the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. On September 12 Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz and Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi announced that the Kingdom would rush an extra nine million barrels of oil to the United States. For the next two weeks Saudi Arabia used its own tankers to ship 500,000 barrels of oil a day to the United States, reducing the price of crude oil from $28 per barrel to less than $20 within a few weeks.[9] Clearly, the partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia goes beyond financial gains. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal has frequently stated, oil, from a Saudi perspective, can be an instrument of stability, friendship and development rather than an instrument of war.

At the present time, Saudi Arabia is the largest U. S. trading partner in the Middle East, with exports from Saudi Arabia in the year 2000 estimated at $14.3 billion and imports at $5.9 billion. Saudi Arabia's primary export is oil; while U. S. arms are the principal imports, these are followed by significant amounts of U. S. commercial equipment. In 2000, for example, Saudi Arabia imported over $6 billion of transportation equipment, industrial machinery, computer equipment, and fabricated metal products from the United States.[10]

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

In early 2002 Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia took an historic step, expanding upon ideas first proposed by King Fahd in the 1980s to suggest a permanent resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has assumed epic proportions in terms of bloodshed and brutality on both sides. Offering recognition of Israel in exchange for the establishment of a truly viable Palestinian state, the Crown Prince's proposal was presented to a meeting of the Arab League in a March 2002 meeting in Beirut, and was subsequently endorsed by those states in attendance.

At the same time that the Crown Prince was presenting his proposal, however, the Israeli-Palestinian situation was rapidly deteriorating even further, making consideration of a peace process in the near term almost inconceivable. As noted above, it appears that the initiative, a strategic opportunity for both Israelis and Palestinians, has been largely sidelined because of the cataclysm of violence consuming Israel and Palestine. Nonetheless, one of the notable elements of the Crown Prince's proposal was that it indicated the readiness of a key Arab leader to take a controversial stand at the highest Arab forum and to campaign for it.

Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative and its acceptance by other Arab countries also indicates the increasing awareness of Middle East countries of the importance of regional political stability as a prerequisite to economic growth and integration with world economies -- a step forward to avoid being left behind. All countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, face a demographic explosion over the next generation. Economic and social issues must dominate agendas: jobs must be created, children must be educated, families must be housed and fed, and the institutions of civil society must be nurtured. Indeed, finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is not an option, but a necessity for world peace.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a millstone around the region's collective neck, in the short run providing excuses for regimes to delay reforms, but in the long run dragging down efforts to restructure and cope with increasing social and demographic stresses. Crown Prince Abdullah's plan was an acknowledgement of reality, and an invitation to Israel and the rest of the Middle East to join in a common vision of a viable future.

At some point, there will be a final settlement of this catastrophic conflict, a settlement that ultimately must be negotiated directly between Palestinians and Israelis. Crown Prince Abdullah's plan offered a basic framework for that settlement, an opportunity for moving out of the corners into which both protagonists have painted themselves. It refocused discussion on the central issue: territory. It was based on universally accepted UN resolutions, and one of the most respected figures in the Arab world, crown prince of the largest and strongest country in the Arab world, backed it. While the world has looked to Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States to produce a "deal-maker," it is quite possible that in the long-term Saudi Arabia, instead, may fill that role.

The U.S. relationship with Israel has been a complex and exasperating problem for Arab countries, and an increasing difficulty in America's relationships with them. In the years since 1967 particularly, as U. S. support for Israeli interests and policies grew into a new "special relationship" complete with arms sales and the provision of sophisticated American weaponry, concern grew in Saudi Arabia that the Israeli connection would adversely affect the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Congressional reduction or cancellation of some proposed arms sales to the Kingdom during the 1970s and 1980s convinced many Saudis of undue Israeli influence on Washington.

Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab states, was fiercely opposed to establishment of a Jewish state on Arab land at the expense of fellow Arabs, and to American recognition of it following the Second World War. Regardless of Arab objections, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine, which was accepted by the General Assembly and by the Jewish Agency in 1947. By 1948 Great Britain withdrew its army and administration, and in May of that year the Jewish National Council proclaimed the State of Israel. It was recognized by the Soviet Union, then the United States -- and these actions were followed immediately by the attack of neighboring Arab states on Israel to restore the rights of Palestinians.

Although King Abdul-Aziz threatened to shut down ARAMCO and cut off supplies to the United States and Great Britain, the concession was the sole source of Saudi Arabia's rapidly increasing wealth; in addition, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia guaranteed the country's territorial integrity and independence -- and the United States was firmly behind the establishment of the state of Israel.

The following years saw a closer relationship between the United States and Israel, and an ambivalent relationship between the United States and the rest of the Middle East. Despite Israeli depredations in Lebanon in 1982, the casualties that the U.S. suffered in Lebanon in the early 1980s affected American relations with the Arab Middle East profoundly. The primary focus of the Reagan administration was the Soviet Union, and the attempt to put together a "strategic consensus" among Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, that would be directed against potential Soviet aggression.[11] Arab states, however, were more focused on immediate threats-such as Israeli and Iranian actions.

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War provided a test of the U.S.-Saudi relationship -- a test that was to be repeated with greater resonance in 1973. Oil, an essential resource to the West, was used as a political weapon by the oil-producing countries of the Gulf, following Israel's preemptive strike on Arab forces under the leadership of Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser. The result was Israeli occupation of land in the Sinai, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. In response, Arab oil ministers formally called for an oil embargo against the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Within days, the flow of Arab oil was reduced by sixty percent; Saudi facilities were completely shut down, as were the Suez Canal and the oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. In July civil war broke out in Nigeria, which resulted in the removal of another 500,000 barrels a day from the world market.

