Let's get to know the Saudis
Lee Hamilton
The U.S.-Saudi Arabian relationship has long been important,
sensitive and opaque. Over the last few months, it has also
been tested by a newly assertive Saudi Arabia.
A simple deal has driven U.S.-Saudi relations for decades:
The Saudis provide access to affordable oil; the United
States provides security for the Saudi royal family. Yet
tensions intrude upon this marriage of convenience.
Americans have questioned Saudi Arabia's autocratic
government, opposition to Israel and financial support for
radical Islam. The Saudis have chafed at our lectures on
democracy, support for Israel and the war in Iraq.
Lately, Saudi King Abdullah has shown a surprising
willingness to go his own way. The
Saudis brokered a cease-fire between Palestinian
factions that the U.S. saw as too favorable to Hamas, a
group we have targeted for isolation. King Abdullah in turn
called for an end to the isolation of Hamas. He also renewed
a
2002 Saudi initiative for an Israeli-Palestinian peace
based on Arab recognition of Israel in return for a
Palestinian state based on Israel's 1967 borders.
King Abdullah has been even more direct in challenging the
United States.
Speaking to a conference of the Arab League, he
declared: "In the beloved Iraq, the bloodshed is continuing
under an illegal foreign occupation and detestable
sectarianism." In the Middle East, where opposition to
America is at unprecedented levels, these moves went over
well.
The irony is that the United States has pressed the Saudis
to be more assertive. For months, Bush administration
officials have spoken of a realignment in the Middle East in
which "moderate Arab states" like Saudi Arabia worry more
about a rising Iran than Israel. Yet while the Saudis are
very concerned about Iran's growing influence and nuclear
program,
King Abdullah has hosted talks with Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and spoken out against the prospect of a
U.S. attack on Iran.
The reality is that the Saudis see many things differently
from the Bush administration. They don't want the
Palestinians to descend into civil war, but they do see
Hamas as a legitimate player in Palestinian politics. They
don't want us to pull out of Iraq immediately, but they do
want us to do more to protect Sunni Arabs from Shiite
militias. They don't want a nuclear Iran next door, but they
are open to engagement with Iran and groups like Hezbollah.
The Saudis want to maintain close ties with the U.S. and
certainly want our military presence to provide stability in
the region, but they also appear to be looking for other
ways to advance their interests.
In the United States, we should be doing our own
re-evaluation. We do have a significant interest in the
stability of the Saudi kingdom, principally because its oil
is enormously important to the health of our economy. But
Saudi Arabia is not a moderate Arab state -- it is an
autocracy. While it has cooperated in the war on terror, it
denies its people political and economic opportunity. It is
no coincidence that 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were
Saudis angry at their government, angry at the United States
and ensnared by radical Islam. Yet while we press the Saudis
to cooperate on counter-terrorism, we do not press them to
liberalize their political and economic system.
We should not push for dramatic and potentially
destabilizing change, nor should we reduce our commitment to
the security of Saudi Arabia. But we should press for
pragmatic reform so that the seeds of civil society, greater
economic equality and political participation have the
opportunity to grow. We should also pursue an energy policy
that reduces our dependence on foreign oil and gas. Here,
too, we cannot expect miracles. But we can move boldly in
the direction of energy independence. Over time, these
threads can complement our commitment to stability and lead
to a more mature relationship.
At a time when America's standing in the Middle East is
shaken, it is not surprising that the Saudis are defining
their interests as they see them, not as we do. We should
use this occasion to better understand Saudi concerns, and
to move toward a relationship that is deeper and more
sustainable than the simple deal that has defined U.S.-Saudi
relations all these years.
About Lee Hamilton, President and Director, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars
What is the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars?
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established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington,
D.C. It is a nonpartisan institution, supported by public and
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