In our recent interview with Prince Turki
al-Faisal, the new ambassador to the United States talked about one of his missions in America being the relationship with Congress:
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Our severest critics are in the Congress. And that is part of my brief from the King when I was coming here. I asked him how do you want me to deal with President Bush and the American people and he said, �Just be frank with them.� Since the government-to-government issue is going so well -- it is practically handled by the King and President Bush, they call each other on the phone, they send emissaries between them -- my concentration is more on reaching out to Congress, both houses, and meeting with the critics of Saudi Arabia. I can hopefully answer their concerns and questions about the Kingdom and express to them our concerns and our questions about how we view the relationship from Saudi Arabia to the United
States.
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With those concerns in mind we are pleased today to present an exclusive essay from David Dumke on the sources of tension in Congress over US-Saudi relations and how they play out in Washington's political landscape. Mr. Dumke, a former Capitol Hill staff member and currently involved in Washington policymaking, has contributed his perspectives on Congressional issues to
SUSRIS/SAF in the past. Links to those contributions follow his latest
essay below.
Saudi Arabia and Congress: Understanding the Tension
By David T. Dumke
It has been four and a half years since Al Qaeda terrorists launched attacks against New York and Washington. In the wake of 9/11 stupefied Americans turned sharply critical toward Saudi Arabia, a country with which the United States had a strong and enduring relationship since the historic 1945 meeting of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz. The simple, oft-repeated fact that 15 of the 19 9/11 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia, human nature -- not deep-seated hostility -- recast public opinion. Following the public�s lead, Congress began not only to seriously question the Kingdom�s reliability as a friend and ally, but whether it tacitly encouraged extremist Islamic militants.
Officially, the United States and Saudi Arabian governments remained cooperative in their
post-9/11 relations. They have coordinated extensively on countering terrorism, including monitoring terrorist financing. While the Kingdom did not politically support the US during the run up to the invasion of Iraq, it did quietly assist US forces during the campaign. Led by defacto ruler Crown Prince Abdullah, who became King in August 2005, Saudi Arabia has fully supported the Road Map peace plan, and has offered its own proposal for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And while the Kingdom has questioned the wisdom of American initiatives for regional democratization, it has undertaken internal political reforms which produced nationwide municipal council elections in 2005. With global oil prices soaring, it has worked with OPEC and utilized its excess capacity to limit petroleum costs. Lastly, King Abdullah and President Bush
announced a Strategic Dialogue initiative last April which hopes to strengthen bilateral ties in the long-term by establishing a framework for addressing security, financial, economic, cultural, social and other matters.
Despite the close cooperation in these important areas the anti-Saudi fervor has not diminished in Washington. In his most recent
State of the Union
address, President Bush proposed to wean the United States of 75 percent of Middle East oil by 2025. While the proposal was met by skepticism about the viability of alternative fuels, the nature of the global oil market, and US demand, Bush�s plan attempted to placate an anxious American public weary of $50 per barrel oil.
The House of Representatives, on the other hand, passed two pieces of legislation in 2005 critical of the Kingdom. The first measure, an amendment to House Resolution (H.R.) 3057, prohibited the US from providing aid to Saudi Arabia. While the Kingdom has not received any significant US assistance since 1975, $22,000 was allocated annually to support the training of Saudi military officers. The second act, House Concurrent Resolution (H.Con.Res.) 275, passed in December, demanded the Kingdom reform its educational system. The House of Representatives found that Saudi education, �promotes and encourages extremism.. ..fosters intolerance, ignorance, and anti-Semitic, anti-American, and anti-Western views.� While neither measure was passed by the Senate, both provide an accurate assessment of congressional attitudes against the Kingdom and White House management of US-Saudi bilateral relations.
US-Saudi Relations: Background
For decades, US-Saudi relations have been based primarily on security cooperation and oil. The Kingdom has long been criticized for its position vis-�-vis Israel, human rights, and other issues. But the alliance was not consistently questioned or seriously challenged because Saudi Arabian oil was so vital to the American economy. Prior to 2001, no single issue stuck to the Kingdom and damaged its standing in Washington. Saudi Arabia had been a �Teflon� ally.
