< continued from - Oil Rivals  [Part 4] >

Reform in Iraq, Reform in Saudi Arabia

Although the Saudi government is more immediately worried about instability on the kingdom's northern border than about the internal shape of a future Iraqi government, that does not mean it is unconcerned about the direction of Iraq's political evolution. Although deference to the principle of noninterference demands that the kingdom insist it is prepared to accept any Iraqi government, provided it does not seek to meddle in Saudi affairs or threaten the peace, the fact is that Saudis believe the United States has opened a political Pandora's box in Iraq, as Prince Saud al-Faisal made clear in New York in September.[19] Of the possible domestic political outcomes in Iraq, few can be attractive from Riyadh's perspective, particularly a majoritarian democratic system dominated by the 65 percent of Iraq's population who are Shiites.

Saudi officials profess to believe that there is no threat of any demonstration effect or spillover of Iraq�s new political institutions into Saudi Arabia. One senior Saudi diplomat stated that in the long run any government has to reflect what its people want and expect, and that Saudi Arabia is prepared to get along with any of them. He pointed to Yemen's military-dominated government as a case in point; Saudi Arabia gets along just fine with the regime of Ali Abdullah Salih, he said, and no one in the kingdom looks to Yemen as a model.[20]

The comparison with Yemen is, of course, disingenuous. It is not Sana'a that has historically served as a center of Arab culture, but Baghdad. Nor, despite the historic Saudi fixation on keeping the Yemenis tightly confined in the corner of the Arabian Peninsula, has Yemen ever posed a serious military threat to the survival of the kingdom. Most important, though, it is not Yemen but Iraq that has the educated population and the economic potential to re-establish itself as a major power within the Arab world. So one would think that the Saudis would take more seriously the prospect that successful Iraqi political evolution will ultimately present a challenge to the Saudi regime in the form of rising popular expectations for political reform. They do not, however, seem to be doing so, apparently for three reasons.

First, the Saudi political system has proven to be more resilient and more capable of coping with crisis than outside critics generally recognize. The example that Saudis usually quote is the relative ease with which the monarchy survived the family coup that led to the ouster of King Saud bin Abd al-Aziz in 1964, but one might also mention the family crisis over the "Free Princes" in 1961, the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, and the radical takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. 

Second, Saudis have a strong sense of exceptionalism; their system, their history, and their culture are all -- as they see it -- unique to themselves. They recognize that there is a demand for reform inherent within the Saudi population and that a process of reform in response to that demand is necessary, but they tend to be blind to any parallels between these demands and similar cases experienced in other countries or at other times, and they express deep skepticism that any foreign experience, even from other Arab countries, is transferable. The insistence on Saudi uniqueness persists despite the fact that the outcome of the first Saudi municipal elections, held in early 2005, closely paralleled that of the Iraqi parliamentary elections being conducted at about the same time, with a strong showing by Islamist groups among both Sunnis and Shia and a clear assertion of sectarian identity in the Shia majority areas of both countries.

Third, and perhaps most important, Saudis do not fundamentally believe that democracy can succeed in Iraq. It is of a piece with the Saudi stereotype of Iraqis that they consider Iraq to be fundamentally an untamable country. One senior Saudi diplomat points out that, even in the early days of the Umayyad caliphate, the Iraqis kept killing the governors sent from Damascus to rule over them. Finally, in 694 A.D., Caliph Abd al-Malik dispatched a notoriously ruthless general named Al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf to be the governor. Upon his arrival, Hajjaj gave a speech, quoted approvingly by the Saudi official, announcing, "O people of al-Kufah! Certain am I that I see heads ripe for cutting, and verily I am the man to do it. Methinks I see blood between the turbans and the beards."[21] While Iraq may not need a Hajjaj now, the Saudi official conceded, it does require a powerful hand to keep the country under control. Apparently most Saudis assume that that is exactly what Iraq will ultimately get. Provided that the strong man does not harbor external ambitions, that would probably be Riyadh's favored outcome.

< continued - The Religion Card  [Part 6] >

< Notes contained in Part 8 >

• Part 1 - Summary/Introduction

• Part 2 - The Primacy of Stability

• Part 3 - A Context of Distrust

• Part 4 - Oil Rivals

• Part 5 - Reform in Iraq, Reform in Saudi Arabia

• Part 6 - The Religion Card

• Part 7 - Working with Washington

• Part 8 - Conclusion

Complete Report (PDF):
Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry
Joseph McMillan

Complete Section:
Iraq and Its Neighbors - USIP

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.