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Why Reforge the U.S. and Saudi Relationship?
An Interview with Anthony Cordesman

EDITOR'S NOTE:

Dr. Anthony Cordesman - Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies - is very familiar to readers of the Saudi-American Forum (SAF) and Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS) essays, newsletters and other items. Earlier this year he contributed his analysis of "Ten Reasons for Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Relationship," to the SAF. Last week we asked Dr. Cordesman for an update to that report. In a telephone interview on September 19, he discussed the reasons for a strong US-Saudi relationship in light of developments since his essay appeared in February and the challenges that remain.

Also of interest: Dr. Cordesman's remarks at the Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference held September 12-13 in Washington, DC.

Why Reforge the U.S. and Saudi Relationship?
An Interview with Anthony Cordesman

SUSRIS: Earlier this year you wrote an essay called, "Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi Relationship," that appeared in the Saudi-American Forum. It is an excellent starting point for a discussion of where US-Saudi relations are today and where they are going.

Your first point addressed the global war on terrorism. You said, "Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia now face a common threat from terrorism, both in terms of internal and regional threats. Saudi Arabia may have been slow to recognize how serious this threat is, but since the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, it has become clear that it is as real for Saudis as it is for Americans." The cooperation between the two has improved as a result. There are some who still say that the cooperation isn't as good as it should be. How would you see that aspect of the U.S.-Saudi relationship?

Dr. Anthony Cordesman: Well, first I think you need to understand that when you talk about counterterrorism, you're also talking about intelligence and operations and internal security, which are some of the most sensitive issues any two governments can deal with. We have problems with virtually all of our European allies and with virtually every Asian country. It's a fact that you don't always get perfect sharing of intelligence, and you don't always regard the same people as terrorists. And, to pick on Saudi Arabia as being unique in this category is unrealistic.

It's also true that from the Saudi viewpoint, we have often given sanctuary or asylum to people that they regard as a serious threat in terms of extremism and terrorism just as we have often been critical of the Saudis' tendency to not crack down on given individuals. But, all that aside, when it comes down to areas like financing and the control of the transfer of money, it's never going to be perfect, but the relationship has improved tremendously.

Saudi Arabia has done a great many things to halt the financing of extremist movements or that can move into charities that have ties to terrorist groups. There's much better exchange of intelligence now. There's far better cooperation in providing techniques and training in terms of terrorism equipment, which the Saudis need. In the past, their security forces have simply not faced this kind of threat. There's cooperation on intelligence activity outside Saudi Arabia. And, this has helped in areas like Yemen, and it's helped in the Gulf as well as in Central Asia. Saudi Arabia has been much more careful about which religious movements it finances outside Saudi Arabia and whether these have ties to Islamic extremists.

Now, as you go down this list of actions, are there areas where both sides could improve the cooperation? The answer is of course. But, all of this has to be kept in perspective. We have differences even with nations like Britain over exactly how to deal with the IRA and with various forms of Irish extremists. We need to keep that in perspective whenever we discuss the issue of terrorism.

SUSRIS: The second point you made was that the U.S. and the world need Saudi and Gulf oil, and Saudi Arabia and its neighbors need to export it. There's been a lot of commentary and criticism in recent months about the Saudi ability to affect world oil prices and provide stability. There have been claims that Saudi Arabia has manipulated the world market, and there are some who say that Saudi Arabia has promised the Bush Administration that they were going to increase production to enhance President Bush's re-election prospects. So, Saudi Arabia's role in the world energy market is now a political topic in the United States and again a source of criticism.

Cordesman: Well, it's a little ironic that Saudi Arabia, simply because it is the largest exporter of oil, perhaps Russia might argue that, becomes a natural target for virtually every conspiracy theory imaginable. Right now in the United States, you have one group saying that it's manipulating world supply to raise prices, and on the other hand, that it's lowering prices to re-elect George Bush. Now, if it can do both at the same time, it's performed something of an economic miracle.

The reality is that the problems in oil prices have almost nothing to do with Saudi Arabia, which has actually attempted to keep production relatively high. Chinese demand has been extraordinarily high. The growth of Asian demand has been higher than predicted. The economy on a global basis has recovered more quickly than people predicted. We've had major problems in terms of oil supply with the former Soviet Union, particularly with Russia's treatment of Yukos. We've had problems in Venezuela. We've had problems in Iraq.

