Regional Crises in the Context
of
Saudi-US Relations:
A Conversation with Flynt Leverett
Editor's
Note
We are pleased to bring you a SUSRIS interview with Dr. Flynt Leverett. He is Senior Fellow and Director of the Geopolitics of Energy Initiative in the
New America Foundation�s American Strategy Program. His previous service in government, as senior director for Middle East affairs at the
National Security
Council, Middle East expert on the Secretary of State�s Policy Planning Staff, and senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, provided him with a special perspective on America's role in the Middle East and its relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Dr. Leverett talked about the evolution of US-Saudi relations in recent year and the approach taken by Riyadh and Washington to the regional crises that require coordination and cooperation between these long-time security partners. Dr. Leverett spoke with SUSRIS by phone on January 23, 2007.
Flynt
Leverett, Senior Fellow and Director of the Geopolitics of Energy
Initiative in the New America Foundation�s American Strategy Program
It is critical for Americans to understand that the relationship with Saudi Arabia is the most important strategic relationship that the United States has in the region.
It is obviously important from a standpoint of energy security but it is also critically important in terms of being able to manage the challenges to US interests in the region.
It is really important that the United States work with the Saudis in a way that the collaboration is going to be genuinely productive because its going to be very hard, if not impossible, for the United States to meet its policy objectives in this part of the world without very close cooperation with the
Kingdom.
Dr. Flynt Leverett
Regional Crises in the Context of Saudi-US Relations
A Conversation with Flynt Leverett
SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time with us today to discuss Middle East regional issues from the perspective of the Saudi-US relationship. Let�s start with an overview of where we�ve been in recent years and then we�ll turn to the current situation.
Most of the conversations regarding US-Saudi relations in recent years were focused on 9-11 and its aftermath -- the number of Saudi citizens involved, Osama bin Laden, charges of continued support for extremists and so forth. In April 2005
President Bush hosted King Abdullah for a second visit to the ranch at Crawford and this seemed to signal a shift from that post 9-11 period to a cooperative approach to bilateral issues. There were positive assessments of joint initiatives, such as in the war on terror, and there was the initiation of a formal
Strategic
Dialogue. Then last summer we were occupied with the situation in
Lebanon. Saudi Arabia played a role there. They were very vocal in condemning Hezbollah and external interference but at the same time they were also
critical of the United States for its unblinking support of Israel despite the heavy-handed scope of its military strikes in Lebanon. Can you give us your assessment on where the Washington and Riyadh relationship has been in recent years?
DR. FLYNT LEVERETT: I think you�re exactly right that even before the Bush Administration came to office and before the 9-11 attacks you had seen signs of genuine disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the Clinton Administration over a host of regional issues. How to deal with Iraq? How to deal with Iran? The Saudis not being very enthusiastic about the Clinton Administration�s dual containment policy.
To some degree when the Bush administration took office they anticipated they would be dealing with an American Administration that would be more on the same page with them about how to deal with these various regional security challenges.
Instead, in the post 9-11 period they got an Administration that was, if anything, far more problematic from the Saudi standpoint in terms of how this Administration wanted to deal with the region. I think that the Iraq war has been almost disastrous from a Saudi perspective. It has completely upset the balance of power in the Gulf. It enabled Iran�s rise. It created a dynamic in post Saddam Iraq where the most powerful political forces are Islamist Shia with ties to Iran.
In other parts of the region the Administration pushed really hard after Hariri was assassinated to get Syrian troops out of Lebanon and to try to destabilize the Assad regime. This has really only had the effect of empowering Hezbollah to become an even more dominant player in Lebanese politics and gain greater standing within the region.
It also plays into Iran�s rise and also works against Saudi interests in the region. The Administration continues, from the Saudi perspective, to disregard the importance of the Palestinian issue in the region, notwithstanding the Saudi efforts to try to make sure everyone understand that the Saudi Peace Initiative that was endorsed by the Arab League in 2002 is still on the table. The Saudis want to move in that direction.
The regional security environment has gotten worse, from a Saudi standpoint, in no small part as a consequence of US policy decisions. These were decisions by the Saudis� traditional security partner. I think this is creating real security and foreign policy challenges for the Saudis.
SUSRIS: Give us a broader perspective on the scope and nature of the changes in the strategic dynamic in the region.
LEVERETT: I think it has several dimensions. One is just a classical balance of power. The Saudis have always attached a lot of importance to Iraq acting as a �balancer� to Iran in the Gulf. It was really the only Arab state that had the strategic potential to play that role. The Saudis have always thought that was an appropriate role for Iraq, and with the US invasion to overthrow Saddam you have completely taken Iraq out of that traditional role. It provides a tremendous strategic opening to Iran.
