From the History of U.S.-Saudi Relations

Oral History Interview with Nicholas G. Thacher
Consular Embassy for the American Embassy, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1962-65

[The following is an excerpt from Mr. Thacher's oral history interview.]

Niel M. Johnson, interviewer: If Truman had been elected, or decided to run, and had been elected President in 1952, do you think there would have been a SEATO and a Middle East Treaty Organization? Do you think that regardless of who was President, whether it was Republican or Democratic, there would have been these alliances, these two alliances in Asia and the Middle East?

Nicholas G. Thacher, served Consular Embassy for the American Embassy, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 1962-65: I think we would have done something. I think because of these factors I've mentioned two or three times. The collective impact of those factors, that there would undoubtedly have been some sort of effort to establish a Middle East defense organization under either a Democratic or a Republican administration. Perhaps it might have been just an understanding among the Western powers that this was a problem and we must plan for it or it could have been was the kind of thing we had with Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Morocco. These were quiet understandings that we were on their side, if they might need our help. We gave them military assistance. People don't know it, but during the Yemen civil war the Egyptians were attacking Yemen and overflying Saudi Arabia in 1964 and we sent a squadron of 12 U.S. Air Force F-100 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. We put six of them in Dhahran, the Persian Gulf side and we put six over on the Red Sea side at Jeddah. When I was Charge' d 'Affaires at Jeddah I had my own air force, you might say, of six planes.

Johnson : Who was that under?

Thacher : President Kennedy. It was along in the spring of '64, and the Saudis were deathly afraid of Nasser and deathly afraid of having him establish a strong foothold in Yemen to the south of them. They said, "Come on, do something for us."

We had a destroyer visit Jeddah every month, and then we had these six planes come in. They [Saudi Arabian officials] came to me one day, and said, "They're overflying us, and they've dropped bombs along our border with Yemen, the Egyptians have. What will you do for us? Send some of your planes down there."

So, I sent a message to Washington concerning the limits that we had set as to where the F-100s would go. I got no answer, and the Minister of Defense kept calling me up and saying, "When are you going to do something?" So, finally I got together with the Navy commander. They were Air Force planes, but they were under the charge of a Naval Air Officer. I said, "Well, what can we do?" He said, "Well, let's just put them in the air and send them down in that direction without letting them get very close to the Yemen-Saudi border."

Then I informed Washington, and I never got any answer; I never got any criticism. So, this military maneuver was successful and it satisfied the Saudis. You know, they were looking for some gesture of support by the United States, and putting these planes in the air and having them go down and fly around no closer than 150 miles to the Yemen border and come back seemed to be adequate. I never had any confirmation that the Egyptians noticed the flight of our planes or were deterred by it.

Johnson : Was that the most important policy decision that you ever made?

Thacher : Well, I don't know.

Johnson : It sounds like it was.

Click here to read the complete transcript of Mr. Thacher's oral history interview.

Source:  Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum

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