Trying to blame these on Saudi Arabia seems rather strange, particularly when there is a global market and Saudi Arabia has actually been remarkably forthcoming in increasing production and using its surplus capacity to try to stabilize prices. What we have to understand is that over time, as local demand increases, it's almost inevitable that you're going to see serious rises in real oil prices. They will always be cyclical and erratic. But at this point in time, as the International Energy Agency points out, most oil producers and exporters have simply not invested enough in oil production to meet all of the growing world demand without some rise in price. This is a fact which not only Americans but everyone in the world is going to have to get used to.

SUSRIS: Among the reasons you cited for reforging the U.S. and Saudi Arabia relationship was that, "The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a common interest in the long-term internal stability of Saudi Arabia." You cited population growth figures for Saudi Arabia, talked about unemployment and reform in the economy, the impact of government debt, the inability of the government to provide social services, modernizing the infrastructure, and diversifying the economy without major economic reform and investment. You said it was important for the United States to be supportive of Saudi Arabia as it moved down the path of reform. Have you see any additional progress or movement?

Cordesman: I think that virtually everyone would agree that Saudi Arabia as of yet is not moving forward on economic reform quickly enough to deal with the problems created by having a very young population and a rapidly growing labor market, and providing that services and the educational standards necessary to make workers that are competitive. But, it is making progress. It is reforming its educational system. It is trying to create a systematic pattern of Saudization. It is attempting to liberalize and diversify its economy.

In the past, when Saudi Arabia has had this kind of sudden boost in oil wealth that it's had over the last few years, it's tended to use the money relatively carelessly. In this case, it has done just the opposite. It's paid off its debt. It's put its money into job creation and into stimulating the economy.

There is a very serious problem -- the rate of population growth is extremely high. The level of education for young Saudi males has not been good. You have a society where it is difficult for women to work or make full use of their talents. But it is women who now have more secondary school graduates and university graduates than males.

So, there are social issues that Saudis have to address. There are questions in becoming competitive, which is one of the reasons that Saudi Arabia is seeking entrance to the World Trade Organization. Now, all of these factors plus the need for political evolution are things that the Saudi government clearly understands. Certainly Crown Prince Abdullah has stressed the need for such reforms again and again. But, the pace is not going to bring stability unless it increases. The United States has every reason to want a stable political and economic evolution in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi society must create an environment where there is good employment and good opportunities for young men and educational standards that are competitive on a global basis. The reasons for that are strategic because of Saudi Arabia's location and obviously because Saudi Arabia is so critical, not only to today's oil production and exports and -- to any of the estimates that are being made by the Department of Energy or the International Energy Agency -- as to future production. If you look at those estimates, they call for Saudi exports or at least Saudi production capacity to more than double between now and 2020 or 2030. That can only happen if there is a stable, secure Saudi Arabia.

SUSRIS: Related to economic developments, you mentioned in your essay that, "This common interest [between the United States and Saudi Arabia] extends to Saudi political reform." Saudi Arabia, as you noted, has a mix of leaderships in the royal family among the technocrats, businessmen, and Western-educated intellectuals, who are a progressive elite who understand the need to reform but that neither the U.S. nor Saudi Arabia would benefit if the U.S. didn't recognize that Saudi Arabia must reform at its own pace. Since your February essay, there's been the announcement of the three stages of municipal elections, and there have been some other movements on reform. The elections are now scheduled for February through March of next year, and some other activity in the reform movement has occurred. How do you see that playing out?

Cordesman: Well, first the local elections are perhaps the first real experiment with the kind of elections that will affect, hopefully, both the government and the entire country. The purpose, one has to believe, is to ultimately have an elected Majlis, but it is also true that Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a fight against terrorists.

One of the problems that develops very quickly is that if you begin to hold elections in a society, which does not have a history of them, is to find ways of doing it where you get stable, political parties being created, where you don't end up with demagogues, who are local political figures who simply have a historical heritage of taking office. Saudi Arabia is a very conservative society, and one whose history is still essentially that of family and tribe, has to go very, very cautiously.

