The Rocky Road Ahead in US-Saudi Relations
A Conversation with Afshin Molavi - Part 1

SUSRIS: The US Government has announced plans for military aid to Israel -- $30 billion � and Egypt -- $13 billion over the next ten years. There is also a package of arms sales of about $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. Why is the United States making these deals and why now?

Afshin Molavi: Washington has been fairly explicit in its statements about these arms deals. It is to support their, quote, moderate Arab allies, unquote, against what they view as encroaching Iranian hegemony. It�s also important to note that, in some respects, this is simply business as usual. While the news has captured headlines and has elicited some criticism from Democrats, Washington has a long-standing security relationship with its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf and with Egypt and Jordan, and that security relationship often means selling arms. So, it�s not a new story; however, the timing of it � amid statements by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice of the Iranian threat, and as the Bush Administration�s democracy agenda seems to unravel -- has raised some questions.

It also sends a message to their Arab allies who have been frustrated with them in many ways, particularly over the direction of events in Iraq. They have also been frustrated, especially in Saudi Arabia, by Washington�s handling of the Middle East peace process. 

The arms deal is Washington saying to Jordan and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and others, �At the end of the day what is very important to you is your security and we are your allies. We want to support you and we want to cut to the very core of what matters to you, which is your security.� That is an important aspect of these arms deals � affirming America�s security commitment. 

And let�s not forget another thing. It�s also a lucrative deal at a time when the Gulf region is flush with cash, and French and British manufacturers are eager to get in on the action. So, there�s also a pure economic rationale here too.

SUSRIS: The former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al Faisal, told us last year that his toughest challenge was the way the US-Saudi relationship played out on Capitol Hill. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, especially when arms sales are involved, has frequently been a hot button in Congress. The Hill isn�t necessarily your beat but how is this deal likely to be received on the Hill and how will rhetorical attacks on Saudi Arabia affect the relationship?

Molavi: The question of the arms sales to Saudi Arabia is already a significant issue in the Congress. There is active opposition, led by Representatives Anthony Weiner and Robert Wexler and Jerrold Nadler, to arms sales to Saudi Arabia, particularly the provision of guided bombs. 

The criticisms include claims that Saudi Arabia has not supported America in the war on terror, with reminders to Americans that 15 of the 19 hijackers on �9/11� were Saudis; charging that Saudi Arabia is a place that exports Jihadis to Iraq. They have also criticized King Abdullah�s statement that U.S. forces in Iraq constitute an �illegitimate occupation� and they also condemn Saudi Arabia�s brokering of the Mecca accord because they argue that it undercut U.S. peace efforts and allowed Hamas to get off the hook, in a sense, from forswearing violence against Israel or recognizing Israel.

This kind of language � especially claims that Saudi Arabia is a source of terrorism � obviously doesn�t go down well in Riyadh. And, in fact, the Mecca accord was seen as a diplomatic triumph because it brought Palestinians back from the edge of a civil war. However, as with the Arab League peace initiative, Riyadh felt that Washington snubbed the Mecca accord and, therefore, Palestinian factional fighting was likely to resume � as it did.

At the end of the day, even though many Saudi elites understand the nature of the Congress, and understand that Congress will never be as friendly to Saudi Arabia as the White House or the State Department, some of the heated rhetoric that will emerge about Saudi Arabia over the next few months from Congress will cause some strains in the US-Saudi relationship. And this is campaign season, we must remember, and candidates don�t win votes by saying nice things about Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is somewhat insulated by Washington�s obsession with Iran and the view -- somewhat simplistic, I believe -- that Riyadh could be a bulwark against Iran in the region.

SUSRIS: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came out very quickly and said that Israel understood the rationale for the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Does that deflect any criticism in Congress?

Molavi: It certainly does deflect some of that criticism in the Congress. But this isn�t the first time Olmert has said positive things about Saudi Arabia. He referred to King Abdullah as a �remarkable leader� several months ago, but that didn�t stop the efforts of the Members I mentioned, and some others, in opposition to the arms sale to act to reject it. So the lack of objection from Israel � it must be remembered that Israeli opposition bolstered Congress in past arms sales battles � will certainly have an effect but I don�t think it will quiet all the critics. It will be interesting to see what kind of traction they get. So far, it doesn�t seem to have hit a critical mass, partly, again, because of the shadow of Iran. I believe ultimately the Bush administration will win approval for the arms deals. The question, however, is how bruised the Saudi-US relationship will get by what is said in Congress and if all elements of the deal � including the guided munitions � will pass muster.

