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EDITOR'S NOTE:
Joseph M. Myers was called to testify before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance to address the U.S. Treasury Department's
role in combating terrorist financing. Mr. Myers also addressed the
importance of continued U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia in combating
terrorist financing.
| Joseph M. Myers Testifies U.S. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia
on Combating Terror Financing
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Statement of Joseph M. Myers Counsel,
Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman* before the United States Senate Committee on
Finance Hearing on the Treasury Department and Terrorism Financing and the
Nominations of Stuart Levey and Juan Zarate
May 19, 2004
[The following are excerpts from Mr.
Myer's remarks.]
Background
Prior to September 11, 2001, there was little
political will to take aggressive enforcement steps against domestic
fundraising for terrorism, which in many cases was difficult to distinguish
from First Amendment protected freedoms of speech and religion. Similarly, few
resources were devoted to assessing global terror fundraising networks; fewer
still were directed to doing something about them.
After 9/ 11, eyes and ears were opened. At
Treasury, Secretary O'Neill's initial skepticism about money laundering and
terrorist financing control gave way to enthusiastic support and creative
leadership. The FBI's white-collar investigators and the CIA's financial
analysts were integrated into their respective counter-terrorism divisions and
quickly proved their value both to the backward looking 9/ 11 investigation
and to preventing attacks. Customs investigators turned their formidable
financial investigative resources to sanctions busters, currency smugglers,
and illegal money remitters. The Justice Department began using the terrorist
financing statutes to take terror cells off the streets before they had a
chance to strike.
Our diplomats helped persuade and assist
countries around the world to improve their own capacities to deal forcefully
with supporters of terrorism. This interagency work was formalized by the
creation of a policy coordination committee (PCC) under the NSC structure.
The PCC has made great strides in focusing our
limited resources on the most important issues and tasks, and ensuring
methodical, thorough all-source intelligence analysis of strategic financial
targets. The agencies have worked to balance in particular cases competing
interests in collecting intelligence, pursuing criminal investigations,
imposing sanctions, and empowering our allies to take the initiative to
address problems posed by their own citizenry and institutions.
Several important objectives have been
achieved. Most important, al Qaida's ability to raise and move funds with
impunity has been severely diminished. This is not to say that the
organization has been crippled, I'm sorry to say. But the government's efforts
have made a real impact on the organization's financial picture, and it is a
weaker organization as a result. Much of our impact has been through
deterrence -- i. e., donors are either afraid to support, or repulsed at the
thought of supporting, an organization whose goal is to slaughter innocent
civilians.
There continues to be a relatively high level
of international support for the UN sanctions regime against al Qaida and its
affiliates.
Key agencies in our government have grown
accustomed to working with one another in new ways, and have become better at
accommodating one another's interests. The CIA and the FBI, in particular,
cooperate closely up and down the chain of command, on a tactical and
strategic level.
The White House leads a regular, high level,
and wide ranging dialogue with Saudi Arabia on financing and ideological
support of extremists. The Saudis are now engaged in a multi-faceted campaign
against terrorism that seeks to overthrow their regime, and their cooperation
with the U.S. is extensive.
The Europeans now formally recognize Hamas as
a terrorist organization, and the Saudis have withdrawn official support for
its activities.
Challenges
The government's counter-terrorist financing
infrastructure is still in its infancy, and needs to be nurtured. Effectively
performing all of the functions involved in combating terrorist financing
requires an orchestrated, interdisciplinary, international effort. It is
difficult, sensitive, and labor-intensive. It requires specialized
investigators, cutting-edge technology, intensive diplomatic engagement, and
cooperation from the private sector.
5. We cannot go it alone. One of the
standard "talking points" for senior officials discussing
counter-terrorism generally, or terrorist financing specifically, is to note
the importance of allies, and international cooperation. One of my favorite,
often repeated lines, illustrates the necessity for cooperation in gaining
access to records from foreign financial institutions by invoking the
unworkable absurdity of the alternative -- bombing a foreign bank. But I am
concerned that these talking points are too often mere lip service, and that
we don't realize how destructive our other, often contradictory words and
actions can be in securing effective cooperation.
The political posturing on Saudi Arabia is a
good example of the importance of careful language to maintaining alliances.
The Saudis are regularly portrayed as either our worst enemies or our best,
most loyal and steadfast allies. The reality in my limited experience is
that our relationship with the Saudis has much in common with our other
bilateral relationships: it is strategically important, and complex, and we
seek to maximize areas where our interests overlap, while we minimize
conflict in order to achieve as many of our common goals as possible. The
relationship is in the spotlight for good reason: we face a common deadly
enemy in al Qaida, and neither of us anticipated how serious an enemy it
would be. But the Saudis are fighting it with us, on many levels, including
by pursuing a reform agenda inside the Kingdom. Whether they have taken the
right steps, or taken them quickly enough, is a subject about which
reasonable people can reasonably disagree. But there is no reasonable option
other than to work with Saudi Arabia to fight al Qaida, and to support the
Saudis' reform agenda in the process.
Click here to read the full text of Mr.
Myer's testimony in PDF format.
*The views expressed in this
testimony are the personal views of Mr. Myers. They do not necessarily reflect
the views of the law firm of Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman.
 Joseph
M. (Jody) Myers joined Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman in early 2004 as
Counsel, focusing on anti-money laundering regulatory and compliance issues,
and advising clients on international trade and sanctions issues, USA Patriot
Act issues, corporate governance, white-collar crime, and fraud prevention
matters.
Prior to joining the Firm, Mr. Myers was with
the National Security Council (NSC), where he held the position of Director,
International Financial Affairs in the Office of Combating Terrorism.
He was the principal NSC director responsible for coordinating the
financial front of the U.S. Government's war on terrorism, taking over the
newly-created position a week after 9/11. He played a key role in
counter-terrorism efforts, developing sections of the USA Patriot Act,
coordinating interagency programs to investigate and prosecute terrorist
financing worldwide, and imposing sanctions against terrorist supporters under
the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and applicable UN
Security Council Resolutions. Mr. Myers also was intimately involved in
the recovery of assets from the former Iraqi regime, as well as the
development and implementation of economic sanctions, and policies and
programs to combat corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
Prior to his work at the NSC, Mr. Myers was
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Enforcement Policy) at the Treasury
Department, where, among other things, he developed the National Money
Laundering Strategy and led the U.S. delegation to the 29 nation Financial
Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF). Mr. Myers led the
expansion of FATF's membership, as well as the FATF's work to identify
so-called non-cooperative countries and territories. He played a central
role in intensive bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ensure the reform
of anti-money laundering regimes in numerous countries, including the Cayman
Islands, Colombia, Israel, Liechtenstein, Panama, and Russia.
Mr. Myers also worked for seven years at the
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), where he was
assistant director for international programs and deputy chief counsel.
He played a key role in writing and administering regulations issued
pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act, including the ground-breaking suspicious
activity reporting rules for banks and the novel application of Treasury's
authority to impose geographic targeting orders to require money remitters to
comply with special reporting obligations. He also was involved in
drafting and negotiating FinCEN's basic information sharing agreements with
federal and state law enforcement and regulatory agencies, and in establishing
the international Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and negotiating
protocols for international exchange of sensitive financial information.
Before working for the government, Mr. Myers practiced commercial litigation
in New York City for five years.
He received his bachelor's from Yale College
in 1982 and his J.D. from Vanderbilt University Law School in 1987. He
is admitted to practice in New York and in the U.S. District Court, Southern
and Eastern Districts.
Source: Katten
Muchin Zavis Rosenman
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