I think that certainly it would be desirable to move forward on the local elections that at least are scheduled and that Saudi Arabia now proposes. Saudi Arabia also needs to look very hard at how to create an elected Majlis. Now, with the steady expansion of the Majlis' size and responsibility, you have to believe that although it's never been announced, that the people of the royal family do understand that this has to go from a selected Majlis and one which is picked by local leaders to an elected Majlis at some point in the relatively near future.

Again, there is a great deal of effort that needs to go on to allow more open political debate. And, here it is disappointing that reformers who did little more than petition for reform have been treated as if they were somehow a political threat. This kind of debate, this kind of political action, which is peaceful and progressive, is simply not something that deserves having trials and arrests.

The same has to be said about the more conservative Saudis. If Saudi Arabia is to move toward a democracy, people who are willing to be part of the political system, to take peaceful, political action, who are beginning to organize around political parties, have to become part of this system. It can't simply be the people who are technocrats or businessmen or educators, who are approved by Saudi leaders or by traditional local leaders.

So, you have to say that things are moving forward. There are two steps forward, and in some ways, one step backwards. And, those steps forward are really not as of yet moving quickly enough.

SUSRIS: Let's talk about social reforms. You commented that cooperation must extend to Saudi social reforms as well with the United States. But, Americans needed to understand that the Saudi system would never evolve social structures that match those of the U.S., that there are not universal standards in the sense of mirror-imaging. How do you see the evolution of social reform in Saudi Arabia? Many feel that it is not going fast enough, and again as in the other areas of reform, Saudi Arabians have said that they need to move at their own pace. Indeed, Secretary of State Powell recently reaffirmed the United States' position that Saudi Arabia needed to undertake reforms at their own pace. In the area of social reform, how do you see this playing out?

Cordesman: I think there are a wide variety of reforms, which need to be made. One basic reform comes with the effort to create employment and to diversify the economy and jobs. One key aspect of society is to move away from paternalism and dependence to a social structure in which young Saudi men and young Saudi women work and compete on the basis of earning a living just as, for that matter, their forefathers did. That has all kinds of functional and political implications. And, you should never forget the linkage between social reform and economics.

There are other kinds of reform, which are really up to the Saudis. Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, the most conservative Islamic society in the world. Outsiders may want it to open up to other religions or to show a great deal more religious tolerance than it has in the past, but the fact is that those are Saudi choices, not choices to be imposed from the outside.

It is quiet clear that this isn't the set of choices being made by the government. It's a set of choices being made by the Saudi people. This is an example of a case where you're not going to have universal standards and certainly not within the foreseeable future.

If anything, the Kingdom's need for religious tolerance, at this point in time, really consists of having more tolerance for the spread between Saudis who are more modern, more secular and Saudis who are more religious without being extremists and between the more puritanical Sunnis, which dominate Saudi Arabia, and the Shiites. This is a major social change in itself. Moving forward in this area is far more important in practical terms than trying to change the entire character of Saudi Arabia's religious faith -- something that certainly isn't going to happen in the foreseeable future.

When you look at the other sets of reforms, I don't know if you call educational reform social reform or not. The problem goes far beyond what people often refer to as Islamic versus secular education. There is no reason why Islamic education shouldn't be part of the Saudi curriculum. There is a very good reason to move away from a curriculum that has gotten to be very outdated, rely on rote learning, which doesn't train young Saudi men and women in both tolerance for other societies, and in the practical skill they need to operate in their own.

This social reform is going to be critical to Saudi Arabia's future. It isn't going to be possible to meet Saudi Arabia's needs by simply getting rid of foreign labor and compelling employers to hire Saudis. What's critical is that young Saudis be able to earn those jobs.

The final dimension goes back to the changes taking place socially. The global economy basically is dependent on productivity among the entire labor force, and virtually all of the developing countries in the world, women play a critical role in the labor force, and their productivity is one of the most important aspects of development. In Saudi Arabia, where again you have more women graduating from secondary schools and universities, and because of the very nature of Saudi education, largely outside the Islamic education program, you cannot move forward unless eventually -- eventually has to be within the next decade -- women play a much stronger and much more openly competitive role in the economy. Now, how Saudi Arabia does that, and the rate of which it does it, is up to Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia is to deal with a growing population and its economic needs, it has to make these changes.