Then, as I said, you have overturned the traditional balance of power inside Iraq where you had Sunni elites in charge for many decades, and now because you have unseated those Sunni elites and instituted a more participatory kind of politics in Iraq the Shia are on the rise. They are 60% of Iraq�s population and the Islamist Shia forces have emerged by far as the most powerful political players in that community. Iran has considerable influence over ties to all of the major players in Shia politics right now, which gives them considerable advantage and influence on the ground, inside Iraq and that also provides them with a strategic opening.
If you look at the way that Hezbollah has emerged as such an important political force, not just a paramilitary force but a political force, in Lebanon since the Syrians, when Hariri was assassinated and the Syrians withdrew their troops, this has also helped to put Iran in a very influential position in Lebanon. It is problematic to the Saudis because, certainly since the
Taif agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1989, the Saudis have seen themselves as the principal external player, the people who brokered the agreement, the people who were supporting reconstruction, all of this. Now Saudi Arabia is pitted in a competition for influence in Lebanon in ways that are problematic for the Kingdom. So you know Iran�s rise is a multi-faceted thing.
I throw in another dimension, which is important -- this has become more of a factor since Ahmadinejad was elected President in Iran. Ahmadinejad has proven very effective in playing to the Arab street, not just Shia Arabs but Sunni Arabs. You know he has been able to make the Iranian foreign policy agenda resistant to Israel, resistant to US influence in the region. He has been able to pitch that as a kind of pan-Muslim, pan-Islamic agenda in ways that it has real appeal to publics in the Arab world, including it would seem from this summer, including in the kingdom. This is something that is also very problematic for the Saudi regime, that US policy is not just empowering Iran, but it is also enabling Iran to conduct, if you will, public diplomacy against the United States, which further complicates the strategic challenge facing Saudi leaders right now.
SUSRIS: How do you read the confluence of interest between Saudi Arabia and Israel regarding Iranian influence?
LEVERETT: I wouldn�t want to overstate that. I think that, yes to some degree, both Israeli interests in the region and Saudi interests in the region are challenged by the rise of Iran in the way I described it to you. But I think that in terms of the broader picture of Saudi foreign policy there are limits to how far that overlap of interest can go.
For the Saudis the Palestinian issue remains a major concern. Without significant progress on the Palestinian issue I think that�s going to put very, very severe limits on any possibilities for indirect, much less direct Saudi-Israeli cooperation. I think that the Saudi Peace Initiative makes it very clear that the Saudis have acknowledged that when peace comes Saudi Arabia is going to be prepared to recognize Israel, full diplomatic relations and all that. In the meantime as long as the Palestinian issue is stalled, as it is, I think that is going to put some real limits on the potential for Israel and Saudi Arabia cooperating in any active sense.
SUSRIS: Can you help us sort out the stories from last November that Saudi Arabia would intervene in Iraq on behalf of the Sunnis if the US withdrew precipitously?
LEVERETT: I don�t know what the blow by blow is on Nawaf Obaid�s op-ed or
Prince Turki�s
resignation, but if you stand back and look at the picture, what it says to me is that there is a very, very deep concern in the leadership, first of all about the direction of US policy on Iraq. The Saudis were very concerned when
Cheney went to Riyadh -- this was all in the run up to the
Baker-Hamilton study
group. There was a lot of discussion mounting in the United States about withdrawing forces, redeploying, drawing down, and I think the Saudis were very concerned about the consequences of the United States walking away from Iraq.
The US invasion of Iraq created enormous problems for the Saudis as I said, but at the same time I think the Saudis believe that for the United States simply to withdraw precipitously would make those problems much worse. I think the Saudis were in various ways, both in direct conversations with senior officials like Vice President Cheney and perhaps through channels like the
Washington Post op
ed, were conveying to official Washington �this is a big problem for us and if you go down this road of withdrawal or walking away from Iraq, US interests will suffer some very bad consequences.�
I think the other level of concern reflected is concern about the broader regional picture. As I said I think the regional environment is more problematic from the Saudi standpoint than it has been in a long time. It wouldn�t surprise me if there was an internal debate or policy discussion going on at high levels in the Kingdom over how best to respond to the rise of Iran, and how to work with the US on how to contain that rise. And it wouldn�t surprise me if some parts of the leadership might be arguing for a more coercive approach and some might be arguing for an approach that emphasized trying to resolve and manage Iran�s rise through diplomatic means.
SUSRIS: We�re now seeing a buildup of US military assets in the Gulf for possible use in dealing with Iran. Saudi Arabia clearly shares the perspective of the US that growing Iranian power in the Gulf and the region is a problem, but when it comes to how to deal with the problem especially in the case of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program there seems to be a divergence of opinion. Can you help us understand where we are heading -- in terms of the US Saudi relationship -- in how to deal with Iran especially regarding the nuclear enrichment program and the possible US military response?
LEVERETT: I think you�re right that there are a lot of reservations in the Kingdom and I think it is entirely justified about the wisdom of US military strikes on Iran. I�m someone who�s argued for a long time, from an American perspective, that I think that course of action would be disastrous for US interests in the region and I can understand why there would be concern about that from the Saudi perspective.
