Editor's Note:

Each fall the National Council on US-Arab Relations brings together a distinguished group of diplomats, government officials, business people, military officials, scholars and others to tackle the thorny issues surrounding US-Arab relations. SUSRIS has provided AUSPC speakers' remarks, which touch on the Saudi-US relationship, to you for over the last five years. In keeping with that practice we again provide for your consideration a collection of AUSPC presentations. 

Today we present the remarks of Wayne White, an Adjunct Scholar with Washington's Middle East Institute. Mr. White was joined on the Iran-Iraq panel by Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Gen Joseph Hoar and Dr. Kenneth Katzman. Their remarks will be provided separately. The panel was introduced by Dr. John Duke Anthony, President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

Additional AUSPC sessions which address U.S. and Saudi issues will be provided by SUSRIS in the coming days.

17th ANNUAL ARAB-U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE
"Transitioning the White House: Challenges and Opportunities for Arab-U.S. Relations"
October 30-31, 2008 | Washington, DC

GEO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS: IRAN AND IRAQ

Chair: Dr. John Duke Anthony
Speakers:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.)
Gen. Joseph P. Hoar (USMC Ret.)
Mr. Wayne White
Dr. Kenneth Katzman

Challenges in Transition
Wayne White

[WAYNE WHITE] Thanks John Duke. One thing I'd like to say is thanks for putting together such a terrific conference. These things are worth it. This is my second time and I'm very glad to be invited and I'd also like to thank the support staff that works with you for doing such a terrific job bringing the speakers together and taking care of our needs. 

In the tradition of my State Department alma mater which is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, I'm going to try to be realistic and in at least one instance out of the box. With that in mind, I'll get into this. 

On Iraq, I think it's clear from the intense wrangling over the U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, the SOFA, or a memorandum of understanding, or whatever title this agreement will eventually bear in recent months that Iraqis want the American role in Iraq to be reduced quite considerably. Since this is likely to occur regardless of what Washington wants or doesn't want, it's best for all concerned on the American side to get used to the idea that for better or worse, the Iraqis will be progressively taking over at a pace far faster than would have been anticipated just six months ago.

I say this because forces in Iraq opposed to even the current revised agreement for U.S. troop presence beyond December 31, are broad-based, reflecting high levels of opposition to occupation among large numbers of Arab Iraqis. We even detected back in 2003 in polling from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that a vast majority of Shia at the beginning of the occupation opposed occupation, but were essentially playing along in order to benefit from the democratic process that would presumably, demographically usher them into power. So our welcome there has always been somewhat tenuous. 

I cannot predict the likely result of the final face-off over this draft agreement, but already the Iraqi side has used it to considerably erode U.S. situational control beyond December 31 in a variety of ways. In fact, in order to survive politically, Iraqi politicians like Prime Minister Maliki are now competing on the basis of the extent they stand up to U.S. demands, affecting anything related to perceived or real Iraqi sovereignty, quote, unquote. 

As a result of U.S. declarations that there can be no more changes in the draft, or even threats that without an agreement, come January, the U.S. would cease aspects of its military support in Iraq, this has only further inflamed those elements opposed to even the most recent draft inside of Iraq. And whatever the reason for the attack into Syria so recently, it has greatly increased demands for a ban on all U.S. attacks from Iraq against neighboring states, which just happened to be a preexisting Iraqi demand related to the existing draft.

Quite a number of Iraqis believe their country would be less fraught with violence were the U.S. to leave. I, like General Scowcroft, am more skeptical, at least in the near term. Additionally, I believe the Maliki government is overconfident, underestimating the extent to which its gains on the ground this year were due almost exclusively to the Iraqi Army, and not inconsiderably because of robust U.S. air and ground support, or a threat of same in backing up the Iraqi Army, not the Iraqi government per se. 

Meanwhile, the government itself, the civilian government, remains deeply corrupt at the local level, often quite dysfunctional, and still somewhat alienated from the general population. In addition, anecdotal reports suggest a number of Iraqis regard the government as illegitimate, since it is viewed by some quarters as a government formed under American occupation, an attitude certainly not made any better by various failures in performance on the part of the government. 

Nonetheless, regardless of my fear that there is a significant chance for a rebound in violence as the U.S. reduces its presence, Washington has no choice but to bow to the wishes of the host government, in this case fairly solidly backed by most Arab Iraqis. In that respect, regarding my concerns and concerns of others about the potential for resumed violence, I can only hope that my fears are very much misplaced. If they are not, however, not only will there be considerable suffering on the part of the Iraqis, but recent U.S. claims of success in Iraq would ring pretty hollow. 

On Iran, I'd like to address only one issue. A recommendation for those who fear or believe that Iran is in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, or growing close to attaining it, or keeping that open as an option related to its nuclear enrichment cycle. For the purpose of argument, lets assume Iran does have a nuclear weapons effort embedded in its nuclear power program, or intends its nuclear power program to be used for that purpose at some point. Such an assumption automatically would lead many toward dramatic options aimed at taking out or slowing the Iranian nuclear program, especially enrichment through military action at some point in time. 

However I hardly think that even the current Iranian regime would be so incredibly foolish as to attempt an eventual nuclear strike against Israel, only to receive in return with utter certainty, a far more devastating nuclear counterpunch from Israel's own vast nuclear arsenal. 

Therefore, even if Iran does seek nuclear weapons, the chance of this happening probably is down near one percent. Quite a number of Israelis would be unhappy, to say the least, living even with that small chance of such a horrific scenario. However, quite frankly I'm not Israeli, and I must look at this through an American lens, and in keeping with American national interests. 

I do oppose of course the proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, and I support all diplomatic efforts, and far more robust than the ones we've seen today. I also am not unconcerned about the potential nuclear domino effect mentioned by General Scowcroft. I think that is quite serious. 

Nonetheless, I also know how futile efforts to stop determined and properly endowed nations from going that route have proven in a number of cases in the past, such as right next door, Pakistan. Military action to take out or severely damage Iran's nuclear program could well initiate a serious crisis in the Persian Gulf region, possibly rather prolonged, one that will be destabilizing and one that would certainly among other things, many other things, cause global energy prices to rebound dramatically. 

Following the torturous Iraq saga, it is time to stop looking to forward leaning military solutions to challenges in this already very battered region. Frankly, amidst the current world financial meltdown among other things, the U.S. simply cannot afford the potential consequences of military action against Iran. And for different reasons, neither can the region. In essence, in this case the proverbial cure, military action, probably would be far worse than a disease, the presumed effort to begin simply learning how to live with a nuclear Iran. Thank you very much.

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Read more from this panel, including the Q&A, in the transcript posted at:
http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/fact-book/special-sections/2008/auspc/iran-iraq.html

Source: Arab-US Policymakers Conference Web Site (AUSPC 2008)
http://www.auspc.org

Transcription Services by Ryan & Associates