Editor's Note:

"Iran on the Horizon: Iran and the Gulf" was the second panel in a Middle East Institute conference series featuring speakers Barbara Slavin, Wahid Hashim, Ebtisam al-Kitbi and Sami al-Faraj. Barbara Slavin is a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute for Peace and Senior Diplomatic Reporter for USA Today. Dr. Wahid Hashim is Associate Professor of Political Science at King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia. Dr. Ibtisam al-Kitbi is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UAE University and serves on the boards of the UAE Society for Human Rights and the Arabic Organization for Transparency. Dr. Sami al-Faraj is President of the Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies and an advisor to the Kuwaiti government on preparing for potential nuclear accidents in Iran.

The focus of this panel was a discussion regarding Iran and the issues facing GCC states with respect to Iran's attempts to become a regional hegemon, focusing on how Iran's rise to power is affecting the political and economic policies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. The event was held February 1, 2008 at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, DC. The following is a complete transcript of Barbara Slavin's remarks. The other speakers' remarks will be distributed in SUSRIS later this week.

For SUSRIS readers, this panel has been divided into four sections with each speakers' remarks. To view the entire presentation, as well as the Questions & Answers section, click here. To read further Middle East Institute panels on Iran in this series, visit the Middle East Institute. 

Iran on the Horizon: Iran and the Gulf
Middle East Institute Conference Series

Barbara Slavin: We have begun today's events by trying to figure out what Tehran wants, what Tehran is doing internally. Now we are going to go to a very important subject for Iran, for the region, for the United States, for the world as a whole: Iran's relations with its neighbors across the Persian Gulf, as Iran calls it; the Gulf, as others would have it. The Gulf indeed can be very wide between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

I am reminded that just about a year ago I was in Kuwait with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, with the State Department press corps and the rest of the entourage. We were on a trip to the Middle East that had as one of its principal missions an effort to contain Iran, isolate Iran. Condoleezza Rice was in Kuwait meeting with a group of other foreign ministers from an organization that she had dubbed the GCC + 2: the Arab nations of the Gulf plus Jordan and Egypt. She was working on a joint statement with these countries. The statement eventually emerged; it was pretty anodyne stuff, boilerplate about the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bring stability to Iraq. Yet it was important to the Bush administration as part of this strategy of bringing together the so-called moderates against the so-called extremists after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah summer war. The goal was, and to some extent still remains, to isolate Iran and its allies -- particularly Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

President Bush on his recent trip to the Middle East also pushed this agenda. But I think whatever limited enthusiasm there was for it even a year ago has dissipated a bit. Gulf Arab states may be happy to buy another $20 million worth of advanced U.S. weaponry, assuming Congress approves, but they are not buying into the anti-Iran agenda to a great extent, at least not in public. Instead the trend that we have seen is one of hedging bets on Iran as its clients grow more influential in the region. Ken Pollack may be right; it may be not so much Iran rising as the United States stumbling. But this is certainly the perception in the region, especially as a lame-duck American administration continues to fade from view. Lack of progress on the Arab-Israeli front since Annapolis has also further diminished enthusiasm among U.S. Arab allies for an anti-Iran coalition that might include more overt ties between these Arab governments and Israel. In addition we have the recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that said Iran has halted a covert military nuclear program. This has added to a sense among Arabs that the Bush administration is not going to attack Iran and is going to have difficulty mobilizing the rest of the world against Iran's overt uranium enrichment program.

This hedging strategy against Iran has been very obvious in recent weeks. I am sure our speakers here are going to talk about it at length. In December Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to and attended a GCC summit in Qatar. It was the first time an Iranian president had been invited. Saudi Arabia also invited him to perform the hajj not long before President Bush visited the Kingdom. Kuwait's foreign minister flew to Tehran just a few days after Bush left and the speaker of Iran's parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, has just been in Kuwait, a country that owes its very existence to U.S. intervention in 1991. Even Egypt, the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the Arab world, has been discussing restoring diplomatic relations with Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei's representative on the Iranian National Security Council, Ali Larijani, has recently visited Cairo. So has Haddad-Adel. This past week Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met with Haddad-Adel and it was the highest-level contact between the two countries since the Shah died and was buried in Egypt in 1980. So it is a remarkable change.

Meanwhile we have developments elsewhere in the region. Hamas has just scored a big public relations victory by literally bursting out of its captivity in Gaza. Hezbollah continues to block the selection of a president for Lebanon, three or four months after a deadline has passed. I have to admit that Condoleezza Rice and other U.S. officials do not seem to be talking so much about the GCC + 2. This appears to be another grouping that has faded away as the strategy behind it also seems to fade.

To discuss these developments involving Iran and the Gulf we have three distinguished speakers from the region. Our first speaker will be Dr. Wahid Hashim. He is an associate professor of political science at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. Dr. Hashim has also been a political consultant for the Okaz Organization for Press and Publication. He supervised Okaz newspaper's international department from 1998 to 2005 and he has written for numerous Arabic publications. He has degrees from Arizona University, Colorado University and King Abdul Aziz University.

Our second speaker will be Ibtisam Al Kitbi, assistant professor of political science at the United Arab Emirates University. She serves on the board of the UAE Society for Human Rights, the Arabic Organization for Transparency and is a member of the editorial board of the UAE's Journal of Social Affairs. She has also served on the consultative committee for the UAE Center for Strategic Studies and the UAE Federal National Council. Dr. Al Kitbi also has a doctorate in political science from Cairo University.

Our final speaker will be Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, who is president of the Kuwait Center for Strategic Studies and an advisor to the Kuwait government on preparing for potential nuclear accidents in Iran -- a very important topic. He is also an advisor to the GCC. He has degrees from Oxford and Cambridge as well as from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Wahid Hashim: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank the Middle East Institute for inviting me and giving me this opportunity to discuss some issues and thoughts with you regarding the Iranian-Saudi relationship in particular and the Iranian-Arab relationship in general. I tend to look at the Iranian-Saudi relationship in terms of a more holistic view that represents myself as an academic, a political scientist and a person who is really interested in Middle Eastern politics and the way it is headed -- where and to what extent it will affect the national security and stability of the region.

Iran, if we look at it from a historical, geographical, cultural and ideological perspective, is more than the Iran of today. It is the Iran of ancient times, when Iran was conquered by the Arab Islamic army and therefore Iran became part of the Islamic Empire. However, things changed during the first four caliphs -- Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and the big struggle between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu'awiya ibn Abu Sufyan. It was a political struggle over who would be the next khalifa/imam. The question was whether the imam and the khalifa [should be] in one person or in the house of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. That was the view of the Shi'ites of that time, and they were not the Shi'ites of today. The word Shi'ite relates to those who supported Ali, the supporters of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's nephew who was married to his daughter, Fatima. So that was the case -- the Shi'ite supporters of Ali and those who claimed that Ali should be the third caliph; they were arguing he should be the first one anyway, if we look at it more deeply.

