Editor�s Note: 

SUSRIS subscribers are very familiar with Dr. Anthony Cordesman's many contributions to the dialogue on US-Saudi relations [list/links below]. Today we are pleased to present his recent essay "Saudi Arabia and the Struggle Against Terrorism" as well as the first part of a recent interview he conducted with SUSRIS.

Once again, we thank Dr. Cordesman for sharing his insights with SUSRIS readers.��

Saudi Arabia and the Struggle Against Terrorism
by Dr. Anthony Cordesman

The last few weeks have confirmed the fact that Saudi counter terrorism forces are becoming steadily more effective, that many of the leaders of Al Qa�ida in Saudi Arabia have been captured, and that Al Qa�ida in Arabia has not emerged as a major threat to the Kingdom's stability. In just the last week, Saudi security forces have killed three major Al Qa�ida leaders -- Kareem Altohami al-Mojati, a Moroccan, and Saud Homood Obaid al-Otaibi and Abdul-Rahman Mohammed Yazji, both Saudis. At this point in time, the Saudi government has killed or captured 25 out of the 26 leaders of Al Qa�ida that the government identified after Al Qa�ida launched its major offensive in Saudi Arabia in May 2003.
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The threat isn't over. The Saudi victory in Al-Rass did not come quickly or easily. It took a three-day battle and Saudi special forces, police, and security units took serious casualties in killing al-Mojati and al-Otaibi. The Al Qa�ida cell also demonstrated how seriously its members were committed to the struggle. Only six were captured after twelve other militants were killed in a series of firefights. The police raid that killed Yazji was less intense, but still involved significant fighting and damage to the two story building in the industrial area of Riyadh where he was hiding. It both cases, the Al Qa�ida cells had explosives and in Al-Rass, some reports indicate that they had machine guns.
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There is no reliable count of how many active Al Qa�ida members are still in Saudi Arabia, or how many it has in reserve in countries like Yemen. There is no way to know how many new recruits and leaders it can develop inside the Kingdom, or how many Saudi young men will return from Islamic extremist causes in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and India. There almost certainly will be more Al Qa�ida attacks, probably extending over a period of years. On December 31, 2004, Al Qa�ida issued a statement claiming that their targets in the December 29 bombings were the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef, and his son, Prince Mohammad bin Nayef. Bin Laden's statements also indicate that attempts are going to be made to raise the ante by striking more often at major government leaders and offices, and at Saudi oil facilities.

The fact remains, however, that Saudi counter terrorism capabilities are getting steadily better, Saudi intelligence and force effectiveness is increasing, and the number of experienced and capable cadres is thinning. Moreover, the charges by some outside commentators that the Royal family is divided and cannot cooperate have been proved wrong in the process. "Jointness" is as imperfect between the Saudi Ministry of Defense, the Saudi Ministry of Interior, and the Saudi National Guard as it is between elements of the US government. At the same time, "traditionalists" and "reformers" in the three agencies have all cooperated and developed specialized functions that allow them to support each other, rather than operating as rivals or in isolation.

What is equally important is that both the royal family and the Saudi government have shown they have "depth" in dealing with these issues. The sons of the ruling princes traditionally stay in the background in Saudi Arabia, but the sons of Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defense), and Prince Nayef have all proven to be highly competent in meeting Saudi Arabia's new security challenges. Moreover, the generation of officers under them has also proved to be capable of adapting to new security challenges, and has shown growing initiative and independence of action. Every element of the Saudi counter terrorism forces still needs improvement, and some improvement will take years even with the outside international support that Saudi Arabia is quietly receiving. The progress since May 2003, however, is still very impressive.
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Prince Nayef, in his opening speech at the counter terrorism conference, in Riyadh, summed up the Saudi counter terrorism experience:
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In the last two years, Saudi Arabia has witnessed 22 criminal incidents � including explosions, attacks, and kidnapping � causing the death of 90 citizens and foreign nationals and injuring 507 people. Thirty-nine security troops were martyred and 213 among them were injured, whereas 92 terrorists of this miscreant minority were killed and 17 of them wounded. Material losses in property and damage to facilities have exceeded 1 billion dollars. It is thanks to Allah�s grace and their alertness that the security forces have been able to foil a total of 52 terrorist operations in preemptive strikes that have thwarted the occurrence of any further loss in life or property.
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Saudi Arabia still has much to do in dealing with international cooperation, improving its controls over the flow of money in and out of the Kingdom, and working with the other countries� counter terrorism forces, as does every other country in the world. Saudi Arabia, however, did host 60 countries and international organizations in a conference on ways to improve international counter terrorism efforts in February.

The report of that conference is the only meaningful survey to date of operations for improving cooperation, it addresses new ways to fight terrorist financing in more depth that any other unclassified document available. Saudi Arabia emphasized the need to join in a global effort to create international terrorism centers as well as the need for reform to fight the causes of terrorism without equivocation. Interestingly enough, the supposed rivals within the Saudi royal family all cooperated in creating that conference. Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Nayef were the keynote speakers and Prince Saudi al Faisal, the Foreign Minister, chaired it.

