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SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2004                                                   ITEM OF INTEREST

Saudi Arabia:  Enemy or Friend?
35th in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy
Conference Panel - David Aufhauser
Former General Counsel, Department of the Treasury

[Second in a series]

 
Editor's Note:

The Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service would like to thank the Middle East Policy Council for permission to share this series with our readers.  These presentations were made at the 35th Capitol Hill Conference on U.S. Middle East Policy on January 23, 2004.  The conference was hosted by the Middle East Policy Council.  This item provides the panel presentation of Mr. David Aufhauser, Former General Counsel, Department of the Treasury.  Individual transcripts will be provided separately by email and posted on-line -- see links below. 

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Middle East Policy Council
35th in the Capitol Hill Conference Series on U.S. Middle East Policy
Saudi Arabia: Enemy or Friend?

Transcript -- David Aufhauser, Former General Counsel, Department of the Treasury

CHAS. W. FREEMAN:  With these rather too-lengthy remarks behind us, let me invite David Aufhauser to the podium.

DAVID AUFHAUSER: Thank you. I don't think anything has more political resonance with the American populace right now in terms of the American-Saudi relationship than the issue of the financing of terror. I say that as an observation of their perception. In many respects my responsibility at Treasury with regard to terrorist financing showed me that we may be too Saudi-centric in some of the vocabulary and focus, and that terrorist focus is a significant global problem. But nevertheless, in the American politic, eyes of the American politic, I don't think anything has a higher profile in terms of needing to be resolved, and also do-able -- and also do-able. So it's a perfect proxy for trying to demonstrate comity rather than animus.

Hussein and I were talking just before the conference. With all due respect, I actually think the title for the conference does a disservice to the purpose of the people on the panel. I understand it's a crowd-pleaser and it draws people in, but it's really not a binary operation that we're talking about, whether it's either a zero or a one in the computer operation of our relationships. There's a great deal of complexity. But to say there's a great deal of complexity doesn't mean there isn't an opportunity for clarity on some of these issues.

I want to talk to you about the financing issue, which is a very sore wound, I think, between the countries, and one -- although I don't think I'm pollyannish about this -- one which has real problems but still one which is quite open to resolution. You had some encouraging news - we all had some encouraging news yesterday. A joint Saudi-U.S. action in the designation of four offices of one of their largest charities, I must say a charity sponsored by the royal family and one in essence overseen by fiduciars of the royal family; these four offices in various places have been designated as essentially fronts for terrorist activity, and they were designated jointly. That's very, very encouraging news, and it's a very important indication of joint resolve to try to attack a common problem, at least vis-�-vis al Qaeda's conduct globally.

It's also one more step in a long litany of very positive developments between both countries. Let me just tick them off so you get a sense of their breadth. First, the establishment of charities oversight, since a great deal of the money that goes unaccounted for and eventually gets diverted in outposts of the world where NGO's are located, is a significant problem in the funding of terror. Second, a bar on cross-border cash giving. Third, the requirement that charities have single disbursement accounts so that there can be tighter controls. Fourth, approval of the signatory over those accounts. Fifth, a relatively new and sophisticated anti-money-laundering regime, legislation and rules. Sixth, opening that regime to international audit recently by the financial action task force. About two months ago a team went out there to scrutinize those rules and to try to make suggestions about how to improve them. Second, prohibiting and closing down unlicensed money exchange houses and more supervision over the informal transfer houses known popularly as halalahs. Sixth, actually no cross-border transfers unless licensed. I guess that's a subset of what five was. Seven, the actual arrest of six, eight, or 10 significant financial facilitators within the peninsula who are identified either to us or to the Saudi government by detainees as significant players in the raising of money. Seventh, the designation of two prominent Jeddah merchants over the last year and a half as having been too casual about what transfers and transpires in their businesses, and therefore freezing their assets. Lastly in this long list is the establishment of a joint task force with federal officials in Riyadh. It was one of my last and most significant official acts to actually pursue, with the benefit of compulsory process, investigations of people within the peninsula for participating in terrorist financing.

But there are two other measures which to me speak greater volumes for the promise held here of jointly working on this problem. The first is a bar and a ban on the collection of coin and currency today in their mosques. Now, just take a step back for a second. Probably for more than 1,500 years in every mosque in Saudi Arabia there's been a collection box. It's known as a qaddah (ph), if I'm giving it the right pronunciation. And it's a place where people make their own covenant with their own god, and it's actually a quiet, private, secret act, and it's no business of the government to get involved in it. But they, and we, found that these collection boxes were in the hands of various al Qaeda cells, and therefore they had the potential of significant unaccounted-for funds falling into the hands of terrorists, and they decided that they would ban the collection of these coins and currencies. Now, you may think this is a small matter, but small collections aggregated together pose significant problems, not only in Saudi Arabia but throughout Islamic call centers and schools and mosques throughout the Islamic world, and it's very important to try to get control of unaccounted-for funds. This is a real sea change, to actually make this change. It may be difficult to police, but its symbolism cannot be understated.

