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From Exclusivism to Accommodation: 
Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism -- Part 5

EDITOR'S NOTE:

The Saudi-US Relations Information Service is pleased to present this important work and thanks the author and the NYU Law Review for permission to reprint it. The complete article is available on-line.
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"From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism" originally appeared in the New York University Law Review ( 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 485 (2004)).

From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism -- Part 5

By Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad

Collapse of the Saudi State and Rise of the Rashidi House: Conservatism Under Siege 

The Saudi civil war concluded unhappily for the ruling house. Through a combination of Saudi blunders and Rashidi shrewdness, the House of Rashid was able to end Saudi rule and dislodge the last Saudi ruler, Abd al-Rahman (d. 1928) -- father of King Abd al-Aziz, the founder of the modern Kingdom (d. 1953). The old polarization among the religious scholars continued unabated, but unlike the earlier disputes regarding Abd Allah's actions, the debate now reflected the conflicting sympathies of the supporters of the House of Saud and the House of Rashid. The old themes -- who is and who is not a Muslim -- earnestly were pursued, and there was significant hostility within the scholarly community. Both Saudis and Rashidis were closely interested in these debates, the most critical of which revolved around the status of the Ottomans, who happened to be allies of the House of Rashid. 

The conflict was most pronounced in the region of al-Qasim, which, towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, had become a pivotal actor in Najdi politics and profoundly affected the balance of power between pro-Saudi forces in the south and the Rashidi power base in Ha'il in the north. 

As noted above, a plurality of opinion in al-Qasim always held that the exclusivism of the southern Wahhabis was the main reason for the invasion of foreign forces; this plurality explicitly or implicitly advocated a less strident attitude towards the outside world. Because of its strategic location as a major artery through which pilgrims traveled from Iraq and eastern Muslim lands to Makkah and Madinah, as well as its fairly extensive commercial contacts with the Levant and more distant lands, countervailing influences always found their way into the region, and provided an antidote to the conservatism of the southern scholars. This growing countercurrent was apparent by the middle of the nineteenth century, and it blossomed under the auspices of the Rashidi dynasty. 

The conservative Wahhabis were alarmed by the loss of power of the House of Saud, their traditional ally, and by the disintegration of the country. To the east, the Ottomans came and occupied the most fertile part of the realm and became entrenched as the conservative Wahhabis had feared, and in the process emboldened the otherwise weak anti-Wahhabi factions. To the far north, the Rashidis, in alliance with the rest of their tribe, the Shammar, one of the dominant nomadic groups, were consolidating their hold and presented a substantial threat to the detribalized southern Najdis. The Rashidis also maintained at least an understanding, if not always an alliance, with the Ottomans, the archenemies of the Wahhabis. In the middle was al-Qasim with its fractious and sometimes bloody politics. And it was in al-Qasim that many of the decisive battles, both theological and military, were to take place until the successful Saudi restoration and eventual consolidation of the modern state. 

Under the watchful eyes of the Rashidi rulers and their sympathizers, the conservatives -- their implacable hostility to the Ottomans and not-so-secret yearning for a Saudi restoration notwithstanding -- had to tread a careful line lest they offer the Rashidis a pretext to persecute them. Nevertheless, persuaded that the Ottomans were grave-worshipping apostates who also were occupying part of the country, they drew a series of conclusions from this conviction. A true Muslim had to express his enmity towards, and disavowal of, the Ottomans, avoid traveling to their lands, and if he happened to live in their midst, exercise the obligation of migration from the land of unbelief to the land of Islam. This position was an insinuation -- at a minimum -- that the Rashidis' friendly relations with the Ottomans were a violation of the shariah. For many of the mercantile interests, it was a verdict to ruin their businesses. Historically, trade with Ottoman possessions formed an important part of al-Qasim's economy, and this trade required regular visits to Ottoman territory. Taken to their logical conclusion, southern Wahhabi ideas would have made such economic activity difficult if not impossible.

The Rashidi amirs tried to navigate a middle path between persecution of the southern scholars and their supporters and indifference to these debates. The conservatives always had been suspicious of the Rashidis and were generally on guard in their interactions with them. Yet, the conservatives were put under pressure at various points in the history of the Rashidi dynasty. They were exiled from Riyadh and sequestered in Ha'il under the watchful eyes of the amirs, which ironically enabled them to spread their influence by recruiting local scholars to their cause. 

About the Author

Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad received his B.A., 1979, Michigan State University; M.A., 1980, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; J.D., 1984, Yale Law School. Mr. Al-Fahad is a practicing attorney in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Transnational Connections: The Arab Gulf and Beyond, at St. John's College, Oxford University, September 2002, and at the Yale Middle East Legal Studies Seminar in Granada, Spain, January 10-13, 2003.


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