SUSRIS: "There is a continuing need for U.S. and Saudi security cooperation and that the removal of Saddam Hussein didn't reduce the security risks in the Gulf completely." That was your sixth reason for reforging relations. You said the U.S. interest in Saudi Arabian security would continue, and the coordination between our militaries would continue. There seems to be confusion among some observers as to the status of the US-Saudi military-to-military relationship given the withdrawal of U.S. forces, principally the Operation Southern Watch forces from Prince Sultan Air Base. Some saw that development as a political issue rather than the end of a mission - the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq. How do you see the current state and future of the Saudi-U.S. military-to-military and security relationship?

Cordesman: Well, we do need to recognize that the U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia, which was essentially dominated by air forces, with a limited presence of Patriot surface-to-air missiles, was a source of serious debate and to some extent instability within Saudi Arabia. It was one of the cardinal arguments made by extremists.

It is a fact that the United States did not ever reach an agreement to have bases in Saudi Arabia and went into Saudi Arabia basically to defend it and to liberate Kuwait. But, we have to bear in mind the fact that when the Iraq War occurred, Saudi Arabia did provide a great deal of cooperation with the United States. It allowed U.S. Special Forces units to operate out of Arar. While U.S. troops and their units were no longer operating actively in the country they still flew other kinds of support missions extensively in during the Iraq War. The command and control for some of these that the U.S. created outside Riyadh were used to a great degree. There was airborne refueling and overflight rights. Basically, while Saudi Arabia did not allow the U.S. to use its bases formally, it cooperated in virtually in every other way.

Now, today, the United States has no combat forces in Saudi Arabia, but it still plays a vital advisory role. Saudi Arabia uses U.S. military equipment. A lot of that equipment is still in delivery or is still being absorbed by Saudi forces. Saudi Arabia would find much of that equipment impossible to use if it could not make use of U.S. military advice. It needs the kind of expertise that the U.S. can provide to improve its training standards, to improve its readiness and to move its forces forward to become the kind of forces that can actively defend the Kingdom. It also has good reason to see the U.S. presence in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman as a basic shield between Saudi Arabia and an Iran, which seems to be acquiring nuclear weapons and as a way of protecting the Kingdom if Iraq does not move forward towards a more stable and more friendly state.�

These are realities where the Kingdom benefits from the U.S. role, and the U.S. obviously benefits from the stability of Saudi Arabia and the knowledge that in an emergency the cooperation we saw in the Iraq War would probably be repeated again.

But, it doesn't mean that the United States has to have an active military presence in Saudi Arabia in essentially peacetime or that we need to go back to the kind of relationships we had immediately after the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein's Iraq was one of the largest military powers in the developing world. Iraqi military forces, despite all that happened in the Gulf War, totaled hundreds of thousands of men, and they still had very large armored forces and a very large number of combat aircraft. The fact that threat is gone has helped, but for all the reasons I've outlined earlier, it's scarcely eliminated every threat that calls for U.S. and Saudi cooperation.

SUSRIS: The next you made in justifying the rationale for reforging the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was that both nations need to cooperate to counter the forces of Islamic extremism. Saudi Arabia is still the custodian of Islam's two most important holy places. It is still a symbol of Islam, as well as Arab rule, to many people outside as well as inside Saudi Arabia. How is it in the interest of the United States, the role that Saudi Arabia plays in the Islamic world? How is that important in the relationship?

Cordesman: Unfortunately, the easiest way to illustrate just how important it is to imagine what would happen if Saudi Arabia actually came under control of someone like Bin Laden or any Islamist extremist movement that was really committed to some kind of struggle along religious lines with the West.

In that case, being the custodian of the most important Islamic holy places would give such a movement immense leverage, and its influence would be far more destabilizing. At the same time, if you could imagine how a combination of that ideology and the income Saudi Arabia draws from oil exports could be used to support the causes of extremism, terrorism and for that matter, asymmetric war. But, when you look at today's climate, it is very important that we understand that it isn't simply a matter of having secular governments in the Arab world to fight extremism. This is in many ways a struggle for the hearts and minds of the Islamic world. It is a struggle for the future of Islam.

