Why is Saudi Arabia becoming the
major power in the region?
Adel Al Toraifi
When the recent fight broke out between Fatah and Hamas
militants in Gaza, the whole Middle East was affected by
the brutal and unprecedented struggle over power in the
Palestinian territories. Egyptian efforts to curb the
deadly carnage failed and for the first time in the
history of Egyptian mediation Hamas accused Cairo of
siding with its opponents by supplying arms and
ammunition to Fatah factions. The internal Palestinian
war stopped only after King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
called upon both parties to negotiate a unity government
in the city of Mecca. Surprisingly, both parties agreed
within hours. For Fatah it was the only option to avoid
the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, created by
the Oslo Peace Process. As for Hamas, it sought to seize
the opportunity of Saudi recognition due to what had
been a cautious Saudi policy towards the rise of Hamas
power after the 2006 elections.
The
Mecca agreement signed between the Palestinian parties
in February 2007 is one example of how Saudi Arabia is
becoming a major regional power. Although Saudi power
and diplomacy have clearly been effective since the
early seventies, the last three years have brought great
changes to the definition and dimension of Saudi power.
Historically, Saudi power in the region has experienced
ups and downs and it is possible to frame these into
three main intervals. The first reflects the creation of
a modern kingdom in the heart of the Arab peninsula that
encompasses the two Muslim holy places, Mecca and
Medina. Due to its expansive landscape and relatively
large population it played a highly influential role
among its neighbors. Although Saudi power did not extend
beyond the Gulf, when the Arab nationalistic wave spread
across the Middle East and several monarchies were
overthrown in a series of revolutions and military
coups, the Saudis faced a major challenge. Consequently,
until the end of the sixties Saudi resistance to
Nasserism pushed the monarchy towards reliance on its
western allies. The second phase in Saudi Arabia�s
regional role can be attributed to a number of major
events; first, the Arab defeat in 1967 by Israel, which
spelled the decline of the Arab National movement of
Nasser, and second, the rise of oil prices in the early
seventies, which triggered the formation of a strong
wealthy state, and the exercise of Saudi financial power
as a heavy-duty tool in its foreign policy.
The Nixon administration observed this transformation
and promoted a Middle East doctrine asserting the
necessity of supporting moderate regimes, such as Saudi
Arabia and Iran, to counter Soviet interference in the
Middle East. Therefore, dependency on America by Saudi
Arabia and Iran grew significantly during the seventies
and by the early eighties three major petroleum
countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran) played a larger
role in Middle East affairs while a weakened Egypt
struggled to maintain its position.
The eighties provide a good example of Saudi
effectiveness in the region. At first, the fall of the
Shah to an anti-American regime alerted the Saudis to
oppose the Shia Islamist revolution by helping to arm
Iraq and counter the Mullahs ideologically. In addition,
the Saudis moved against the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and led a pan-Islamic resistance to the
communist occupation, which served American and western
policies. From controlling oil prices worldwide to
exercising its financial wealth in the region and
abroad, the Saudis were able to hold an unprecedented
position in the Middle East, and appeared to be an
important mediator in Arab and Islamic affairs,
brokering monumental peace treaties such as the Taif
accord (1989) and the Afghan peace talks (1993).
However, Saudi power experienced a setback throughout
the nineties. The initial reason for this was the first
Gulf War (1991) when the Americans and Saudis
orchestrated the formation of an international coalition
to liberate Kuwait and stop Saddam Hussein�s aggression
towards his neighbors. Saudi Arabia�s invitation to
American and western troops was opposed by Arab
nationalists and Islamists across the Middle East, and
inflicted inconceivable damage on the Saudi image among
ordinary Arabs who were opposed to American foreign
policy. However, the setback in the rise of Saudi
influence became most evident when King Fahd suffered a
debilitating stroke in 1995. Although Saudi foreign
policy remained the same, the weakness of the ruling
Saudi king had an effect on the country. The immediate
outcome was that Saudi policymakers found themselves
more reluctant to interfere in regional affairs unless
they were driven to it. In other words, they drew back
from initiating steps and fostering agendas and instead
priority was given to national politics.
King
Abdullah was handed the foreign and economic files
around the end of 1997. In the region he was known and
respected by many leaders but his popularity did not
extend beyond his fellow citizens, and in the West he
was mistakenly observed as a pro-Arab nationalist and a
critic of the West. Things worsened when the second
intifada (2000) erupted following the failure of peace
talks. Saudi Arabia, as well as other Arab countries,
like Egypt and Jordan, was criticized for not putting
more pressure on their American ally. Although the
Saudis did argue seriously with the Bush administration
over the devastating situation in the Palestinian
occupied territories these efforts where overshadowed by
September 11th. The Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on
America using young deluded Saudis had a catastrophic
impact on the Saudi-American relationship and in many
ways limited the Saudi role in the region. For more than
three years the Saudis faced significant challenges,
specifically American pressure to initiate changes in
the social and education system, an increased terrorism
threat within the country and several national problems
like reform calls, poverty and unemployment, all of
which required serious attention.
