President
Kennedy and King Saud Meeting
February
13, 1962
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#191
Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between
President Kennedy and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, February
13, 1962. The following is a list of topic areas
that were discussed in the meeting.
Iraq-Kuwait
The
President expressed pleasure at the opportunity to discuss
with His Majesty some of our concerns in the Middle East.
He asked the King for his views on the Kuwait-Iraqi
relationship and whether Qassim would continue to exert
pressure on Kuwait. The King expressed confidence that
Kuwait would succeed in withstanding Iraqi pressures in
view of the support Kuwait enjoys from "all of the
Arabs" as well as Great Britain's vital interest in
Kuwait. The President wondered whether this was a
sufficient enough deterrent against a possible Iraqi
surprise attack on Kuwait which conceivably might be
accomplished within the space of a few hours. The King
expressed the view that the presence of Arab troops in
Kuwait, together with back-up British military support,
would be sufficient.
Syria
The
President asked the King for his views on the new regime
in Syria. The King expressed pleasure with the new regime
although, contrary to U.A.R. [United Arab Republic]
assertions, he said Saudi Arabia had had nothing to do
with the Syrian secession from the U.A.R. The President
asked whether the King saw any danger signals in the
Syrian Government's economic mission to the Soviet Union.
The King expressed confidence that the Syrian Government
would remain anti-Soviet and emphasized the importance of
U.S. assistance to Syria as insurance. The President
indicated that the U.S. is alert to Syria's need for
assistance and has already pledged a certain amount. He
said our Ambassador to Syria has returned to Damascus from
consultations in Washington with instructions to follow up
closely Syria's need for further U.S. assistance. In
response to the President's question as to the existence
of pro-Nasser sentiment in Syria, the King replied that
while many Syrian youth had once been enamored with
Nasser, the U.A.R. President now commands virtually no
following in the country.
U.A.R.
The
President asked the King for his assessment of
developments in the U.A.R. The King reported that at the
time of the Suez campaign in 1956 he had pledged Nasser
his full support and for a number of years Saudi Arabia
had enjoyed excellent relations with the U.A.R. The recent
nationalization and sequestration decrees, however, had
revealed Nasser as a Communist who presents a real danger
to the Arab World. (The King repeated this point several
times during the meeting.) The President noted that the
Communist Party is banned in the U.A.R. The King contended
that this is merely a facade. In response to the
President's question as to how long the King thought
Nasser would stay in power, the King commented that while
only God knew, Nasser's days appeared to be numbered. The
President asked whether the military in the U.A.R. is
disaffected with Nasser. The King replied that both
military and civilians in the U.A.R. now oppose Nasser.
The King called the President's attention to the vehement
attacks being leveled by the U.A.R. against both the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia. He understood the reason Saudi Arabia
was the object of these attacks but why the U.S. which
continues to provide the U.A.R. with economic assistance?
The President pointed out that our assistance to the U.A.R.
has been mainly in the form of sales of agricultural
surpluses for Egyptian currency for which humanitarian
reasons exist. He said our economic assistance to the
U.A.R. should not be misunderstood as supporting U.A.R.
policies. Nevertheless, continued the President, we are
watching Nasser's policies carefully and are prepared to
review our economic assistance to Nasser in the light of
future developments.
Saudi
Complaint Regarding U.S. Assistance to States with Leftist
Tendencies
The
King told the President he wished to speak to him in all
candor on the following subject which had been bothering
him: U.S. aid to states which have pronounced leftist
tendencies and sympathize more with the Soviet Union than
with the U.S. The President asked the King specifically
what countries he had in mind but did not succeed in
eliciting any definite response. The President told the
King that the basis of our assistance to such countries as
Indonesia, Ghana and Guinea is to reinforce anti-Communist
elements in the hope that the latter will eventually
assume a predominant role and, at the same time, in order
to prevent a further drift to the leftist camp. When the
King mentioned the U.A.R. in this category, the President
said that the same principle applied. The President
acknowledged the impossibility of predicting accurately
the direction these countries will take. The King
commented that there are some countries which are 100
percent Communist which receive U.S. assistance. The
President replied that our aid to Yugoslavia, for example,
has kept Yugoslavia out of the Warsaw Bloc and this, in
turn, has protected the flanks of Greece and Turkey. The
President called the King's attention to the
Soviet-Chinese split. The King asked what side the
President thought the U.A.R. would take in the event of
war. The President said this depended on the type of war.
