Meeting
between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia
September
27, 1962
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#58
Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Crown Prince Faysal of
Saudi Arabia on September 27, 1962. The following is a list of topic areas
that were discussed in the meeting.
(The
following discourse took place before and during dinner.)
Yemen
The
Secretary mentioned that Prince Hassan had been in touch
with his colleagues that day and asked Prince Faysal to give
his views on the situation in Yemen.* Prince Faysal stated
that Prince Hassan had seen him before departing from New
York that evening. He thought Prince Hassan was the only
leader left who could command support in Yemen and
criticized Imam Muhammed for having leaned on elements who
had betrayed him. The Secretary commented that Prince Hassan
had also seen Lord Home. Prince Faysal stated that Hassan
would decide whether to return by way of Aden or Saudi
Arabia once he had reached Khartoum. The Secretary asked
Prince Faysal if he had any late news of Yemen. Faysal
replied that the situation is still unclear, but evidently
the Yemen military had taken over. It was also unclear as to
whether Imam Muhammed had been assassinated or had fled. He
wondered whether we had more information. The Secretary
commented we had as yet received no communications from our
Legation in Taiz. Mr. Talbot recalled that when Imam Ahmad
had died 10 days earlier, we had heard nothing for two days.
Prince Faysal noted that at that time the new regime of Imam
Muhammed had postponed the release of the news of the death
for a couple of days.
*On
September 26, the Yemeni Army High Command overthrew Imam
al-Badr and killed numerous members of the Royal family,
abolished the monarchy, and announced the establishment of a
"free republic."
Arab
League and Arab Unity
The
Secretary asked whether the pact recently signed between
Jordan and Saudi Arabia would lead to a larger Arab
grouping, perhaps eventually including Syria, Lebanon and
Iraq. He wondered whether such a grouping would not be
conducive to Arab solidarity. Prince Faysal replied that the
joint Saudi-Jordanian announcement left the way open for any
other Arab country to join. At the moment, however,
circumstances precluded the entry of the three countries the
Secretary had mentioned: Lebanon maintains its traditional
position of neutrality; Syria is preoccupied with its own
internal political problems; and Iraq is in too precarious a
state. The Secretary said that while his lack of full
background information prevented him from speaking
authoritatively, he had gained the impression that the
formation of the Arab League was a step in the direction of
Arab unity. Prince Faysal stated that one must look at the
League's history in order to evaluate it properly. He noted
that the League had been conceived by Great Britain and
that, because of this, Saudi Arabia had opposed it from the
beginning. Nevertheless, the late King Abdul Aziz was
eventually prevailed upon to join the League, and until
about 1952 it did achieve some results. The League was
weakened, continued the Crown Prince, by the advent of the
Egyptian Revolution and Nasser's attitude of condescension
toward and "trusteeship" over other Arab states.
Egypt, unable to control the League at that time, endeavored
to paralyze it. By 1955 Egypt had reversed its posture
toward the League, and instead sought to dominate it. The
League's end came at Chtaura this year where the U.A.R., in
an attempt to crush the League, "destroyed
itself." The Secretary expressed the view that two
factors had impaired the League's success: the U.A.R.'s
masterminding of the operation and the offsetting pull of
the North African countries. Prince Faysal noted that if the
League could operate in the normal fashion--each League
member having equal status and influence--the organization
could be successful despite North African polarity.
Baghdad
Pact
The
Secretary said that he did not intend to cast aspersions on
his predecessors but wished to inquire if in retrospect
Prince Faysal thought it had been wise to bring Iraq into
the Baghdad Pact. Prince Faysal recalled that at the time of
the Pact's inception, he had advised the Turkish Foreign
Minister against singling out only one Arab state for
inclusion in the Pact. He said he had emphasized the
importance of having several Arab states join a defense pact
of this nature and the necessity that such an organization
be fostered from within rather than from without. He
recalled how "Nahas Pasha" of Egypt and Prime
Minister Nuri Said of Iraq had discussed the possibility of
a military pact composed of most of the Arab states.
However, other Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, had
refused to acquiesce because of British inspiration. Faysal
went on to state that the Baghdad Pact had been poorly
timed.
Kuwait
The
Secretary commented that Mr. Gromyko had said to him a few
days before that the Soviet Union was reviewing its stand on
Kuwait's membership in the UN. Prince Faysal noted the
difference between "reviewing" a position and
"changing" a position and wondered how the
Secretary interpreted this remark. The Secretary said his
experience with the Soviets led him to conclude that when
the Soviets speak of reviewing a position, they usually end
up making modifications. Accordingly, he was optimistic that
the Soviets would not veto Kuwait's application the next
time it is proposed.
Syria
Mr.
Talbot recalled his visit to Riyadh several months ago when
Prince Faysal had mentioned the importance of U.S. aid to
Syria. He hoped the Prince was pleased that the U.S. had
since provided Syria with a stabilization loan. Prince
Faysal said he welcomed this because of the importance of
Syria's stability to the area. He hoped the U.S. would
contribute more assistance, especially now that Syria had
established a constitutional government.
(The
following discourse took place after dinner.)
U.S.-U.A.R.