Successive U.S. Administrations have worked with Saudi Arabia to address mutual threats, many rooted in the Cold War. Challenges from Nasserism, communism, Iranian militancy, and more recently Saddam Hussein, demonstrated the importance of cooperation, as the Americans and Saudis worked hand-in-hand to resist threats to regional stability which endangered the flow of oil to the West. More than just the Executive Branch stood behind strong US-Saudi ties. Congress repeatedly approved selling arms to the Kingdom despite opposition from one of Capitol Hill�s strongest lobbying organizations, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Senator Joe Lieberman (D-Connecticut), himself an Orthodox Jew, has bucked AIPAC in the past in favor of allowing arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Economically, Saudi Arabia is a key trading partner � the largest in the region in 2004. That year, the US exported $4.7 billion in goods to the Kingdom, and imported $20.4 billion -- almost entirely in petroleum products. Prior to 9-11, overseas Saudi private capital was estimated at $700 billion, with much of that figure invested in the United States. Traditionally, on economic matters, Saudi Arabia and the United States shared the goal of maintaining a stable, affordable, reliable supply of oil to the world. It clearly served the interests of the United States -- the largest consumer of oil -- and Saudi Arabia -- the largest supplier of oil -- to maintain strong relations.
Congress and Saudi Arabia: Historic Political Overview
Congressional policy toward the Middle East has long centered on supporting Israel. The Israeli lobby -- led by AIPAC but comprised of numerous other like-minded entities -- has always frowned on efforts to bolster US-Saudi ties. From the Israeli perspective, shared by many of its allies in Congress, any gain for the Saudis is a loss for Israel. In this zero-sum game, Israel is opposed to any move which could ultimately result in Saudi Arabia replacing it as America�s most important regional ally. The importance of oil alone, not to mention other geopolitical issues (particularly after the Cold War reduced Israel�s importance as an American proxy), puts Tel Aviv on the defensive. America could remain secure without Israel, but would suffer greatly should Arab oil cease to flow.
Like Jimmy Carter, his predecessor, President Ronald Reagan ran into problems with AIPAC over arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The decision to sell additional F-15 fighter jets and AWACS command and control aircraft to Riyadh made sense from a strategic standpoint, as both the United States and Saudi Arabia feared a spillover from the Islamic revolution in Iran. Arms sales have been a lucrative business for Americans. From 1950-1997, US-Saudi arms transactions totaled $93.8 billion. However, Reagan burned up considerable political capital in supporting the sale � needing one of the two Congressional chambers to approve the deal. Israeli Prime Minister Begin, personally lobbied against the sale during a visit to Capitol Hill. The House of Representatives voted decisively against the package, but the Senate narrowly passed it after Reagan applied heavy pressure to wavering Senators. But Reagan had little success with Congress in future arms deals for Arab states in the region. In 1985 Congress blocked an arms deal with Jordan to the chagrin of King Hussein and forced Reagan to withdraw a Saudi arms package. A year later another Saudi arms deal was overwhelmingly rejected by the Senate 77-22.
In the wake of Reagan�s successful push for the Saudi F-15/AWACS arms package, AIPAC and other pro-Israel organizations demonstrated that while they could offer congressional candidates carrots, they would not hesitate to use the stick to punish vulnerable incumbents opposing their agenda. For example, Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois) was targeted in 1984 for his alleged pro-Arab positions. His opponent in the general election, Paul Simon, received $3 million in Jewish contributions -- allowing AIPAC director Tom Dine to publicly take credit for his defeat. The same year, Tom Harkin was heavily backed by pro-Israel political action committees in the Iowa Senate race over incumbent Roger Jepsen, who famously switched his vote on the Saudi AWACS sale.