Things changed dramatically after the battle between Ali ibn Abi Talib's army and the army of Mu'awiya ibn Abu Sufyan, the ruler of Syria (the Battle of Siffin). That battle brought a new group into the scene, the Khawarij ("the externals") who were antagonistic to both Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu'awiya. But after Siffin we have the development of the Shi'ite ideology as an ideology that has different behavior, different thinking from that of those who supported Umar ibn Khattab at the beginning. Then they are followed by many scholars and here developed the Sunni sect.

So what is taking place in the region is a continuity of the struggle between the Shi'ite and the Sunni, number one.

Number two, the Shah of Iran was not highly politicized in terms of its role regarding leading the Muslim world and then attempting to find roots within the Arab communities and reach out to the Arab Shi'ites, because many of the Arabs believed that there should be a distinction between Shi'ite Persian and Shi'ite Arab. That distinction was very strong during the war between Iran and Iraq, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. The Iranians tried to play the card of Shi'ite Arabs to support them but it did not work.

Things changed after the war between Iran and Iraq. I can go back a little further and say that Iran in 1979 became revolutionary Iran. It adopted a new ideology of exporting its revolution to the Arab world and to the Muslim world. That reminds me of the Nasser era when he attempted also to export Arab nationalism to the Arab countries and called the monarchies the "backward monarchies" that needed to be removed and replaced by republic regimes or political systems.

Iran, when it began its policy of exporting its revolution, it had in mind to export also the Shi'ite ideology. Therefore Saudi Arabia, who first began to have contestation and struggle with Nasser when he wanted to spread the idea of Arab nationalism, that ended and now in 1979 Saudi Arabia had to face the Islamic revolution of Iran and attempts to use Shi'ite ideology in order to win support within the Shi'ite communities of the Arab world. Unfortunately, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, most of the Arab world in general and the Gulf states in particular were not highly supportive of their Shi'ite communities. The Shi'ite communities were ignorant and were not represented in the political systems and therefore the Arab Shi'ite had to look for leadership. I think Iran and the Iranian clergy and the Iranian revolution provided such leadership for the Arab Shi'ites. We have seen now Hezbollah in Lebanon. I remember back in 1979-80, you could enter any Shi'ite house anywhere in the Gulf and you would see the pictures of Khomeini and the other Iranian clergy. So Iran managed to establish support within the Arab Shi'ites. It is not anymore Arab nationalism against Persian nationalism. Now you are talking about Shi'ite versus Sunni.

I think partly the scholars, which is my second level of analysis, contributed to this division. At the same time they fueled the division between Sunnis and Shi'a on both sides -- either the side of the Sunnis, the extremists who considered the Shi'ites as kufr, and the other way around also, the Shi'ite have something called taqiyyah. My colleagues talked about Iranian intentions. I do not know whether they have taken the place of the idea of taqiyyah, which is to show an intention but yet you have a different intention. You have a hidden agenda, a hidden intention that you do not show. That taqiyyah is a major characteristic of the Shi'ite ideology.

What I see in the Middle East is a revival of the Persian Empire but it relies heavily on the ideology of Shi'ism. Iran not only found itself in one day surrounded by Sunni states -- Taliban, Pakistan, Iraq during Saddam Hussein, the Gulf States, Turkey and even Syria -- a Sunni state even though those who rule Syria are Ba'athist but yet Alawite. Alawite are Nusayriyya, the most extreme of the Shi'ites. Iran, in order to maintain and safeguard its national interest as well as its national security, had to play a role in the region. It had also to build its strength in order to face the so-called Sunni Islamic bomb. In my view, Iran's main intention is to develop its own Shi'ite bomb in order to balance the power in the region; to deter any Pakistani in the future to interfere on behalf of the Gulf if any hostility breaks out between the Iranians and the Gulf states, particularly if we talk about the three United Arab Emirates islands occupied by Iran that still cause a problem.

The main actors in this theater are the clergy, the sheikhs, the ulama, the Islamic scholars on both sides. In this respect we have to understand that whatever positive political development between the Gulf states in general, Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular, it is in my view to continue coexistence. But hostility, antagonism, distrust, suspicion are major characteristics of relations between the Gulf and Iran.

At the populist level, if you look at it from this respect, I do not see any differences. There are no antagonisms or hatred between the people who live in Saudi Arabia, particularly the people who live in Mecca, and the Iranians, whether they are extremist Shi'ite, moderate Shi'ite or even if they are non-believers. If we look at the trade perspective, the business community, two things are taking place now. One is al-hajj and al-umrah business between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Many Iranian pilgrimages come to Saudi Arabia and that is really benefiting both sides. That is welcomed by the Saudi people. However I do not see that much bilateral investment between the two countries in the coming future unless with the leadership -- which makes a big difference. If leaders understand one another and become befriended with one another, then everything will be okay with the people, the clergy and the populace. So if leaders manage to rectify their differences and build new bridges and start a new era of relations, which is a fact of Arab politics and Iranian politics, a new era of alliance will take place between the two countries even with the existence of distrust and antagonism.

I see also the distrust of American foreign policy in the region. American credibility is undermined. The fear from the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia that America might strike a deal with the Iranians -- they are not going to forget the Shah era when his country was the police of the area on their account. Therefore they are living next to Iran. They have cultural ties, the geographical fact to live with one another. Why not then have a new era of bilateral relations with Iran? Settle the differences and find a way to deal with one another on the political level, just as there is a fluidity and strong relationship between the people of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and the Iranians. I can see that in Mecca for example, when all the Shi'ites come to Mecca for hajj. Nobody objects to their religious practices; on the contrary, we assist them. We provide them with the houses and food they require.

The other part of my analysis is there is a new development in terms of personality. That development took place after the Israeli-Hezbollah war. I have noticed and conducted some research on how students view the Shi'ites. Iran's only legitimacy now in the region is that it is the country that is standing up to Israel and the United States. There is a fever in the area -- anti-America and anti-Israel -- and Iran is the only knight who will stand up to America. That is why many people support the Iranians. I was very surprised to see Sunnis naming themselves after Hassan Nasrallah. They named their sons after Hassan Nasrallah. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, people are supporting Hezbollah, are supporting Iran against America and Israel, because of the Iranian position against the Israelis.

I think my time is up; I have lots of things to say, however I cannot. I would like to thank you very much for listening and I hope to get some of your questions and I would be glad to answer. 

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi: Let me thank the Middle East Institute and my friend David Mack for their kind invitation. I think this is an important conference. Bear with me my friends in Washington, for what I am going to say might upset you. I am going to talk about the GCC and the UAE's stance toward Iran and also the United States.