Relations
The
Secretary reiterated his admiration for the wisdom, quiet
approach and clarity of expression which had been
demonstrated by the Crown Prince during his appearances at
the United Nations in 1948 when the Secretary had been a
member of the U.S. delegation. For this reason particularly
he welcomed this opportunity for a frank exchange of views
with the Crown Prince. U.S. friendship with Saudi Arabia, as
well as the mutuality of interests between our two
countries, requires close and frank consultation. The
Secretary noted that U.S. attitudes are often misunderstood
by contending parties in the area (such as Pakistan and
India) and we do not want Saudi Arabia to misunderstand our
posture toward the U.A.R. Basically, the U.S. supports the
independence and integrity of all states. In the case of the
U.A.R., we are fully aware that the U.A.R. is doing things
vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia which we do not approve and we would
like to have the benefit of Crown Prince Faysal's thinking
on the U.A.R. The Secretary mentioned three possible
alternatives in the conduct of U.S. policy toward Egypt: (1)
we could have nothing to do with the U.A.R.; (2) we could
place our full support behind the U.A.R. and prop up the
regime; or (3) we can maintain a form of American presence
in the U.A.R. as an alternative to the Soviets. He noted
that we had elected the latter course, so that the U.A.R.
would not be abandoned to the Soviet Union and in order that
we can be in a position of exercising moderate influence. On
the latter, he said, we are not always successful.
Prince
Faysal noted that his frankness has often been his weakness.
He said it pained him to discuss inter-Arab problems with an
outside power. (Note: A further exchange between the
Secretary and Prince Faysal clarified the fact that the
Prince was pained not at the Secretary having introduced the
subject but by the fact that the state of Arab relations had
reached such a turn.) Prince Faysal stated that there is no
problem at issue between Saudi Arabia and Egypt--unlike the
relationship between India and Pakistan. It is only that the
U.A.R. has chosen to attack Saudi Arabia with the evident
sole aim of destroying it. Prince Faysal stated that no Arab
would wish to deny any Arab people the kind of support the
U.A.R. is receiving from the United States. With regard to
the three alternatives cited by the Secretary, he, too,
would dismiss the first two alternatives. He favored the
U.S. conducting normal relations with the U.A.R., including
economic aid, providing the U.S. uses its influence to deter
the U.A.R. from a policy of intransigence and subversion of
other Arab countries. Prince Faysal stated of all Arab
countries, only Saudi Arabia has been consistent in its
policy toward the United States. In spite of occasional
differences of opinion between our two countries, he said,
Saudi Arabia has always considered friendship with the U.S.
a cornerstone of its policy.
The
Secretary expressed concern at the development of an arms
race in the Middle East, and expressed the view that
Nasser's arms program seemed beyond his defensive needs. He
feared that Nasser would one day use the arms against other
Arabs in the area. Prince Faysal stated that Saudi Arabia is
not afraid of the U.A.R.'s military strength since he found
it inconceivable that Nasser would attack with military
force. (The Secretary interjected a note of personal
satisfaction with this assurance from Prince Faysal.)
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia was concerned with U.A.R.
infiltration tactics as employed in Yemen. In response to
the Secretary's question, however, he expressed confidence
in the loyalty of the Saudi Army and in the absence in Saudi
Arabia of effective U.A.R. subversive groups. Prince Faysal
emphasized that he had not come to the U.S. to advocate any
severance of relations with the U.A.R. nor did he wish harm
to the Egyptian people. He stated that while he was speaking
personally, he wished to emphasize that the directives from
King Saud did not differ from the views he was expressing.
U.S.
Global Responsibilities
The
Secretary expounded on U.S. responsibilities in the world:
the confrontation with the Soviet Union (Communism) on every
continent and in different ways, e.g. militarily in Europe
where we are forced to keep 400,000 soldiers, guerrilla type
of Communist tactics in Viet Nam and more subtle tactics in
Africa. In certain places, such as Ghana, we have with
difficulty not "given up" and kept our pride; but
the overall consideration has made it imperative that we
maintain our presence until, hopefully, the situation
changes and Ghanians look for an alternative. The Secretary
stated that throughout the globe our policy has had one
thread of consistency; namely, our concern for the welfare,
independence and security of people. The Secretary expressed
optimism that if the countries outside the Communist World
managed to live through the danger, we would see more and
more people turning away from Communism. The greatest danger
lies in the Communists' resorting to violence at moments
when, and at places where, they felt they are losing, e.g.
their failure in East Germany caused their intransigence on
East Berlin. He noted that it was no accident that the North
Vietnamese who were witnessing the contrast of prosperity in
South Viet Nam chose to attack the latter.
Prince
Faysal expressed gratitude for this obvious mark of personal
confidence in making the Prince privy to U.S. policy
considerations. He assured the Secretary that Saudi Arabia
stands against Communism for traditional and religious
reasons. He stated that Saudi Arabia is doing everything
possible for its people. Education and health are free and,
recently, social security regulations have been promulgated
in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is not afraid of Communism as
an ideology. This, however, does not mean that Saudi Arabia
might not establish diplomatic relations with the USSR at
some point. He expressed the hope that Saudi Arabia will not
be compelled to do so in the near future.
Arrangements
for Luncheon with the President
The
Secretary informed Prince Faysal of the President's
invitation to him to lunch at the White House on Thursday,
October 4, and of the informal briefing session which the
President's confidential advisors would give him at the
Department. Faysal expressed gratitude and said he looked
forward to both events.
Source:
Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2762.
Confidential. Drafted by Seelye and Sabbagh on October 5 and
approved in S on October 12. The conversation was held in
the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers.
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