Nations like Saudi Arabia, which are deeply Islamic, which speak to the conservatives in Islam, to the more puritanical groups that have no interest in violence or in extremism or in terrorism, have an influence which goes far beyond its borders.

Even the way it manages the Pilgrimage plays an important role in how people in Islam view Islam. These are the kinds of forces that we need to think about because we are not simply dealing with Bin Laden or Al Qaeda. We're dealing with the kind of debate over the future of Islam in not only the Arab world or the Middle East but the entire Islamic world that is going to go on not simply for a few years, but probably for well over a decade. The role nations like Saudi Arabia play in that debate, and the role they play in ensuring that whatever the outcome is, it is not extremist, it is not intolerant, and it does not lead to some kind of clash of civilizations, is absolutely critical.

SUSRIS: In that regard, you said cooperation was needed to develop "information campaigns" to build understanding rather than anger and fear. Constructive criticism could play some role in the bilateral dialogue but the Saudi-bashing by some in the Congress and U.S. media was largely destructive. Can you talk a little bit more about that aspect of the relationship, and where it has evolved since wrote your essay?

Cordesman: Well, I think frankly that we still are at the start of the level of dialogue that we need. The history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is often the history of distance, a tolerance based on ignorance or really based on the ability to cooperate remotely without any direct involvement between the peoples.

In the middle of the current debate and struggle over the future of the Islamic world, and certainly after 9/11 and after May 2003, that approach is inadequate. It is going to take a really determined effort to build dialogue and to build tolerance on both sides. There is in the United States, not only Saudi-bashing, but a lot of careless rhetoric about Islam and about the Arab world and an indifference to the problems of the Palestinians. This combines to feed extremism and terrorism.

At the same time in Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world, there is an almost endless series of conspiracy theories with little effort to check the facts. Many of them are so far out of mind that they come close to the assumption or to the kind of fear of alien abductions rather than rational, political action. There is still in Saudi Arabia a level of religious intolerance, which people in Saudi Arabia need to address. There is a state of denial over the depth of some of the Kingdom's social and economic problems and of what actually happened in leading up to the events in Afghanistan and in 9/11.

Both sides have made some very serious mistakes. Both sides are still ignorant of each other. Both sides have within their societies people who are doing a great deal to make things worse rather than better. Now, you have seen people like President Bush, and it's very important to note this, repeatedly make the statement that Islam is not to blame for Bin Laden -- that he is an aberration, that he is an extremist. You have seen U.S. officials reach out to Saudi Arabia to counter the various theories or charges of the U.S. that are Saudi-bashing. You have seen similar steps taken in Saudi Arabia to attack extremism and terrorists, but it is clear that this is as of yet not doing enough.

We need a lot more dialogue. We need a lot more mutual understanding. We need a lot more governmental efforts to improve the level of education and to really train and to help people deal with the problems that we both face in the threat of terrorism and extremism.

SUSRIS: The penultimate point you made in reasons for reforging the relationship was that cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was important in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Both sides have taken positions and try to move initiatives forward towards resolving that problem. Can you give us your view on where that fits in to the U.S. and Saudi Arabian relationship?

Cordesman: It is certainly true that many Saudis as many Arabs blame the United States for lack of progress in ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in reaching the kind of peace that they believe is needed. Just as many Americans blame the Saudis and Arabs for not pushing the Palestinians into reform and in bringing extremism and terrorism under control.

The problem we face, and it is an extraordinarily difficult problem, is that at this point in time, you do not have either a Palestinian government that seems capable of making the necessary reforms and moves towards peace or an Israeli government that is committed to putting an end to the settlements and which is willing to make positive steps towards peace in the middle of what is a very real ongoing struggle between both sides.

It's very easy to blame either the United States or Arab nations outside this struggle for the mistakes being made by Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, the reality is that it is very, very difficult to move forward whether you're in Saudi Arabia or the United States when you have two governments, and to some extent two peoples, at this point so committed to conflict or at least finding it so difficult to understand the other side's goals and objectives.