The first part of my presentation will be focused on the factors influencing the GCC's stance towards Iran. The GCC states realize that ultimately the United States has the option of cutting its losses in Iraq and going home whereas they will have to live with the empowered Shi'a and emergent Iran. The end result of this has led the GCC to feel that it is better to engage Iran than to leave it to its devices.

The GCC countries recently announced their readiness to start negotiations on trade agreements despite U.S.-led efforts to further isolate the Iranian economy. While such talks are no doubt in the very initial stages, it is nevertheless a signal that the GCC will follow their own economic interests. They see increased economic engagement as a vessel to lessen overall political tensions. Simply put, the GCC states do not want their current economic boom jeopardized by U.S. policies that might result in a U.S.-Iranian confrontation that could engulf the entire region.

At first glance a free trade agreement seems an odd format. Neither the GCC states nor Iran can offer each other much economically. All are energy exporters and importers of manufactured goods. There are few opportunities for synergies. For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, the GCC states that have large Shi'ite populations and so are terrified of Iran's rise, the deal could serve as a sort of political tribute, a kind of pledge of cooperation with the region's superpower. Such a deal might be hard to swallow for these states but open defiance could invite Iran to make more direct efforts to influence its neighbors.

Elsewhere in the GCC, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are more likely to view the FTA offer with legitimate interest. None of these states has appreciable Shi'ite interests and so all feel less threatened by Iran than the states that do. Qatar has always acted independently of its neighbors and having U.S. Central Command stationed on its territory gives it the confidence to implement a trade accord, even a politically motivated one, with few second thoughts. The United Arab Emirates actually has an economic rationale to sign on. It serves as the re-export window that allows Iran to access the international economy so a trade deal would have positive economic impact. Finally, of all the GCC states, Oman traditionally supports the friendliest relations with Iran and should a regional military conflict break out, geography dictates that Oman would be the last state to be affected. A political sop for Oman costs nothing and gains much goodwill.

If I move to the factors influencing Iran's stance toward the GCC states, I think from the Iranian point of view, though a major achievement getting invited to a GCC summit, it is far from the sum of Iran's desires. Therefore Iran wants to capitalize on the opportunity and get its foot in the door, from where it can then move forward. This also provides Iran with a way to counter any U.S. moves to align itself with the Arab states in an aggressive action against the Islamic Republic. Iran has floated the possibility of a free trade agreement with its Gulf neighbors. Iran is positioning itself to take advantage of an expected reduction of U.S. influence in the region and a trade initiative could prove to be a deft tool.

But Iran is not approaching this as an economic partnership as much as a token of homage. Iran wants the GCC to recognize it as the region's predominant power and agreeing to a trade treaty is a convenient way to recognize a country's importance without groveling.

At the end of the day, Iran is not planning for this FTA idea to divide the GCC states. If it comes to that Iran will use the Shi'ite wedge. But instead to provide an Iran-GCC framework that explicitly excludes the United States, Iran is trying to reorient its region away from Washington. This is simply a step along that path.

The GCC stance toward the United States -- the underlying dilemma within the existing complexity of regional and international politics is that the United States has so far failed to come to terms with the GCC states defining their own interests outside of the context of the need for U.S. military protection. In the past, Gulf states may have willingly, albeit grudgingly, gone along with much of the U.S. policy given the direct and more serious challenges posed by threats, such as the Iranian revolution and the regime of Saddam Hussein. However in the wake of the Iraq policy disaster, U.S. policies are seen more as being a part of the problem of regional instability than as part of the solution. The formula of past U.S.-GCC relationships of security and protection for stable oil supplies, although still relevant, is no longer predominant and all-defining. Instead the GCC states have begun to define their own national priorities and interests. This is something that the United States needs to pay attention to.

While the GCC states would be ready to increase the pressure on Iran should Tehran maintain its obstructionist stance on the nuclear issue, the prevailing notion in the region is that there is still time to find a solution. What the GCC states fear most is preemptive action by the United States against Iran, with the region left to handle the consequences.

If I move to the UAE stance, what are the factors influencing the UAE's stance towards Iran? The UAE should take the following eight factors into full consideration before adopting any stance or taking any decision towards Iran. This is my perspective. I am representing myself as Ibtisam Al-Kitbi, not my country, not my government, not even my university.

The geographical location -- Iran is geographically close to the UAE and thus this proximity to Iran affects its political attitudes and decisions. The geographical location was one of the most important factors that motivated Iran to occupy the three UAE islands.

Second is Iran's size and demographic capabilities. Iran enjoys vast lands and a large population, which promotes its huge potential and reduces the capabilities of other states to exhaust its powers. This factor reflects Iran's ability to remain steadfast for a long period and to face different kinds of threats.

Third is Iran's military power. Human and geographical advantage provides Iran with military might and strengthens its sizable, multi-purpose military power, which makes it difficult for the small states of the Gulf to confront Iran despite the foreign protection and national military capabilities.

Fourth is human relations with Iran. The UAE has the largest Iranian community that lives legally in the state. According to data released by the Iran Dubai consulate, 400,000 Iranians are part of the UAE's total population. This community does not necessarily support the Iranian regime's policies, yet its national Persian sense of belonging should not be underestimated. This is a source of major and permanent political and stability concern for the UAE.

The fifth factor is economic relations with Iran. Economic ties with Iran should be taken into consideration, especially for Dubai, the federation's second-largest emirate. Dubai is the main magnet for Iranian investment. About 8,050 Iranian companies are registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry while figures released by the Iranian Business Council of Dubai indicates that about 10,000 Iranian firms are currently operating in the Emirates. With business covering banking, real estate and petroleum, the executive vice president of the board of directors of the Iranian Business Council of Dubai has estimated the worth of Iranian assets in the UAE at about $66 billion. The 2006 volume of trade was estimated at around $11 billion. The resulting business from companies owned by Iranian investors in the UAE and the re-export trade is estimated at $7 billion annually, and plays an important role in this regard. If Iran wants to attract the Gulf states to minimize the potential impact of a confrontation with the West, here the UAE may be of primary importance for Iran's strategy. The country is Iran's biggest trading partner in the region, and Iran certainly wishes to keep this channel of trade open, especially if the threats of more sanctions on Iran are implemented.

Also, the religious influence is a factor. Iran is viewed as a patron and guide for the Shi'ite community, Arab and Iranian. The Iranian religious establishment enjoys extensive influence, direct or indirect, on the Shi'ite community worldwide, including that of the UAE and the Gulf states.

Then there is the UAE and Arab public opinion. The Iranian policies managed to mobilize Arab public opinion behind its stance and policies opposing Israel and the United States. It won their sympathy, if not support, with the Iranian stance among the Arab population. Therefore any decision needs to consider this dimension.

