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Throughout
their contemporary history, Saudi-Iranian
relations have ranged between cooperation and
tension. Decision-makers in both countries now
clearly realize that their ties have generally
been more of an echo of external changes than an
expression of national interests. When the US
policy was based on the twin pillar of Riyadh and
Tehran maintaining regional security, the ties
between the two countries were characterized by an
unprecedented level of cooperation and
coordination. But after the revolution Tehran’s
efforts were directed at confronting its regional
neighbors in general, and the littoral states of
the Arabian Gulf in particular. Accordingly, there
was unjustified interference in the affairs of
some regional countries with a view to instigating
domestic, sectarian and national contradictions.
These crises were manifested most in the violent
confrontations between Iranians and Saudi security
forces during Haj pilgrimages.
During
the Iraq-Iran War, Tehran spared no effort to
condemn the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
and defame Saudi Arabia in particular, until
Tehran and Riyadh severed ties in 1988.
These
relations have been gradually restored because a
new external change in the form of the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait mandated cooperation. Riyadh
and Tehran agreed that they had to confront the
destabilization caused by the occupation of Kuwait
because they were the most affected parties in the
region.
In
spite of these positive developments shades of
mistrust and skepticism remain. Good intentions
alone are not enough to establish international
relations on sound and strong foundations. Even
the “security agreement” signed in 2001 has
failed to pave the way for credible and
trustworthy relations. As a result, many thorny
issues remain unresolved. There is no doubt that
there are some complicated issues rooted in
sectarian and ideological differences, as well as
divergent oil and security policies that require
immediate attention. The disputes get complex with
each country adopting a divergent view regarding
some of the regional crises, and ending with the
serious and justified concerns about Iran’s
determination to develop its traditional and
nontraditional defense programs.
These
thorny issues, however, are not beyond resolution.
Both parties need to realize that the disputes
will not disappear just by ignoring them, and that
there is a strong desire to search for tangible
solutions through candid negotiations, thereby
fostering mutual interests.
With
this is mind, it must be pointed out that some
aspects of the Iranian politics in the region are
not conducive to defusing tension. In fact, they
give rise to doubts and concerns among the Gulf
countries, reigniting memories of Iran’s
negative impressions toward the region. The
foremost is Tehran’s determination to develop
its conventional and nonconventional defense
programs, which the GCC states cannot view merely
as a US-EU-Iran dispute because those directly
threatened by such weapons are not the Americans
or the Europeans, but the GCC countries. Due to
this direct threat, the GCC states find themselves
obliged to depend more on foreign forces to
guarantee their national security. Thus, Iran’s
policies intensify foreign military presence in
the region and force the regional states into an
arms race that would adversely affect regional
stability, deepen mistrust and obstruct national
development plans.
Iran’s
attempt to exploit the current instability in Iraq
to consolidate and assert its political leverage
at the expense of the other parties sends wrong
signals. It is not just a direct intervention in
the affairs of an Arab country whose political
stability and security are directly linked to the
Gulf environment as a whole, but it is seen as an
attempt to destabilize the regional balance of
power and sends clear signals that Tehran’s
foreign policy is still motivated by narrow
interests.
On
the other hand, it is vital for the GCC states to
understand and take into account Iran’s security
concerns, especially after it found itself under
serious foreign political pressure and besieged
from all directions by the US presence in Central
Asia, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq. There is no
doubt that it is not in the interest of the GCC
states to allow continued animosity between Tehran
and Washington because it adversely impacts
GCC-Iran relations. More than ever, the GCC is
today required to make Tehran feel that it is an
indispensable part of any Gulf security
arrangement.
As
the secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council of Iran, Dr. Hassan Rouhani, tours some of
the GCC countries (he left Saudi Arabia [June 12]
after a two-day visit), it is illogical for the
visit to be motivated — as some Iranian
political analysts suggested — by Iran’s
objective to rally regional support for its
nuclear policy.
This
is unacceptable because the visit will once again
seem influenced by an external development. Iran
and its neighbors should address all the pending
regional issues.
Amid
dramatic changes that put the region in the eye of
the storm, it is imperative that our leaders build
bridges of confidence among them. Gulf people,
Arabs and Persians, are in the same boat, and they
cannot afford to do anything but make the Gulf
waters a sea of cooperation and peace.
—
Abdulaziz Sager is chairman of Gulf
Research Center,
Dubai.
This
item originally appeared in Arab News on
June 13, 2005. It is reprinted with
permission.
Also
see:
America's
Need to Personalize the Enemy Is a Tough Challenge
for Saudis, By Abdulaziz Sager
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