There is irony in that this arms deal is seen by Washington as a message to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that the US is their number one ally and supports them and their core security needs. However, it will bruise the relationship because it will probably lead to the kind of acrimonious statements in Congress that will ruffle feathers in Riyadh. It will also lead to more probing of Saudi Arabia that could be unwelcome by many people in the Kingdom. I think we are going to see over the next six months to a year an effort in the Administration to patch up the rocky road that is the US-Saudi relationship but it will be tough going.

SUSRIS: This week US Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad expanded on a New York Times op-ed he wrote critical of Iraq's neighbors. He told CNN that Saudi Arabia was among the countries he referred to. Here's what he said:

"Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries are not doing all they can to help us in Iraq. I mean, they are great allies of ours in that region. And the future of Iraq is the most important issue now affecting the region. And therefore, we would expect and want them to help us on this strategic issue more than they are doing. And at times, some of them are not only not helping, are doing things that is undermining the effort to make progress.�

What do you make of his remarks and those concerns?

Molavi: When you look at it from the Saudi perspective they feel they need to support the tribes, the Sunni tribes in Iraq as a bulwark against extremists. So, from what I can tell, there is money being funneled to Sunni tribes. To some extent, this dovetails with U.S. strategy now, wherein U.S. forces are reaching out to Sunni tribes to fight al-Qaeda. Therefore Riyadh really takes umbrage at the kind of statements that are made in not only in the Congress � as we just discussed � but also by officials like Ambassador Khalilzad. I guess I�d need a more specific rendering of what Ambassador Khalilzad means when he says they are �undermining the effort.� As for �not helping,� I suppose that charge can be accurately made of Saudi Arabia, but also the entire Arab League, who have been reluctant to embrace the Iraq project.

SUSRIS: Can you talk about the merits of the criticisms that are often launched? We�ve all seen ad hominem attacks by critics of Saudi Arabia. Some pundits charge Saudi Arabia as supporting terrorism as if the government had a budget line item to send insurgents to infiltrate Iraq. Given Saudi Arabia�s awful experiences dealing with its sons who returned from fighting the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan � at America�s urging � does it make sense that Saudi Arabia would seek to send its young men to become terrorists?

Molavi: Well, that�s absolutely right. Saudi Arabia learned many lessons from Afghanistan in the 1980s. The most important lesson was that when you are lax with your young men -- and you either subtlety encourage or simply turn a blind eye to them going into a foreign land to serve as a Jihadis -- eventually those young men will come home and they will make trouble at home. So it would be very surprising if there was a deliberate government strategy or even the turning of a blind eye to Saudis turning up in Iraq. 

Now we must consider that Saudis are, in fact, turning up in Iraq. We do know that. And they are serving as Jihadis. We do know that � in alarming numbers. But we also know that Saudi Arabia is facing their own terrorist threats in the Kingdom and has been extremely successful at rolling back local Jihadis and local extremists. Their counterterrorism strategy has been a model of success, particularly their reeducation of some of these Jihadis. They�ve used very interesting methods that others fighting Al Qaeda and extremists can learn from. They have a number of former Jihadis who are now speaking out against others going to these battles. 

One of the interesting things I noticed on my recent visits to Saudi Arabia was that Saudi television was full of anti-Jihadi programming. There was a very prominent television program series that aired on Saudi-owned MBC, which showed young men serving in Afghanistan as Jihadis. It was very effective because it de-romanticized the act of Islamic militancy. Clearly those kind of things � to prevent creation of a new generation of extremists � are being done by the government. This is something that is taken very seriously. This is not the Saudi Arabia of the �80s and �90s when young men who went to Chechnya and Bosnia and Afghanistan on jihad were celebrated at home. I lived in that Saudi Arabia in the early �90s. I remember talking to young men who had attended lectures by recently returned Jihadis and were full of excitement, and I wondered at the time why the government was doing so little to discourage this. Saudi Arabia, it seems to me, after having their own 9/11 � the 5/12/2003 attacks in Riyadh � have made a serious effort to push back. And yet, despite this, Saudis are still finding their way to Iraq. The big question is: when they return, will they bring back the deeply vitriolic anti Shia sentiment among today�s Iraq Jihadis to the Kingdom? And what will that do to Sunni-Shia ties within Saudi?

