Editor's Note:

Each fall the National Council on US-Arab Relations brings together a distinguished group of diplomats, government officials, business people, military officials, scholars and others to tackle the thorny issues surrounding US-Arab relations. SUSRIS has provided AUSPC speakers' remarks, which touch on the Saudi-US relationship, to you for over the last five years. In keeping with that practice we again provide for your consideration a collection of AUSPC presentations. 

Today we present the remarks of Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Senior Middle East Analyst for the U.S. Congress. During 1996 and between July 2001-March 2002, he was assigned to the Majority Staff of the House International Relations Committee to work on Middle East issues. Between 1985-1989, he served as an analyst for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, where he was tasked with preparing written reports for U.S. Middle East policymakers on leadership dynamics in Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf states, and with briefing senior U.S. officials. He has also written numerous articles in various outside publications, including "The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard," and papers on the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States ("Rumsfeld Commission") in 1988. During 2004, Dr. Katzman was a consultant to CBS News on Al Qaeda and related Islamic extremist groups. He is quoted frequently on the Persian Gulf in the U.S. press and appears frequently on Middle Eastern news stations including Alam TV, Al Hurra, Al Arabiyya, LBC, and Al Akhbariya

Dr. Katzman was joined on the panel by Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Wayne White and Gen. Joseph P. Hoar. Their remarks will be provided separately. The panel was introduced by Dr. John Duke Anthony, President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.

Additional AUSPC sessions which address U.S. and Saudi issues will be provided by SUSRIS in the coming days.

17th ANNUAL ARAB-U.S. POLICYMAKERS CONFERENCE
�Transitioning the White House: Challenges and Opportunities for Arab-U.S. Relations�
October 30-31, 2008 | Washington, DC

Iran Capturing Iraq
Dr. Kenneth Katzman

[DR. JOHN DUKE ANTHONY] We now have Dr. Kenneth Katzman who�s the senior specialist, writing reports and advising members of Congress on issues pertaining to Iran, Iraq, Arab-Israeli conflict, and other transnational issues. He�s prolific in the voluminous reports that he prepares that are accessable to people engaged in foreign affairs, policy analysts, policy makers, and policy implementers. Dr. Katzman.

[KATZMAN] Thank you John, and thank you for having me again. I always enjoy speaking before these great conferences. And Happy Halloween everybody.

In regards to Sheika Lubna�s great speech at lunch, Iran is a neighbor of the UAE. It�s a neighbor that�s sitting on three islands owned by the UAE, but it is a neighbor to the UAE, that�s correct. 

The title of my talk today, and I have a few extra copies, is called �Iran Capturing Iraq.� �Iran capturing Iraq.� 

I�ve been asked to address Iran�s influence in Iraq. With the conventional military and WMD threat from Saddam removed, Iran now seeks to insure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran, whether U.S. forces are in Iraq or not. I used to ask, with panels like this, two years ago, I would ask my peers on the panel does Iran want the United States in Iraq or do they want us out of Iraq? And the answer that would universally be given two years ago is both, or neither. 

Well now I think the answer is becoming clear, clearer. Having secured Shia control over Iraq, Iran now -- they were ambivalent two years ago until Shia control was consolidated -- now that it is consolidated, Iran wants the United States out of Iraq. I think that�s becoming clearer. By supporting Shia factions, Iran�s influence in Iraq has at times hindered U.S. stabilization efforts and has heightened the threat of U.S. perception threat of Iran generally. 

However, Iran is now itself facing difficult choices because its Shia prot�g�s in Iraq are now at odds with each other. This even Iran did not expect. During 2003 to 2005, Iran calculated that it suited its interests to support the entry of Shiite Islamic factions into a U.S. led election process, because the overwhelming majority of Shia, numerical majority, would produce a Shia government, which is exactly what happened. 

Iran in fact helped assemble the Shia Islamic block called the United Iraqi Alliance, which includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Dawa Party, and the faction of Muqtada al Sadr. A senior Dawa leader is Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki. Several leaders of the Supreme Council control other positions. The Sadr faction�s ties to Iran were initially limited after the fall of Saddam because Sadr�s family was not in exile in Iran or elsewhere. Sadr�s family was still in Iraq, and his ties to the Iranian leadership were not formed really at all. 

It�s only later that Iran, when Iran started to really reach out to Muqtada al Sadr when they saw that Sadr had his Mahdi Army, which I�ll call the J Shah Mahdi or JAM. It was becoming a powerful force and Iran said that this is a force that we cannot ignore. We need to place some bets also on this group. And Iran began supplying arms to the JAM through the Quds force, the export of the revolution force of the revolutionary guard, which it�s the unit that goes abroad. It started really as the unit that helped form Hezbollah�s militia. And it evolved to a sort of a force that goes abroad and helps Shia movements, not only Shia, but movements outside of Iran. 

What happened though was Iran�s strategy, which was going so well, actually tripped up Iran in 2007. Why is that? Because the United States, President Bush, decided on the troop surge. And he told Prime Minister Maliki we are going to help stabilize this deteriorating situation, but in exchange you must allow us to go after Sadr and the JAM. Maliki really had no viable choice other than to say okay. And what happened was the United States, the troop surge forces, started going after the JAM. And what happened, Sadr broke with Maliki, the alliance unraveled, Sadr pulled out of the United Iraqi Alliance, he pulled his five ministers out of the cabinet, and we began getting battling between the JAM and the government forces, Shia dominated government forces throughout southern Iraq.