Despite temporary panic on the part of oil importers, the Arab boycott was short-lived, with the real losers the countries that instituted the embargo. In addition to losing revenues, they were also asked to provide large and continuing revenues to Egypt and other "front line" Arab states.[12] By September the embargo was lifted. In fact, as a result of the surge in production following the Six-Day War, available supplies exceeded demand, leading to fears of a glut and the imposition of import quotas.

Arab states used the oil weapon far more successfully in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when Egyptian forces attacked Israel in a surprise move. Oil suppliers withheld access to oil to supporters of Israel, sending petroleum prices to levels that never again subsided to their previous level. The United States, which had established a supply line to provide Israel with massive quantities of goods for its war effort, was badly hit. Israel turned the tide of battle and both the Soviet Union and the United States, in conjunction with the United Nations, arranged a ceasefire.

The war was a watershed for Arab oil countries, with a huge enhancement of oil wealth. Higher oil prices drove up prices of anything requiring heating, cooling or transportation, and increased prices of innumerable petroleum by-products.[13] While the embargo was short, it changed the future of Saudi Arabia as well as its relationship with the United States: by March 1974 the price of oil rose from less than $3 a barrel to more than $11. Hundreds of billions of dollars were transferred from oil-consuming nations to oil producers, providing the foundation for the building of the modern Saudi-American relationship and for the modern Saudi state.[14]

Once more, Saudi and U. S. interests converged -- the United States wanted to ensure access to oil at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future, while Saudi Arabia had need for Western administrative and technical skills. Accordingly, following the oil crisis, U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William Simon proposed a Saudi-U.S. Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, creating a mechanism for the U.S. to provide technical advice and assistance to Saudi Arabia on a wide range of issues, "from how to create a modern customs service and how to collect statistics on a fast-growing economy to how to desalinate and distribute drinking water. The recipient of the assistance, Saudi Arabia, paid for all of it,"[15] eventually paying over $1 billion to the U. S. government for services including salaries and living expenses of the Americans who created the infrastructure of a modern state in Saudi Arabia.

On March 26, 1975, Faisal bin Musa'id, one of King Faisal's young nephews, slipped into the king's majlis (meeting) as he was about to receive a delegation from Kuwait. The prince produced a pistol and fired several times, killing King Faisal almost instantly. Faisal's successor was his half-brother, Khalid, whose poor health resulted in the accession to real power of Crown Prince Fahd-and a general meeting of minds, particularly over oil pricing, with the United States.[16]

The Impact Of The Iranian Revolution

U. S. and Saudi interests have frequently conflicted over Israel and its activities in the region. But differences have existed as well over U. S. policy toward Iran, at least until 1979. The collapse of the Pahlavi regime, as well as the perceived increase in threat from the Soviet Union, brought Saudi Arabia and the United States together with a series of informal military agreements that ranged from basing rights to intelligence-sharing.

The British withdrawal from the Gulf had led eventually to the "twin pillars" strategy established by the United States to enhance regional security. Iran and Saudi Arabia were the pillars, with Iran perceived as the "big pillar" until the 1979 revolution. As a result of this relationship, the U. S. gave the Shah of Iran a virtual blank check to buy as many American weapons as he wished, including the most technologically advanced, as long as they were not nuclear weapons. Thus, by the mid-1970s, "Iran was responsible for fully half of total American arms sales abroad."[17] Iran was perceived by Washington to be an essential ally with a major security role in the Middle East, not least because of its border with the Soviet Union. The warning signs of Iranian domestic disruption were overlooked: inflation, corruption, and increasing political and social tensions that signaled broad opposition to the Shah's regime.

At the same time, the U. S. government was involved in building up Saudi Arabia's military infrastructure. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers moved its Mediterranean Division from Italy to Riyadh and supervised construction of over $14 billion worth of work on three huge bases, including King Khalid Military City, two deep-water ports for the Saudi Navy, airfields, barracks, and housing estates.[18]

In a 1980 interview, Dr. Ghazi Algosaibi, Saudi Minister of Industry and Electricity, stated, "the new Arab world is interdependent with America.. Your industrial way of life. will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your strength and resolve."[19] Dr. Algosaibi's remarks pointed up an additional point of agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States: their joint abhorrence of Communism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 only reaffirmed this aspect of the relationship, and encouraged acceptance of the U.S. as a distant partner -- an "over the horizon" presence, to be sure, but a definite strategic partner.

The Iranian Revolution, combining as it did republicanism with Shi'ite Islamic fundamentalism, bound the United States and Saudi Arabia even more closely; both countries were concerned with containing the spread of Iranian-style fundamentalism.

For the United States, this period, especially after the fall of the Shah, provided an opportunity for gaining a further foothold in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf.[20] The twin crises posed by Iran and Afghanistan led to the development of steadfast U. S. relations in the Gulf, not just with Saudi Arabia, but also with other Gulf states such as Bahrain and Oman.

