Saudi Government Counterterrorism-Counter Extremism
Actions
BY Anthony
H. Cordesman
I do not wish to be an apologist for Saudi Arabia. It
has made many mistakes, and it faces major challenges to
its stability. I do, however, find that the present
flood of charges being made by people with little or no
real experience in the country and often are based on
unsourced or suspect data. What should be serious
articles and media coverage is often filled with
financial guesstimates that cannot be validated, and
loose chains of guilt by association that confuse Saudi
government carelessness with the deliberate support of
terrorism. Far too many charges are being made by people
who have never read a Saudi budget or five-year plan,
never really talked to Saudi clerics, or examined the
progress the Kingdom has actually made.
Far too many ignore both the history of the
Kingdom�s past counterterrorism efforts, and what it
has done since 9/11. Certainly, much of the current
debate over the classified 28 pages in the Congressional
report on the performance of the U.S. intelligence
community in failing to detect the 9/11 attacks on
the U.S. has fallen into this pattern. The focus has
been on what Saudi Arabia did or did not do before the
September 11, 2001 attacks. It has also been filled with
the usual speculation, uncertain numbers, and conspiracy
theories.
I have spent some three decades dealing with the
Saudis and my own criticisms (and praise) of Saudi
Arabia can be found in two books that have just been
published on the country: Saudi
Arabia Enters the 21st Century, Vol. 1: The Political,
Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions,
and Saudi
Arabia Enters the 21st Century, Vol. 2: The Military and
International Security Dimensions,
Praeger/CSIS, April 2003. I am clearly on record as
having found many problems in Saudi Arabia�s political
structure, budgets and economic plans, efforts to deal
with social reform, and military forces. The first
volume, in particular, provides a detailed critique of
many aspects of the Saudi effort to deal with terrorism.
The Right Kind of Pressure and Media Coverage Can
Be of Great Value
I firmly believe that the Bush Administration needs
to keep up quiet pressure on the Saudis to improve their
counterterrorist activity, and implement reforms. I also
believe that informed, investigative media and academic
criticism helps not only to put indirect pressure on the
Saudi government, but also to support Saudi reformers
and moderates.
Such pressure and reporting is particularly useful
when it addresses:
--Exerting tighter controls over specific Saudi
charities.
--Supporting full Saudi and U.S. cooperation in
official counterterrorism activities.
--The need to modernize Saudi intelligence, internal
security operations and the operations of the Ministry
of the Interior.
--Saudi government treatment of domestic support for
religious schools and institutions outside Saudi Arabia,
and the extent to which funds and support go to
hard-line Salafi and other extremist movements.
--The state of Saudi educational reform, its
progress, success in removing anti-Christian and
anti-Jewish content, and its success in educating young
Saudis for jobs.
--Excessive Saudi military spending and wasteful arms
imports.
The Wrong Kind of Criticism is Both
Counterproductive and Risks Losing the War on Terrorism
But, I am increasingly concerned that the majority of
Western reporting on the Kingdom fails to go into any
detail on the many things the Saudi government has done
to deal with terrorism since 9/11. It focuses on the
statements of Saudi extremists rather than the many
attacks Senior Saudi officials have made on extremism,
makes broad charges about �corruption� with no
credible details, and ignores Saudi progress in economic
and social reform � much of it of considerable
importance.
| I am concerned with the careless
use of �Wahhabi� (a term many Saudis find
offensive because it personalizes Islam in
terms of one teacher) to describe religious
movements and groups. Far too often, the
groups and movements involved are Salafi and
not �Wahhabi,� or have closer ties to the
Moslem Brotherhood or Egyptian and North
African groups than Saudi ones. Statements are
selected from the worst of Saudi preachers
(and Christianity and Judaism have their own
bigots and hatemongers) that are not
representative of main line Saudi religious
teaching and practices. There is a careless
tendency to confuse extremist Saudi preachers
with the kind of preaching and attitudes one
encounters from most religious Saudis. |
I am concerned with...
...the careless use of "Wahhabi" to
describe religious movements...
...equally careless condemnation of the entire
Saudi royal family...
...with the use of Saudi Arabia as a virtual
scapegoat...
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I am concerned with the equally careless condemnation
of the entire Saudi royal family � which has had many
highly competent leaders that have pushed for reform �
and the ignorance or indifference to the role of Saudi
businessmen, technocrats, and educators � many
educated in the West and the US. Certainly, it is hard
to see how any near-term Saudi government could be
better or do more to move towards reform than the
present alliance of Crown Prince Abdullah, the more
moderate and progressive princes, and Saudi technocrats,
educators, businessmen, and moderate clerics.
