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King Fahd's
death, and Crown Prince Abdullah's accession to the
throne, is
unlikely to have any negative impact on Saudi stability and may well
help the Kingdom move forward in dealing with a number of major
issues.
Although
rumors always persist of divisions and conflicts within the Saudi
royal family, the reality has been very different. Prince Abdullah
was selected as Crown Prince in 1982 -nearly a quarter of a century
ago. He has acted as de facto regent since King Fahd's stroke in
1995.
Since that
time, he has been seen as both a supporter of reform, and
traditional in values - free of corruption and deeply Islamic. He
has encouraged the next generation of princes to support reform,
pushed for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and supported dialogue
with the West to counter Islamic extremism.
He has also
steadily expanded his de facto control of the Royal Court, the
Council of Ministers, Majlis, and royal appointments. King Fahd's
death will now give him full power, and he may well be able to move
forward in several areas of reform, exploiting the ties he has
already developed to "reform" factions in the family,
technocrats, and elite.
Abdullah is
very unlikely to alter the Saudi system of rule by consensus among
the senior princes, and close consultation with senior technocrats,
religious figures, key tribal figures, and key businessmen. Saudi
Arabia may not be a democracy, but it also has little relation to
the Western concept of an absolute monarchy. Rulers are expected to
show merit and the ability to govern, to consult, and to be open
to appeal of their decisions.
Decisions at
the top are generally reached by consensus, and often after
extensive conversations with those outside the royal family. When
major disagreements do persist, decisions tend to be deferred. Power
is also often compartmented, with senior princes taking clear
responsibility in given areas -- a compartmentation that minimizes
rivalry and tensions between them.
The choice of
Sultan as the new Crown Prince has been agreed to since the
mid-1990s. Sultan is, however, only slightly younger than Abdullah
(they both are reported to be 81), and has uncertain health after an
operation for stomach cancer. He is, however, still very active and
a key power in the Kingdom, and his son Khalid has emerged as a
major force in the Ministry of Defense and Saudi Arabia's security
structure.
If there is a
succession issue, it many come after Abdullah and Sultan. Analysts
have raised the issue for some years that the direct sons of Saudi
Arabia's founder are growing old, and how and when a King will be
chosen that is not a direct descendent of Saudi Arabia.
There are,
however, two princes in line for the succession, both
sons of King Abd al Aziz, that are roughly ten years younger. Prince
Naif is 72, He is the Minister of the Interior, is perhaps the most
conservative senior royal, and one who's potential status as
"No. 3" has been the subject of debate inside and outside
the Kingdom. Naif is deeply conservative, and there have been
reports that he is anti-reform, has quarreled with other princes,
and has acted to block reform.
In practice,
however, the fact that Naif has given some ill-judged public
speeches may be misleading. He does not seem to be anti-reform as
much as pro-security His success in dealing with terrorism and Al
Qa'ida has strengthened his reputation, as has the success of his
two sons in dealing with internal security matters.
The Naif vs.
Abdullah and the reformers debate postulated by some outside
analysts may reflect some real differences over policy, but both
princes have shown they can work closely together in the past, and
it seems premature to judge Naif's potential actions or see him as
any block to Abdullah's efforts in areas like economic and
educational reform.
Prince
Salman,, age 71 and the Governor of Riyadh, is another Prince with a
high reputation, and one seen as more pro-reform. He has been a
leader in advocating religious dialogue with the West, and his son
has been a major force seeking educational reform.
As for the
leading princes of the next generation, Prince Khalid is emerging as
a public figure. Crown Prince Abdullah's son Prince Mitab also has a
solid reputation. Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal and his brother
Turki both have high reputation in the Kingdom, and are seen as key
figures in the reform movement. Younger Princes generally are
expected to keep a low profile and to defer publicly to their
fathers, but this scarcely means they are not active in government,
competent, or eventual potential candidates for the throne.
As for key
policy issues, few major policy changes are likely in the short
term. The long illness of Fahd has already created a
"transition" that has lasted for nearly a decade. High oil
revenues have brought a great deal of economic growth and the
short-term pressures for reform have been eased by the flow of
money.
The key issues
Crown Prince Abdullah will face in the near term are (i) Islamist
extremism as an internal and regional threat, (ii) uncertainties
over Iraq, (iii) rise of a nuclear Iran, (iv) the lack of meaningful
progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, (v) instability and
economic problems in Yemen, and (vi) the overheating of the Saudi
economic and stock market with so much oil revenue that values
threaten to create a bubble that could produce a major collapse of
stock market values.
Longer term
issues include (i) the problem of "Saudisation" and
finding jobs for Saudi Arabia's rapidly expanding population; (ii)
dealing with the high cost of modernization and expanding Saudi
Arabia's infrastructure to deal with population growth; expanding
and modernizing the Saudi educational system, (iii) diversifying the
economy to reduce dependence on oil export income and create jobs,
(iv) developing a long-term strategy for investing in the
development of Saudi upstream and down stream oil and gas resources,
(v) modernizing Saudi social customs without creating tensions with
Islamic conservatives, and (vi) modernizing the political system to
expand the political role of those outside the royal family and
reduce or eliminate subsidies to the princes and princesses who do
not make a major contribution to Saudi governance.
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Anthony H.
Cordesman holds the Arleigh A Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS.
He and Nawaf Obaid have written Saudi Security: Military and
Internal Security Developments, which will be published by the CSIS
and Praeger this fall.