The period also was one that sowed the seeds of future disaster, for it witnessed the creation of the mujahedin, the Muslim religious fighting force that ultimately defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. Supported by the CIA, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China, the mujahedin attracted hundreds of young Arabs and Muslims to the fight against Communism. Only a comparatively small number of Saudis remained with the mujahedin at the end of the Afghan war-but out of this remaining group grew a network of hard-line extremists and terrorists, many of whom reportedly became members of Usama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September of 1980 was not unwelcome news to either the United States or Saudi Arabia. In the view of many, it was better to keep these two disruptive entities engaged with each other rather than affording them the opportunity for a spillover of their aggressions --military, religious, and political -- throughout the region. For the United States, Iran was the enemy, so Iraq was supported with intelligence sharing and dual-use technology, as well as with some help for its economy. The outcome of the war, however, was disastrous: it weakened Iran, and left Iraq as the dominant power in the Gulf, wrecking infrastructure in both countries and doing massive damage to oil and gas fields.

In the meantime, the United States was moving frantically to put together an operational strategy to protect its interests and allies from a seemingly endless list of threats-from Iranian fundamentalists in Tehran to Soviet troops in Kabul. The concept of a Rapid Deployment Force, first discussed in the Kennedy Administration, was revived, and American emissaries were sent out to Gulf countries to secure basing rights for U. S. troops throughout the region. Included in these plans were strategies to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, underpinned by arming indigenous resistance forces in state-of-the-art weaponry such as Stinger anti-aircraft equipment, along with training provided by U.S. forces.

Military Cooperation

Successive U.S. administrations have entered into military sales agreements with Saudi Arabia because of its prestige in the Arab world, its importance as a major source of oil, and its vulnerability to threats from neighboring states supported in the past by the Soviet Union. Heightened threats from Iran in the late 1980s and subsequently from Iraq provided rationale for an expansion of the arms supply relationship, and some observers believe further sales are needed to redress a continuing gap between Saudi weapons inventories and those of potential adversaries. Also, the Saudi arms market has helped maintain the U.S. industrial base and create jobs at a time of economic stress. Indeed, in the sphere of military relations, the United States and Saudi Arabia have relied on each other for security, resources, political support, money, and intelligence, an alliance convenient for both parties. Saudi Arabia received the security it required, while the United States has had the assurance of a reliable supply of oil at affordable prices.[21] In addition, a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia has been built up by a series of American administrations through informal military agreements and military deployments -- from the 1963 deployment of F-100 fighter aircraft during the Yemen civil war and Egyptian invasion to the massive 1990 deployment of troops and equipment to turn back Saddam Hussein.

Since the late 1970s, a series of informal agreements, statements by U. S. leaders, and military deployments to the Gulf have demonstrated America's strong security commitment to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, U. S. support for Israel has frequently had an impact on the issue of Saudi arms sales, with several major transfers contested in the U.S. Congress. Examples are the F-15 aircraft in 1978, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in 1981, and a package of air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-sea missiles in 1986. At issue was Congressional sensitivity to the potential of increased threat to Israel, although some Congressmen supported the sales as a means to bolster Saudi defenses in the Gulf while enhancing the U. S. job market.[22]

After the initial Western euphoria at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dangers of uncertainty emerged, particularly in the area of ethnic conflict-not only between newly independent states but also within them. Yugoslavia tore itself apart, while introducing a new euphemism into the lexicon: ethnic cleansing. "The ending of the Cold War had not brought peace in our time; it had not engendered a new world order. The implacable hostility between two great monolithic systems had been replaced by an increasingly fragmented world in which many of the old political certainties had no place."[23]

At the same time, Saudi Arabia was able to take an interest in the emergence of independent former Soviet Central Asian states and in their freedom to practice Islam. A vast swathe of land, with a fast-growing population and considerable mineral wealth waiting to be efficiently exploited will once again form part of the Muslim community of nations -- a factor that may be increasingly important to Saudi Arabia's status as the leading Islamic state.

The 1991 Gulf War once again demonstrated the coincidence of U. S. and Saudi interests. The idea of Iraqi control of the majority of the world's oil was unacceptable to the United States, whose policy in the Gulf for decades had rested on the concept of access to oil at reasonable prices. For their part, the Saudi fear was more proximate: they did not want to be the next victim of Saddam Hussein. Thus, the vast effort that was first Operation Desert Shield and eventually Desert Storm came into being, deploying hundreds of thousands of U. S. and allied forces and untold amounts of military equipment into Saudi Arabia with the consent of the Saudi government. Once again, American and Saudi interests coincided.

Within a week of Saddam's invasion, the first U. S. military forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, in response to a Saudi request for U.S. troops to defend against a possible Iraqi attack.[24] In the months that followed, the United States, under President George H. W. Bush, put together an extraordinary coalition of forces to take back Kuwait. In the end nearly 630,000 allied troops from all over the world, including the Middle East, were part of Operation Desert Storm.

None of this could have been done without the support and cooperation of the Saudi government, which provided military combat support as well as basing rights for allied troops. The Saudi contribution was invaluable, and was a true exercise in international cooperation as well as a vivid illustration of the importance of the Saudi-U.S. relationship.

Human Rights And Democracy

A persistent and prickly issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia is that of human rights. Critics cite Saudi government restrictions on the press, speech, assembly and association, as well as the role of women in Saudi society, and claim that there is no significant opposition to the government only because the Al-Saud government quashes any overt signs of dissent.

Political reforms initiated by King Fahd and augmented by Crown Prince Abdullah, however, have begun the move toward more democratic processes and individual freedoms. At the same time, however, democracy as interpreted by the West -- particularly the United States -- may not be the most appropriate or effective means of government for Saudi Arabia.

