 |
| | |
| | |
SAUDI-US RELATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE
|
|
| SATURDAY,
NOVEMBER 1,
2003 ITEM
OF INTEREST |
|
Saudi Redeployment of the F-15
to Tabuk
by Anthony H. Cordesman
|
|
| |
These are remarkably tough times in the Middle East and it
is easy to overreact to developments that might be quietly
accepted in periods when Arab-Israeli tensions were not as
high, and events like 9/11 had not created so many concerns
regarding Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi decision this March to deploy F-15 aircraft to
Tabuk, a base in Northwest Saudi Arabia, some 150 kilometers
from Israel, is a case in point. So is the fact that
Saudi Arabia held its first joint exercises near the Gulf of
Aqaba in October, although these exercises were far smaller
and less impressive than some critics seem to feel.
 Critics
of the moves make several points. Saudi Arabia did
agree not to deploy the F-15s to Tabuk in 1992 as one of the
conditions for the purchase of additional aircraft.
The base is not yet properly equipped and structured to
support the F-15, and the move was something of a political
gesture -- although there are good military reasons for the
change as well.
Several other factors need to be kept in mind. The first
Saudi purchases of F-15s took place in 1978 -- some 25 years
ago. Since that time, the balance of technology has changed
immensely, Israel has vastly improved both its fighter and
land-based air defenses, and Israel's advantages in
electronic warfare and air control and warning have
increased sharply over Saudi Arabia in spite of Saudi
purchase and modernization of the E-3A.
It is also worth pointing out that Jordan now has a peace
treaty with Israel, and this too affects the strategic
equation. Furthermore, Saudi exercises in the Gulf area
would have to take place at a time when the United States
has extensive air operations in supporting Iraq, and the
Saudi border area with Yemen remains a sensitive area where
military exercises might be seen as provocative and affect
major Saudi-Yemeni progress in resolving border issues and
territorial disputes that have been a source of tension for
decades.
The Saudi Air Force has also reached something of a
readiness crisis. While it still has some 370+ combat
aircraft on paper, readiness and operational capability
dropped badly between 1992 and 2001, and Saudi Arabia's F-5EIIs,
and other F-5s virtually lost operational capability. Time
marches on in air forces, just as it does in all other
aspects of life. Some of Saudi Arabia's F-15s are 25 years
old and it no longer has other combat aircraft suitable for
deployment at Tabuk.
The aging of the F-5, and its loss of operational
capability, mean the Saudis no longer have a
"second tier" fighter suitable for deployment at
Tabuk. They might use the Hawk trainer as a substitute, but
it
would be deployed more as a gesture than a war fighting
capability. The air defense version of the Tornado, which
Saudi Arabia purchased from Britain, has never been a
particularly effective fighter, and the other Tornados are
all dedicated strike/attack aircraft, which makes deploying
them to Tabuk far more provocative than deploying the F-15.
Moreover, it is far from clear that Saudi Arabia acted
without first going to the United States. The Saudis
cooperated with the United States during the Iraq War, and
the United States has long been aware of the problems in the
Saudi Air Force and the need to change mix of aircraft types
and deployments. It seems that the change in Saudi
deployments came with U.S. agreement, that Secretary
Rumsfeld sent a letter to Congress, and Under Secretary Doug
Feith informed Israel about the changes in the restriction
on Saudi deployments before it took place. (There are
reports that the United States implied to Israel that the
change would be temporary, but it would seem that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee was informed that the lifting of
the restriction was permanent.)
There are other factors that affect any real or perceived
threat to Israel. U.S. combat forces may have departed from
Saudi Arabia following the Iraq War, but Saudi Arabia also
remains dependent on the United States for training and
technical services. It cannot sustain independent
combat without U.S. support, and it cannot use many of its
air control and warning assets without U.S. support. It also
is still in the process of taking delivery on, and getting
support in conversion to, some $7.7 billion worth of U.S.
arms and military technology it purchased during 1996-2002,
and any break with the United States would virtually derail
its modernization and sustainment efforts.
In a less troubled time, the Saudi redeployments would
probably never have been an issue. The politics of the
moment are less pleasant, but Saudi deployment of the F-15
to Tabuk is as much a reflection of the military weaknesses
of its air force as its strengths, and is not a threat.
|
| ALSO
BY DR. CORDESMAN |
|
|
| ABOUT
THE AUTHOR |
| Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the
Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and is
Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He
is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor
of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He
directs the assessment of global military balance,
strategic energy developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net
Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of
books on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war
as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the
peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military
developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S.
strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation
issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern security,
economic, and energy issues. |
|
Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for
ABC News for the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia,
Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was the Assistant for
National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow
at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the
Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian
Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of
Defense Intelligence Assessment, Director of Policy,
Programming, and Analysis in the Department of Energy,
Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of
Defense's representative on the Middle East Working Group.
Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts.
He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a
Director on the NATO International Staff, working on Middle
Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon,
Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to
the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has
traveled extensively in the Gulf and North Africa.
|
|
Saudi-US Relations Information
Service
A Public Service of the National
Council on U.S.-Arab Relations
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036
eMail: [email protected]
Web: http://www.Saudi-US-Relations.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