It would not matter in the case of nuclear war and should
the war be localized, he believed the U.A.R. would remain
neutral.
Pakistan-Afghanistan
Transit Dispute
The
President informed the King of our concern over the
impasse which has been reached in connection with the
Pakistan-Afghanistan transit dispute. He reviewed briefly
the current history of the problem and pointed out that if
the matter is not soon resolved, we will be faced with the
necessity of considering the construction of a road of
ingress into Afghanistan through Iran. The Afghanistani
action in reopening the border on a temporary basis has
helped somewhat, he observed. The President recalled that
the Saudi Government had been helpful in the preliminary
stages of negotiating a settlement of the 1955 Pakistan-
Afghanistan dispute and asked the King for his views on
how the problem might now be ameliorated. The King replied
that he, too, has been concerned at the existence of this
dispute between these two neighboring Moslem countries. He
expressed a desire to help again if this could be
effective, and called attention to the Soviet pressures
being placed upon Afghanistan. (Jemal Hussaini remarked
that as a former member of the Saudi negotiation team in
1955 he believed that Afghanistan would resist Soviet
domination to the last man.) The King stated that while in
the hospital in Boston he had received letters from the
chiefs-of-state of both Afghanistan and Pakistan
independently seeking his support. He mentioned a
long-standing invitation from the Afghanistan Government
to visit the country and indicated the possibility that
upon his return to Saudi Arabia he might take advantage of
this invitation to offer his mediation services.
Saudi
Concern with Algeria, Palestine and Southern Arabia
The
King asked for the President's forebearance while he
raised three subjects uppermost on his mind: Algeria,
Palestine and Southern Arabia. With regard to Algeria, the
King expressed appreciation for the position the President
had taken while a Senator and hoped the President's views
had not changed. The U.S. should use its influence to
assure a "favorable" solution. With regard to
Palestine, the King indicated the importance of
implementing the 1947 UN resolutions and thus adhering to
the UN charter. On the subject of Southern Arabia he
referred to the British policy of "colonialism"
in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, including
that affecting Buraimi. The King expressed the hope that
the U.S. would persuade the British to modify their
policies in this area.
The
President indicated optimism that the matter would be
settled soon. He pointed out General de Gaulle is doing
his very best under trying circumstances. On Palestine,
the President recalled the correspondence last year he had
exchanged with the King on the subject and said that he
was fully aware how strongly Saudi Arabia feels on this
issue. He acknowledged the "gap" in the
respective U.S.-Saudi approaches to the problem, but
pointed out that the United States wishes at the same time
to maintain good relations with both Israel and with Saudi
Arabia. With regard to the King's comments on Southern
Arabia, the President stated that he was not fully
informed on the subject and following consultation, we
would be in touch with His Majesty.
Request
for U.S. Economic Assistance
The
King reminded the President that Saudi Arabia is a
relatively backward country whose native resources are
inadequate to cover the growing needs and appetites of a
population of some 10 million. (Note: An exaggeration of
approximately 4 to 5 million.) He said Saudi Arabia is in
dire need of hospitals, schools, ports, roads and artesian
wells, and relies on the United States for required
assistance. The President noted that the Saudi Arabian
Government has hired a number of technicians including, in
particular, Mr. Harold Folk, an American employed as the
top planning advisor in the new Supreme Planning Board. He
expressed his understanding that the World Bank had
prepared a development plan for Saudi Arabia which was
being executed under the aegis of these technicians.