In the 1980�s, AIPAC and others within the pro-Israel lobby began to aggressively broaden their coalition by building ties with evangelical Christian groups, shape debate in the academic world, and prominently injecting themselves in political campaigns. AIPAC formed strong relations with Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and other evangelical luminaries. The Zionist-Christian right alliance was to increase in importance in the coming years, especially during the time President Clinton and Prime Minister Netanyahu were in office, allowing Republicans to compete with Democrats for Jewish votes and campaign contributions. For its part, the Christian right has grown significantly over the past three decades, particularly as the Republican Party solidified its control over the �Bible Belt� by appealing to the American South�s social and religious conservatism.
Critics of the pro-Israel lobby attribute President George H. W. Bush�s political tailspin to his insistence on brokering a Middle East peace deal which Israel opposed. Faced with Israeli inflexibility, Bush threatened to freeze a lucrative $10 billion loan guarantee, which Israel intended to use to construct housing -- much of it in occupied Arab lands -- for Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. His position on the loan made him the target of considerable criticism from Israel�s congressional allies. The President received a letter, drafted by AIPAC, signed by 240 members of the House and 77 Senators opposing his decision to withhold the loan guarantee. One estimate suggests that Bush�s Jewish support dropped from 38 percent in 1988 to between 8-13 percent in 1992.
In Congress, Saudi Arabia was under significant criticism prior to 9/11, primarily due to the Palestinian Intifada. As is common when violence in Palestine intensifies, the Israeli lobby worked doggedly to damage the standing in Congress of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They feared these two erstwhile American partners would press the United States into forcing a peace which would not protect Israeli interests. This helps explain why, from 2000-2001, both countries faced new and recycled allegations over their shoddy human rights records, questions about the necessity of obtaining modern American military hardware, and charges of incitement of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism. Congressional attacks on America�s most vital Arab allies increased after 9/11, fed in large part by increased
Islamaphobia among members of Congress and the public at large.
2004 Presidential Elections
Saudi Arabia was an issue in the 2004 presidential campaigns, due to the 9/11 backlash and a spike in petroleum prices. In the Democratic primaries, Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida) and former governor Howard Dean repeatedly blasted the Bush Administration�s handling of relations with Saudi Arabia. Democratic nominee John
Kerry attacked the Kingdom for its support of Islamic militants, and stressed the need for America to gain energy independence from Saudi Arabia. In a May 2004 speech he noted, �If we are serious about energy independence, then we can finally be serious about confronting the role of Saudi Arabia in financing and providing ideological support of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.� Two months later he said, �I want an America that relies on its own ingenuity and innovation � not the Saudi royal family.�
President Bush used a more diplomatic tact when speaking about Saudi Arabia, but he did not ignore the rampant anti-Saudi sentiment when he commented in July 2004, �Three years ago, terrorists were well-established in Saudi Arabia. Inside that country, fundraisers and other facilitators gave al-Qaeda financial and logistical help, with little scrutiny or opposition. Today, after the attacks in Riyadh and elsewhere, the Saudi government knows that al-Qaeda is its enemy.�
US-Saudi Cooperation
While Saudi bashing proved useful to presidential and congressional candidates alike, it did not change the fact that Washington and Riyadh have continued to cooperate on a variety of issues since 2001. The threat of terrorism came to the Kingdom with al-Qaeda attacks against residential compounds in Riyadh in May 2003. Before that, however, Saudis had joined the United States in the fight against global terrorism. Saudi Arabia supported UN Security Council Resolution 1373, and working with the US Department of Treasury and the G-7, formed a Financial Action Task Force to examine terrorist financing. Intelligence cooperation, close prior to 9/11, was strengthened even more.
Economically, Saudi Arabia recently surpassed Israel as America�s largest trading partner in the region. It continued to purchase arms from the United States, with sales to the Kingdom totaling $7.3 billion from 1996-2003. In 2004 alone, US-Saudi arms agreements totaled $1.6 billion. The United States was instrumental in Saudi accession to the World Trade Organization in 2005, a goal long sought by the Kingdom.
