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EDITOR'S NOTE:
The Saudi-US Relations Information
Service is pleased to present this important work and thanks the author and
the NYU Law Review for permission to reprint it. The complete article is
available on-line.
"From Exclusivism to
Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism" originally
appeared in the New
York University Law Review ( 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 485 (2004)).
"From
Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism"
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From
Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism --
Part 3
By Abdulaziz
H. Al-Fahad
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I n
contrast with the intermittent local challenges that the Saudis faced
after the consolidation of the state, the 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented a radical new threat not
previously witnessed by the modern Kingdom.
The Saudis recognized that internal resources were not
sufficient to stem the danger and that they needed outside help.
True to their modern history of regarding themselves as pillars
of stability and guardians of the state, the religious scholars, all
their notions of belief and unbelief notwithstanding, provided an
unequivocal fatwa legitimating
the solicitation of help from non-Muslim forces in defense of the
state.
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True
to their modern history of regarding themselves as
pillars of stability and guardians of the state, the religious
scholars, all their notions of belief and unbelief notwithstanding,
provided an unequivocal fatwa legitimating
the solicitation of help from non-Muslim forces in defense of the
state..
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The
fatwa
is interesting in many respects. While
straightforward and lacking qualification, it still reflected the unease of
its authors. They invoked no
precedent and, more importantly, never explicitly raised the critical
issue -- that the forces in question were non-Muslim.
They never addressed the stipulations that jurists typically attach to
the validity of the military
help, such as the power of the party offering the assistance or the religious
identity of the adversary. Such
stipulations would have been problematic.
Nor did they provide textual support for their position beyond a vague
and indirect reference to necessity, a doctrine accepted in Islamic
jurisprudence. One is left with
the impression that the jurists were discharging an odious duty that they did
not want. But discharge it they
did. After all, the religious
scholars were in the business of
defending the realm and they were not going to repeat the mistakes of yore in
which ideological purity came at the expense of practical survival.
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After
all, the religious scholars were
in the business of defending the realm and they were not going to
repeat the mistakes of yore in which ideological purity came at the
expense of practical survival.. |
While
this fatwa
is perhaps the most impressive instance of how far Wahhabi ideology and its
guardians have evolved, there are other interesting, if perhaps less
conspicuous, examples in which the Wahhabi scholars appear to be aware of the
usefulness of realpolitik and the
necessity of compromise even at the expense of cherished beliefs.
 Perhaps, the most striking case of the new flexibility is that there
are no known fatwas
or pronouncements by the religious scholars
with respect to the Anglo-Saudi treaty of 1915, wherein King Abd
al-Aziz ceded powers to the English in exchange for material
support, during the same period when Wahhabi scholars were energetic in their
censure of the Rashidi alliance with the Ottomans. Indeed, while much has been said by radical elements about
the presence of U.S. forces on Saudi soil after the 1991 Gulf War, the United
States maintained an elaborate air base in Dhahran for about twenty years
until it was removed in 1962. We
know of no public position taken by any of the religious scholars with respect to that presence; they seem to have accepted it as
politically necessary. Instead,
it was under the pressure of Arab nationalists, mainly Egyptian, that the base
was removed.
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The
key is to understand that Wahhabism emerged in the middle of
eighteenth century Arabia, an area that lacked
central authority.. |
The
Gulf War fatwa
therefore should be seen as the culmination of a slow and painful process that
transformed Wahhabism from a puritanical, exclusivist, and uncompromising
movement into a more docile and accommodationist ideology that is more
concerned with practical politics than ideological rigor.
How can this transformation be explained?
The key is to understand that Wahhabism emerged in the middle of
eighteenth century Arabia, an area that lacked
central authority. The
movement's founder was very much aware of the crisis facing society and the
chaotic and bloody nature of its politics.
His famous pact with the House of Saud was an explicit
recognition of the need to unify the country and put an end to the rampant
instability. His strict
application of monotheistic concepts was perhaps a blunt instrument that was
nonetheless necessary to forge the unity that the Wahhabis so single-mindedly
sought, even while causing unease among some scholarly allies in adjacent
lands. For two centuries, the Wahhabi scholars experimented with
various formulas and degrees of militancy and exclusion, and through an
agonizing process of trial and error they slowly discovered the utility and
necessity of compromise to preserve and maintain their state. The Gulf War fatwa
is the least varnished example of these lessons learned.
| Statement by
the Council of Senior Ulama
Supporting Actions Taken by the Leader Inviting Qualified
Forces to Respond to the Aggression Against This Country
Praise
be to God..
The
Council of Senior Ulama
and others in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are not unaware of
events taking place on its borders involving amassing of great forces
and aggression against a neighboring country of Iraq.
The Council has been informed through what has been circulated
by news agencies and broadcast by the news media and relayed by
escapees from the country under attack, Kuwait, of heinous matters and
serious crimes as well as denigration of values and violation of the
sanctity of neighborliness the reality of which is far worse than
could be described. The
fortunate is the one who learns his lesson from the fate of others.
This is what compelled the leaders (wulat
al amr) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to pursue means to protect
the country, its people, and resources (muqawimat)
from a similar fate to that of their neighbor, Kuwait, and to request
the assistance of Arab and non-Arab countries to repel the expected
danger and to stand against the anticipated aggression of those who
wish to attack the country. The
actual events in Kuwait confirmed that the promises of this enemy
could not be relied upon nor could one be secure from its treachery.
It
is therefore necessary to enunciate the legal (shari)
rule in this case so that people of this country and elsewhere are
fully cognizant of the matter, and to clarify the situation through
their ulama.
Hence, the Council of Senior Ulama
has decided to convene a special session to issue this statement
to explain the necessity of defending the community (ummah)
and its resources with all available means and that it is incumbent
upon its leaders to immediately take every measure to avert danger,
stop encroachment of evil, and to secure for people the integrity of
their religion, property, honor, and blood and to preserve the
security and tranquility they have been enjoying.
The
Council of Senior Ulama,
therefore, supports actions taken by the leader, may God lead him to
success, of inviting qualified forces with equipment that bring fear
and terror to those who wish to commit aggression against this
country. This is his
obligation dictated by necessity under the present circumstances and
made inevitable by the painful facts and the rules and proofs of the shariah making it incumbent upon the leader of the
Muslims to resort to the assistance of those with the ability and
through whom the purpose is achieved.
The Qur'an and Prophetic Sunnah
show that it is necessary to be prepared and to take precautions
before it is too late. .
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Abdulaziz
H. Al-Fahad received his B.A., 1979, Michigan State University; M.A.,
1980, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; J.D.,
1984, Yale Law School. Mr. Al-Fahad
is a practicing attorney in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on
Transnational Connections: The
Arab Gulf and Beyond, at St. John's College, Oxford University, September
2002, and at the Yale Middle East Legal Studies Seminar in Granada, Spain,
January 10-13, 2003.
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