Democracy in one form or other, however, is not antithetical to the Arab World, or to Saudi Arabia. Most opposition to democratic practices in the Middle East stems not from Islam, nor from "tribal custom," but from the reluctance of regimes to accept opinions from the people they govern. The United States and the West cannot impose its values on others; however, it can certainly emphasize that the values of democracy are universal -- and can over time be accepted by Arab governments. Such values are in fact, compatible with Islam and with authentic Arab traditions.

Terrorists, Dissidents And September 11th

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., many Americans have been dismayed and infuriated by the extent and vehemence of anti-American feeling that is apparent throughout the Middle East and the Muslim World. These Americans see the Middle East as the region where Washington liberated Kuwait, and they point to the U. S. role in saving hundreds of thousands of Somalis in the early 1990s, fighting two wars to protect Muslims in the Balkans, and providing more humanitarian aid than any other country to the people of Afghanistan.[25]

For many Arab analysts, however, the roots of anti-American feeling lie not only in American insistence on continuing a punishing embargo on Iraq, but also in U.S. failure to broker and ensure a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has taken on new and virulent life since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. The seeming inability of the U.S. to understand the Palestinian position and situation in the midst of clear destruction of the Palestinian economy and any instruments of civil society has had disastrous effects on the peace process, on regional perception of the United States, and on the stability of the region.

But it is also clear that antagonism to American policies exists independently of the Palestinian question. The first attack on the United States, after all, was the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center, "a mere dress rehearsal for the calamity of September 11, 2001."[26] It was inspired by the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, at a time when Yasser Arafat was beginning his transformation from outcast to statesman, when consciousness of Palestinian nationalism and identity -- and the possibility of a Palestinian state -- was beginning to be accepted, and when the "Oslo process" was almost universally expected to be an effective recipe for an end to conflict. Several terrorist acts against the United States occurred during the 1990s, including bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and the Al-Khobar Towers in 1996, embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 -- all during years when the peace process was at least nominally alive.

The Riyadh and Al-Khobar bombings in particular, where large numbers of U.S. military personnel were present, raised questions in the West about stability within the Kingdom and created concerns among Gulf leaders over threats from local elements opposed to a Western military presence. The first explosion occurred at the Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, and killed seven persons (including five U.S.-citizens -- one military and four civilian or retired military) and injured 60 others, including 37 U.S. citizens. Three little-known groups -- the "Tigers of the Gulf," the "Movement for Islamic Change," and the "Combatant Partisans of God" -- claimed responsibility. Four Saudi nationals were arrested, confessed to the crime on Saudi state television on April 22, 1996, and were executed on May 31, 1996.[27]

A more deadly explosion occurred on June 25, when a bomb containing 3,000-5,000 pounds of explosives destroyed the Al-Khobar Towers apartment complex housing U.S. Air Force personnel near Dhahran Air Base, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and injuring 547 persons including 148 U.S. citizens. Two previously unknown groups claimed responsibility: the Iranian Saudi Hizbollah organization, and the Lebanese Hizbollah organization.[28] In statements to the media on August 2 and August 3, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said the size and sophistication of the bomb indicated international involvement in the atrocity, and U.S. officials reportedly have said there were pieces of evidence pointing to possible involvement by Iran and a Lebanon-based Shi'ite Muslim guerrilla organization.[29]

What accounts for this rage against America? One perspective is that since the end of the Cold War the United States has piled up a record of unabashed national egotism and arrogance, "ripping up treaties, sending troops to every corner of the globe, bombing Afghanistan, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Iraq without troubling the United Nations, maintaining a string of murderous embargoes against recalcitrant regimes," and throwing its weight behind Israel's continuing illegal military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as the Palestinian intifada rages.[30]

Another perspective, only somewhat less harsh but perhaps more to the point, sees September 11 and the terrorist attacks that led up to it as yet another proof that U. S. relationships in the Middle East were never built on a deep understanding of the region's societies and people, and thus Americans are continually surprised by events, as in Iran, when the Shah's overthrow took the U.S. government by surprise.[31] U. S. misreading or ignoring of domestic influences and policy shifts in these countries is commonplace-and can lead to bad outcomes and bad policy-making in response (e.g., "dual containment")[32]. The much-discussed (since September 11) U. S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat and the ensuing radicalization of both segments of the indigenous population and the remaining mujahedin are also seen as causes for retaliation against America.

The Al-Qaeda terrorists are not "the man in the street." But they do feed off anti-American sentiment. It provides them with recruits, as well as with people willing to give them aid and comfort. It is therefore in the U.S. interest to counter these feelings -- to cut off the oxygen that gives them life -- and in the process to strive for a real understanding of the complexities of its relationships in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, our ally in strategic and operational areas, and our political and economic mainstay in the Middle East.

In Saudi Arabia three entities have been cited as posing opposition to the Saudi regime and to its relationship with the United States. They are, first, movements that operate from overseas, such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and the Movement for Islamic Reform (MIRA); Saudi Shi'a -- who are monitored closely by the government, and radical groups such as Al-Qaeda.[33] The question, of course, is whether these groups are linked and, in fact, if they are really groups at all or only individual dissidents with little to no following, since they are mostly located in the United Kingdom.

