This passage from Staff Statement No. 5 of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States provides
background information on cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United
States prior to September 11, 2001. For the complete statement visit the
commission web site.
Diplomacy
Staff Statement No. 5
The Saudi Effort and its Aftermath
In May 1998 the Clinton
administration issued a new presidential directive on terrorism, PDD-62.
It described ten policy programs. Program number one was "Apprehension,
Extradition, Rendition, and Prosecution." The lead agency was the Justice
Department, supported by the Department
of State. As this directive was issued a plan was being developed to
capture and bring Bin Ladin to justice. This plan would use Afghan agents of
the CIA. Top policymakers, including the CIA leadership, did not think the
plan would work. They welcomed a diplomatic alternative.
Saudi Arabia was a problematic ally
in combating Islamic extremism. One of the world's most religiously
conservative societies, the Kingdom's identity is closely bound to its
religious links, especially as the guardian of Islam's two holiest sites. The obligation
to donate to charity is a basic pillar of faith for all Muslims.
Traditionally, throughout the Muslim world, there is no formal oversight
mechanism for donations. Individuals select and aid the recipients directly.
As Saudi wealth increased, the amounts that individuals, and the state, could
and did contribute grew dramatically. Substantial sums went to finance Islamic
charities of every kind.
Until 9/11, few Saudis would have
considered government oversight of charitable donations necessary; many would
have perceived it as interference in the performance of their faith. At the
same time, the government's ability to finance most state expenditures with
energy revenues has not created the need for a modern income tax system. As a
result, there were strong religious, cultural, and administrative barriers to
monitoring
charitable spending.
Attitudes toward the United States
were mixed. The United States was aligned with Israel in a conflict where
Saudis ardently sympathized with the Palestinian cause. Yet for more than half
a century the Saudi monarchy has had close relations with the United States,
finding common cause in the commercial exploitation of its oil wealth and the
anti-Communism of the cold war. In 1990 the Kingdom had chosen to host U.S.
armed forces in the first war against Iraq. In 1998 it was still the base for
ongoing military operations against Iraq.
The ruling monarchy also knew Bin
Ladin was an enemy. Bin Ladin had not set foot in Saudi Arabia since 1991,
when he escaped a form of house arrest and made his way to Sudan. Bin Ladin
had fiercely denounced the rulers of Saudi Arabia publicly in his August 1996
fatwa. But the Saudis were content to leave him in Afghanistan, so long as
they were assured he was not making any trouble for them there.
Events soon drew Saudi attention back
to Bin Ladin. In the spring of 1998 the Saudi government successfully
disrupted a major Bin Ladin-organized effort to launch attacks on U.S. forces
in the Kingdom using a variety of man-portable missiles. Scores of individuals
were arrested. The Saudi government did not publicize what had happened, but
U.S. officials learned of it. Seizing this opportunity, DCI Tenet urged the
Saudis to help deal with Bin Ladin. President Clinton, in May, designated
Tenet as his representative to work with the Saudis on terrorism. Director
Tenet visited Riyadh a few days later, then returned to Saudi Arabia in early
June.
Crown Prince Abdullah agreed to make
an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin for
eventual delivery to the United States or another country. Riyadh's emissary
would be the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal. Director Tenet
said it was imperative now to get an indictment against Bin Ladin. A sealed
indictment against Bin Ladin was issued by a New York grand jury a few days
later, the product of a lengthy investigation. Director Tenet also recommended
that no action be taken on other U.S. options, such as a covert action plan.
Vice President Gore thanked the Saudis for their efforts.
Prince Turki followed up in meetings
during the summer with Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders. Employing a
mixture of possible bribes and threats, he received a commitment that Bin
Ladin would be handed over. After the Embassy bombings in August, Vice
President Gore called Riyadh again to underscore the urgency of bringing the
Saudi ultimatum to a final conclusion.
In September 1998 Prince Turki,
joined by Pakistan's intelligence chief, had a climactic meeting with Mullah
Omar in Kandahar. Omar reneged on his promise to expel Bin Ladin. When Turki
angrily confronted him, Omar lost his temper and denounced the Saudi
government. The Saudis and Pakistanis walked out. The Saudi government then
cut off any further official assistance to the Taliban regime, recalled its
diplomats from
Kandahar, and expelled Taliban representatives from the Kingdom. The Saudis
suspended relations without a final break.
The Pakistanis did not suspend
relations with the Taliban. Both governments judged that Iran was already on
the verge of going to war against the Taliban. The Saudis and Pakistanis
feared that a further break might encourage Iran to attack. They also wanted
to leave open room for rebuilding ties if more moderate voices among the
Taliban gained control.
Crown Prince Abdullah visited
Washington later in September. In meetings with the President and Vice
President he briefed them on these developments. The United States had
information that corroborated his account. Officials thanked the Prince for
his efforts, wondering what else could be done.