I am concerned with the use of Saudi Arabia as a
virtual scapegoat for a far broader set of problems with
Islamic extremism and violence that affects every Middle
Eastern and most Central Asian states, as well as the
Islamic states of South and Southeast Asia. The fight
against terrorism certainly will never be won, nor even
have the right target, if people continue to believe
that Saudi money is the only money supporting extremism
(or that the government can fully ever control what is
done with the vast private holdings of capital Saudi
citizen have outside Saudi Arabia). It certainly will
not be won if the causes of extremism and terrorism that
both the governments in the region and the West must
deal with are not considered on a country-by-country
basis.
Handing Bin Laden Victory
I am struck by the fact that many of Saudi Arabia�s
most severe critics are unconsciously handing Bin Laden
a major victory by helping to create exactly the kind of
gulf between the US and Saudi Arabia that Bin Laden
wants. We have seen the dangers in the crisis of
religious extremism in the Middle East since 9/11, and
because of that, we see it as a clash between
civilizations. In reality, Middle Eastern governments
have been dealing with the problem for well over a
decade, and it is far more a �clash within a
civilization� than one between Western and Arab or
Islamic society.
Ultimately, we can only win if we help governments
and societies in the region modernize, diversify, and
�globalize� their economies, if we recognize the
social strains that drive minorities to violent Islamic
extremism, and if we understand that demographic
pressures and poverty cannot be dealt with simply by
calling for undefined �democratization.� The Middle
East, North Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, the
Islamic areas of Africa, and parts of Islamic Southeast
Asia, all face internal challenges that will take a
decade, if not decades, to address. Pragmatic evolution
is the only way that this can be done without massive
internal and external violence.
At present, the flood of attacks on the Saudi
government ignore this need for evolutionary change and
the single most important strategic reality affecting
the Kingdom�s future: Crown Prince Abdullah, the more
progressive princes, Saudi technocrats, Saudi
businessmen, Western-educated Saudi educators, and an
often moderate Saudi press are the only force that can
lead this deeply conservative nation forward. In fact,
modernization in Saudi Arabia has always come from
above, not from below, as the result of pressures from
non-existent popular movements.
Should evolution in Saudi Arabia move faster?
Probably, but it is far from clear that Saudi society is
willing to do so at a broad level. Is virtually any
credible alternative to the present progressive elements
of the Saudi regime likely to be Islamist extremists,
and do the Saudi people and world far more harm? Almost
certainly!
Even from the narrowest perspective, does trashing
the Saudi government actually help Israel? No, it simply
creates a deep adversarial relationship. Do the neocons
who do the same have any practical path to their vague
calls for instant Saudi democracy? No, again. They are
Bin Laden�s unconscious allies.
Saudi Actions in Dealing with Terrorism
As a result, I would urge you to read through the
list of actions listed below that the Saudi government
has stated that it has taken to fight terrorism since
9/11. Do these claims oversimplify the problems
and overstate what Saudi Arabia has done? Yes, of
course. Does each Saudi claim merit detailed media
examination and criticism, and further quiet pressure
from the Bush Administration? Yes, again.
The fact remains, however, that the nearly constant
U.S. and other Western focus on the worst-case
interpretation of Saudi actions before 9/11 ignores real
progress. When this is coupled to a lack of detailed
investigative reporting into what the Saudi government
has done since that time, the result is both unfair and
dangerous.
| Saudi
Arabia's Progress in the War on Terrorism |
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"I
vow
to my fellow citizens and to the friends who
reside among us, that the State will be vigilant
about their security and well-being.
Our nation is capable, by the Grace of
God Almighty and the unity of its citizens, to
confront and destroy the threat posed by a
deviant few and those who endorse or support
them. With
the help of God Almighty, we shall prevail."
-
Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the
National Guard
May 13, 2003
Actions
to Counter Terrorism
From
September 2001 to May 2003:
-
More
than 300 terrorist suspects were arrested.
-
About
100 suspects were referred to the courts to
stand trial.
-
Over
1,000 suspects were questioned.
Since
May 2003:
-
Over
130 individuals with suspected ties to
terrorism have been arrested.
-
Over
the course of the arrests security officers
also seized large quantities of high
explosives, automatic rifles, bomb-making
materials and devices, false identity cards
and documents, and large amounts of cash.
Specific
Cases:
-
Yousif
Salih Fahad Al-Ayeeri, a.k.a. Swift Sword, a
major Al-Qaeda operational planner and
fundraiser, was killed on May 31 while
fleeing from a security patrol.
-
Ali
Abdulrahman Said Alfagsi Al-Ghamdi a.k.a.
Abu Bakr Al-Azdi, surrendered to Saudi
authorities.
Al-Ghamdi, considered one of the top
Al-Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia, is
suspected of being one of the masterminds of
the May 12 bombings in Riyadh.
-
Turki Nasser Mishaal Aldandany,
another top Al-Qaeda operative and
mastermind of the May 12 bombings, was
killed along with three other suspects in a
gun battle with security forces that had
them surrounded.
