| Editor's
Note:
The Saudi-US Relations Information Service is
pleased to provided this insightful interview with Ambassador Richard
Murphy. It originally appeared on the Council for Foreign Relations Web
site (www.cfr.org ). We wish to thank
the Council for permission to share it with our readers.
Introduction
Richard W. Murphy, a former U.S. ambassador to
Riyadh, says that U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation is increasing.
"From a slow and fitful start in October 2001," he says, mutual
efforts to track terrorists "really took off" after the May 12,
2003, assaults on Riyadh housing compounds that killed 35. Saudi public
sympathy for Muslim extremism is eroding, he says. When terror attacks
"ended up killing Saudis or even non-Saudi Muslims, the public reaction
grew increasingly negative," Murphy says. "I gather the reaction to
[the April 21] bombing [in Riyadh] was particularly negative. A direct attack
on a major government installation associated with the police was just the
latest evil in the minds of the Saudi public."
The Council's Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow
for the Middle East, Murphy was interviewed on April 23, 2004, by Bernard
Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org.
U.S.-Saudi Anti-terror Cooperation on the
Rise
An Interview with Ambassador Richard W.
Murphy
Q. Describe the current
political scene in Saudi Arabia. Are there still tensions in the royal family?
Some experts say that
Prince Nayef, the interior minister, and Crown Prince Abdullah don't see eye
to eye.
A. Despite the very large royal
family, the core leadership group that shapes Saudi policies has been working
together for years. You can't really expect it to be speaking always with one
voice; however, it is easy to exaggerate the differences of view and
differences of approach. Right after 9/11, Nayef's public statements put him
at odds with others among the senior [royalty] on the issues of al Qaeda
involvement and Saudi involvement in the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon. He was the lead spokesman for the denial camp. "It couldn't
have been Arabs; it certainly couldn't have been Saudis," he more or less
said.
Crown Prince Abdullah
|
Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation |
Prince Nayef, Minister of the Interior |
Others came around to what was a
painful acknowledgment that there had been Saudis involved and there just
might be al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. Nayef is a full brother of Prince
Sultan, the defense minister, and a full brother of [King Fahd]. He has been
in his government position for more than 20 years, as has Sultan. The crown
prince was the designated No. 3 when King Khalid was still alive, and he moved
up under King Fahd [who suffered a severe stroke in 1996; the crown price has
effectively ruled the country since].
Abdullah represents the Saudis who
are increasingly ready to speak out about the need for
reform. He is more
interested in opening a national dialogue than some of the brothers. He's
considered more open to reform and change than Nayef, who is allegedly the
counterweight. Sultan has kept his positions private, but you can be sure that
he speaks up in the inner circles. There is ferment going on. The Saudis have
[formally] started a "national dialogue" and launched a Human Rights
Commission, even though it still has not acted on behalf of human rights
activists, as far as we can tell.
Q. Have the terror incidents
caused Prince Nayef to acknowledge that Saudi Arabia has a problem?
A. I think the bombings [of
housing compounds] in May 2003 in Riyadh led to a change in Nayef's attitude.
He is the senior member of the family most directly responsible for internal
security, and he has spoken out very forcefully against terrorism since last
May. It's been a troubled year. The bombings in May and another terrorist
attack [on housing compounds in Riyadh] in November were the most serious. But
there were shootouts [with terror suspects] in July, and police activity is
increasingly publicized. The Saudis took the unusual step after the November
bombings of publishing photographs of their "most wanted." They've
been arresting and killing the men on that list ever since.
Q. Are the
"wanted" all Saudis?
A. There is no question. They
are all Saudis.
Q. Do they come from
so-called good families?
A. Saudis point out that the
conspirators on the hijacked aircraft on 9/11 were men from "the
South." It means a certain tribal grouping and, in some cases, strong
Yemeni connections--and some Saudis therefore argue that these men were not
"good Saudis." I don't know enough about the identification of the
others who have been hunted down since.
| But while it probably makes sense to
talk of al Qaeda operating in Saudi Arabia because it is Osama bin Laden's
home territory, even the Saudis who use that description rather quickly
acknowledge that the terrorists are "inspired by" rather than
"directed by" [Al Qaeda]. After the campaign to close down al Qaeda
in Afghanistan, they are not sure there is direct control or inspiration from
Osama or Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, or from anybody else in the
top command that survived the Afghan war. |
..A direct attack on a
major government
installation [April 2004] associated with the
police was just the
latest evil in the minds
of the Saudi public.. |
But there is no question that once
the operations ended up killing Saudis or even non-Saudi Muslims, the public
reaction grew increasingly negative. I gather the reaction to [the April 21]
bombing was particularly negative. A direct attack on a major government
installation associated with the police was just the latest evil in the minds
of the Saudi public.
Q. I assume there is now
more U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation because of the attacks in Saudi
Arabia.
A. There is. After 9/11, the
Saudis became aware that they had to install some control mechanisms in the
financial field. They sent over top finance officials to explore with our
Treasury Department how to control the outflow of money to groups such as al
Qaeda. Now, this administration has been criticized for being too soft or too
generous in its comments about the Saudis, for pulling punches. As best I
understand it, from my vantage point outside the government but traveling to
Saudi Arabia fairly frequently, there are grounds for Washington to be
pleased. Until the war against terrorism is over--and that won't happen in the
near future--there is always more work to be done. But the cooperation, if you
charted it out, has been definitely increasing. From a slow and fitful start
in October 2001, it really took off after May 2003.
| Now there is general satisfaction, I
find, with the speed of the Saudi reaction to requests for name checks [of
terror suspects] and for working together on [investigations of] questionable
financial transactions. They have gone beyond that in their own sphere, moving
to close down the collection boxes outside of mosques, because they want to
create a paper trail, which never existed, to forestall monies raised by
charitable foundations from reaching terrorists. |
..there are grounds
for Washington to
be
pleased..