The UAE political structure also a factor. The federal structure of the UAE limits the freedom of the central government and stresses the necessity of taking the interests of the other emirates into consideration before adopting any strategic decision.

So the combination of Iran's capabilities, military and otherwise, and its intentions, the regime's rhetoric and practice, does not inspire confidence. It seems the UAE is weighing its options to enhance its ties with Western powers while building bridges with Tehran through high-level diplomatic visits -- Iran's president visited the UAE last year; improved economic and commercial ties to create homogeneous interests that Iran would have a great stake in not destabilizing the UAE; and lastly to create political assets valuable for Iran, such as Egypt's increased diplomatic dialogue with Tehran, and encourage Iran not to jeopardize Arab goodwill toward Iran.

Here I have to talk about what is also the UAE's stance toward the United States. The United States is the main force, which directly or indirectly, guarantees the security and defends the UAE. This is a major factor that is taken into consideration in all UAE decisions and those related to Iran in particular.

The UAE stance towards the current U.S. administration could be summarized as follows. 

First, since its invasion and failure in Iraq, the U.S. administration has lost its credibility and sense of wisdom. The UAE decision cannot be seen as being supportive of U.S. policies or demands. This U.S. administration is counting its final days. It will leave office within 11 months. Its policies cannot be impressed and its demands cannot be met, especially after the administration can no longer make any vitally important decisions.

The UAE cannot now raise the issue of the three occupied islands because any new move in this direction might be understood as part of a U.S. campaign against Iran. The UAE stance should not go beyond reiterating the previous one, which calls for a legal or diplomatic settlement and adhering to national rights. The UAE should make it clear that it finds national and Arab interests in separating the issue of islands from the issue of the Iran nuclear fight and the crisis it has spawned. Thank you.

Sami Al-Faraj: I am in the Middle East Institute. I am aware that you are quite amenable to Middle Eastern culture, so I will put this quite dry presentation in a Middle Eastern setting. You always say, I have a presentation about the tactical things, but I will probably talk about the issues raised by my colleagues in the previous panel and the way I look at American politics.

You say you have a muddled policy. You said that, I did not say that. The fact is that I come quite often to Washington, D.C., and every time I come I see you are more muddled. So it is fun, I guess. The question for us is not funny in the GCC because the passage of time impacts on the way we want to conduct business.

The most important issue we have to take into consideration, and I will go into metaphors -- the previous metaphor and the current metaphor. The previous metaphor, it looks to me from a Middle Eastern point of view, is like someone who wants to shoot his ex-girlfriend. Shoot her? Why? You are not with her anymore. But she still causes trouble for me! She does this, she does that. The current metaphor is somebody tied to a few wives and he still thinks nostalgically about a former girlfriend. He tries to see things that he did not see in the past, like she has centers of power, she has a new way of life, she is free to choose her way of life. She is different; now she is wearing the hijab, she does not drink, she does not go out. He still wants her. This is like one of my colleagues, Gary Sick, reminded us it was 29 years ago. Now he is married with contractual engagements with others, called 6 + 2, plus Turkey, plus whoever is considered Sunni or a power that is competing with Iran.

In this metaphor, he does not take into consideration that his former girlfriend is penniless, he is quite capable of taking her into the fold, but she also wants to be the primary, central power among those established wives. She wants to go into the household and change the minds of the kids. The Arabs, they are there, and they are Shi'ites. They have their political affiliations. They could be Hezbollah; they could be the Ba'ath Party; they could be anything. She still wants not only to get into the fold and the house, but she also wants to change the whole thing.

Iran, for us, wants to be the hegemon in the Gulf on the cheap. Whether you talk about economic capabilities or whatever, it does not restrain Iran from trying to be the hegemon in the Gulf on the cheap. To do that on the cheap is very easy. Look at how it hurt the only power on earth's policies in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Palestine. How could the Arabs talk about two Palestinian states, one Islamic, one secular? It has really created havoc. The Lebanese sit and give interviews, and they believe in whatever they believe, and they reach this stage where one party of the special delegate -- that is, Syria -- is lying through its teeth. It is part of the Arab delegation to restore stability to Lebanon but it is in alliance. This girlfriend actually goes with somebody else. She has no interest honestly unless this gentleman recognizes her -- and that is the United States by the way, if you forgot -- this muddled gentleman seems to pass by the household. In Kuwait there are over 85,000 of his kids transiting back and forth to Iraq, to their death. Who is killing them there?

So it is important to put from our perspective the right setting on how we look at it. You do not need to kill the old girlfriend because it creates havoc for us in the area. Witnessing the organization of the military campaign in Iraq, we have to take care of our household in the area. This household is in a neighborhood. The neighborhood is the GCC, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, the former republics of the Soviet Union and Pakistan -- everybody. Then we have two great economic hegemons coming into the Gulf -- the rising China and India. These things presented, it is passion honestly. It is for us passion. I do not know what this is, after 29 years, what she sees in him, but speaking about myself -- sorry.

So what do we do there in the Gulf? We have to sit and think that this guy does not need to kill her because this will involve him -- he may get to prison and then who is going to be the head of this Middle Eastern household? This big power that really runs the world?

The other thing is that Iran cannot get into this security arrangement on the cheap and without showing any cooperation in the declared objectives of the whole area (stability, prosperity and security for all). These objectives are for all -- including them, including the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Iraqis, Jordanians, Egyptians, Turks -- everybody. So we have a way of saying all this time you have been talking behind our back -- it is not our back, but it looks like it is behind our back -- and you are shifting from one radical position to another without considering that we could achieve the same objective by involving two things. One, what do we know about women? What do we know about the neighborhood? (If we consider these nations as wives that look at this man as their protector.) The other thing is that we could get her to behave well by giving incentives while you go on carrying the stick. The stick alone cannot do that, and the incentives cannot do this job, so we have to do these things.

Now we are going to save you one thing and that is because you really showed no interest, neither in a scenario of war nor a scenario of peace, to consider what we can contribute to this. Today we are capable of selling oil for free on the condition that all nations of the world give us what we need in trade for free. The magnitude of assets there is unbelievable and we all want to do something for the neighborhood -- if this former girlfriend behaves. At the same time you do not seem to consider -- when you consider peace or war, you do not consider the ramifications. You do not consider your statements. You do not consider your power. When you say NIE, it is part of this setup -- it is the American setup. But there people in the street who ask me, "So the United States is not going to hit Iran?" This is how they understood it in the Middle East, assuming the United States was bent on hitting Iran. When you have this and say "We don't know," it is something -- if this person is so careless about how he moves and gets his children killed in some nasty place like Iraq or somewhere else, or in the Gulf today -- you are stopped on the Strait of Hormuz. So just imagine the erosion of your influence in the area.

