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EDITOR'S NOTE:
The following item of interest features the full text of the 9/11
Commission's findings on the U.S.-Saudi relationship and recommendations for
what to do to win the war on terror.
9/11 Commission Report --
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia -- Recommendations
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Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in
combating Islamic extremism. At the level of high policy, Saudi Arabia's
leaders cooperated with American diplomatic initiatives aimed at the Taliban
or Pakistan before 9/11. At the same time, Saudi Arabia's society was a
place where al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through
charities. It was a society that produced 15 of the 19 hijackers.
The Kingdom is one of the world's most
religiously conservative societies, and its identity is closely bound to its
religious links, especially its position as the guardian of Islam's two
holiest sites. Charitable giving, or zakat, is one of the five
pillars of Islam. It is broader and more pervasive than Western ideas of
charity -- functioning also as a form of income tax, educational assistance,
foreign aid, and a source of political influence. The Western notion of
the separation of of civic and religious duty does not exist in Islamic
cultures. Funding charitable works is an integral function of the
governments in the Islamic world. It is so ingrained in Islamic culture
that in Saudi Arabia, for example, a department within the Saudi Ministry of
Finance and National Economy collects zakat directly, much as the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service collects payroll withholding tax. Closely tied
to zakat is the dedication of the government to propagating the Islamic faith,
particularly the Wahhabi sect that flourishes in Saudi Arabia.
Traditionally, throughout the Muslim world,
there is no formal oversight mechanism for donations. As Saudi wealth
increased, the amounts contributed by individuals and the state grew
dramatically. Substantial sums went to finance Islamic charities of
every kind.
While Saudi domestic charities are regulated
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, charities and international
relief agencies, such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), are
currently regulated by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. This ministry
uses zakat and government funds to spread Wahhabi beliefs throughout the
world, including in mosques and schools. Often these schools provide the
only education available; even in affluent countries, Saudi-funded Wahhabi
schools are often the only Islamic schools. Some Wahhabi-funded
organizations have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of
violent jihad against non-Muslims. One such organization has been the al
Haramain Islamic Foundation; the assets of some branch offices have been
frozen by the U.S. and Saudi governments.
Until 9/11, few Saudis would have considered
government oversight of charitable donations necessary; many would have
perceived it as interference in the exercise of their faith. At the same
time, the government's ability to finance most state expenditures with energy
revenues has delayed the need for a modern income tax system. As a
result, there have been strong religious, cultural, and administrative
barriers to monitoring charitable spending. That appears to be changing,
however, now that the goal of violent jihad also extends to overthrowing Sunni
governments (such as the House of Saud) that are not living up to the ideals
of the Islamist extremists.
The leaders of the United States and the
rulers of Saudi Arabia have long had friendly relations, rooted in
fundamentally common interests against the Soviet Union during the Cold War,
in American hopes that Saudi oil supplies would stabilize the supply and price
of oil in world markets, and in Saudi hopes that America could help protect
the Kingdom against foreign threats.
In 1990, the Kingdom hosted U.S. armed forces
before the first U.S.-led war against Iraq. American soldiers and airmen
have given their lives to help protect Saudi Arabia. The Saudi
government has difficulty acknowledging this. American military bases
remained there until 2003, as part of an international commitment to contain
Iraq.
For many years, leaders on both sides
preferred to keep their ties quiet and behind the scenes. As a result,
neither the U.S. nor the Saudi people appreciated all the dimensions of the
bilateral relationship, including the Saudi role in U.S. strategies to promote
the Middle East peace process. In each country, political figures find
it difficult to publicly defend good relations with the other.
Today, mutual recriminations flow. Many
Americans see Saudi Arabia as an enemy, not as an embattled ally. They
perceive an autocratic government that oppresses women, dominated by a wealthy
and indolent elite. Saudi contacts with American politicians are frequently
invoked as accusations in partisan political arguments. Americans are
often appalled by the intolerance, anti-Semitism, and anti-American arguments
taught in schools and preached in mosques.
Saudis are angry too. Many educated
Saudis who were sympathetic to America now perceive the United States as an
unfriendly state. One Saudi reformer noted to us that the demonization
of Saudi Arabia in the U.S. media gives ammunition to radicals, who accuse
reformers of being U.S. lackeys. Tens of thousands of Saudis who once
regularly traveled to (and often had homes in) the United States now go
elsewhere.
Among Saudis, the United States is seen as
aligned with Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians, with whom Saudis
ardently sympathize. Although Saudi Arabia's cooperation against
terrorism improved to some extent after the September 11 attacks, significant
problems remained. Many in the Kingdom initially reacted with disbelief
and denial. In the following months, as the truth became clear, some
leading Saudis quietly acknowledged the problem but still did not see their
own regime as threatened, and thus often did not respond promptly to U.S.
requests for help. Though Saddam Hussein was widely detested, many
Saudis are sympathetic to the anti-U.S. insurgents in Iraq, although
majorities also condemn jihadist attacks in the
Kingdom.
As in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries,
attitudes changed when the terrorism came home. Cooperation had already
become significant, but after the bombings in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, it
improved much more. The Kingdom openly discussed the problem of
radicalism, criticized the terrorists as religiously deviant, reduced official
support for religious activity overseas, closed suspect charitable foundations
and publicized arrests -- very public moves for a government that has
preferred to keep internal problems quiet.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in
mortal combat with al Qaeda. Saudi police are regularly being killed in
shootouts with terrorists. In June 2004, the Saudi ambassador to the
United States called publicly -- in the Saudi press -- for his government to
wage a jihad of its own against the terrorists. "We must all, as a
state and as a people, recognize the truth about these criminals," he
declared, "[i]f we do not declare a general mobilization -- we will lose
this war on terrorism."
Saudi Arabia is a troubled country.
Although regarded as very wealthy, in fact per capita income has dropped from
$28,000 at its height to the present level of about $8,000. Social and
religious traditions complicate adjustment to modern economic activity and
limit employment opportunities for young Saudis. Women find their
education and employment sharply limited.
President Clinton offered us a perceptive
analysis of Saudi Arabia, contending that fundamentally friendly rulers have
been constrained by their desire to preserve the status quo. He, like
others, made the case for pragmatic reform instead. He hopes the rulers
will envision what they want their Kingdom to become in 10 or 20 years, and
start a process in which their friends can help them change.
There are signs that Saudi Arabia's royal
family is trying to build a consensus for political reform, though uncertain
about how fast and how far to go. Crown Prince Abdullah wants the Kingdom
to join the World Trade Organization to accelerate economic
liberalization. He has embraced the Arab Human Development Report, which
was highly critical of the Arab world's political, economic, and social
failings and called for greater economic and political reform.
Cooperation with Saudi Arabia against Islamist
terrorism is very much in the U.S. interest. Such cooperation can exist
for a time largely in secret, as it does now, but it cannot grow and thrive
there. Nor, on either side, can friendship be unconditional.
Recommendation: The problems in the
U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States
and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that
political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend -- a
relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment
to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside
world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and
cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent
extremists who foment hatred.
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