A senior Saudi prince said to me recently that you could say there are two ways of trying to deal with the Iranian nuclear issues. One is you try to use military force to stop it or delay it and the other is you use diplomacy to try to come up with some kind of settlement regarding Iran�s place in the region that would give Iran incentives to sign on to strategically significant restraints on its nuclear activities. Both paths are very, very uncertain. There are no guarantees of success with either. But if you look at all the collateral damage, all the regional fallout that would come from going down the military road, this senior prince suggested to me that it was probably more prudent to go down the diplomatic road. We will see.
I think that if the United States were to engage in military action against Iran it would, in the end, be very difficult for Saudi Arabia or for other traditional allies of the US in the Gulf to support that. I think that the risk of blowback to those states from Iran, the risk of popular opposition to the move, I think it�s going to be very difficult for our traditional security partners in the region to support the United States using military force against Iran at least any time soon.
SUSRIS: Leaders in the Gulf see that US public opinion is against what is happening in Iraq and they probably wouldn�t have much of a sense that the United States would be a reliable long-term partner after any action against Iran. What is your view?
LEVERETT: Yes, the Saudis are well aware of that. They follow very closely what goes on in American politics and I think they understand American politics at a high level of detail. I think you�re right that this has been a mounting concern for the Saudis over the last year, that the political mood here in the United States would turn against sustaining American involvement in Iraq and the US would begin to withdraw prematurely from the Saudi standpoint and that would just make the problems that the Saudis are facing now, it would just make those problems worse.
SUSRIS: Lastly, what should Americans understand about the US-Saudi relationship in dealing with the crises in the region.
LEVERETT: I think, particularly since 9-11, there has been a lot of demonization of the Saudis in the United States in popular culture, and in elite discussions about politics and foreign policy.
It is critical for Americans to understand that the relationship with Saudi Arabia is the most important strategic relationship that the United States has in the region.
It is obviously important from a standpoint of energy security but it is also critically important in terms of being able to manage the challenges to US interests in the region. It is really important that the United States work with the Saudis in a way that the collaboration is going to be genuinely productive because its going to be very hard, if not impossible, for the United States to meet its policy objectives in this part of the world without very close cooperation with the Kingdom.
SUSRIS: Thank you for your time today.
LEVERETT: Okay, glad to do it. Thank you.
ABOUT FLYNT LEVERETT
Flynt Leverett is Senior Fellow and Director of the Geopolitics of Energy Initiative in the New America Foundation�s American Strategy Program. He is also a visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
From 1992 to 2003, Dr. Leverett had a distinguished career in government, serving as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council, Middle East expert on the Secretary of State�s Policy Planning Staff, and senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. Since leaving government, he has written important articles and Op Eds on global energy affairs for leading newspapers and journals, including The Financial Times, The New York Times, The Washington Quarterly, and The National Interest. Additionally, Dr. Leverett is the author of
Inheriting Syria: Bashar�s Trial By
Fire, a much acclaimed 2005 book on politics and policymaking in Syria that also offers recommendations for U.S. policy toward this critical country. He has published numerous Op Eds and articles on Middle Eastern and other international issues in outstanding newspapers and journals and appeared on a wide range of news and public affairs programs, as well as The Daily Show With Jon Stewart. Dr. Leverett speaks regularly on Middle Eastern and global energy issues in prominent fora in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and before distinguished business audiences. He holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Flynt
Leverett is Senior Fellow and Director of the Geopolitics of
Energy Initiative in the New America Foundation�s American
Strategy Program.He
is also a visiting professor of political science at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
From
1992 to 2003, Dr. Leverett had a distinguished career in
government, serving as senior
director for Middle East affairs at the National
Security Council, Middle East expert on the Secretary of
State�s Policy Planning Staff, and senior analyst at the Central
Intelligence Agency. Since leaving government, he has
written important articles and Op Eds on global energy affairs for
leading newspapers and journals, including The
Financial Times, The New
York Times, The Washington Quarterly, and The
National Interest.Additionally, Dr. Leverett is the author of Inheriting
Syria: Bashar�s Trial By Fire, a much acclaimed
2005 book on politics and policymaking in Syria that also offers
recommendations for U.S. policy toward this critical country.He has published numerous Op Eds and articles on Middle
Eastern and other international issues in outstanding newspapers
and journals and appeared on a wide range of news and public
affairs programs, as well as The Daily Show With Jon Stewart.
Dr. Leverett speaks regularly on Middle Eastern and global energy
issues in prominent fora in the United States, Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia, and before distinguished business audiences.
He holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and is a
life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Most of the conversations regarding US-Saudi relations in recent years were focused on 9-11 and its aftermath -- the number of Saudi citizens involved, Osama bin Laden, charges of continued support for extremists and so forth. In April 2005
To some degree when the Bush administration took office they anticipated they would be dealing with an American Administration that would be more on the same page with them about how to deal with these various regional security challenges.