I would like to tell you the following. In the GCC and all the others, we are Western-oriented -- period, 100 percent. Any tilt in our position toward Iran or toward whoever, the way my colleague here said "hedging our bets," is to do something that the man of the house is not really considering all the issues when he decides on things.

The other thing is, whatever Iran is going to gain by sitting with the United States and settling the problems of Iraq and Lebanon and Syria and the Palestinian questions is going to erode your influence and give it to Iran. So we have the option of whether we live with a militarist Iran and face up to this scenario of meeting Iran in battle with the United States, if something like that happens. We are assuming that this is going to happen someday, because this gentleman might just change his mind so we do not know. So we have to ready ourselves. Or the other option for us is to live with this newcomer to the household as the paramount power in this household, which is meant for good. So it is like a cancerous tumor, whether you get rid of it or you live with it. This is the situation.

We think of it as a cancerous tumor and therefore we are looking at things differently than you. For instance, the way we look at Iran, this former girlfriend is going to trouble us -- it is in Arabic, it is intentionally done for you so you do not know what we are doing -- but if we look at what Iran can do, it is based on our experience and specifically what the Kuwaitis contribute in the planning for the GCC, what Iran has done to us and to Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war, prior to the revolution and at the outset of the revolution and after the revolution. They did many things. Iran is not looked upon in the Arab media as a military occupant, although it occupies islands. Iran is looked upon in the Arab media as the greatest danger to Israel, and there is no legal state of war between Iran and Israel. It never happened, a legal state of war between the Jewish kingdom and the Persian Empire -- never. We are considered by Israel to be in a legal state of war, like small Kuwait, small Qatar, small UAE, because we still have not signed an agreement.

But what could Iran do for us? It could do the following. I am talking about the level of how people look at what Iran is going to do. The missing point in the negotiation process today is that it is going to leave us with a peaceful Iran with nuclear capabilities on the Gulf, which means it is going to impact on our lives. It is not 100 people dying because of contamination in Washington, D.C.. This is a national disaster in the city of Doha or Manama in Bahrain. So we have to think seriously about this man of the house. We are not going to change him of course, we like him.

So Iran could use terrorism in order to be the paramount power on the cheap. It could use war. It could use coercive means. It could use antagonizing of Shi'ite citizens of the GCC. It could use mishaps in Iraq in order to create havoc and a refugee problem for us.

For us, this is how we look at Bushehr. The first one is a map of the Gulf, and we look at the impact of a computer model, and look at how it covers the whole of Kuwait. Kuwait is the forefront of the GCC and if anything happens, Kuwait will go straight to Saudi Arabia and the others, one after another. This is something I showed here in Washington -- it is the impact of earthquakes. The dots show the instability. It is not the girlfriend who is unstable, her home is unstable itself. It may fall on all of us.

The other thing is the current. Look, she lives on a really nice beach where it is deep. Whatever happens, it is not surface. Here on our side, the garbage will surface, on the other side of the Gulf. The current also will carry that girlfriend's garbage to us. So we need to tell her that she has to behave, we have to collect garbage together. Here is the current again. It shows you that whatever happens there, any mishap done by this girlfriend is going to come to the real household of all of us, including the United States of America. We live as a household on these fisheries. This is the impact on the Gulf seabed and this is the channels. Look how wide the Strait of Hormuz is, but they still use loudspeakers to say, "Who are you? Who are you to enter an international strait, which is your legal right?" Again, these are the Gulf fisheries and you see that this is our livelihood. Of course we can share with you; we are little, you can come and sell and buy. That is what is happening with Iranian traders and Iranian fishermen. We believe in human endeavor, common human endeavor with this girlfriend.

Here of course we could not rely on the help of the United States so we seek help everywhere. That includes the IAEA. We put all these arrangements with them, as if we knew about this behavior of this former girlfriend. Because she bought a station in Iran, which is one of the international networks to monitor things like that, we decided to put one because we do not trust her. So look, it is only Kuwait and Iran in there. Kuwait works in alliance with the GCC.

This is the state of the streets in the GCC. We hear talk about strategic issues, and there they are looking for traces of radiation because we do not know about this girlfriend. She does not tell us anything. We do not know the size of her household, that is Bushehr, its protection, what emanates from it, and opposite to it to the greatest concentrations of the Arab Gulf and the cities of Saudi Arabia, the city of Kuwait and the cities of the Emirates. So this is really a lousy situation. We need the minimum cooperation with Iran on at least the nuclear side. This is not presented by the 5 + 1 negotiation on behalf of the Western world, on behalf of the United States. Therefore we go into our own devices.

Here are our own devices. Nice, bought from the West -- you see it in every street. This is not for pigeons, as it may look, it is for radiation. So we take things seriously. This is what we have decided. Whoever gets a missile from that former girlfriend tells the others, and we work in a circle as the GCC to protect our existence and survival in the material sense -- not survival in the financial sense or as oil producers, but as existing humans. This has nothing to do with us being Arabs or Shi'ite or them being Iranian or Persian. We have no confusion about these issues. They are humans; we are humans.

Google allowed us to look at ourselves from above. Is that a mistake? Here we look at a place where -- this map I have chosen for you because it was a center of an exercise. The northern side of the map is the greatest industrial, and these ports are used by the United States and the world. These are either for oil or for troops -- United States power projection capabilities into Iraq. So the success in Iraq, I would like to remind my former speakers, is not due to Iran cooperating. It is due to the efforts of 6 + 2 + others. It is the other way around.

On the left of this is the biggest concentration of American troops in the Arab world. So the protection of your children is there and is at stake. Any contamination of this area is then, because we are exercising our treaty obligation to defend whoever is there, including United States forces -- it is not the other way around, by the way.If you look at exercises like that, you will have sirens and with the sirens you have a contamination and you have to stop ships from getting into the yellow and red zones. Then you will have all our capabilities, which are limited by the way, to treat something that is unbelievable for us. Even our medical services will have to stop there.

The second thing is basically the same scenario and then expansion to the level that we need Saudi forces to come in. You see them in the bottom left side of this diagram. We had an exercise because today there is no way that Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or the Emirates can really exercise its protection without real cooperation. Also it is not real unless Iran really cooperates and tells us about would-be scenarios of accidents, tells us about the thickness of the Bushehr reactor, what they have, what they do. It is neither Iran nor Russia telling us about that. Especially when a Russian comes to me and says, "Don't worry; it's all good" -- after Chernobyl it is really trustworthy.