Iraq, Israel, Syria, and Iran continued to be complicating factors for US-Saudi ties, but even on these issues there has been cooperation. Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, was helpful in allowing the nascent Iraqi government to re-enter the Arab League and other international organizations. It also worked to address the substantial debt owed by Baghdad so as to not cripple Iraq�s recovery. The Middle East peace Road Map has been backed by Riyadh with Saudi Arabia even putting forward a proposal for full recognition of Israel which won approval at an Arab League summit. Lastly, the success of any efforts by the United States to isolate, punish, or alter the behavior of Tehran and Damascus relies on the cooperation of Saudi Arabia.
In no way, however, have congressional attitudes toward the Kingdom been altered by the bilateral cooperation. If anything, they may have hardened.
Today�s Congress and Saudi Arabia
It should be noted that three factors make Congress tick: (1) electoral needs; (2) ideology; and, (3) partisanship. All three factors overlap in congressional decision-making: reacting to events, appeasing special interest groups, and protecting parochial interests.
Foreign policy is no different from any other issue, except that the local link to international issues is tenuous. Members of Congress certainly want to do what is best, but not if voting a certain way risks their political fortunes. They don�t simply try to appeal to specific country or ethic groups, they more often try to avoid offending them. Offending special interest groups that are perceived as powerful hinders a member�s ability to pursue legislative priorities. If the Middle East or Cuba -- two areas heavily influenced by powerful domestic lobbying groups -- are not important to either reelection or policy goals, most are unwilling to accept the consequences, real or imagined, of ruffling feathers by opposing a powerful lobbying organization such as AIPAC.
Today there is little reward for acting conciliatory toward Saudi Arabia, but ample evidence suggesting attacking the Kingdom is political gold. This explains why it is unlikely, in the near future, that Saudi Arabia will generate any substantial support on Capitol Hill. Consider the quotes made during the July 15, 2004 debate in the House of Representatives over the $22,000 allocated to joint Pentagon-Saudi military training:
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�The Saudis have famously also failed to crack down on terror..
..Since September 11, not a single Saudi donor of funds to terrorist groups has been publicly punished.� -- Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-New York).
�Time and again, the Saudis have shown that they are not our allies in the war on terror. In fact, they are soft on al Qaeda terrorists operating in Saudi Arabia.� -- Rep. Joseph Crowley (D-New York).
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And, more recently, in the December 19, 2005 debate over Saudi education reform:
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�The extremist Wahhabi religious education which is present in Saudi schools encourages and promotes extremism, viciously anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic
attitudes.. .. It is no surprise that 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11 were Saudi nationals.� -- Rep. Tom Lentos (D-California).
�It is unfortunate that some of the textbooks which are used in Saudi Arabian schools foster intolerance, ignorance and anti-Semitic, anti-American and anti-Western views.� -- Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida).
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With opinions like these dominating Congress, particularly during an election year, it is easily apparent that advocates of the US-Saudi relationship have much work to do before bilateral relations improve at the congressional level. In November, candidates will compete in elections for all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 34 seats in the Senate. Employing anti-Saudi or, more broadly, anti-Arab rhetoric is still likely to be of electoral benefit to candidates seeking to bolster their security credentials.
The recent controversy over the attempted acquisition by a United Arab Emirates-based firm of a contract to maintain several large American seaport terminals highlights congressional willingness, consciously or unconsciously, to employ anti-Arab scare tactics. Leading congressional opponents of the deal include both Republicans and Democrats. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, a top contender for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, has been a leader in this effort. Congress has chosen to ignore that the UAE has been a staunch ally to the US on terrorism and other key issues, instead dwelling on the facts that one of the 9/11 bombers was a citizen of the Emirates, that 9/11 financing was funneled through UAE-based banks and that the UAE was one of three nations that recognized the Taliban.