In the post-Desert Storm era, the CDLR emerged in Saudi Arabia, challenging the legitimacy of the Al-Saud government. In fact, dissidents like CDLR, MIRA and Al-Qaeda may have been behind the 1995 bombing that killed five Americans working in Riyadh with the Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG), as well as the bombing of the al-Khobar Towers in 1996 referred to above. However, were the bombings anti-American or were they really aimed at the Saudi regime? By hitting Americans the perpetrators were able to embarrass the regime, not least because the regime was forced to allow foreigners to enter and report on the events. These problems have been exacerbated by the uncovering of terrorist cells, plots, plans, and support for terrorist movements by factions within Saudi Arabia. Saudi government support of Islamic religious schools throughout the Muslim world has also come under scrutiny, particularly in Pakistan's madrassas, where radical Muslims have been trained.[34]

At the same time, it is essential for Americans to understand that the actions of Al-Qaeda before and after September 11 were the activities of an aberrant group that, in effect, has attempted to hijack Islam. Usama bin Laden has perverted the teachings of a great faith that, for 1,400 years, has had no Inquisition, sponsored no Crusades, and perpetrated no Holocaust.

One of the principal issues of concern between Saudi Arabia and the United States at the present time concerns the stationing of some 5,000 U. S. troops in Saudi Arabia as part of the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA). Since 1991 the U.S. military has been enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq out of Saudi Arabia -- Operation Southern Watch. U.S. service personnel were based in downtown Dhahran until 1996 and the bombing of the Al-Khobar Towers. Military forces were subsequently moved to Prince Sultan Air Base, fifty miles from Riyadh. Washington tends to see these troops as temporary rotations; while the opposition view such presence as permanent. Such presence, in fact poses threats to internal stability and fueling internal criticism of the regime.

Opposition to the U.S. presence tends be prevalent throughout the Gulf, but the level of opposition varies.[35] Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have voiced token criticism, and Kuwait generally supports it. In Saudi Arabia, however, the criticism has been both frequent and vehement, and ranges from complaints over the cost of maintaining the operational U.S. presence and related arms purchases to the presence of non-Muslims and an alleged spread of corruption.

The days of U. S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, at least as they are currently constituted, are likely numbered, as that presence becomes an issue used increasingly against the Saudi monarchy by its opponents. Indeed, following a March 2002 visit to the Kingdom by Vice President Richard Cheney, indications were that most, if not all, troops currently in Saudi Arabia will be located to other bases in the area, including Qatar. But Saudi Arabia alone provides the geography essential for effective U. S. deployment of land forces: "the country is the heart of the Arabian Peninsula; everything else is either peripheral or, like Iraq or Iran, not available to the United. States."[36]

The United States has, in the past, been sensitive to the implications of its presence in Saudi Arabia. In December of 1990, for example, prior to Desert Storm, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Herman Eilts commented:

".As soon as this crisis is over, whether ended by war or by another means, the Saudis are going to want us out. It is not good for the Saudi monarchy in the eyes of its own public, in the eyes of Arabs as a whole, and in the eyes of Muslims as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the trustee for the holy places, and it is not good to have large numbers of American troops..." [37]

U.S. presence in the Gulf goes beyond the stationing of troops, of course. It includes a variety of security and access agreements essential to U.S. defense of the Gulf against an aggressor. A serious vulnerability accompanies this presence, however: "a vast and diverse range of potential military targets for anti-U.S. radicals to strike. Large numbers of U.S. personnel in all the states can be attacked by terrorists, as can U.S. facilities, as the 1995 and 1996 terrorist killing of U.S. military personnel in two attacks in Saudi Arabia attest."[38]

Defining Mutual Interests

At the present time, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia appears to be at a crossroads as both countries define their interests, look for points of congruence, and learn to tolerate differences. Oil is still a preponderant factor in the relationship: Saudi Arabia occupies a critical position in ensuring the flow of world oil and the support of the global economy. With an estimated 25 percent of the world supply of oil, and with Saudi oil production capacity projected to rise from 14.5 percent of all world capacity in 2000 to 19.2 percent of the world's total capacity by 2020, the oil factor is clearly significant.[39]

As noted above, however, the United States has interests other than oil in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; it has strategic and geopolitical interests in preserving security in this part of the world. It has security commitments with other countries in the region, including Israel and Turkey, which preclude allowing the domination of the region by hostile anti-Western regimes that might threaten the interests of all by attempting to change the borders and governments of the region and by controlling the flow of oil in ways that would disrupt the global economy.

Many Arabs believe that U.S. support for Israel is more to blame for fostering terrorism than any movements within Saudi Arabia and across the Islamic world. President Bush's support of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is incomprehensible and infuriating to most Arabs and Muslims, many of whom consider the Israeli leader a war criminal who engineered Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent massacre of Palestinian refugees by Israeli-allied Lebanese militiamen. The American administration's apparent indifference to Palestinian suffering is also incomprehensible as are perceived attitudes toward Saudi Arabia since the September 11 attacks.

Many Saudis believe that both the American media and the American people have unfairly and incorrectly attacked them. Prince Turki al Faisal (son of the late King Faisal and brother of the Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal), former head of Saudi intelligence, recently commented, "The people of Saudi Arabia are not enemies of the United States. We have had a close relationship for 70 years. Who put us in this difficult position? America, because of its duplicity to the Arab world and because of its relationship with Israel.. We have always looked to America as a friend of Saudi Arabia."[40]

In a February 2002 interview, Prince Turki also pointed out that there has been extensive cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia over the issue of Usama bin Laden, noting that since 1997 a joint U.S.-Saudi committee has met on a monthly basis to share information regarding bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. [41]

The events of September 11, 2001, have opened a door that both Saudi Arabia and the United States might have preferred remain closed. For almost a century, much of the relationship between the two countries has existed in an unexplored area, one not confronted by either country. Within that area are wide cultural and political differences: one of the parties is a closed society and an Islamic monarchy ruled by one family; the other is the world's oldest democracy. Until now, it has been convenient for both countries to leave these issues largely unexamined. That door, however, is now open, and it may be time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to confront their differences -- and reaffirm their mutual interests, which are likely to continue to transcend cultural differences.