When we talk about capabilities, we not only buy weapons. People look at us; we decide someday to go buy weapons for $30 billion. No, we buy other things to protect the civilian population. The civilian population, which is something missing in this picture, does not consist of Kuwaitis only but consists of expatriates which number 120 nations. Here you talk about medical centers and services. Here we talk about the impact on our food and water. Remember, Iran has got rivers -- we do not. So we have to really check water. Here we are talking about water not just for us. They say we enjoy in Kuwait and the GCC a luxurious lifestyle. We also have ration cards. We get cards for essential goods like rice and sugar and the like. In a state like Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates, the number of expatriates are larger than the nationals. In Kuwait, it is one-third to two-thirds. So when a state so small like Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates goes and issues for expatriates ration cards, it means we really take seriously the Iranian contamination danger because of the non-cooperation of Iran. This is our card. This is the city.

This is the other scenario for us. It is something like September 11. Why? Because we had Iranian hijackings in the 1980s. We are not blaming Iran out of the blue. We are basing our planning on precedence and history and the way we understand the culture.

I will stop here and tell you just one thing with regard to refugees. We have to control all this. If you look at the west of this picture and the south of this picture, this is where American troops move. So basically this is the picture I wanted to present to you from the grand strategic into the tactical and the real-life situation. What I am saying is you do not need to kill the wife, the former girlfriend, and you do not need to marry her and get her into the household. She has got to have a special status and she has to know her borders and barriers, one of which is the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. If we allow Iran to go into the midst of the Arab side of the Arab Gulf, it is as if we are sanctioning Saddam Hussein attacking Iran through the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The only credibility for us is international legitimacy and balance of power in the region. Thank you very much.

Question & Answer

Barbara Slavin: I want to thank our three speakers for very interesting presentations. We have a number of very good questions for them as well.

I want to begin by asking the three speakers -- Dr. Al-Faraj, you focused a lot on Bushehr and least we all forget, the Russians have now supplied all the fuel for Bushehr and there is talk of actually starting this thing up by the end of the year. But I wanted to ask you about the other part of the Iranian nuclear program, whether you all think Iran is determined to build a bomb, to simply have some strategic ambiguity and have the rest of the world think they could build a bomb -- what do you think their intentions are, especially since we can't count on the husband now to necessarily keep them in check?

Sami Al-Faraj: Thank you, I am quite privileged to answer the first question. If you understand Iran, it is nothing to do with a person being suspicious. There is nothing wrong with a person being suspicious, to go and wash his hands and be reclusive or whatever. But one trait of the Iranian character is to be suspicious of the other and, as we say in the Middle East, to have them for lunch before being had for dinner. So I do not think they will trust you. I think you have emphasized to them the example of not trusting you after the Taliban and after Saddam Hussein. The only viable deterrence for them is to make it really painful for you. Not necessarily by nuclear weapons but by other means available.

The other trait is over-confidence in the Persian character. This is not something that is negative, not at all, but sometimes it is over-confidence when you talk about an area of cooperation that they could do this or that. The more we see the situation, the more you see the news -- the inability of the Lebanese to elect a president, the inability of the international court to reach for the people who really assassinated Prime Minister Hariri, the success of being invited to sit with the United States to discuss what is happening in Iraq. I do not know what they say to you but to us they use different language -- it is a threatening language. You do not want to meet Mr. Ali Jafari.

Barbara Slavin: The question was, do you think they are going to build a bomb?

Sami Al-Faraj: Not necessarily build a bomb, but they will -- if they do not build a bomb, it is because of their failures, not because of lack of intention.

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi: I think this question also has to be asked for the U.S. national intelligence, when they surprised us with their report saying that Iran stopped its military nuclear program since mid-2003. I think they are determined to acquire the bomb because this is what makes them the superpower in the region, enhances their hegemony in the region.

Wahid Hashim: Iran challenging the leadership of the Muslim world -- it is challenging Saudi Arabia. Before, Saudi Arabia was the leader of the Muslim world without any challenge. Iran since the revolution has been sharing that kind of status and power. Iran also believes that in order to maintain this new status quo and expand its hegemony and dominance in the region it has to be a powerful country, not to mention what I mentioned before -- Pakistan possesses the Sunni nuclear bomb and therefore the Shi'ites are not able to have a balance of power from that perspective. I believe ideology is very strong in the Middle East, particularly the clear divisions that exist either in the social strata or in the ideological strata. Therefore Iran is imminent and will develop the Shi'ite bomb. I think that has to be followed by the so-called Arab nuclear bomb in order to have a balance of power in the region.

Barbara Slavin: Do the other two speakers agree that GCC countries -- Saudi Arabia perhaps -- will develop a bomb in return, if Iran does this?

Sami Al-Faraj: I tell you this because I am privy to the workings prior to that decision. We never had an intention to have an independent nuclear program. The way we look at it is quite wholesome. The way we look at it is whatever Iran is doing is going to give it a technological edge and Iran should not have a technological edge because we must not allow Iran to have any other edge besides its size and population, because it already has all the elements of hegemony. Added to that finance and technology and that is it.

Also we are talking about the collateral damage of developing a program, even on the civilian side. So it was the right time to declare that what we are going to do is basically we are bent on starting things within the realm of international legitimacy. Our approach has been we went as the GCC -- the GCC Secretary General met Mr. El Baradei with a list of all the treaties that we undertake to abide by and that we will be dealing with the nuclear technology that is coming from the West, under the control of the West. We have no stomach actually for any lapses in security and safety because of the proximity of our population centers and the size of our population centers. So we would not want to, for instance, have Russians or Chinese or whatever -- as we have seen the French. It will be probably American and British and the like -- that is one thing.

If you allow me, I want to say one thing about the NIE and how it is perceived in Iran. You must understand that Iran -- the way I understand it from precedent is we know about decision-making but we have to understand the decision-makers and their experience. What we have today is a group of seasoned leaders who know how to deal with the world, honestly. So if we look at the NIE, it says that the Iranians stopped any military aspect of their program in September. But we forget that the Iranians, because of their revelations of A.Q. Khan of Pakistan, went in front of the IAEA in May and told some of the story in June, and told other parts of the story, and because of pressure in August told all the story, from which Mr. Gary Sick told you that their program dates back to 1985. This was in August. In August started the European group trying to speak to Iran. So it is natural for the Iranians to stop in September. It is the way they think. This has nothing to do with them making the right decision. This is their perception of the American presence in Iraq. You were there, so you are mighty and big and you have just destroyed Iran's arch-enemy. What do you think would dispel this fear in the minds of leaders who were present during the downing of the Vincennes, a civilian airliner? If we look at what Rafsanjani had revealed recently, he said that they put one plus one together and that is there has been a concerted action -- Iraq is reclaiming the Faw peninsula with Arab and Egyptian and Jordanian help; the Americans give them satellite information; and then the Americans go as far as shooting a civilian airliner. What is going to stop them?