Nevertheless, he continued, the U.S. would be prepared to
discuss the matter of possible economic assistance with
the Saudi Government and suggested that the Ambassador
might wish to raise the subject with Mr. Fowler Hamilton,
among others in the State Department. The King wondered
whether the United States might be able to send an
economic mission to Saudi Arabia and whether, in any case,
the U.S. could agree in principle at the outset to
providing economic assistance. The President replied that
we would first need information on specific projects and
areas of need before making any decision. He said the U.S.
would be delighted to receive a Saudi economic mission and
would be willing to dispatch a mission to Saudi Arabia. He
expressed certainty that U.S. lending institutions would
be willing to consider projects which the Saudi Arabian
Government might wish to submit on their merits.
Status
of USMTM
The
King called attention to the needs of his Government to
develop a strong military force. His Government, he said,
was requesting the U.S. to retain its Military Training
Mission in Saudi Arabia but on a reduced scale of 80
officers and men. The President replied that we are
prepared to be sympathetic to the proposal to retain the
USMTM but the figure of 80 is too small. With the removal
of the Second Air Division from Dhahran, the
administrative requirements of the mission would increase
and an adequate training job could not be accomplished
with less than some 200 men. The King said that the reason
for his desire to reduce the size of the mission was to
economize. The King was then informed that the U.S.
defrays the costs of the USMTM with the exception of
housing and local transportation. The King commented that
if the U.S. could pay for all the costs of the mission, it
could be any size.
Credit
Terms for Latest Saudi Arms Purchase Request
The
King stated he would also like the U.S. to arrange credit
terms for the most recent Saudi request for the purchase
of about $16 million worth of arms and equipment in
accordance with the 1957 arms sale agreement. The
President asked for the status of existing credit payments
and was told that several more payments are still due. The
King expressed regret at Saudi delinquency in past
payments and said he wished to correct this. The President
informed the King we would look into the matter of further
credits and would ask the Saudis to indicate the nature of
the credit arrangements they had in mind.
Port
of Damman Customs Difficulties
The
President told the King that there were two irritants in
U.S.-Saudi relations which he wished to draw to the King's
attention, the first of which was the matter of customs
difficulties experienced by our Consulate General
personnel at Dhahran. The President said he hesitated to
bother the King about such an administrative matter, but
this was causing us a serious operational problem. The
King referred to the matter of reciprocity in privileges
accorded Consular personnel. It was pointed out to the
King that reciprocity already exists and yet equipment for
our Consulate General in Dhahran continues to remain in
customs. The King promised to look into the matter and
pledged all possible assistance. He asked that in the
future the American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia deal
directly with the King on this matter.
Discrimination
Against American Jews
Another
irritant the President referred to was the inability of
American citizens of Jewish faith to transit Dhahran
airport and the refusal of the Saudi Government to issue
visas to American Congressmen of Jewish faith. The King
replied that the Saudi restrictions are only placed upon
Zionists and that "many" non-Zionist American
Jews have visited Saudi Arabia. The President commented
that Congressmen of the Jewish faith, whether or not they
are Zionists, are Americans who have pledged allegiance to
the United States. The Saudi refusal to allow them to
enter Saudi Arabia is grist for the propaganda mill and
hurts the Saudi cause. The President surmised that some
who claim a desire to visit Saudi Arabia would probably
not go once they were issued visas. The President stated
that Saudi policy in this regard is more extreme than that
pursued by other Arab states. The King promised that he
would give the matter consideration after his return to
Saudi Arabia and expressed his intention to apply the
policy followed by other Arab states.
Note:
Telegram 983 to Cairo described key points raised during
this meeting, primarily those not relating to direct
U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations, and suggested that Bowles
brief Nasser on it when they met. It also indicated that
UAR Ambassador Kamel had been briefed on the Kennedy-Saud
meeting. (Department of State, Central Files,
786A.11/2-1762)
Source: Department
of State, Central Files, 786A.11/2-1362. Secret.
Drafted by Seelye (NEA/NE) on February 16 and approved by
the White House on February 27. The briefing book that the
Department of State prepared for President Kennedy's use
prior to the February 13 meeting is ibid., Conference
Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2054.
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