Oil and joint security interests provided the foundation for the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In the past 30 years Saudi Arabia has been transformed from a medieval desert kingdom to a modern and wealthy state. "Saudi money greased the relationship and supported U.S. policy goals from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, while Saudi leaders often defended U.S. interests in the councils of Arab states." [42] Both the United States and Saudi Arabia were able to overcome -- or ignore -- dramatic differences in religious, culture and politics to share strategic goals and provide for each other's needs.

Should Saudi Arabia develop a more assertive position in the Persian Gulf and in Arab affairs, should it develop a more modernized government and take a more professional approach to policy making and implementation, it may be less willing than in the past to automatically accept U. S. advice -- with potential negative impact on the relationship, at least in the short term. The United States, however, must recognize that it is natural for allies to disagree on matters secondary to the relationship -- and that other countries have vital interests as well, which do not necessarily coincide with U. S. interests, but which are also not necessarily antithetical to those interests.

While many of the issues currently under discussion between the United States and Saudi Arabia are, indeed, secondary issues, it is clear that better cooperative efforts could be developed between these old allies. Some areas of cooperation include ensuring that Afghanistan is no longer a nation that breeds terrorists. Saudi Arabia, because of its status as a major Islamic nation, can play a critical role in healing the tension between Afghans and Arabs. Saudi Arabia can also assist in vigorously rooting out Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and Central Asia, ensuring that funds for charity are not diverted to extremist causes, and publicizing the message that acts of terrorism cannot be justified by Islam and are, in fact, a perversion of Islamic teachings. Saudi Arabia, in fact has condemned terrorism as un-Islamic, and its religious establishment has issued numerous religious decrees condemning terrorism. This is a message that is not being heard in the West, where familiarity with Islam and its teachings is minimal. But it is an essential element; it is critical that both America's leaders and its public understand that the United States and Saudi Arabia stand together against terrorism.

As for the United States, it needs to assure its friends and allies that a common approach for dealing with Iraq, in agreement with regional allies, will be sought, that Iraqi territorial integrity will be preserved and that the United States will assist in creating a stable neighbor in the process of nation-building. Recent rumblings about a U.S. strike on Iraq are extremely unsettling to a region already characterized by uncertainties and instabilities. Rejecting or ignoring advice from long-term friends in the Middle East regarding Iraq -- and other issues -- is likely to be both short-sighted and antithetical to genuine U. S. interests in the region.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the United States needs to reestablish its bona fides on the Palestinian question, focusing on a joint effort to renew a legitimate peace process that will result in giving Israel security and creating a viable Palestinian state. The U.S. must act as a superpower, taking the long view to determine what is necessary for lasting peace. This must include a political component in addition to demands for military disengagement. In particular, the United States must insist not just on an end to Israeli settlement expansion, but, most important, to removing the Israeli presence from the Occupied Territories. In turn, the Saudis must pressure Palestinian extremists to renounce the use of terrorism, in any form, as un-Islamic, morally repugnant, and counter-productive to political gains. [43]

Both the United States and Saudi Arabia should recognize the role of economics and demographics in providing an impetus for terrorism. The United States can assist by supporting Saudi economic reforms and diversification, ensuring a steady flow of private investment and an expansion of trade and joint ventures that will create jobs.

Political economist Alan Richards has said that "the Siren song of fanatics becomes most seductive when economic, political, social and cultural crises combine, and when people feel that they have been repeatedly humiliated." [44] These are issues that resonate beyond the Saudi-U.S. relationship to the Middle East as a whole; but they are also issues of which the Kingdom is a part. The United States must finally become aware of the Middle East's core problems: high unemployment, a decline in real wages and living standards, unmanaged urbanization that has overwhelmed public services, and a profound discontent with ineffective government policies that transcends economic hardship.

These problems subtly but surely are destabilizing the region. They are also issues that can only be addressed by indigenous governments, with the support of the United States and the international community, because they are the breeding grounds for terrorism. They are also a palpable, immediate threat to Middle East regimes, including Saudi Arabia's, and to the long-term interests of the United States. It is in America's own best interests to understand the roots of discontent and despair that run so deeply in the Middle East and, with its allies, to begin to alleviate the economic and sociological issues that stunt growth and breed terror. Until and unless some of these basic societal needs are addressed, the threat of regional instability will remain high.

Conclusion

It seems inevitable that, for the foreseeable future (and perhaps well into the 21st century), the world will get its oil from the Gulf. America will not, under such circumstances, be able to ignore the region. More than likely, we will be intensely involved there for quite some time.[45]

Since September 11, the future of the Saudi-U.S. relationship has been thrown into question. Yet the United States, for the foreseeable future, will need good relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. No other country or region can provide the oil capacity that the United States, and the world, requires in the case of a supply disruption.[46] Of course, regardless of Western policies, Saudi oil will flow onto the market, since oil is no use buried under the desert. Nor, in theory, does it matter who controls the oil, since even "rogue states" must sell their assets to survive. This assumes a set of rational actors, however, i.e., oil producers who act in the interests of themselves and/or their countries.

One danger is that a Taliban-like regime might gain control of the oil spigot, leading through either ideology or incompetence to a prolonged interruption in the flow of oil. The consequences of such an interruption, for the United States and the global economy, would be highly disruptive, particularly if emergency oil production elsewhere could not be brought on line quickly.[47] Damage to the oil fields, or to their vulnerable processing sites, could also disrupt oil flow.