SUSRIS: Talk about another area where Saudi Arabia is being criticized -- their support to their co-religionists, the Sunnis, in Iraq. The Iraqi government is said to be critical of General Petraeus for supporting the Sunni tribes at the same time the Congress and others are critical of Saudi Arabia for supporting the Sunni tribes? Is that an ironic twist that is just chalked up as a typical feature of the complexities that shape the Middle East today?

Molavi: When it comes to support to the Sunnis in Iraq, my understanding, everything I hear, is that a lot of money is going to the tribes. As you stated, so is Washington. Ironic twist? Yes, I suppose you could put it that way. Riyadh has lost a lot of faith in Nouri al-Maliki. I understand that, but at the end of the day Maliki is the Prime Minister of Iraq. You can support Sunni tribes but to truly to support the Iraqi government you are going have to reach out to Maliki in some way, shape or form. I don�t think the Saudis have done enough of that and it is an area where criticism of the Saudi position is legitimate. 

SUSRIS: The Palestinian question has been a troublesome area for US-Saudi relations. Where are Washington and Riyadh on the pursuit of Middle East peace � the Arab-Israeli conflict?

 

Molavi: Saudis, especially King Abdullah himself, feel very passionately about the Palestine issue. Senior officials in Saudi Arabia have told me King Abdullah talks about his dream of one day praying in Jerusalem. It�s an issue that is very close to the king�s heart and that�s why he brought those pictures of suffering Palestinian children to show to President Bush at their Crawford meeting a few years ago. He just felt that any concerned human being would moved by those photos. The agreement he brokered between Hamas and Fatah, the Mecca agreement, was a diplomatic victory in his eyes and in the eyes of many people. It was seen in some respects as an historic accord that saved Palestinians not only from another generation of civil war, but also potentially saved the prospect of the peace agreement. So it was no surprise that King Abdullah was very frustrated by Washington�s response to the Hamas-Fatah accord.

They felt that Washington neglected it, that Washington dismissed it. They felt that Washington dismissed it in much the same way they dismissed or neglected the Arab League peace initiative -- again one of King Abdullah�s creations when he was Crown Prince in 2002. 

The Arab League Peace initiative and the Mecca accord showed us something very important. We won�t have real peace in the holy land unless America displays a real commitment to that goal, and that commitment means pushing Israel toward some milestones that will display the fruits of peace to suffering Palestinians. 

I�m not optimistic, however. I just can�t see light at the end of the tunnel anymore, especially with Hamas and Fatah so far apart.

On the issue of Palestine, on Iraq, on Lebanon, on a whole range of issues, it seems that Riyadh has lost a measure of faith in Washington�s ability to stem crises and has, therefore, stepped into the breach to play a more assertive diplomatic role in the region. This also has something to do with King Abdullah�s worldview. He remains, by all accounts, a pan-Arabist with dreams of a more prosperous and unified Arab world and, therefore, grows frustrated at what he has described as �a powder keg� in the region, and he is therefore pushing hard on a whole range of diplomatic fronts. Riyadh is, by far, the busiest diplomatic capital of consequence in the Arab world, and the King has emerged as a sort of regional elder statesman.

We talked about the rocky road ahead but both sides understand the importance and resilience of the relationship. I do, however, get the sense that the Saudis are playing a waiting game -- waiting for the end of the Bush administration. So we probably won�t see any dramatic moves by Saudi Arabia. I should add that Saudi Arabia is probably also waiting for the end of the Ahmadinejad �Administration� in Iran. While they wait, they are hoping there will be no war before these two administrations come to an end. 

[Mr. Molavi was interviewed by phone from his Washington, DC office on July 31, 2007 with followup questions provided via email.]

Part two will be provided later this week.  If you received this email from a third party make sure you are on the SUSRIS mail list.  Visit our subscription page to get on the list.