Saudi Arabia - Nawaf Obaid - Containing Iran

Home > Articles > 2006 > IOI > August 30, 2006

The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon
Nawaf Obaid

Editor's Note

Earlier this month, several days before UN Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a full cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hizbollah, Nawaf Obaid, director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, opened the dialogue on Saudi Arabia's role in Lebanon. In an essay that SUSRIS distributed he argued that "Saudi Arabia has both the strategic interest and the authority to limit the influence of Iran" in Lebanon. Today SUSRIS is pleased to share for your consideration Mr. Obaid's follow up essay that advances that discussion.

This essay was published today in the Daily Star (Lebanon) and is reprinted here with the author's permission.

The Saudis and Containing Iran in Lebanon
Nawaf Obaid

With the Lebanon war apparently over, the world can turn its attention to managing the aftermath. And no country in the Middle East is in a better position than Saudi Arabia to play a key role in that effort. How so? The kingdom, with its relatively close relations with Tehran and growing regional authority, can do much to influence Iran, which has armed and funded Hizbullah for years. It will use its economic clout to help finance reconstruction and the international force sent to secure the Israeli-Lebanese border. However, Saudi Arabia can achieve none of these aims if the United States does not push Israel to abide by the cease-fire, fully withdraw its forces, and return all occupied Lebanese lands.

From the beginning, the Saudi government blamed Hizbullah for the current conflict. The day after its unprovoked attack against Israel, the Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a sharply worded statement: "There is a difference between legitimate resistance and the reckless adventures undertaken by [Hizbullah]." But the kingdom's attempt to rally the Arab world against the militant group was undercut by Israel's disproportionate military response, which killed close to a thousand Lebanese civilians. And the Bush administration was partly to blame. While King Abdullah was willing to use his weight in the region to attempt to halt Hizbullah's attacks, President George W. Bush did nothing to rein in Israel. This not only embarrassed the Saudi leadership, it will also prove counterproductive to American interests down the road, as Israeli attacks boosted the popularity of Hizbullah and Iran in the Muslim world.

Military action will not disarm Hizbullah; only diplomacy can achieve this. Once Israeli forces withdraw, a prisoner exchange is implemented, and all Lebanese lands (including the Shebaa Farms) are returned, Hizbullah's justification for retaining arms will no longer exist. Saudi Arabia will then lend its support to the international effort to disarm the group. Next, the kingdom will apply diplomatic pressure on the Iranian government to control the actions of the Revolutionary Guards, which not only founded Hizbullah and pump an estimated $100-150 million in cash and arms to the group each year, but also pursue policies that destabilize the Middle East. For instance, according to the US ambassador in Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, Iran recently pushed Iraqi Shiites to step up their attacks against US forces as "punishment" for the Lebanon war.

Moderating Tehran's policies will be difficult, but not impossible. Seen in a larger context, Iran's defiant support of Hizbullah is part of an effort to establish itself as a regional leader. However, given that more than 80 percent of the world's Muslims are Sunnis, Iran has little religious authority outside a specific area. Nor is it an Arab state. And despite having three times the population of Saudi Arabia, its economy is only half as large, and its oil exports four times less than those of the kingdom.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's power is growing. It has recently increased its troop strength by 25 percent and is investing billions to boost spare oil capacity. Indeed, by next year, the kingdom should have enough to offset all of Iran's oil exports. Taken together, these efforts represent a comprehensive insurance policy against the loss of Iranian oil - either through war or if Tehran follows through on threats to withhold its oil as a political weapon. And Saudi Arabia is using profits from record oil sales to help stabilize the region. It has already committed $1.55 billion in financial aid to Lebanon - a $550 million grant to help rebuild damaged infrastructure and another $1 billion to boost currency reserves. At least another $500 million is promised. King Abdullah issued a royal decree stating that these monies would "form the nucleus of an Arab and International Fund for the reconstruction of Lebanon," and has called for a conference to be convened in Mecca to prepare for the aftermath of the war. In addition, the kingdom will pay the lion's share of the cost of the UN force in the South as well as provide aid to the Lebanese Army.

Such crisis resolution is not new to Saudi Arabia. In 1989, the Saudi leadership vitally helped bring Lebanon's 18-year Civil War to a peaceful close with the Taif Agreement and financed the bulk of post-war reconstruction. Not only is UN Security Council Resolution 1701 based in large part on Taif, it also closely follows Riyadh's position for ending the conflict. Now, as the world turns to post-war planning, Saudi Arabia will leverage its economic might and religious authority to build the conditions for long-term peace and stability in Lebanon.

But the US must do its part as well. This includes offering Lebanon an aid package commensurate with Washington's leadership role in the world, ensuring that Israel abides by the cease-fire, and most important, turning its attention to the root cause of violence in the region - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Nawaf Obaid is current the Managing Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a government consultancy based in Riyadh.

He is author of "The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia" (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). he is also an Adjunct Fellow in the Office of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC where he co-authored, with Anthony Cordesman, "National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges."

He has a BSFS from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, an MA in Public Policy from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and completed doctoral courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Security Studies Program.

Related Material:

Middle East Crisis:

Also By Mr. Obaid:

Saudi-US Relations Information Service
eMail: [email protected]
Web: http://www.Saudi-US-Relations.org
� 2006
Users of the The Saudi-US Relations Information Service are assumed to have read and agreed to our terms and conditions and legal disclaimer contained on the SUSRIS.org Web site.