The Saudi National Security Assessment Project recently shared a briefing
[PowerPoint PDF - click
here] of its findings from a six-month Iraq assessment study with SUSRIS readers. Today we are pleased to be able to share the final report from SNSAP's Iraq Project which touches on regional security issues of vital importance to both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The complete document is posted on the SUSRIS Web site [click
here] and the introduction to the report is provided below. We would like to thank Mr. Nawaf Obaid, Director of the Saudi National Security Assessment
Project, for allowing us to share this document with you.
You can visit the SUSRIS
special section of SNSAP reports for more information.
Fragmented Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security
Introduction
Iraq is at a crossroads and faces a myriad of challenges, including economic, social and most importantly, security issues. The 2003 US invasion opened a bloody Pandora's Box of deep-rooted sectarian tensions as well as rival communal interests. It also ignited a tinderbox of violence brought on by an insurgency that is proving difficult to contain and even harder to eradicate -- to date, the country has seen no respite from violence, which has targeted US and Iraqi forces and terrorized civilians with almost daily bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and assassinations. A civil war may well be inevitable. Such a development would have the gravest implications for the entire region, especially Saudi Arabia, which shares its longest international border with Iraq.
The importance of a stable and cohesive Iraq to Saudi Arabia cannot be overstated. King
Abdullah, as the most powerful leader in the Arab Muslim world, has a vested interest in preserving the integrity of Iraq and safeguarding the rights of Sunnis in a country dominated by Shi'ites.
Although the recent elections represent a milestone in the country's move towards democracy, they have done little to foster a sense of unity among Kurds, Sunnis and Shi'ites, the three principal
communities in Iraq. On the contrary, they have largely served to emphasize communal differences. As
Chart 1 shows the election results fell primarily along ethnic lines (see
Appendix I for complete election results. The new government appears to be unable or unwilling to resolve these disparities, but this situation must be addressed if the political process is to move forward with any legitimacy. Whether the new government can meet the test is still uncertain.
The Kurds, who have long enjoyed the privileges of living in a semi-autonomous state, are unlikely to be willing partners in a government that, when fully functional, might offer them considerably less. Since the US invasion, the Kurds have demonstrated a tendency to use their dominance in the provinces that comprise the Kurdish area in a manner that gives them a distinct advantage over other ethnic groups in the region. The soft ethnic cleansing now underway in Kirkuk is a prime example of this.
Pervasive interference from Iran further complicates the situation. Iran's influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq has been significant, and the most predominant Shi'ite parties in Iraq politics have long enjoyed the sponsorship of Tehran. Iranian levers of influence include a broad network of informants, military and logistical support of armed groups, and social welfare campaigns. Most importantly, Tehran has sought to influence Iraq's political process by giving support to new various parties, in particular to the SCIRI.
For their part, the Sunnis, who occupied positions of power under Ba'athist rule, may find it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile their now subordinate status in the new Iraq. Basic issues of governance, such as the nature of the central government and the role of Islam, will be points of contention for many years to come. Finally, although they constitute only a fraction of the insurgency, foreign fighters will continue to remain a seriously destabilizing force in the country.
While the situation in Iraq may be too far gone to salvage, there are several policies that may assist the Kingdom in mitigating the grave situation that has been created in the country. These include: The development of a comprehensive national strategy which takes into account the possibility of a civil war; improving communications between the Kingdom and the United States regarding the extent and strength of the insurgency; and neutralizing Iranian interference. When the security situation allows, the Saudi leadership should also work to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Iraq and cultivate relationships with its religious and political leaders. These proposals are more fully discussed at the conclusion of this report.
To review the complete report visit:
�Fractured Iraq: Implications for Saudi National Security,� Saudi National Security Assessment Project � Final Report
Nawaf Obaid is current the Managing Director of the
Saudi National Security Assessment
Project, a government consultancy based in Riyadh.
He is author of "The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia" (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). he is also an Adjunct Fellow in the Office of the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC where he co-authored, with Anthony Cordesman, "National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges."
He has a BSFS from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, an MA in Public Policy from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and completed doctoral courses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Security Studies Program.
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