About all I can say is that this is an area where both governments need to be seen to go on trying very visibly and very actively. In the case of the United States, it would be desirable if the United States would put more pressure on Israel to put an end to settlements, to ensure that any fences or security barriers do not divide up the West Bank and truly are needed for security purposes -- security that could help the Palestinians as well as the Israelis.

If Gaza is to move forward, it is to move forward in the ways where the Gazans and the Palestinians really end up with what is the beginning of a true Palestinian state, and not simply some kind of glorified refugee camp.

It would be equally desirable for Saudi Arabia to take every step to move its peace proposal forward and to do so on the understanding that whatever we come up with, it's got to look a great deal like the Clinton proposal at Camp David or the best proposals that both sides put forward at Taba.

We can't go back to 1949. We can't go back to 1967. We can't recreate a Palestine, which is a rural state. We can't ignore demographics that say most Palestinian refuges outside the country aren't going to find jobs or an economy inside Gaza or the West Bank with its current population growth rate.

At the same time when we look even further into the future, we have to understand that Saudi Arabia, the United States and the other Western and Arab powers are going to have to provide the kind of aid and support if we do get a peace that will not only allow Israel to remain stable but to give the people of Palestine the kind of economic opportunities and growth so that they see real peace benefits -- something were seriously lacking in the period following the Oslo accords. That is a very difficult set of issues to deal with.

None of what I have said provides easier good answers. But, the fact that you sometimes need to spend time to deal with complex problems and focus on the best option available rather than the option you want is just a fact of life.

SUSRIS: The last point you made in your essay was that both nations -- the United States and Saudi Arabia -- need to work together to avoid a 'clash of civilizations.' You touched on that today in talking about Islamic extremism and Saudi Arabia's role in the Islamic world and the U.S. interest in developing understanding. You mentioned in your essay that, "Extremism and terrorism cannot by themselves either defeat the U.S. or bring down moderate Arab regimes. They can only succeed, however, if they can provoke hatred and bigotry on both sides, and create a 'clash of civilizations' that makes effective cooperation impossible." How do Americans see the roles the United States and Saudi Arabia and the relationship plays in ensuring there is not a "clash of civilizations"?

Cordesman: I think frankly that Americans, when they do think of these issues, they think about them in terms of 9/11 and in terms of terrorism, not in terms of the broader problems of creating and trying to understand and ties between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which is ultimately the only way to counter extremism.

We have not yet, as a country, anymore that any other country, looked beyond the immediate risks and problems of terrorism and extremism. What we need to do in counterterrorism is to create the kind of partnerships and understanding of efforts between governments to educate people and to deal with the ideological, philosophical and religious issues.

If this were just one small sect of scattered movements in one or two countries, what we are doing would be enough. The fact is, however, that we are talking about a world which is involved in massive change. The problems which affect the Middle East and the Arab world affect Islam in Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia as well. They are problems, which are generational.

We are going to have to think beyond counterterrorism, to think strategically, to see this struggle on an ideological level just as we saw the same struggle occur during the Cold War. Now there, over time, it was mutual understanding, a rational approach to economics and social behavior, a focus on progressive reform, which ultimately put an end to the kind of extremism of arrogant communism.

We are dealing with a much more difficult set of issues today. A lot of what happens is going to be determined if not most of it by the struggle not between civilizations but the struggle for civilization and for the future of Islam within Islam.

I think that's a struggle that is going to be won by moderates. It's going to be won by the core values of Islam which have existed since the time of Mohammed, but it is also a struggle in which the West on the outside plays a part.

If you ask me have we really understood it in the United States, or for that matter in Europe or the West, and particularly the kind of positive role we can play rather than simply focusing on counterterrorism, the answer has to be not yet.

SUSRIS: We should be encouraged by your optimism that the moderates will win out. Thank you Tony Cordesman for sharing insights into these important issues that shape the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

Also see:

"Beyond Anger and Counterterrorism: A New Grand Strategy for U.S. and Arab Relations," by Anthony Cordesman [Remarks by Dr. Cordesman at the 13th Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference]

About Anthony Cordesman

Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.

Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's representative on the Middle East Working Group.

Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff, working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in the Gulf and North Africa.

Essays by Dr. Cordesman

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