Editor�s Note:
The following article is the executive summary of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations staff report entitled "Chain Reaction: Avoiding A Nuclear Arms Race In The Middle East." The report was
transmitted to committee members on February 27, 2008. According to the report's letter of transmittal, ranking member of the Committee, Senator Richard G. Lugar, directed staff member Bradley Bowman to undertake an examination of the factors that could motivate states of the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons.
Between July and December 2007, Mr. Bowman conducted research and interviewed hundreds of individuals in Washington DC, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to pursuing the question regarding �nuclear drivers� in the Middle East, he also focused specifically on the regional ramifications if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons.
The resulting staff report contains policy considerations that represent the independent judgments of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of members of the committee. However, in the wake of the December 2007 NIE and in light of recent announcements by Arab states regarding nuclear energy, the observations and analyses presented here are timely. They are offered as one contribution in the effort to understand Middle East politics and the challenges the U.S. will confront going forward.
For SUSRIS readers, the following is the staff report's executive summary and overview of chapter 3 pertaining to Saudi Arabia. To view the staff report in its
entirety (PDF format), click
here.
Chain Reaction: Avoiding A Nuclear Arms Race In The Middle East
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate, 110th Congress, Second Session, February 2008
Executive Summary
Iran�s nuclear program remains one of the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace, despite the
December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion that �Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003.� Iran continues to enrich uranium -- the most difficult component of a nuclear weapons program -- and continues to conduct work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE states, Iran now possesses the �scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.� Consequently, the NIE judges �with moderate confidence�� that Iran will have enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010-2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is entirely possible that the United States could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons capable Iran in the next decade.
If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next decade, despite the international community�s best efforts, the U.S. must not be caught unprepared. U.S. decision-makers must seek to understand the regional dynamics that would accompany an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and be ready to implement policies to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the balance of power could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran�s neighbors seek to redress the new power imbalance. This raises important questions: How are these three countries currently responding to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own?
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain staff�s findings related to these questions. Each chapter touches on the respective country�s relationship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state�s response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report comes to the following conclusions for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey:
Saudi Arabia (Chapter 3)
The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The only factor that would likely dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored United States-Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate actions in the coming years to achieve both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb.
The vast majority of individuals interviewed believe that Saudi Arabia represents the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant disagreement among many parties exists regarding the Saudi�s final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, high-level U.S. diplomats in Riyadh with excellent access to Saudi decision-makers expressed little doubt about the Saudi response. These diplomats repeatedly emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis ��to their core�� and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear weapons.
Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would severely damage their most important bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States. The United States has served as Saudi Arabia�s most important security guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States because the United States has served Saudi Arabia�s interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States cannot or will not protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies. If the United States does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S. security guarantee, this will increase the likelihood that the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent.
The second argument frequently cited relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime�s undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid approach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50�60 CSS-2 missiles, 10�15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5 billion in the late 1980s provides an example. These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi move -- apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or the United States -- reflected anything but a conservative or timid approach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a much greater challenge to the bilateral relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interests.
The third argument often cited relates to Saudi Arabia�s nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia�s nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. However, many individuals emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia�s ability to buy the technology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or �understanding� may exist.
To read this staff report in its entirety (PDF format), click
here.
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