It is primarily Iran�s arming and training of the JAM that has added to U.S./Iran tensions over Iran�s nuclear program and broader regional influence. And I, where I may differ with Wayne, is that the key threat from an Iranian nuclear program is not necessarily that Iran is going to attack Israel or use the nuclear weapon, the threat is that Iran will be emboldened because no one will be able to retaliate against Iran. It will be emboldened to further all the aggressive policies in the region that Iran has been pursuing. That�s the key, I think, drawback to a nuclear Iran. 

We have of course specific evidence that Iran is shipping numerous types of weapons to the JAM. General Petraeus has testified to this, and we now have some of these JAM elements consolidating it to what�s called special companies or special groups. Some call them rogue breakaways of the JAM. I happen to consider them still JAM, who are still simply continuing radical activity. 

And so I described this break between Maliki and Sadr. Now provincial elections are scheduled in Iraq for early 2009. And Maliki in advance of that wants to suppress the strength of the Sadr faction, and this I think explains why he launched his offensive on Basra against the JAM in 2008, and I totally concur with Wayne that part of the reason the government forces did gain the upper hand was not their own ability but really Petraeus and the U.S. military and the British military supporting them. I think had that not happened, the Iraqi, the ISF was very close to fracturing in Basra and would�ve had to retreat in humiliation. 

So Sadr seeing what�s going on has now tried to retrench and is bringing in the JAM and saying they will do political, social, and cultural work. Some U.S. commanders say they�ve gone to Iran; they�re waiting to come back. Some are maybe coming back, trying to influence perhaps the elections, the provincial elections. 

Now, how is Iran consolidating? You know, to head a lot of this off, the United States decided actually on direct talks with Iran. This was unprecedented. The United States since the revolution had not really had direct talks but we�ve had them in Baghdad with Iranian representatives. And those seem to be not making too much progress but at least they were on going. Now in May, Iran seeing that it is basically consolidated control of its prot�g�s in Iraq has said we will not attend these talks anymore. And I think this reflects Iran�s growing confidence in its position in Iraq that it no longer feels it has to talk to Ambassador Crocker. 

Iran has also exploited its close ties to build broad political and economic influence. Iran has pumped lots of loans into Iraq. We�ve had at least two increments of one billion dollars each in credits extended. And not only is Iran doing development work in the south, it�s also doing development work up in the north with the Kurds in the Kurdish area, building roads and doing construction. So Iran is not just pursuing a Shia only strategy, a Shia Arab only strategy, it is also pursuing to some extent a north-south strategy in expanding its tentacles inside Iraq. 

Now the big test is the U.S./Iraq strategic pact and I think it is clear from this Iran wants us out of Iraq. Iran is working overtime to scotch the pact entirely. Iran is making a lot of progress to do that. They stiffened the resolve of Maliki and his allies to insist on a timetable for U.S. withdrawal on that pact. President Bush acceded to that request, to that demand really. But now even that is not enough. Iran continues to try to pressure various parliamentarians. General Odierno said Iran is trying to bribe Iraqi parliamentarians to vote against the pact if it gets to the Parliament. And Iran is also continuing to help the Sadr faction, which is going against the pact on the street level, with regular demonstrations against the pact every week.  So Iran is really using all its leverage to try to scotch the U.S./Iraq Strategic Pact. And this is because Iran does not want Iraq to serve as a potential aircraft carrier for a U.S. potential strike, not that any strike is imminent or going to happen, but Iran wants to make sure that the United States does not capture Iraq. Iran feels that it has captured Iraq, the title of my talk, and it is continuing to tighten that grip and the Arab-Persian differences that many said would cause the two to split apart have not materialized. Maliki has visited Iran three times. He has invited Ahmadinejad to visit, who visited in March. And all the signs are that Iran is increasingly tightening its grip over Iraq. Thank you.

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Arab-US Policymakers Conference (AUSPC 2008)

Transcription Services by Ryan & Associates

About Dr. Kenneth Katzman

As a specialist with the Congressional Research Service, Dr. Katzman serves as Senior Middle East Analyst for the U.S. Congress, with special emphasis on Iran, Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, and terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia. He provides reports and briefings to Members of Congress and their staffs on U.S. policy and legislation on these countries and issues. He has also written numerous articles in various outside publications, including The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard, and given numerous official presentations and briefings at conferences and in bilateral meetings throughout the Islamic world. During 1996 and July 2001-March 2002, he was assigned to the Majority Staff of the House International Relations Committee to work on Middle East issues, including hearings and legislation. 

Among other major publications, Dr. Katzman wrote working papers on the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States ("Rumsfeld Commission") in 1988. In late 1999, the Atlantic Council published his study, U.S.-Iran Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations. Dr. Katzman is quoted frequently on the Persian Gulf in the U.S. press and he appears frequently on Middle Eastern news stations including Alam TV, Al Hurra, Al Arabiyya, LBC, and Al Akhbariya. During 2004, he was a consultant to CBS News on Al Qaeda and related Islamic extremist groups. 

Dr. Katzman holds a PhD in Political Science from New York University, 1991. His dissertation was on �Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Radical Ideology Despite Institutionalization in the Islamic Republic.� From 1989 to 1991, he was an analyst for Defense Systems, Inc., in McLean, Virginia, where he wrote analyses for clients in the defense and policy analysis community. Among these projects were those focused on military and security forces in Afghanistan, Saddam Husayn's intentions, and the combat effectiveness of several Middle Eastern military forces. During 1985-1989, he served as an analyst for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, where he was tasked with preparing written reports for U.S. Middle East policymakers on leadership dynamics in Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf states, and with briefing senior U.S. officials.

For more information: www.loc.gov/crsinfo/

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