There is another kind of danger, however, and that is the danger that over-simplification of both the relationship and its problems can bring. This is not a contest between the defenders of democracy and Puritanical Wahhabis, nor is the choice in Saudi Arabia one between a Western-allied absolute monarchy and a revolutionary, anti-Western Islamic regime. Saudi Arabia faces challenges of a political, social and economic nature that could fuel the radical flank of Islamists and that require attention and serious structural reforms. The grievances of the Islamists include "authoritarianism and repression, maldistribution and inequity [of resources], the absence of representation in the political system, and the seemingly permanent stationing of United States military forces in Saudi Arabia."[48] These are issues that must be addressed by the Saudi monarchy, not least because they threaten the Al-Saud's claim to legitimacy as protectors of the faith, based on the success of military conquests in the early 20th century and the Al-Saud's long-term alliance with religious authorities and with the Al-Wahhab family.

American blindness to issues of fundamental concern to the Middle East, and its insensitivity to the vital interests of others, creates a dangerous situation, a minefield that in the end will affect U.S. interests even more than those of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis will still have oil -- and the West will have a need to buy it. But an unfriendly regime in Riyadh on the eastern flank of the Arab world would likely become a hotbed of opposition to the West, to Israel, to moderation within the Islamic community, and to sensible oil-pricing policies.

Twenty years ago Raymond Close, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Station Chief in Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 1977, discussed U.S.-Saudi relations as follows:

In the mid-1970s there was a mood here of excitement and anticipation as the Saudis, aware of their new power, prepared themselves to be full partners of the free world against Communism. That mood has now faded, largely because the United States has been seen to pursue its own objectives without sensitivity to the vital interests of its friends. In Saudi eyes, America still seems blind to the absolute necessity of achieving justice for Palestinians, not just "Middle East peace," if it expects Arab cooperation on the strategic level. Many American officials realize this, but until discreet private convictions become forthright public policies, hopes for a Saudi-American partnership, as originally conceived, will never materialize. [49]

It is an unfortunate fact that little appears to have changed in twenty years in terms of American understanding of Saudi Arabia or the Middle East.

As this Paper is written, Crown Prince Abdullah has emerged as a champion of the Palestinian people with his proposal for an end to Arab conflict with Israel in exchange for Israel's retreat to its pre-1967 borders. [50] The Crown Prince's purpose in making the proposal was "to make clear to the Israeli people that the Arabs don't reject or despise them, but the Arab people do reject what their leadership is now doing to the Palestinians, which is inhumane and oppressive."[51]

The Crown Prince's proposal also demonstrated his power within Saudi Arabia-and may indicate that Saudi Arabia is now poised to promote its own interests and those of the region. Perhaps most significant for the United States, the proposal and its acceptance by the Arab community of nations indicates that there is a potential for a lessening of American influence in the Middle East, that the United States may ultimately become much less important in the Middle East peace process (as perhaps it should).

Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal was modeled on one presented over twenty years ago by King Fahd -- but it went beyond that proposal even as it went beyond what the current Israeli government has been publicly willing to consider. It was embraced by a number of influential sources, including U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who called the Crown Prince's proposal an important step. It also came at a time when appalling conflict continued to rage in Israel and the Occupied Territories, a never-ending cycle of asymmetrical violence for which there is plainly no military resolution but for which Israel, as of this writing, is unwilling to propose a political solution.

It is increasingly clear that Israel and the Palestinians are locked in an impasse of bitterness, hatred, and distrust; while many call upon the United States to break the impasse and impose a solution, the Bush Administration, until the dispatch of Gen. Anthony Zinni to the region in November 2001, was reluctant to take on the challenge. Saudi Arabia, however, stepped up to the plate with a proposal that even contained a recipe for cooperation on two previously intractable issues: Israeli control over the Western Wall and over Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem.[52] It was a strategic opportunity presented at a time of acute crisis.

Unfortunately, the outcome of the Arab League summit in March, which many regional leaders did not attend due to the enforced absence of Yasser Arafat, and the subsequent ratcheting-up of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, has cast a pall over attempts at resolution of this consuming crisis. Additionally, there is increased regional anxiety over the possibility of a spillover of violence that will affect not only the long-term security and prosperity of the entire Middle East but the wider world as well.

Thus, the Bush Administration was pushed into involving itself in the Palestinian-Israeli crisis at a much higher level -- with greater political risk -- than it ever intended. The dispatch of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the region was a response to both continued suicide bombings by Palestinians and massive military operations and a virtual reoccupation of the West Bank by the Israeli government. But the Powell mission, as so many before it, was essentially a failure. Both sides remain rigid in their claim to righteousness -- and the killing of innocents continues.

For the United States and Saudi Arabia, however, the stability of the region is paramount -- for each the reasons may be different, but the goal is the same, as it has been for almost a century. At the end of the day, it may be that the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia converge to an extent, and in an area, not explored before. The "special relationship" will endure.

NOTES
1. Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations," Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, November 2001, p. 2.

2. ARAMCO was bought out by the Saudi government in 1988 and renamed SAUDI-ARAMCO.

3. In 1998, at a meeting in McLean, Virginia, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz announced that Saudi Arabia would consider proposals for re-involvement by Western oil companies in the Saudi energy sector, with possible access to Saudi oil and gas fields. The catalyst for this decision may have been the fact that the Saudi share of U.S. oil imports fell from 24 percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 1997. Exxon-Mobil subsequently was chosen to lead two of three "core ventures" -- projects that would require an initial $20 billion to develop gas fields, transmission lines, gas-fueled electric power plants and desalination plants.

4. Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations," Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2001, p. 8. Venezuela and Canada have exceeded Saudi Arabia in oil sales to the U.S. in recent years.

5. Federal Reserve Division, "Area Handbook: Saudi Arabia," Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992, Section 1.

6. "Ending the Oil Addiction," Editorial, The New York Times, February 18, 2002, p. 18

7. Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions." Santa Monica: RAND, MR-1245-AF, 2001, p. 7.

8. Nawaf Obaid, "The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia," Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper No. 55, 2000, p. 39.

9. David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, "After Sept. 11, Severe Tests Loom for Relationship," The Washington Post, February 12, 2002, p. A1. 10. U. S. Census Bureau, quoted in U.S.-Saudi Business Council website, http://www.us-saudi-business.org "Imports," Prados, op.cit. p. 7.

11. Barry Rubin, "The United States and the Middle East," in "The Middle East After the Invasion of Lebanon," Robert O. Freedman (ed.), New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 69.

12. Ibid. p. 557.

13. Bogle, "The Modern Middle East," op.cit. p. 416-417.

14. Robert G. Kaiser and David Ottaway, "Oil for Security," op.cit. p. A1.

15. Ibid.

16. Yergin, "The Prize," op.cit. pp. 641-642.

17. Ibid., p. 644.

18. Kaiser and Ottaway, "Oil for Security," op.cit., p. A1

19. Robert Azzi, "Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom and Its Power," "National Geographic," September 1980, p. 296.

20. The U. S. already had a presence, with MIDEASTFOR based in Bahrain and the U.S. military missions in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

21. Robert G. Kaiser and David Ottaway, "Oil for Security Fueled Close Ties," The Washington Post, February 11, 2002, p. A1.

22. Prados, op.cit. p. 15.

23. "The Aftermath of the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Saudi Arabian Information Resources, http://www.saudinf.com/main/x002.htm; accessed February 19, 2002.

24. Initial forces arrived on August 7, the day after King Fahd's request to senior American officials.

25. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America's War on Terrorism," Current History, December 2001, p. 407.

26. Foud Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," "Foreign Affairs," November/December 2001, p. 3.

27. Prados, op.cit. p. 3.

28. Ibid. p. 4

29. Ibid.

30. Seumas Milne, "Americans Can't See Why They Are Hated," Pharoahs, October 2001, p. 43.

31. Julia Nanay, "New Friends, New Enemies and Oil Politics: Causes and Consequences of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," "Middle East Policy," Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001, p. 12.

32. Martin Indyk, then Senior Director for Middle East Affairs of the National Security Council, promulgated the policy of dual containment in February 1994. The policy was supposed to constrain the two most powerful regional states, Iran and Iraq, by imposing harsh economic sanctions on them, forcing them into amending behavior that the United States found intolerable. Among its other deficiencies, dual containment tends not to differentiate between Iran and Iraq and the level of threat each poses to the international security system and to regional politics.

33. Byman, "Political Violence," p. 31

34. Pamela Hess, "Levin Wants U.S. Out of Saudi Arabia," "CountryWatch.com, " January 15, 2002.

35. Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, "Political Violence and Stability in the States of the Northern Persian Gulf," Santa Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1999, p. 26.

36. George Friedman, "The Saudi Crisis," "Stratfor.com," accessed January 21, 2002.

37. Statement of Herman Eilts, Director of the Center for International Studies, Boston University, and former U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, "Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War," December 1990, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 604.

38. Byman, "Political Violence," op.cit. p. 5

39. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic Partnership,"

http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm, accessed February 1, 2002.

40. Michael Slackman, "Saudis Feel Unfairly Tarred With a Terrorist Brush," Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2002, p. 1.

41. NBC News "Meet the Press," Sunday, February 3, 2002.

42. Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, "Saudi Leader's Anger Revealed Shaky Ties," "The Washington Post," February 10, 2002, p. A1.

43. Cordesman, "Reforging," op.cit.

44. Alan Richards, "At War With Utopian Fanatics," "Middle East Policy," Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001, p. 7.

45. Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Land Power and Dual Containment: Rethinking America's Policy in the Gulf," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 1999, p. 22.

46. Discussions over drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge may remain just that, since analysis shows that Alaskan oil is neither economically viable nor is it necessarily secure-and in any case would only briefly reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil by a few percentage points, beginning in about a decade. (Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, "Fool's Gold in Alaska," "Foreign Affairs," July/August 2001, p. 72-73.

47. Sokolsky, et al., "Improving Allied Military Contributions," op.cit. p.16.

48. Gwenn Okruhlik, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia," "Current History," January 2002, p. 22.

49. Azzi, "Saudi Arabia," op.cit. p. 330.

50. Daniel Sobelman, "Interest in Saudi Peace Initiative Grows, Gets U.S., Egyptian Backing," "Ha'aretz." February 21, 2002.

51. George S. Hishmeh, "An Arab Offer That 'Demands Immediate Action,'" Jordan Times, February 20, 2002.

52. "A Peace Impulse Worth Pursuing," New York Times, editorial, February 21, 2002.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Opinions expressed in this occasional paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflects the views of the Center for Saudi Studies

References

"A Peace Impulse Worth Pursuing," New York Times, editorial, February 21, 2002

Foud Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001

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Emory Bogle, "The Modern Middle East: From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958," New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.

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