Last week US Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs C.
David Welch visited Tufts University Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, his alma mater, to talk about the situation in the
Middle East. You may recall that SUSRIS spoke with him in March
and he presented the view from Foggy Bottom on US-Saudi relations
(links below). Today we are pleased to share for your
consideration his remarks on the broader region, as delivered at
the Fletcher School, Medford, Massachusetts on September 6, 2006.
Middle
East Region at Critical Crossroads
C. David Welch
The Middle East region stands now at a critical crossroads with
profound implications for America's national security. The region
is in transition, but to what?
With a combined population of some 230 million people -- the vast
majority of whom is under age 30 -- the region is confronting
challenges of an order of magnitude beyond what we could have
envisioned when I was here in 1975. The socialist, secular state
machinery that once held such promise has demonstrably failed to
keep up with the needs of the people. As the Arab
Human Development Reports from 2002 to 2004 have chronicled,
huge deficits in the areas of education, economy and politics have
resulted, creating vacuums that in some cases, well-organized
Islamic organizations have stepped in to fill.
Governments have been slow to respond to this rapid change, but
many are beginning to do so. Egypt, for instance, through a
painful process of economic reform, has been growing for the past
couple of years at 5 percent and is expected to grow even faster
in 2006. Though slow in comparison to Asia's powerhouses, Egypt's
growth is allowing it to absorb most of the new entrants into the
labor force and is beginning to change mindsets. Egypt has also
recently experimented with direct elections and is beginning the
difficult process of expanding political space in a one-party
dominated system.
Such changes are crucial, but they are also slow. They need time
and space to come to fruition, but in that same period there are
disruptive alternative visions. While there is a trend to
democracy, there is also resistant to it. The same factors pushing
reforms upon the governments of the region are also empowering
those who would like to wipe the entire slate clean and start over
with an exclusionary, intolerant world view. In many ways this is
a race, and our decision has been to seek to engage now rather
than wait to see what happens later. There is a legitimate
question as to whether we will succeed, but we know that if we do
nothing we will most certainly fail.
The challenges are numerous but the path is clear. Obviously, Iraq
is a huge focus. We must work with moderate Iraqis to stabilize
Iraq and to give that nation a chance to strengthen its democratic
foundations. Security is primordial to that endeavor and, for the
moment, that can only be created by a combination of US troop
pressure, Iraqi forces build-up, reconciliation with non-terrorist
elements of the insurgency, and elimination of death squads. This
must be complemented by continued international support for Iraq.
Our focus here is the UN and Iraq-led effort for an international
compact linking Iraqi economic reform and political steps to
enhanced international financial and political support.
We must continue to go on the offensive against radicals and
extremists who exploit other conflicts to undermine a non-violent
and liberal order. In particular, we must confront the new
challenge that the Islamic Republic of Iran represents to the
international community and to peace and stability in the region.
And, more widely throughout the region, we must continue with our
efforts to support moderate governments and civil society in their
efforts to meet the needs of their people and to encourage genuine
freedom to take root.
Meeting any of these individual challenges would not be sufficient
to bring peace and stability to the region. And the Arab-Israeli
conflict, which has been so central for so long, must be solved if
any hope for lasting peace is to be assured. Precisely because all
of these issues are so deeply intertwined, our approach must be
comprehensive and must seize opportunities where only dangers seem
apparent.
In no place now are the risks and opportunities more apparent than
in the current
situation in Lebanon, for it is related to all of these
challenges. Hezbollah, a powerful terrorist organization, emerged
as a "state-within-a-state" because of the failure of
the central government to meet the needs of its citizens. Iran has
aided and abetted Hezbollah's growth through cold hard cash and
weapons, a policy that dates back to the early '80's, but recently
has been reinvigorated. Iran has also looked to replicate the
Hezbollah "model" in Iraq in order to further
destabilize that country, and has enlisted the minority Alawite
regime in Syria. After Hezbollah initiated the violence on July
12, the US and France led the effort to create a new dynamic in
Lebanon for greater stability and peace in that country, an effort
that resulted in UNSCR
1701. Through 1701 the international community supports the
sovereignty of the Lebanese state, with a monopoly on force within
its borders and controlling those borders, so that Hezbollah
cannot be present as an armed group in the south and cannot be
rearmed. It is our expectation that the introduction of an
international force into Lebanon to work with the government of
Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces can achieve these critical
objectives and avert yet another round of violence in this pivotal
nation.
With the arrival of the international force, we will also look to
empower the government of Lebanon by urging the prompt lifting of
the Israeli embargo by deploying the force as Israel withdraws,
and by beginning reconstruction efforts in earnest. We will also
work with the government of Lebanon in concert with the
international community to address underlying structural problems
in the economy that existed before the war.
But this can only be a beginning. We must also work for
Hezbollah's disarmament, which is in the end the only way to
support harmony among all Lebanese. Above all, Syria's continued
interference in Lebanon must stop.
Iran
looms as an emergent, dangerous challenge. Shortly, we will be
going back to the UNSC to demonstrate to the Iranian government
that the international community is resolved to see an end to
Iran's effort to weaponize its nuclear program. To give strength
to the EU-3 negotiations with Iran, the US recently agreed to join
our European partners at the table with the Iranians should Iran
agree to suspend enrichment and reprocessing. Iran has made
abundantly clear that they will not, and the IAEA has confirmed
continuation of enrichment, so we have no choice but to consider
how further to isolate Iran. We continue to hold out hope that
Iran will abide by the will of the international community, but
hope is not a plan. We will therefore seek to constrain Iran's
ability to benefit from the international community which it now
threatens.
Stabilizing Iraq, shoring up Lebanon, and containing Iran are all
part of a broader strategy that also seeks an end to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For too long, extremists have traded
off the tragedy of this conflict to attract recruits by
radicalizing the poor and uneducated. Increasingly, it is
extremist Islamic groups who most vigorously exploit this issue.
We remain committed to advancing the President's two-state vision
of peace, and we continue to work with the parties and key
regional allies to realize that vision. Progress will also strike
a blow to rejectionist groups that have adopted anti-Israeli
rhetoric in an attempt to further their own political
agenda.
While making progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a core
concern, the ability of the international community and key states
in the region to improve their economic and political situation
remains the only way to create the conditions for real development
and lasting stability. To the degree that we and they are
successful the ambitions of radicals and extremists will fail.
Increasing the scope of political freedom, reducing high rates of
unemployment, creating opportunities for personal economic
improvement, and raising the standard of living will help address
the "root causes" of terrorism and reduce the appeal of
extremist-Islamic political movements. By creating an autonomous
business class, new political leaders could emerge.
It will be equally important that governments in the region take
on the task of reform. The international community should do its
utmost to support reformers as they go through the inevitable
growing pains. Our plan is ambitious. We continue to push for
greater market transparency, privatization of banking and
financial institutions, and a Middle
East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) by 2012. To build
partnerships for change, the U.S. has initiated two comprehensive
plans: the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative
and the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). These two programs work
directly with civil society, nascent democratic movements, and
government officials to identify areas of reform and provide
support where possible.
We are under no illusions. We know how hard conflict resolution
and reform in the region will be. But I am an optimist and I think
we can succeed. As I said before, the Middle East is a region in
transition and it has come to a crossroads. U.S. leadership is
key. How we respond will define our relationship with the region
for the foreseeable future.
I have touched on a great many topics today and only scratched the
surface on many complex issues. In the spirit of debate, I hope
that I have raised more questions and answered a few. I would like
to thank you once again for inviting me to speak to you today. It
is a great honor and privilege, as a former student, to be asked
to address this group. Thank you.
Source: US State Department
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