So for people who were present then, they would be present now. In September 2003 they would say, "Oh my god, maybe they will just turn right and go." Your army, as I have seen it, is not the army you wanted to do today a civilian job, but it was an army designed in 2003 to crush any military might. I am telling you from military experience from working with the American forces since 1990. That army raised fears in the people who saw echelons after echelons occupying 65 percent of the territory of the state of Kuwait for its own operation and movement. It is still doing that. It still raises fear in the minds of people who see it. I am sure it raises fear in the minds of Iranians in September 2003.

Barbara Slavin: One of our questions has to do with the notion of U.S. engagement with Iran. Given what has happened in Iraq, given the way in which the United States has been weakened by the situation in Iraq, is it advisable for the United States to begin a process of engagement? Is it advisable for this administration or for the next? How would that be interpreted in your countries?

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi: There will be an engagement -- we have to be there. It should not be behind us. We do not want to come after. When you negotiated with them about Iraq, you did not invite us. Also about the nuclear capabilities -- you did not invite us. The GCC does not want to be excluded from any deal or negotiation with Iran.

Barbara Slavin: Would you like some sort of new security framework that would bring the Europeans, the Russians, Chinese, Americans and the GCC countries together with Iran?

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi: I think a multinational approach is better for the region and better for you also, not to be alone there. To engage also the Europeans, the Chinese and NATO also.

Sami Al-Faraj: The name of the game there is you have an abundance of finances being readied to be invested in all these flashpoints -- in Iran, Iraq, Arab-Israeli territory -- all over the place. You have crashes of stock exchanges in the Gulf because there are phony companies there, a company that is planning for landing on the moon or something like that, whereas real development subjects are around us. So we have to look at what we need for continuous prosperity and security for all. This cannot happen when you have the Iranian leadership -- the most important thing about it is that it is not in sync with the others on how the others behave. It is in financial ruins and it is talking military.

The other aspect of that is you have to maintain the pressure on the diplomatic front. We have to be one portion of that diplomatic team. We have to play the cards that are Middle Eastern cards. It is the knowledge of the character, the knowledge of the trade -- it is like a bazaar. When you sit with Iranian diplomats, as we do, it is bazaar trade. What is missing is the rugs and the pistachios. We are talking about nuclear and about labor.

There is one thing working for us and that is how Iran perceives its interest. The numbers mentioned by Dr. Al-Kitbi are there as is the interest with Saudi Arabia, the largest petrochemical producer. It is the expertise that can help Iran.

Third, Iran sees its interests across the Gulf. This is the biggest deterrence for Iran -- the economic interests, the labor opportunities. We have created more jobs on this side of the Gulf, the Arab side, without any attention to a Sunni-Shi'a division -- more than the Islamic revolution has created. This is a fact. So the possible future, the prosperity, all these things are the deterrent for Iran.

I will tell you about the change of mind: the day that Condoleezza Rice presented the last trump card for the United States, and that is to sit with the Iranians, to recognize them as a regime, and to have cooperation. The same day the head of the Revolutionary Guard said, "Whatever happens, if there are any mishaps, any encounters, any military action in the Gulf, we shall not endanger the peoples of the GCC." It was the same day, the 23rd.

Barbara Slavin: Dr. Hashim, if you would reply but also if you would talk a little bit about what happens as the United States withdraws from Iraq. There is a question about whether there will be some sort of clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran, if not directly then through proxies in Iraq.

Wahid Hashim: First I would like to say that from 1979 until 1987, there was a cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a result of Iranian attempts to export its revolution to the Gulf. The year 1987 was the beginning of the actual clash between the two countries in Mecca, when thousands of Revolutionary Guard demonstrated in the streets violently, burned cars, destroyed houses. I was one of those mutawwif who had to defend my pilgrimage and my property against angry Iranian demonstrators. I think 400 people died that year. From 1987 until 1997, Iranian actions and conspiracy in Mecca and Jeddah increased. My camp was also burned in 1997 with 3,000 pilgrims -- they did not die, we evacuated them, but everything burned in that fire. Not only my camp but almost two-thirds of Mina, the area where we were. Of course nobody gave us money for what we lost; it was "God willing."

From 1998, a new era of detente began between Saudi Arabia and Iran, when Khatami visited the Kingdom and went to Medina and so forth. I think 1998 is a turning point because King Abdullah was running the state, and he is open-minded and moderate. He likes to build bridges, a strategic partnership with the world, with the countries in the region. He has a new team of royal advisors and experts who are willing to take actions rather than reactions, who are willing to bridge the gap between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world. That is why Saudi Arabia managed to solve its problem with the Yemen border, even with Qatar now lately. A new era of coexistence began between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and I think that developed more obviously in the last year when King Abdullah invited Ahmadinejad to attend the hajj.

But we have to look again at the visits of Prince Abdul Aziz and the security arrangements that have taken place in Saudi Arabia in the last couple years -- that indicates that there is a tendency between the two countries to bridge the gap and forget the differences and rely on politics, the idea of peaceful coexistence.

Barbara Slavin: The question was how you would regard the question of U.S. engagement with Iran and are you worried, as the United States withdraws from Iraq, that there will be clashes, if not directly, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or through proxies in Iraq?

Wahid Hashim: People are afraid of the domino theory, that if Iraq collapses then all the Gulf states will collapse. I do not think that is really a true theory that could be applicable, neither to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or the rest of the Gulf states. We have to look at the legitimacy factor here and to what extent the regimes or the governments are legitimate in these countries. The problem that becomes more dangerous to the whole region is the existing rift between Sunni and Shi'a, Iraqi in particular, and to what extent that can drag other groups in these states if this hatred and infighting spreads. We know that Iran is playing a very important role in this division, and it is not only supporting the Shi'ite groups but financing them. I know there is cooperation between Iran and Al Qaeda groups and today we heard that two "Al Qaeda feminists" are becoming a new trend in carrying out terrorist attacks in Iraq. The goal of course is to fuel the tension in Iraq. When that tension becomes Sunni versus Shi'ite, Arabs versus Persians or that kind of feeling, then the whole Gulf area will be part of that. Most of the tribes in Iraq are Sunnis -- those in the south, the Shammar tribe and others like the Al Tayyar and the big tribes that are related to the tribes in Saudi Arabia. That of course might lead to more tribal war.

We have suffered from tribal Islam and I have a theory on tribal Islam. Tribal Islam intermarried with fanatic universal Islam -- that is the marriage between Usama bin Laden and Zayman al Zawahiri. That kind of marriage leads to what we have seen since 2001. Now the fear is that kind of marriage might spread and become a marriage between Sunnis versus Shi'a, and the dangers will be unpredictable.

Barbara Slavin: There is a question about whether there is any relationship between the reform movement in Iran and reformers in Saudi Arabia.