King Abdullah took over in August 2005, after the death
of King Fahd, and carried out a comprehensive reform
plan that included political, economic and educational
changes. However, more significant is the rise of King
Abdullah as a regional leader of special status.
Certainly, the fall of Iraq as a power and the rise of
Iran as a threat to the region have helped to enforce
the Saudi position in the Gulf region and in the rest of
the Arab world. But that does not explain Saudi Arabia�s
current role nor does it answer the growing popularity
of the Saudi ruler.
Since the late sixties, when certain influential Arab
leaders, like Nasser of Egypt and King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia, passed away, there has been great demand within
the Arab nations for a symbolic hero, a father figure
leader. Saddam Hussain tried to establish himself as the
new pan-Arab leader, as did other heads of state of his
generation, without success because the inter-Arab
conflicts and turmoil within their own countries swept
away their ambitions. King Abdullah seems different. By
being a simple, direct statesman he has escaped being
characterized using negative stereotypes and has escaped
criticism because he was not present during the
difficult days of the eighties and early nineties.
Today, he enjoys the virtue of being a leader without a
troubling past. Hence, across the Middle East he is
gaining considerable acceptance, and even during the
hard days of last July when Israel retaliated against
Hezbollah attacks, the Saudi king stood firm in
condemning Hezbollah�s actions and later Israel�s
disproportionate response. Although Saudi Arabia was
attacked and criticised by anti-Israeli protesters, who
raised flags and displayed posters of Hezbollah leader
Hassan Nasrallah, King Abdullah was not targeted at all.
In fact, he was later praised for bringing together
Iraqi religious leaders for a peace dialogue in Mecca
and for curbing the Palestinian civil war.
The last Arab Summit in Riyadh presented a clear view of
how Saudi Arabia is reviving not only its regional role
and power, but also becoming the only Arab country
capable of challenging Iranian ambitions in Iraq and
Lebanon. With Egypt lagging behind owing to critical
domestic problems, Saudi Arabia appears the single
player in Arab affairs. This, however, has brought
enormous pressure to bear on Saudi Arabia to intervene
in almost every conflict in the Middle East from Iraq to
Darfur, and the Saudis are already juggling too many
issues at once.
However, two main differences can be seen in the new
Saudi ascendancy: first, they are acting completely
independent of any pressure, namely the United States,
and this can be observed from the fact that the Saudis
are speaking to and even dealing with states that
America refuses to deal with. Currently, they are
conducting intensive meetings with the Iranians; they
still talk to Syria despite their own resentment; they
are conducting a mediation mission between different
Lebanese factions and moreover they have received
Hezbollah officials despite last year�s confrontation.
What is even more surprising is that America is
increasingly relying on Saudi regional power. With its
continuous stumbling in Iraq, America is looking to
Saudi Arabia to ease the tensions in many situations.
This might explain why it patiently swallowed King
Abdullah�s description of the American presence in Iraq
as an "illegal occupation." Some might say that America
has come to realize that he no longer speaks for himself
alone but rather as a leader of the Arab states.
The second change in Saudi power is that it no longer
relies on its religious status or its wealth, but on its
own prestige and soft power. With around fifteen highly
anticipated visits of dignitaries and heads of state,
excluding the last Arab Summit, since the beginning of
this year Saudi Arabia has surpassed every other Middle
Eastern capital as the main destination of outside
visitors to the region seeking to strengthen relations
with the rising star of the desert. Furthermore, with
the Arab Peace Initiative gaining momentum around the
world, the Saudi king is becoming more determined to
help resolve current conflicts within the region.
The future of Saudi power is not yet clear, but many
argue that it could last longer than it did previously.
Iraq seems to pose a great challenge, which the Saudis
are very cautious about dealing with. However, with
deaths reaching nearly one hundred every day, according
to recent UN figures, the Saudis may need to engage in
aiding America in Iraq and pressuring its neighbors to
stop their costly interference. If America decides to
encounter Iran soon, Saudi Arabia�s unique position
could be significantly affected. The 1990 Gulf war is a
good example. The Saudis are eager to resolve the
Iranian issue diplomatically and avert American attempts
to escalate the situation with Tehran. Nevertheless,
some critics in the region still accuse Saudi policies
of being responsible for creating a seemingly polarized
environment. However, the Saudis reply that they are
merely reacting to what is happening rather than opting
to change anything. The good news is that King Abdullah
is not in search of a grand legacy. He is simply doing
what he thinks is right, and this is what makes his
country�s power special.
Adel Zaid al-Toraifi
Adel Zaid al-Toraifi is a political analyst based in London.