The United States acted too. In every
available channel U.S. officials, led by State's aggressive counterterrorism
coordinator, Michael Sheehan, warned the Taliban of dire consequences if Bin
Ladin was not expelled. Moreover, if there was any further attack, he and
others warned, the Taliban would be held directly accountable, including the
possibility of a military assault by the United States.
These diplomatic efforts may have
made an impact. The U.S. government received substantial intelligence of
internal arguments over whether Bin Ladin could stay in Afghanistan. The
reported doubts extended from the Taliban, to their Pakistani supporters, and
even to Bin Ladin himself. For a time, Bin Ladin was reportedly
considering relocating and may have authorized discussion of this possibility
with representatives of other governments. We will report further on this
topic at a later date. In any event, Bin Ladin stayed in Afghanistan.
This period may have been the
high-water mark for diplomatic pressure on the Taliban. The outside pressure
continued. But the Taliban appeared to adjust and learn to live with it,
employing a familiar mix of stalling tactics again and again. Urged on by the
United States, the Saudis continued a more limited mix of the same tactics
they had already employed. Prince Turki returned to Kandahar in June 1999, to
no effect.
From 1999 through early 2001, the
United States also pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban's only
travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and
enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these efforts to persuade the UAE achieved little
before 9/11. As time passed, the United States also obtained information that
the Taliban was trying to extort cash from Saudi Arabia and the UAE with
various threats and that these blackmail efforts may have paid off.
After months of heated internal
debate about whether the step would burn remaining bridges to the Taliban, President
Clinton issued an executive order in July 1999 effectively declaring that
the regime was a state sponsor of terrorism. UN economic and travel sanctions
were added in October 1999 in UN
Security Council Resolution 1267. None of this had any visible effect on
Mullah Omar, an illiterate leader who was
unconcerned about commerce with the outside world. Omar had no diplomatic
contact with the West, since he refused to meet with non-Muslims. The United
States also learned that at the end of 1999 the Taliban Council of Ministers
had unanimously reaffirmed that they would stick by Bin Ladin. Relations
between Bin Ladin and the Taliban leadership were sometimes tense, but the
foundation was solid. Omar executed some subordinates who clashed with his
pro-Bin Ladin line.
By the end of 2000 the United States,
working with Russia, won UN support for still broader sanctions in UN
Security Council Resolution 1333, including an embargo on arms sales to
the Taliban. Again these had no visible effect. This may have been because the
sanctions did not stop the flow of Pakistani military assistance to the
Taliban. In April 2001 State Department officials in the Bush administration
concluded that the Pakistani government was just not concerned about complying
with sanctions against the Taliban.
Reflecting on the lack of progress
with the Taliban, Secretary Albright told us that "we had to do
something." "In the end," she said, "it didn't work. But
we did in fact try to use all the tools we had."
Other diplomatic efforts with the
Saudi government centered on letting U.S. agents interrogate prisoners in
Saudi custody in cases like Khobar. Several officials have complained to us
that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda
financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi
government in 1997. American officials raised the issue. The Saudis provided
some information. In September 1998 Vice President Gore thanked the Saudis for
their responsiveness on this matter, though he renewed the request for direct
U.S. access. The United States never obtained this access.
The United States also pressed Saudi
Arabia and the UAE for more cooperation in controlling money flows to
terrorists or organizations linked to them. After months of arguments in
Washington over the proper role of the FBI, an initial U.S. delegation on
terrorist finance visited these countries to start working with their
counterparts in July 1999. U.S. officials reported to the White House that
they thought the new initiatives to
work together had begun successfully. Another delegation followed up with
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in January 2000. In Saudi Arabia the team
concentrated on tracing Bin Ladin's assets and access to his family's money,
exchanges that led to further, fruitful work. Progress on other topics was
limited, however. The issue was not a consistent U.S. priority. Moreover, the
Saudis were reluctant or unable to provide much help. Available intelligence
was also so non-specific that it was difficult to confront the Saudis with
evidence or cues to action.
The Bush administration did not
develop any diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government
before the 9/11 attack. Vice President Cheney apparently called Crown Prince
Abdullah on July 4, 2001, only to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened
attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom.
Source: http://www.9-11commission.gov
The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), an
independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and
the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to
prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the
immediate response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide
recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.
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- Ten
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- Joint
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- "In
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- "Of
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Tanya Hsu and Grant F. Smith, Saudi-American Forum, December 23, 2003
- "The
Prospects for Stability in Saudi Arabia in 2004 [Part I] - Reducing the Threat
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Service, February 23, 2004
- "Saudi
Arabia: Enemy or Friend?" - Conference Panel - David Long, Saudi-US
Relations Information Service, February 1, 2004
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