-
Three
clerics, Ali Fahd Al-Khudair, Ahmed Hamoud
Mufreh Al-Khaledi and Nasir Ahmed Al-Fuhaid,
were arrested after calling for support of
the terrorists who carried out the Riyadh
attacks.
International
Cooperation
-
Saudi
Arabia and the United States maintain a
Counter-Terrorism Committee comprised of
intelligence and law enforcement personnel
who meet regularly to share information and
resources and develop action plans to root
out terrorist networks.
-
In
May 2003 a new U.S.-Saudi team was organized
from across law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to work side by side to share
�real time� intelligence and conduct
joint operations.
-
Also
in May 2003, Saudi authorities worked
closely with U.S. and British law
enforcement agents who came to the Kingdom
to assist in the investigation of the Riyadh
attacks.
-
Saudi
Arabia has provided extensive intelligence
and military cooperation in the assault on
Al-Qaeda. Public disclosures to date have
revealed major Saudi contributions to the
breakup of a number of Al-Qaeda cells, the
arrests of key Al-Qaeda commanders, and the
capture of numerous Al-Qaeda members.
-
In
2002, Saudi Arabia asked Interpol to arrest
750 people, many of whom are suspected of
money laundering, drug trafficking, and
terror-related activities. This figure
includes 214 Saudis whose names appear in
Interpol�s database in addition to
expatriates who fled Saudi Arabia.
-
Saudi
Arabia is engaging other countries to locate
and extradite Al-Qaeda operatives who may be
hiding in those countries.
AcActions
Taken in the Financial Area
-
Saudi
government departments and banks are
required to participate in international
seminars, conferences and symposia on
combating terrorist-financing activities.
Saudi Arabia has hosted many such events;
and is a member of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) established by the G-7 in 1988.
-
Saudi
Arabia completed and submitted two FATF
self-assessment questionnaires: one
regarding the 40 FATF recommendations on the
prevention of money laundering and the other
regarding its eight special recommendations
on terrorist financing.
-
Saudi
Arabia has established a High Commission for
oversight of all charities, contributions
and donations.
-
A
special Financial Intelligence Unit was
established to ensure that funds are not
misdirected into the hands of those who
would use them to harm others.
-
The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United
States took steps to freeze the assets of a
close bin Laden aide, Wa�el Hamza Julaidan,
who is believed to have funneled money to
Al-Qaeda.
-
In
March 2002, the U.S. Treasury Department and
Saudi Arabia blocked the accounts of the
Somalia and Bosnia branches of the Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation. While the Saudi
headquarters for this private charity is
dedicated to helping those in need, it was
determined that the Somalia and Bosnia
branches supported terrorist activities and
terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and
AIAI (al-Itihaad al-Islamiya).
In May 2003, Saudi Arabia asked the
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and all Saudi
charities to suspend activities outside
Saudi Arabia until a security clearance
mechanism to screen all personnel is
implemented. The Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation has closed its offices in
Croatia, Albania and Ethiopia while moves
are under way to close others in Kenya,
Tanzania, Indonesia and Pakistan.
-
In
February 2003, SAMA began to implement a
major technical program to train judges and
investigators on legal matters involving
terror financing and money-laundering
methods, international requirements for
financial secrecy, and methods followed by
criminals to exchange information.
-
Also
in May 2003, the Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency (SAMA) distributed a circular
entitled Rules
Governing Combating Anti-Money Laundering
and Combating Terrorist Financing to all
banks and financial institutions in the
Kingdom requiring the full and immediate
implementation of nine new policies and
procedures that relate to accounts of
charitable and welfare institutions.
-
In
June 2003, the Consultative Council approved
new legislation that puts in place harsh
penalties for the crime of money laundering
and terror financing. The law consists of 29
articles and stipulates jail sentences of up
to 15 years and a fine of more than $1.5
million for anyone laundering money through
charities. Other money-laundering offenses
are punishable by up to 10 years in jail and
a fine of $1.3 million.
-
Saudi
Arabia has investigated many bank accounts
suspected of having links to terrorism and
has frozen 41 accounts belonging to 7
individuals that totaled $5,697,400.85.
"America
and Saudi Arabia face a common terrorist threat,
and we appreciate the strong, continuing efforts
of the Saudi government in fighting that
threat."
-
George W. Bush
President of the United States
July 1, 2003
Source:
"Saudi
Arabia's War on Terrorism"
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For additional information on this issue:
| ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the
Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies and
is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East
Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC
and a Professor of National Security Studies at
Georgetown. He directs the assessment of global
military balance, strategic energy developments,
and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle
East. He is the author of books on the military
lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the
Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace
process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military
developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S.
strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation
issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern security,
economic, and energy issues.
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