Three other elements of the Saudi counter terrorism effort also deserve attention. The first is that the government has handled its efforts in ways that have made it clear it will not use brute force or repression, and that counter terrorism means attacking terrorists. Anyone who visits Saudi Arabia sees many signs of improved security, but also of a gradual, though sometimes faltering, willingness to open up the news media and allow popular debate over public policy. Elections move slowly, and educational reform moves too slowly, but progress is still there.
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In contrast, the Al Qa�ida extremists have used violence and extremist rhetoric in ways that have largely alienated the Saudi population as a whole. They find little support among Saudi Arabia's business community and educators. The bulk of the Saudi clergy, including its conservatives, see them as serious religious "deviants." There is no sign of popular protests or serious student support, or of more than the most marginal support within the security forces and military. Every class of Saudi society has some extremists and sympathizers, but the numbers are very few and far between.
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The second is that at least for the next few years, Saudi Arabia has had a flood of increased oil revenue that has combined with a major repatriation of capital once held in the US and Europe. The Saudi stock market is booming, and so is real estate. The benefits of these developments are being channeled to eliminate the recruitment pool for extremists, but jobs for young men and women are still a major issue. The government remains in a state of denial over the size of real and disguised unemployment, but things are changing and far more positively than anyone could have predicted in an era where 25 dollar oil seemed to be the ceiling and not the distant floor.
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Finally, for all of the talk about the often all too real problems in political reform, economic and social reform count just as much. The Saudi government has not wasted its new oil wealth. It has gone into reducing the debt, improving infrastructure, revamping health care, improving the educational system, and fostering job creation. These are more important underlying issues in today's Saudi Arabia than political reform, and more important underlying causes of terrorism. To judge progress in removing the causes of terrorism one has to follow the economic at least as much as follow the political reforms.
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None of this means that there still is not much to criticize. No nation in the world is making all of the progress it should in dealing with the threat of terrorism. The good news, however, is that Saudi Arabia is making very real progress and in a wide range of areas.

[Dr. Cordesman, writing with Nawaf Obaid, will soon release books on the Saudi security apparatus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran's military capabilities.]

About Anthony Cordesman

Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.

Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the 1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's representative on the Middle East Working Group.

Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff, working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in the Gulf and North Africa.

Essays by Dr. Cordesman "The Prospects for Stability in 2004 -- The Issue of Political, Economic and Social Reform," by Anthony H. Cordesman,  Saudi US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, Feb. 23, 2004 The 9/11 Commission Report: Strengths and Weaknesses," by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, Jul. 29, 2004 Developments in Iraq at the End of 2003:  Adapting U.S. Policy to Stay the Course," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 7, 2004 "Four Wars and Counting: Rethinking the Strategic Meaning of the Iraq War," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 5, 2003 "Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 18, 2003 "Saudi Redeployment of the F-15 to Tabuk," by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, November 1, 2003 "Iranian Security Threats and US Policy:  Finding the Proper Response," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, October 28, 2003 "What is Next in Iraq? Military Developments, Military Requirements and Armed Nation Building," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, August 22, 2003 "Saudi Government Counterterrorism - Counter Extremism Actions," by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-US Relations Information Service Item of Interest, August 4, 2003 "Saudi Arabia: Don't Let Bin Laden Win!", by Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi-American Forum Item of Interest, May 16, 2003 "Postwar Iraq: The New Old Middle East," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, April 16, 2003 "Iraq's Warfighting Strategy," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, March 11, 2003 "Reforming the Middle East: President  Bush's Neo-Con Logic Versus Regional Reality," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, February 27, 2003 "The Great Iraq Missile Mystery," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, February 26, 2003 "Iraq Security Roundtable at  CSFS: A Discussion With Dr. Anthony Cordesman," Center for Strategic and Future Studies, GulfWire Perspectives, January 28, 2003 "A Coalition of the Unwilling: Arms Control as an Extension of War By Other Means," By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 25, 2003 "Is Iraq In Material Breach? What Hans Blix, Colin Powell, And Jack Straw Actually Said," By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 20, 2002 "Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism And Terrorism," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, December 1, 2002 "Planning For A Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy To Reshape A Post-Saddam Iraq," by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 24, 2002 "The West And The Arab World - Partnership Or A 'Clash Of Civilizations?'" By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, November 12, 2002 "Strategy In The Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic Theory And Operational Reality," by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, October 22, 2002 "A Firsthand Look At Saudi Arabia Since 9-11," GulfWire's Interview With Dr. Anthony Cordesman In Saudi Arabia, GulfWire Perspectives October 10, 2002 "Escalating To Nowhere: The Israeli And Palestinian Strategic Failure," By Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, April 8, 2002 "Reforging The U.S. And Saudi Strategic Partnership," by Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, January 28, 2002