The second is a nascent yet very important commitment to begin to vet clerics and imams and what they teach, and what they do with the money that are given to them and entrusted to them by their congregations. That started domestically, and you've seen some recantations recently by some of their clerics, people who previously championed openly terror but who've said they see the error of their ways.

This is all the good news. I don't want to be totally pollyannish about this. I'm still troubled and concerned about the relationship and about the effort on terrorist financing, and let me give you a summary of those because time is short.

The first is the action on Al Haramein simply took too long. It's been part of a dialogue that's been going on a year. It's been part of a dialogue which has been frustrated, actually, by lethargy and inaction. I don't know whether people perished during the year of the dialogue, particularly in these four jurisdictions, but we took these jurisdictions, and indeed other names of the Al Haramein charity, to the Saudi government a long time ago, and we took it because it was our strongest case for demonstrating that people who've used the cover of NGOs and charity are actually underwriting terror in Indonesia, in Tanzania, in Kenya, in Pakistan and elsewhere.

The second rather, to me, troubling statement - a statement that I will say apparently the U.S. Treasury joined in yesterday in the official press release, was that the Saudi government said they had no control over these foreign offices of Al Haramein. Now think for a minute. Al Haramein is established by the royal family. It strikes me that there's too much of an abdication of actual power and responsibility when you say you do not have control and the ability to actually close down these offices abroad, and the best you can do is to freeze what assets they have within the jurisdiction and to prohibit future contributions.

Second observation about the Al Haramein effort. It's the result of U.S. information brought to the Saudis. They need to be incubators of information themselves. They need to be initiators themselves of - in other words, they need to be more pro-active.

Third, all the changes I ticked off for you are largely systemic and structural changes and they are absolutely necessary, but none are sufficient unless you get at the core issue of personal responsibility. And in the two and a half years that I spent on this matter I cannot remember -- I cannot honestly remember a single Saudi who has been held accountable for participating and being a donor in terrorist financing. Until we get to the issue of donors, the exercise is a fool's errand. Now, that's what's promising about the joint task force that has been established between the Saudi government and the U.S. government.

Let me get on somewhat more contentious grounds. I also don't think we get ahead of the curve until it is a principle of our friends abroad that it's a crime to give money to organizations that you know take portions of the money to blow up school buses and to kill families, and who put a premium on civilians. And today, even as I speak, during the Haj and during the pilgrimage, Hamas is collecting significant amounts of money in Saudi Arabia, if the past is prologue. And until we get a declaration that giving money to the Hamas's of the world is just not acceptable and is culturally, morally, and legally in violation of sharia or any other principle of conduct, we're not going to make sufficient headway.

And by the way, prohibiting giving to the Hamas's of the world does not prohibit giving to schools and libraries and the building of default civilian governments in Palestine. It just puts political will and the capabilities of the governments to the test of establishing surrogates or alternatives for that giving. But we must actually have clear rules about prohibitions about giving to organizations which actually openly champion on TV and the radio the underwriting of terrorist conduct.

I actually have a prescription, but I won't share it because I'm getting the hook here. I do want to reemphasize what I said in the beginning. At least in the eyes of Americans and the body politic in America, this issue of whether or not Saudi Arabia is one of the banks for terror needs to be resolved. Otherwise, the relationship will be irreparably breached.

CHAS. W. FREEMAN: Thank you very much, both for the excellent summary of what has been done and more particularly for the challenge of what has to be done. I think it's fair to say that on the Saudi side, the popular side, this is equally contentious. Views of Hamas in Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world more generally do not coincide with views in the United States, and while Europeans have recently agreed with us on this, this remains a very contentious political issue. But I'm glad you raised it, and we will look forward to hearing your prescription when we come to the general discussion.


Click on a speaker's name to read a transcript of the paper that each presented at the 35th Capitol Hill Conference on U.S. Middle East Policy.  

Speakers:

  • David Aufhauser
    Former General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
  • Frank Anderson
    Former Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, CIA
  • David E. Long 
    Retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer -- Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco and Jordan
  • Nathaniel Kern
    President, Foreign Reports, Inc.
  • Hussein Shobokshi
    President, Shobokshi Development & Trading; Managing Director, Okaz Printing and Publishing
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
David Aufhauser was general counsel of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 2001-November 2003 before rejoining Williams & Connolly LLP in 2004.  While at Treasury, Mr. Aufhauser supervised 1600 lawyers in the department's banking & finance, international affairs and enforcement groups, and in the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Office of Foreign Asset Controls, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of Terrorist Financing, the U.S. Mint, the Bureau of Public Debt, the Financial Management Service, and the Bureau of Printing and Engraving.  Mr. Aufhauser also served as the secretary's representative on the Department of Justice Corporate Fraud Task Force, and as the chairman of the National Security Council's (NSC) policy coordinating committee on terrorist financing.  Mr. Aufhauser also currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.  He received his MBA from Harvard Business School, his law degree from the University of Pennsylvania, and his BA from Wesleyan University.
 

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