The Dubai port battle also illustrates another key political reality. President Bush has promised to veto any legislation which blocks the port deal, primarily because the White House realizes the political implications for the US in the Arab world. However, Congress loudly renounced Bush and called for hearings to review the deal. Senator Lindsay Graham (R-South Carolina), contends Bush is politically �tone deaf� on the issue.
Why the showdown? President Bush�s political capital is quickly vanishing. Some believe Bush has already assumed lame duck status due to the situation in Iraq and his failure to pass many key domestic initiatives after launching his second term in 2005. Compromising Bush�s political position further: for the first time since 1952 neither the sitting president or vice president will compete in the next presidential election. The Bush torch will not be inherited by another candidate.
Congress will continue to press the Kingdom on issues such as oil prices and terrorism in 2006. The decision by Saudi Arabia to provide funding to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government will generate congressional acrimony, and lead to questions about the level of Saudi cooperation on regional issues like Iraq, Iran, and Syria. There is also a possibility, given growing anti-Chinese sentiment, of concern about budding Saudi-Sino relations, particularly after King Abdullah�s recent visit to Beijing. What is certain is that US-Saudi relations at the congressional level are likely to remain troubled.
David T. Dumke is principal of MidAmr Group, an organization that works to facilitate understanding of US and Arab policy making for decision-makers in Washington and the Arab world. He previously served in a variety of capacities in Congress, including serving as legislative director for Representative John D. Dingell (D-Michigan), the longest serving member of the House of Representatives. E-mail:
[email protected]
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Current Saudi Arabia-related Legislation in
Congress
Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005 (HR 2037)
To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep. Weiner (D-New York)
Status: in committee, no action scheduled
Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005 (S 1171)
Senate version of HR 2037.
Sponsor: Sen. Specter (R-Pennsylvania)
Status: in committee, no action scheduled
Saudi Arabia Education (H.CON.RES.275)
Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the education curriculum in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Sponsor: Rep. Davis (D-Florida)
Status: Passed by House; no Senate vote scheduled
Prohibit Aid to Saudi Arabia Act of 2005 (HR 505)
To prohibit assistance to Saudi Arabia .
Sponsor: Rep. Weiner (D-New York)
Status: Passed as House amendment; no Senate action
Saudi Visas (H. R. 604)
To halt the issuance of visas to citizens of Saudi Arabia until the President certifies that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not discriminate in the issuance of visas on the basis of religious affiliation or heritage.
Sponsor: Rep. Weiner
Status: in committee, no action scheduled
OPEC Accountability Act (S. 752)
To require the United States Trade Representative to pursue a complaint of anti-competitive practices against certain oil exporting countries.
Sponsor: Sen. Lunenburg (D-New Jersey)
Status: in committee, no action scheduled
OPEC Profits (S. 847)
To lower the burden of gasoline prices on the economy of the United States and circumvent the efforts of OPEC to reap windfall oil profits.
Sponsor: Sen. Stabenow (D-Michigan)
Status: cleared committee, pending floor action
NOPEC (S.555)
A bill to amend the Sherman Act to make oil-producing and exporting cartels illegal.
Sponsor: Sen. DeWine (R-Ohio)
Status: cleared committee, pending floor action
Additional Perspectives
Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal - Time Interview - Sep. 2003
The Congress seems to be pre-occupied with everything that comes from Saudi Arabia, with the attitude that we are guilty until proven innocent. It is one of those never ending stories, until it finally reaches rock bottom. I hope by the time it reaches rock bottom, it hasn't done too much damage to the relationship."
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Professor Jean Francois Seznec - SUSRIS Interview - Oct. 2004
"I think the Saudi leadership in particular is so upset at all levels, whether it is the commoners, the ministers, the technocrats, or the princes -- they are so upset about what is happening against Saudi Arabia in this country, the treatment of Saudi Arabia in Congress. I attended a few of the meetings in Congress just to go there and look. It's unbelievable what you hear from the neoconservatives and from perfectly normal representatives in Congress who have been briefed by various people on all the negative sides of Saudi Arabia."
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