Wahid Hashim: I do not see any relationship between the two. Since Abdullah was Crown Prince, particularly if you look at it from 1995-96 onward, he began economic reform at the beginning and then he reconstructed the hierarchy of economic institutions. He has a vision of transforming Saudi Arabia into a more modern state, more modern than it is now. For example, he is rebuilding the educational system and he is working very hard to reform the bureaucracy. We believe -- I believe -- the enemies of the Saudis as well as the enemies of all the world are three, and I add number four to them: poverty, disease, hunger -- and I add corruption. Corruption exists everywhere in the world, as we all know, and King Abdullah unleashed his war on corruption as well as his war on poverty. That began years before reforms in Iran. So we are looking at a new Saudi political system with new leadership who is highly popular and beloved by the majority of the people, if not all. Also he has high respect and support not only in Saudi Arabia but also in the Arab and Muslim world. Therefore he began reform in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and it is continuing, whereas in Iran it began after 1998.

Barbara Slavin: There is another question on what individuals and groups in the region can do to try to improve relations with Iran. Are there efforts being made through Shi'a communities, through the large Iranian community in the UAE, to try to build some bridges? Dr. Al-Faraj, you said the Iranians and the Russians are not telling you very much about Bushehr but I presume you are trying to engage them at least on the issue of nuclear accidents. Do you see this trend going along with what is viewed as somewhat of a reduction in U.S. power in the region? Is it possible that it will bear some fruit?

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi: I think the Shi'a card can be played by Iran if there is a real threat. It can be a troublemaker for the GCC. But also the wrong signals are coming from Washington. The GCC is not sure what Washington wants. When I talk about the NIE report, at the same time I think it was also thought that Washington gave Doha a green light for inviting Ahmadinejad -- Qatar would not dare to invite Ahmadinejad without the green light from the United States. So there are contradictory signals coming from your side. The GCC favor their interests at the end of the day. You strike against Iran, you will go home -- but we are in front of them. So any retaliation will be on our land. It is 8,000 miles between you and them. Also in Iraq you can just quit and leave.

I am advising that anything regarding the region should be a consultancy with the people in the region. You are doing your job away from us. Engage us before engaging the others also.

Sami Al-Faraj: You asked me about the Russians?

Barbara Slavin: I asked if the Iranian community in UAE or the Shi'a communities could be used to build bridges and what I hear is no, they are only going to be a card that Iran will play to cause trouble. That does not sound very promising. Do you have any hopes, especially as Bushehr is apparently going to come online in a couple of months, that there could be some sort of productive discussions with Iranians that could be confidence-building measures between Kuwait and Iran? Or is that simply unrealistic?

Sami Al-Faraj: We have to think of the worst-case scenario and that is to say that this is unrealistic. But the precedence -- during the Iran-Iraq war we had a few incidents in Kuwait -- well, not incidents, not terrorist acts or anything -- perpetrated by Iranian nationals. There were incidents perpetrated by Kuwaitis of Shi'a inclination, of other inclination -- including Christian. The biggest terrorist group included all of the above. Hijacking was perpetrated by lots of people. We cannot just blame -- but there were non-Kuwaitis. So the incidents on Kuwaiti territory, there were Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis and the outsiders were non-Kuwaitis. Whether this is going to happen, what we fear today is that muddled situation. Today what we see is a rise in the aura of Hezbollah to the extent that it will challenge the existing order in any Gulf state. For instance, I will give you the ad I read on the plane when I came to Washington, D.C. It was an ad by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior saying that on February 25-26 we are having the national days. The Ministry of Interior warns everybody that only the flags and symbols of Kuwait are to be raised. Any non-nationals should not be raised and anybody who does that will be subject to the law. This means because we have witnessed the rise of the flags of Hezbollah and even in the most inconvenient places like a soccer match. So we have people who are over-confident about what they did to Israel.

The other thing is what we do not know -- and I do not say that Israel will have something to do with the instability of Gulf nations but what we are planning today is when you ask any planner, especially military and emergency planners, they will tell you the fear of American strikes on Iran is not as probable as before but this will give a narrower window of opportunity for Israel to act -- which means we are more scared today of the Israeli factor and the Hezbollah factor being used by Iran to preemptively strike. The Iranians assume that all air corridors will come across our airspace.

Can we depend on the reasonable ones who live and prosper in the GCC? Because what we are trying to present to Iran is the model. The model is that we are nations that consist of national elements and then 120-128 nations. We have contributed to the development of all these nations through remittances. Today we are more capable -- I will give you just one figure. Today the foreign reserves of Abu Dhabi and Kuwait are larger than China. Last year there were four nations larger than China, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar; today without Saudi Arabia and Qatar; and now we wait until March 31 to know about the exact surpluses. All the surplus we need to invest in our infrastructure, not to buy weapons or gear against radiation. Why do we need it? We have in some nations excess electricity, and we need water. So there is room for us to exchange with Iran. The problem is they do not think in sync. That is the problem.

When you talk about Iran -- this is the first time that I see self-imposed deterrence. You are deterring yourself from engaging fully, including all the cards with you -- the European community, the Arabs, the Turks, others. You are quite self-deterred also from using other means like coercive measures. The alternatives open are either war or total engagement, which cannot be happening overnight -- neither war nor total engagement.

Wahid Hashim: Simply speaking, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to use different tactics in order to engage the Shi'ite community in Saudi Arabia since 2001-02. The first time I have seen Shi'ite clergy from the eastern territory and others from Medina and other Shi'ite Ismaili from the south to attend the King's Majlis and to participate in that Majlis. That was a strong development, strong reform and strong cooptation to these groups.

The second one is the King's unleashing of the national dialogue. That kind of dialogue between the Shi'ite and the Sunnis, between the liberals and the extremists and all different groups in Saudi society -- that was also a positive one because even females were engaged in this national dialogue. Also the King unleashed a new Islamic dialogue between Muslim scholars from almost all the Islamic world. I have attended a conference in Mecca just a couple weeks ago when Muslim scholars came from all over the Islamic world plus the pilgrimage. That kind of gathering, brainstorming -- we began to understand more about Shi'ism in the last couple of years than before. Before Shi'ites were an enigma -- we did not understand. People moving in the dark have negative intentions, they want to harm the Sunnis -- that was the stereotyping of the Shi'ites before we opened up the society and started a new era of talking and dialogue and discussing the different issues. I would like to thank the media, beginning with Al Jazeera of course and Al Arabiya and the rest of the TV channels that really began to enlighten the people and correct many of their misunderstandings and misperceptions, particularly between the Shi'a and the Sunni. I do not forget of course the hard work of our government to start a new era of dialogue and discussion between Shi'ite and Sunni and between all different strata in society, particularly those who are accused of being secular or liberal and those who are fundamentalist and extremist, if not fanatics.

Barbara Slavin: I want to thank everybody.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Transcript are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy. 

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