..the cooperation,
if you
charted it out,
has been definitely
increasing.. |
On the one hand, they are an easy
target of criticism because they represent the region's, if not the world's,
largest collection of wealthy individuals. There are hundreds of billions of
dollars in private Saudi hands outside the kingdom. I have no estimate of
what's in their hands inside, but estimates go as high as $600 billion
outside. And terrorism, we have to keep remembering, involves comparatively
few people and small amounts of money. It doesn't cost hundreds of billions of
dollars.
What the Saudis stand accused of is
spreading a doctrine called Wahhabism, which I call the most Puritanical
movement of Islam. They have invested hundreds of millions of dollars to build
mosques and send teachers from Saudi religious schools abroad. These people,
who are by no means leading intellectuals of Islam, have emphasized hate
messages that distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims, be they Christian,
Jewish, or another faith. Even within Islam, they have asserted a superiority
of practice and a purity of belief that sets many Muslims' teeth on edge.
Q. You mean the Shiites in
particular?
A. No. It can be Sunni Muslims
as well. When the Wahhabis have traveled to East Asia for instance, they've
discovered a blend of religious practices that has horrified them. They say,
"We have purified Islam in our revolution in the 18th century and have
been very strict ever since. We have been the best. We are the best. We are in
the land where the holiest of Muslim sites exist, Mecca and Medina. The
Prophet was from here. The language of God is ours." And they are almost
Calvinist in a way when they go beyond that to say, "If you still
question our right to leadership in Islam, explain why we have so much oil. We
have been blessed."
Q. Oil is becoming a
political issue in the United States. The price of gasoline is rising. What is
causing that? Are the Saudis likely to try to lower oil prices to help
President Bush's re-election prospects, as Bob Woodward suggests in "Plan
of Attack"?
A. There are some interesting
statistics out there in the public domain on the price of oil in an American
presidential election year. There has been a dip almost every time. Why? This
is apparently not tied to the incumbency. It happened under Democratic as well
as Republican administrations. One interpretation is that there is a Saudi
interest in not having oil seen as a political issue in an American election
campaign, [and therefore the Saudis] can help ensure the issue fades by
helping provide a surplus of oil to the market in the springtime of an
election year.
The Saudis would like a predictable
price. The price now is in the high $30s a
barrel. There was an OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] agreement solemnly adopted in
December 2003 that if the price got outside of a range of $22 to $28 a barrel
and stayed beyond that range for 60 days, then OPEC would be called into
session to adjust production. That session hasn't happened. They maintained
the cut in production.
Now, why is the price so high? We do
have a situation in part of our own creation. We have a very segmented market
in which California has strict air pollution controls that require a degree of
oil refining, which pushes the price higher. We have not enlarged our refining
capacity to a level that would help cushion price spikes. And of course the
drop in the value of the dollar means that the real value for oil is about
that of the early '70s.
Q. Why have the Saudis
closed their borders and blocked jihadists from streaming into Iraq?
A. The Saudis had a sad
awakening. The great jihad experience in Afghanistan was a very exhilarating
one for a young Saudi or young Arab Muslim and has had some blowback effects
on their countries of origin. The Saudis don't want to see this cycle of
violence start all over again.
Q. Neil MacFarquhar
reported in The New York Times on April 23 that Saudi attitudes are
bifocal. If someone dies fighting Americans in Iraq, he is praised as a
martyr; if the same man dies mounting a terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, he
is evil.
A. This reflects a blurring,
more prevalent now than in the past, of the distinction between the Israeli
soldier in the West Bank/Gaza and the American soldier in Iraq. Both are shown
killing or beating up Muslims. Every night, television is bringing pictures of
Israeli and American soldiers into Saudi living rooms.
Q. Many observers have said
Bush's April 16 endorsement
of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan
worsened the United States' standing in the Arab world.
A. I think it has across the
Arab world. Admittedly, when Bush said he understood the realities on the
ground as far as the [Israeli] settlements were concerned and on the
Palestinians' right of return, he added that these issues had to be dealt with
in negotiations. But his position did shock Arab opinion, did embarrass
leaders like [President] Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan,
not that they don't probably recognize the same realities. As they see it, you
don't talk about them and you certainly don't give positions up before
negotiations are joined.
[Reprinted with permission of the Council
on Foreign Relations.]
Related Material
|
Richard W. Murphy
Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for the Middle East
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and
South Asian Affairs under President Reagan; former U.S.
Ambassador to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania and the
Philippines; Former Chairman of the Middle East Institute in
Washington (1993-2001)
|
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Expertise:
Middle East; South Asia.
Languages:
Arabic (familiar).
Experience:
Trustee, American University of Beirut (current); former
President, Chatham House Foundation, United States; Chairman,
Middle East Institute; Trustee, American University of Beirut
(current); John Adams Memorial Lecturer in the United Kingdom
on a grant from the Fulbright Commission (1989); Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
(1983-89); U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1981-83), the
Philippines (1978-81), Syria (1974-78), and Mauritania
(1971-74).
Education:
B.A., Harvard University; A.B., Emmanuel College, Cambridge
University.
Honors:
Honorary Doctorates from New England College and Baltimore
Hebrew University.
Source: http://www.cfr.org/bio.php?meety=&id=93&puby=2002
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